# **Decoupled Alignment for Robust Plug-and-Play Adaptation**

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#### Content Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language.

We introduce a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning large language models (LLMs) without the need for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Our main idea is to exploit knowledge distillation to extract the alignment information from existing well-aligned LLMs and integrate it into unaligned LLMs in a plug-and-play fashion. Methodology, we employ delta debugging to identify the critical components of knowledge necessary for effective distillation. On the harmful question dataset, our method significantly enhances the average defense success rate by approximately 14.41%, reaching as high as 51.39%, in 17 unaligned pre-trained LLMs, without compromising performance.

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## 1 Introduction

We introduce **D**ecoupled **A**lignment for Robust **P**lug-and-Play **A**daptation (termed DAPA), a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning large language models (LLMs). DAPA aligns unaligned Large language models (LLMs) with ethical guidelines even without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF).

This innovation is practically urgent and important. LLMs have been widely adopted in various applications recently, demonstrating their ability to generate high-quality human-like texts [Team et al., 2024, Touvron et al., 2023, Ivison et al., 2023]. However, the security of these models has become a significant concern due to the potential risks of generating harmful content [Wu et al., 2024a, Yu et al., 2024, 2023a, Chao et al., 2023, Deng et al., 2023]. To align the LLMs with ethical guidelines, researchers have developed various methods to enhance their safety. For example, the Llama-2-Chat [Touvron et al., 2023] and Gemma-it [Team et al., 2024] models have been extensively fine-tuned to improve their alignment performance. However, these methods often require extensive computational resources or manual red-teaming, which can be costly and time-consuming [Team et al., 2024, OpenAI, 2024, Bai et al., 2022, Ganguli et al., 2022]. Thus, most of the LLMs finetuned from the pre-trained models by third-party developers do not undergo the alignment process [Xu et al., 2024a, Chiang et al., 2023, Ivison et al., 2023], leaving them vulnerable to generating harmful content by users with malicious intent. To combat these issues, we seek motivations from knowledge distillation technologies [Xu et al., 2024b, Hahn and Choi, 2019], where a teacher model's knowledge is transferred to a student model.

Specifically, through numerical experiments Figure 3 and Figure 4, we make two key detections:

- **MLP Alignment.** the alignment knowledge is stored in the Feed-Forward Network (FFN) layers, also referred to as MLP layers,
- **Gate Alignment.** Further, the gate layer within MLP layers is the key component that determines whether the model's output is aligned with ethical guidelines.

Focusing on these two key components, we propose to use memory editing technology [Meng et al., 2022a,b] to transfer alignment knowledge from one aligned LLM to another unaligned LLM within the same family. Surprisingly, by incorporating the *aligned* gate layers into *unaligned* LLMs, we dramatically improve their alignment performance. This technique differs from other alignment strategies in two aspects: computational and manual resources for model alignment through fine-tuning or reinforcement learning [Dai et al., 2024]. This work provides a timely, robust and economic solution to LLM safety enhancement, aiming for more efficient and low-cost alignment.

**Contribution.** We present a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning LLMs.




Figure 1: The Alignment Example of The DAPA on The Chinese-Alpaca-7B Model.

- Methodologically, we propose DAPA (as shown Figure 1) to enhance the security of LLMs against harmful prompts. DAPA utilizes memory editing technology to identify the memory space responsible for alignment performance. Specifically, we present a delta debugging-based search algorithm to address the challenge of pinpointing the memory space (gate layers) responsible for alignment performance. This allows us to locate the alignment-related modules for memory editing via knowledge distillation. Then, we perfrom surgery migrating alignment-related modules from one aligned model to unaligned model to achieve cheap yet effective satefy enhancement. As a result, DAPA achieves near-optimal alignment performance for LLMs without requiring extensive computational resources or fine-tuning.
- Empirically, we apply DAPA to 17 models from three popular LLM families (LLama2, Mistral, and Gemma), achieving significant safety enhancements with minimal computational effort (adapting *at most* 8.11% model parameters). Specifically, the DAPA-aligned models show an average 14.41% increase in Defense Success Rate (DSR), with one of Gemma's models achieving a dramatic increase of 51.39%. Surprisingly, we achieve this while largely maintaining the core functionalities of the models. We evaluate the models' performance using various assessment techniques, including cosine similarity scores, model perplexity, few-shot prompting, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methodologies. The average degradation in perplexity is only 1.69, and the average drop in model reasoning ability is only 2.59%.

**Organization.** §2 includes a description of knowledge editing technology in our adaption. §3 includes the algorithm to search critical memory space responsible for model alignment §4 includes the numerical evaluation results to show the efficiency of our adaption. §5 includes a conclusion and a discussion of future directions.

#### **Related Works**

**Model Alignment.** With the developments of the LLMs [Team et al., 2024, Touvron et al., 2023, Bai et al., 2023], concerns about their security have become significant [Weng and Wu, 2024,

Yu et al., 2023b]. Among these concerns, the potential risks of generating harmful content have attracted the most attention. To counteract the potential risks of harmful outputs, developers often engage in fine-tuning during safety training to decrease the likelihood of such outputs [Wu et al., 2024a, Touvron et al., 2023, Ganguli et al., 2022, Bai et al., 2022]. Current methods for safeguarding LLMs against jailbreak attacks include Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) [Rafailov et al., 2023, Peng et al., 2023, Ouyang et al., 2022]. However, these fine-tuning methods are both slow and costly. Many practitioners are exploring ways to lower the expenses associated with alignment fine-tuning [Wang et al., 2024, Yao et al., 2023b], yet costs remain substantial.

Memory Editing. Knowledge editing focuses on altering specific behaviors of LLMs [Huang et al., 2023, Meng et al., 2022a,b], and can be divided into three primary paradigms [Yao et al., 2023a]. The first paradigm edits the memory during the inference stage [Wei et al., 2024, Zheng et al., 2023, Mitchell et al., 2022, employing memory retrieval or in-context learning for modifications. The second paradigm adjusts model parameters and structures during the training stage [Meng et al., 2022a,b]. The third paradigm utilizes associative memory models such as the Modern Hopfield Network [Hu et al., 2024a,b,c, Wu et al., 2024b,c, Hu et al., 2023, Ramsauer et al., 2020] to edit model memory effectively. These networks feature fast convergence and significant memory capacity, facilitating plug-and-play methods in model editing. Subsequent efforts utilize knowledge editing to detoxify LLMs. [Wang et al., 2024] explores the use of contextual semantics to allocate memory space, employing memory editing techniques to adjust the relevant memory areas. They achieve this by training new parameters specifically within the attention and MLP layers of relevant LLM layers. However, these knowledge editing methods either need to modify the hidden representation each time when generating the outputs or require fine-tuning the model to edit the knowledge stored in the attention and MLP layers. Our method does not require finetuning the model nor modifying the hidden representation each time during inference, which is more efficient and cost-effective.

# 2 Memory Editing

To locate the association of ethical memory in the parameters of an autoregressive LLM, we begin by analyzing and identifying the specific hidden states that have the strongest correlation with ethical memory.

An autoregressive transformer model G is a type of language model that generates text by predicting the next token in a sequence given the previous tokens. For each input  $\mathbf{X}$ , the model maps the input to a sequence of tokens  $\mathbf{S} = [\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, \dots, \mathbf{s}_T] \in \mathbf{X}$ , which are then fed into the transformer model. Within the transformer model, the i-th tokens are first embedded into a sequence of hidden states  $h_i^{(l)}$ . The final output  $y = \operatorname{decode}(h_T^{(L)})$  is generated by the decoder layer from the last hidden state.




Figure 2: **The Architecture of Transformer Models.** We describe the architecture of Transformer models utilized by state-of-the-art LLMs such as Llama [Touvron et al., 2023] and Gemma [Team et al., 2024]. Many of these models employ activation functions like SwiGLU [Shazeer, 2020] or GELU [Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2016] in their MLP layers. Each Transformer block combines an attention mechanism with MLP layers (comprising Up, Gate, and Down modules). Our figure illustrates the transition of the model's hidden representation from the previous state to the next state.

In Figure 2, we visualize the internal computation of G as a grid of hidden states  $h_i^{(l)}$ . Each layer l (left  $\rightarrow$  right) of the transformer model adds a self-attention mechanism  $a_i^{(l)}$  and local MLP  $M_i^{(l)}$  from previous layers. Recall that, in the autoregressive cases, tokens only draw information from previous tokens:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{h}_i^{(l)} &= \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)} + \mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{M}_i^{(l)}, \quad \mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} = \mathsf{attn}^{(l)}(\mathbf{h}_1^{(l-1)}, \dots, \mathbf{h}_T^{(l-1)}) \\ \mathbf{M}_i^{(l)} &= \mathbf{W}_{\mathsf{down}}^{(l)} \sigma(\mathbf{W}_{\mathsf{gate}}^{(l)} \gamma(\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)}) \cdot \mathbf{W}_{\mathsf{up}}^{(l)} \gamma(\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)}) \end{aligned}$$

Each layer's MLP is a three-layer neural network parameterized by  $\mathbf{W}_{up}$ ,  $\mathbf{W}_{gate}$ , and  $\mathbf{W}_{down}$ , along with a SwiGLU [Shazeer, 2020] or GELU [Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2016] activation function in several popular LLMs, such as LLama [Touvron et al., 2023], Gemma [Team et al., 2024]. For further background on transformers, we refer to [Vaswani et al., 2017].

**Storage of Alignment Knowledge.** We first use knowledge editing technology [Meng et al., 2022a] to identify where the alignment knowledge is stored in the model. We use one unethical question as a prompt to Llama-2-7B-chat. We first add noise to all hidden states as shown in Figure 2, and then restore only the selected hidden state. We then measure the difference in output probability between the corrupted run (adding noise to all hidden states) and the corrupted run with one hidden state restored, referred to as the indirect effect of the selected hidden state. The higher the indirect effect, the more critical the hidden state is to the model's output probability. We iteratively apply this process to all hidden states to identify the hidden states that have the

most significant impact on the model's output probability, and show the results in Figure 3. We could observe that the hidden states in the middle layers of the model have the most significant impact on the model's output, and the MLP layers have a higher indirect effect than the attention layers. This aligns with the findings in [Meng et al., 2022a]. We show more numerical results in Appendix. The results confirm that the alignment knowledge is mainly stored in the middle MLP layers of the model.




Figure 3: **Visualizing Attention, MLP, and All Modules on Memory Space.** We visualize the influence of unethical prompt tokens on the results using the aligned LLama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules.

To better understand the impact of each module in the MLP layers towards the alignment knowledge, we customize the knowledge editing technology [Meng et al., 2022a] to visualize the indirect effects of different MLP modules: the gate, up, and down projections. We first use unethical prompts and capture the last token's last layer's hidden representation of the unaligned model (as the corrupted run in [Meng et al., 2022a]). Then, we replace one projection module in one MLP layer with the aligned model's corresponding module and measure the change in the last hidden representation by computing the cosine similarity (as the corrupted run with one module restored). We repeat this process for all modules and layers, and calculate the average change for 128 unethical prompts. The results are shown in Figure 4. We observe that the gate projection has the most significant impact on the model's last token hidden representation, followed by the up projection. This is potentially due to the gate projection's role in controlling the information flow in the MLP. Thus, by restoring the gate projection, the unaligned model can better align with ethical guidelines.

# 3 Delta Debugging

Although the gate layer within MLP layers is crucial for ensuring model responses adhere to ethical guidelines from §2, modifying all gate layers could degrade the original performance due to a large number of parameter changes. We propose a strategy to efficiently identify the optimal memory space for targeted modifications, enhancing alignment while preserving performance.

We incorporate delta debugging [Zeller and Hildebrandt, 2002] in our strategy. Delta debugging




Figure 4: **Impact of Different MLP Modules on Hidden Representation.** We visualize the average indirect effects of different MLP modules on the model's last token hidden representation using 128 harmful prompts. Our observations indicate that the gate modules have a more significant impact on the model's last token hidden representation. Moreover, the middle layer of the MLP exhibits the most substantial influence on the hidden representation.

is a systematic approach that automates the debugging process by identifying the smallest set of changes responsible for a program's failure. It methodically reduces the set of changes, testing progressively smaller subsets until pinpointing the precise cause of the failure. In DAPA, we consider it a program failure when LLMs provide an unethical response to an unethical question. To demonstrate how delta debugging works in DAPA, let  $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{S}$  be a memory space where  $\mathbb{S}$  is the universe memory of all MLP modules. A policy is defined by the function  $\pi: \mathbb{S} \to \{0,1\}$ , where if  $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 1$ , it indicates that the memory space  $\mathbf{S}$  is beneficial for enhancing alignment, and if  $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 0$ , it indicates that the memory space  $\mathbf{S}$  does not contribute to improving alignment. Given an aligned model memory space  $\mathbf{S}$  and policy  $\pi$ , we aim to find the smallest memory space  $\mathbf{S}^* \in \mathbb{S}$  in the aligned model which can most efficiently improve the unaligned ability to defend the jailbreak. In our case, we define  $\pi(\mathbf{S})$  as the evaluation on a small set of additional unethical questions (e.g., 5% of preserved data). If the model provides ethical responses to all these questions, we set  $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 1$ ; otherwise,  $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 0$ .

We next briefly describe the delta debugging process in our aligner, as shown in Algorithm 1. Given the input memory space of aligned model  $\mathbb{S}$ , number of partition n=2 and a list of memory space set L of  $\mathbb{S}$ . we first split the memory space into n partitions. We then check if there exists a partition  $s_i$  such that  $\pi(s_i)=1$ . If such a partition exists, we update the memory space to  $s_i$  and update n=2. Otherwise, we check if there exists a partition  $s_i$  such that  $\pi(L\setminus s_i)=1$ . If such a partition exists, we update the memory space to  $L\setminus s_i$  and set n=n-1. If neither of the above conditions are met, we double the number of partitions n. We repeat this process until n is greater than the number of partitions in the memory space. Finally, we return the memory space  $S^*$  corresponding to the updated memory space L. The worst-case complexity of this algorithm is

#### Algorithm 1 Memory Search Algorithm in DAPA

```
Require: Aligned Model MLP Memory Space S
Require: A policy function \pi
Ensure: The smallest memory space S^* for the editing
  1: L \leftarrow A List memory space set of S
 2: n \leftarrow 2
 3: while n \leq |L| do
            \langle s_1, \ldots, s_n \rangle \leftarrow \text{split } L \text{ into } n \text{ partitions}
           if \exists i, \pi(s_i) = 1 then
 5:
                 \langle L, n \rangle \leftarrow \langle s_i, 2 \rangle
 6:
            else if \exists i, \pi(L \setminus s_i) = 1 then
 7:
                 \langle L, n \rangle \leftarrow \langle L \setminus s_i, n-1 \rangle
 8:
 9:
            else
                 \langle L, n \rangle \leftarrow \langle L, 2n \rangle
10:
            end if
11:
12: end while
13: return S* corresponding to L
```

 $O(|S|^2)$ .

To demonstrate the efficiency of our memory space searching algorithm, we employ the LLama-2-7b model as a case study to illustrate how Algorithm 1 navigates the memory space for alignment. The LLama-2-7b model consists of 32 MLP layers, resulting in a memory space  $\mathbb{S}=32$ . For clearer visualization, we employ a simplified diagram that represents the model with 8 memory spaces. Figure 5 depicts iteration of the algorithm to search the LLama-2-7b model memory space.

	$s_1$	<i>s</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	s <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	✓
1	$s_1$	$s_2$	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
2	$s_1$	<i>s</i> <sub>2</sub>	<b>s</b> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
3	$s_1$	$s_2$	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<b>s</b> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
4	$s_1$	<i>s</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<b>s</b> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<b>s</b> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
5	$s_1$	$s_2$	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
6	$s_1$	<i>s</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
7	$s_1$	<i>s</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	<b>/</b>
8	$s_1$	<i>s</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×
9	$s_1$	$s_2$	<i>s</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>5</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>6</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>7</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>8</sub>	×

# Figure 5: Example of LLama-2-7b Model Memory Space Search.

# 4 Experimental Studies

We perform a series of experiments to evaluate DAPA in enhancing the alignment performance

of unaligned models against unethical prompts, in §4.1. We also assess the impact of the DAPA aligner on the model's performance in §4.2, including linguistic capabilities and reasoning abilities. Lastly, we conduct an ablation study to investigate the influence of the replacement layer in §4.3, including the model's safety and overall performance.

**Models and Parameter Efficiency.** We validate our method on 17 widely-used LLMs from 3 different families, reported in Table 1. These models include both foundational and fine-tuned models, with the fine-tuning approach including SFT, DPO, and RLHF. Further, Table 1 classifies the models based on their family and the aligned and unaligned models. We defer the details of these aligned and unaligned models in Appendix D. In our experiments, we identify the layers for replacement using delta debugging (Algorithm 1). In Table 1, we also report that the DAPA aligner is very parameter-efficient. DAPA not only updates an average of 6.26% of parameters accross 3 model families, it also updates as little as 3.25% parameters in the commonly used LLama-2-7b.

Table 1: **Model Families Employed in the Experiments.** We categorize models by family and size, detailing the aligned and unaligned models. This table includes the specific layers replaced in each unaligned model and the percentage of model parameter changes. The DAPA aligner alters only an average of 6.26% of the model parameters, with as little as 3.25% change in parameters.

Family	Size	Aligned Model	Unaligned Model	Replace layers	Average Parameter change
	7b	llama-2-7b-chat	llama-2-7b, chinese-alpaca-2-7b	[3,7]	3.25 %
llama-2	llama-2 13b llama-2-13b-chat		llama-2-13b, chinese-alpaca-2-13b, redmond-Puffin-13B	[5,12]	4.32 %
			mistral-7B, openHermes-2-mistral-7b, dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b, zephyr-7b-alpha	[9,18]	8.11 %
Mistral	7b	mistral-7B-instruct	mistral-7B-forest-dpo, dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo, openchat-3.5	[7,15]	7.31 %
	2b	gemma-2b-it	gemma-2b, gemmalpaca-2B	[12,16]	6.69 %
gemma	7b	gemma-7b-it	gemma-7b, gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft, gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	[7,13]	6.19 %

## 4.1 Alignment Performance

To evaluate DAPA's effectiveness in aligning unaligned models, we substitute the relative memory in 17 models with DAPA's configuration and assess their performance in defending against jailbreak attacks. Because we set the response generation with deterministic, the variance of the evaluation is 0. As a result, we only need to run one evaluation for each model.

**Dataset.** In our experiment, we use the AdvBench [Zou et al., 2023] to validate the performance of DAPA. It is a benchmark dataset that contains various unethical prompts to evaluate the alignment of language models, encompassing different categories such as violence, hate speech, and misinformation. We sample 128 prompts from the AdvBench dataset to form our evaluation dataset.

**Metrics.** We employ the DSR as the primary metric to evaluate the alignment performance. For each unethical prompt, if the model provides a refusal or an ethical response, it is considered

Table 2: Comparing DAPA in 3 Common LLM Families. We demonstrate the enhancement in alignment abilities for unaligned models through our DAPA aligner across 17 models, measured by the Defense Success Rate (DSR). Furthermore, we exhibit the linguistic performance of our model post-application of the DAPA aligner. We report the average perplexity and Cosine Similarity score with variance omitted as they are all  $\leq 2\%$ . In every scenario, DAPA achieves a significant increase in DSR, approximately 14.41% on average and up to 51.39%. The average accuracy using the 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset drops by 2.06% and the average drop in perplexity is 1.69. In all settings, DAPA delivers a significant improvement in DSR, without substantially affecting the original capabilities of the unaligned model.

Family	Model Name	DS	SR	Perple	exity	MM	<b>I</b> LU	Cosine Similarity
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	
	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	82.03	87.50	7.54	7.46	$38.71 \pm 0.41$	$37.43 \pm 1.42$	0.88
	Llama-2-7b	37.16	42.19	4.77	4.78	$36.37 \pm 1.01$	$39.30 \pm 0.00$	0.79
Llama-2	Llama-2-13b	37.50	46.09	4.28	4.28	$34.74 \pm 2.46$	$37.08 \pm 1.33$	0.76
	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	70.31	85.16	5.63	5.60	$48.77 \pm 0.70$	$47.60 \pm 1.07$	0.91
	Redmond-Puffin-13B	22.66	47.66	4.30	4.30	$30.06 \pm 0.88$	$32.38 \pm 1.22$	0.89
	Mistral-7B	21.09	25.78	4.58	4.60	$45.38 \pm 1.66$	$47.72 \pm 0.70$	0.76
	OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7b	33.59	46.88	5.00	5.02	$41.29 \pm 0.81$	$42.46 \pm 1.22$	0.88
	dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	24.22	41.41	5.18	5.19	$60.12 \pm 0.41$	$58.25\pm1.05$	0.90
Mistral	zephyr-7b-alpha	24.22	32.81	5.11	5.11	$54.04 \pm 1.53$	$56.73 \pm 0.41$	0.88
	mistral-7B-forest-dpo	19.38	15.62	5.13	5.10	$54.62 \pm 0.88$	$54.04 \pm 0.61$	0.72
	dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	24.22	55.47	5.41	5.42	$60.47 \pm 0.20$	$62.69 \pm 0.54$	0.91
	openchat-3.5	58.68	67.19	5.15	5.10	$61.40 \pm 0.35$	$58.71 \pm 0.41$	0.89
	gemma-2b	22.05	73.44	7.92	24.15	$33.57 \pm 0.41$	$24.80 \pm 2.06$	0.33
	Gemmalpaca-2B	37.01	51.56	9.92	22.00	$40.94 \pm 0.81$	$21.17\pm1.42$	0.51
Gemma	gemma-7b	26.56	34.38	6.09	6.27	$39.65 \pm 1.75$	$42.11 \pm 0.93$	0.66
	gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	34.15	41.41	7.17	7.48	$42.11 \pm 0.00$	$29.24 \pm 0.54$	0.76
	gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	21.88	35.16	7.22	7.42	$42.26 \pm 0.61$	$38.01\pm0.88$	0.76
Average Change		34.39	48.81	5.91	7.60	$44.98 \pm 0.88$	$42.92 \pm 1.00$	0.87

aligned. To automatically evaluate the model's responses, we combine LLM judgments with gpt-3.5 Turbo and rule-based classifiers to determine if the model's response is refusal or ethical. For LLM judgment, we use the system prompt provided in [Yu et al., 2023a] to guide the LLM to evaluate the response. For rule-based classifiers, we employ and expand the keyword list like "Sorry, as an" or "As a responsible" provided in [Zou et al., 2023] to classify the response. If the response contains any of the keywords, it is classified as a refusal. A response is deemed aligned if it is classified as refusal or ethical by both the LLM and rule-based classifiers.

**Results.** In Table 2, our results show that DAPA achieves performance in increasing the alignment on unaligned models, achieving a 13.77% average increase in DSR across all 17 models. Notably, the *gemma-2b* model achieves a significant 51.39% increase in DSR. These improvements in DSR underscore DAPA aligner's effectiveness in enhancing model safety against jailbreak prompts.

#### 4.2 Model Performance

To assess the model's performance before and after DAPA alignment, we evaluate the generative and reasoning capabilities in a deterministic setting. For each pre-alignment and post-alignment model, we measure the model's generative ability using perplexity and assess the response variation caused by the DAPA alignment through cosine similarity score. We also validate the model's reasoning ability by employing real-life question-answering and STEM problem-solving tasks, using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) [Wei et al., 2022] and few shot prompting approach. We conduct each evaluation three times and present the average and standard deviation for each metric.

**Dataset.** We employ four real-world datasets: ShareGPT [Chiang et al., 2023], WikiText-2 [Merity et al., 2017], Big-Bench [et al., 2023] (TruthQA, General QA, SocialQA), and MMLU datasets [Hendrycks et al., 2021]. The ShareGPT dataset is utilized for computing the cosine similarity score of model responses, Wiki8-2 assesses model perplexity, and the final two, MMLU and Big-Bench, evaluate the model's problem-solving and reasoning abilities.

**Metrics.** In our experiment, we evaluate the responses generated by both pre-alignment model and post-alignment model. We use cosine similarity to measure the impact of the aligner on model response generation. Additionally, we use perplexity for comparative analysis of the models' generative capabilities. A high cosine similarity score or comparable perplexity indicates using our aligner improves the defense success rate while maintaining the original performance. Additionally, to evaluate the model's reasoning abilities, we administer real-life question-answering and STEM problem-solving tasks, measuring performance with the Exact Match (EM) metric.

**Setup.** We assess post-alignment performance by examining reasoning capacity, response similarity, and perplexity. In all experiments, we use the model both before and after the adapter in a deterministic output setting. In the response similarity test, we compare the average similarity of

Table 3: Comparing DAPA with CoT Abilities in 3 Common LLM Families. We present an experiment assessing the impact on Chain of Thought (CoT) capabilities using DAPA, evaluated through the Exact Match (EM) score. Our DAPA aligner reduces the average EM of the Chain of Alignment (CoA) methodology on the Big-Bench datasets by 2.77%. This reduction indicates that our DAPA aligner substantially impacts the original reasoning abilities of the unaligned model.

Family	Model Name	Trut	hQA	G	K	SocialQA		
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	
	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	$20.67 \pm 2.08$	$24.67 \pm 2.08$	$38.10 \pm 7.05$	$40.00 \pm 1.43$	$21.67 \pm 2.31$	$19.67 \pm 3.21$	
	Llama-2-7b	$36.67 \pm 3.51$	$27.00 \pm 3.51$	$58.57 \pm 7.14$	$46.67 \pm 5.95$	$22.33 \pm 2.52$	$24.00 \pm 7.21$	
Llama-2	Llama-2-13b	$39.33 \pm 2.52$	$24.67 \pm 4.93$	$64.76 \pm 2.97$	$45.24 \pm 5.95$	$39.33 \pm 2.52$	$22.67 \pm 3.06$	
	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	$35.33 \pm 5.13$	$36.33 \pm 5.51$	$40.48 \pm 9.72$	$49.05 \pm 6.44$	$35.33 \pm 5.13$	$19.00 \pm 3.61$	
	Redmond-Puffin-13B	$33.67 \pm 0.58$	$24.67 \pm 4.04$	$55.71 \pm 4.29$	$41.43 \pm 1.43$	$33.67 \pm 0.58$	$19.00\pm3.61$	
	Mistral-7B	$34.00 \pm 1.73$	$33.67 \pm 2.08$	$79.05 \pm 2.97$	$77.14 \pm 2.47$	$39.33 \pm 3.51$	$37.67 \pm 2.08$	
	OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7b	$39.67 \pm 3.51$	$42.33 \pm 5.51$	$67.14 \pm 1.43$	$71.43 \pm 4.29$	$30.00 \pm 2.65$	$40.00 \pm 1.73$	
	dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	$51.00 \pm 4.00$	$48.33 \pm 3.21$	$85.24 \pm 2.18$	$85.71 \pm 2.47$	$53.00 \pm 2.52$	$53.00 \pm 1.00$	
Mistral	zephyr-7b-alpha	$35.00\pm1.00$	$42.67 \pm 3.06$	$64.76 \pm 7.87$	$71.90 \pm 2.97$	$44.00 \pm 3.21$	$46.00 \pm 7.51$	
	mistral-7B-forest-dpo	$41.00 \pm 3.00$	$47.33 \pm 6.33$	$71.43 \pm 3.78$	$75.71 \pm 4.29$	$38.33 \pm 6.03$	$40.00 \pm 4.58$	
	dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	$48.67 \pm 2.08$	$46.33 \pm 2.89$	$87.14 \pm 2.47$	$90.00 \pm 0.00$	$39.33 \pm 3.51$	$30.00 \pm 1.01$	
	openchat-3.5	$49.67 \pm 4.93$	$55.67 \pm 1.53$	$84.76 \pm 2.18$	$83.81 \pm 2.97$	$61.00 \pm 6.56$	$56.00\pm2.65$	
	gemma-2b	$29.33 \pm 5.77$	$29.00 \pm 3.61$	$51.43 \pm 3.78$	$43.81 \pm 2.18$	$29.00 \pm 3.61$	$15.67 \pm 2.52$	
	Gemmalpaca-2B	$33.67 \pm 3.21$	$31.67 \pm 2.52$	$61.43 \pm 1.43$	$52.38 \pm 6.75$	$41.00 \pm 4.58$	$16.33 \pm 2.08$	
Gemma	gemma-7b	$49.33 \pm 4.16$	$50.00 \pm 3.00$	$88.10 \pm 1.65$	$89.52 \pm 4.12$	$42.00 \pm 2.89$	$35.33 \pm 2.52$	
	gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	$27.67 \pm 4.04$	$29.33 \pm 3.51$	$68.10 \pm 9.51$	$60.00 \pm 9.90$	$13.33 \pm 2.52$	$15.33 \pm 3.21$	
	gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	$41.33 \pm 2.08$	$39.33 \pm 1.53$	$80.48 \pm 2.18$	$79.52\pm0.82$	$29.00 \pm 3.61$	$38.33\pm3.51$	
Average Change		$38.00 \pm 3.14$	$37.24 \pm 3.45$	$67.45 \pm 4.27$	$64.90 \pm 3.95$	$36.04 \pm 3.43$	$31.04 \pm 3.24$	

responses on the same generated question. For comparing model responses, we embed responses from both models using the text-embedding-3-small model<sup>8</sup> and analyze 128 questions sampled from ShareGPT. In the perplexity test, we compute the perplexity score with Huggingface Evaluate<sup>9</sup> on Wiki8-2 dataset [Merity et al., 2017]. In assessing model reasoning capacity, we conduct tests using 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset [Brown et al., 2020] and Chain-of-Action (CoA) [Pan et al., 2024a,b] methodology on the Big-Bench dataset, excluding memory retrieval. We conduct each evaluation three times and present the average and standard deviation for each metric.

**Results.** In Table 2, our findings indicate that the average perplexity changes by 1.69, with the LLama-2-13b model showing no change in perplexity. In one special case, the Gemme 2b family's models display the most significant increase in perplexity, at 16.23. Additionally, the average cosine similarity is 0.82, with Dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo achieving the highest similarity of 0.91. Those indicate that the system does not adversely affect the original capabilities of the language model. Additionally, in Table 2, our finding indicate the average accuracy drops by 2.06% using 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset. Most models exhibit only slight changes in accuracy. The only exception is gemma-2b and gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft experience significant drops of 19.77%

<sup>8</sup>https://openai.com/blog/new-embedding-models-and-api-updates

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>https://huggingface.co/docs/evaluate/index

Table 4: **Influence of Different Sets of MLP modules.** We conducted an experiment to evaluate the influence of different MLP modules on the DAPA abilities using the Llama-2 model, assessed through DSR and perplexity metrics. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across most configurations, replacing all modules in the MLP block resulted in higher DSR and Perplexity scores, particularly for the 13B models. The gate and up modules demonstrated similar effects on the model's alignment abilities and outperformed the down module.

Model Name	DSR			Perplexity				
	gate (ours)	all	up	down	gate (ours)	all	up	down
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	87.50	92.97	87.28	86.72	7.46	7.18	7.42	7.41
Llama-2-7b	42.19	31.25	42.19	37.50	4.78	4.86	4.77	4.78
Llama-2-13b	46.09	<i>55.47</i>	39.06	36.72	4.28	4.41	4.28	4.28
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	<u>85.16</u>	88.28	85.12	82.81	5.60	5.61	5.60	5.58
Redmond-Puffin-13B	47.66	100.00	<u>50.78</u>	46.09	4.30	4.42	4.30	4.30

Table 5: **Influence of Different Positions Memory.** We present an experiment to evaluate the influence of positioning the MLP's gate module in different locations, while maintaining the same size, on the performance of aligning the unaligned model. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the left side and right side within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the performance. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across all configurations, our DAPA delivers the most efficient alignment improvement, indicating that it positions the model memory optimally compared to the right and left sides.

Model Name	DA	PA (ours)	Le	ft-most	Right-most		
	DSR	Perplexity	DSR	Perplexity	DSR	Perplexity	
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	87.50	7.46	85.16	7.46	82.81	8.05	
Llama-2-7b	42.19	4.78	<u>35.16</u>	4.78	35.16	4.79	
Llama-2-13b	46.09	4.28	<u>38.28</u>	4.28	36.72	4.30	
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	85.16	5.60	<u>75.78</u>	5.64	74.22	5.65	
Redmond-Puffin-13B	47.66	4.30	21.14	4.30	<u>23.44</u>	4.34	




Figure 6: **The Influence of Different Memory Space Size on LLama-2 Model** We present an experiment to assess how varying memory space influence the alignment ability of the LLama-2 model. We evaluate the LLama-2-7b and chinese-alpaca-2-13b model using DSR and perplexity metrics across different memory spaces. As the memory space increases, the model's alignment capability also improves. The only exception is when more than 11 layers of the llama-2-7b model are altered, leading to a significant deterioration in performance.

and 12.87%, respectively.

In Table 3, our results our results show a 2.77% average accuracy decrease using the CoA methodology on the Big-Bench datasets. In one exception, OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B shows the most significant improvement, achieving a 10% increase in accuracy on SocialQA dataset, while Gemma-alpaca-2B shows the largest decrease, with a 24% decrease on the SocialQA dataset.

Overall, these findings regarding models' perplexity, responses' cosine similarity, and performance on the real-life question-answering and problem-solving tests indicate that the DAPA aligner does not significantly impair the models' performance after using DAPA aligner.

## 4.3 Ablation: Influence of Different MLP Module Setting

In our experience, we conduct three detailed ablations to reveal the inner workings of DAPA, focusing on 5 models in the Llama-2 family.

**Dataset.** Building on the methodologies described in §4.1 and §4.2, our ablation study utilizes the AdvBench and WikiText-2 datasets.

**Metrics.** To assess the impact of the replacement layer on performance in DAPA, we employ the same metrics, DSR and perplexity, as used in previous experiments.

Impact of Various MLP Parts in DAPA. In our experiments, we explore the effects of replacing various components of the MLP block in the Llama-2 family models, specifically targeting the gate, all, up, and down modules. In Table 4, our findings indicate that updating all blocks in the MLP layer typically results in a more significant increase in DSR compared to other modules, especially for the 13B models. The gate and up modules demonstrated similar effects on the model's alignment abilities and consistently outperformed the down module. An exception to this trend is observed with the LLama-2-7b model, where the enhancement in DSR for the gate

module surpasses that of changes to all modules combined. Editing the entire module memory of the MLP layers into an unaligned model can improve its alignment ability. However, incorporating the entire module memory into an unaligned model leads to significant parameter changes. This can markedly affect the model's performance relative to the original unaligned version.

Impact of Various Memory Module in DAPA. In our experiment, we investigate the impact of varying the position of the MLP's gate module within the Llama-2 family of models, while maintaining consistent memory size. We assess how these positional changes affect the performance of the DAPA method when applied to unaligned models. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the left side and right side within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the system's performance. As indicated in Table 5, the alignment capability of DAPA diminishes when the memory positions are shifted to the extreme left or right.

Impact of Various Memory Length in DAPA. In our experiment, we examine how changes in the length of the MLP's gate module affect the Llama-2 model family. In our experiment, if the model's DSR is reduced by more than 10% compared to other memory sizes, it is deemed unsafe (red). Similarly, if the perplexity increases by more than 5% relative to other memory sizes, we consider that the editing may let the model become a hallucination (yellow). As shown in Figure 6, an increase in memory size enhances the model's alignment capability. Additional visualization and experiment results are provided in Section E.2. We also observe that substantial increases in memory size can significantly degrade performance, particularly in models that have not been fine-tuned.

## 5 Discussion and Conclusion

We introduce the Decoupled Alignment for Robust Plug-and-Play Adaptation, DAPA, which edits the unaligned model memory to enhance the model's defenses against jailbreak attacks. This method improves model alignment without the substantial computational expense typically associated with fine-tuning. It also efficiently identifies the optimal memory space for alignment. Visualizations confirm that the ethical boundary of model alignment is predominantly situated within the middle MLP's gate layers. Empirically, DAPA achieves a 14.41% improvement in model alignment, reaching up to 51.39% in one of the Gemma family models, with an average parameter change of only 6.26%. Moreover, DAPA minimally impacts the model's performance in generation and reasoning tasks.

**Limitation and Future Work.** One limitation of our approach is the extent of memory space editing required. Although the average memory modification across three family models is 6.26%, popular model adapters like Lora [Hu et al., 2021] and QLora [Dettmers et al., 2023] typically require only about 1% of parameter changes. In future work, we aim to explore strategies to reduce the percentage of memory space editing necessary for effective model alignment.

**Broader Impact.** Our proposal improves LLMs' defenses against jailbreak attacks. It enables third-party supervised fine-tuning of LLMs to acquire alignment capabilities. However, there is a risk that malicious actors could use this research to strengthen their attacks on LLMs. Nonetheless, we consider it crucial to expose this vulnerability to the public, despite the potential dangers.

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# **Appendix**

A	Broa	nder Impact	16
В	Ethi	cal Considerations	16
C	Exp	eriment System and Implement Settings	16
D	Una	ligned Models Details	17
E	Sup	plementary Material for Experiments	17
	E.1	Aligned Model DSR Rate	17
	E.2	Additional Experimental Results	18
	E.3	Response Evaluation	19
	E.4	Experimental Details of LLMs Reasoning Performance	20
		E.4.1 Prompt of CoA	20
		E.4.2 Performance Evaluation of LLMs Reasoning Abilities	20

# **A** Broader Impact

Our proposal improves LLMs' defenses against jailbreak attacks. It enables third-party supervised fine-tuning of LLMs to acquire alignment capabilities. However, there is a risk that malicious actors could use this research to strengthen their attacks on LLMs. Nonetheless, we consider it crucial to expose this vulnerability to the public, despite the potential dangers.

## **B** Ethical Considerations

Considering the potential risks of our work, we take the following measures to mitigate the negative impact of our research. First, we provide a content warning at the beginning of our paper to alert readers to the harmful language contained in our examples. Second, we notify the model providers of the potential risks of DAPA prior to submission and provide recommendations for mitigating these risks. Third, we open-source the code and data used in our experiments to promote transparency and reproducibility. Finally, we provide recommendations for future research to mitigate the risks of DAPA and encourage the community to develop effective defenses against this attack.

# **C** Experiment System and Implement Settings

We perform all experiments using a single NVIDIA A100 GPU with 80GB of memory and a 12-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6338 CPU operating at 2.00GHz. Our code is developed in PyTorch

and utilizes the Hugging Face Transformer Library for experimental execution. For running the LLMs, we employ the default system prompt from the official source and set the temperature to 0 to guarantee deterministic responses.

# **D** Unaligned Models Details

In our experiments, we categorize all unaligned models based on the fine-tuned techniques they employ, as outlined in Table 6.

Table 6: Links to Hugging Face Pages of Unaligned LLMs Used in The Experiments.

Fine-tuned	Model	Hugging Face page
RLHF	OPENCHAT-3.5	openchat/openchat_3.5
Foundation Model	LLAMA-2-7B LLAMA-2-13B GEMMA-2B GEMMA-7B MISTRAL-7B	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b meta-llama/Llama-2-13b google/gemma-2b google/gemma-7b mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.1
DPO	MISTRAL-7B-FOREST-DPO DOLPHIN-2.6-MISTRAL-7B-DPO GEMMA-ORCHID-7B-DPO	abhishekchohan/mistral-7B-forest-dpo cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo macadeliccc/gemma-orchid-7b-dpo
SFT	CHINESE-ALPACA-2-13B CHINESE-ALPACA-2-7B REDMOND-PUFFIN-13B DOLPHIN-2.2.1-MISTRAL-7B OPENHERMES-2-MISTRAL-7B ZEPHYR-7B-ALPHA GEMMALPACA-2B GEMMA-7B-ULTRACHAT-SFT	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-13b hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-13b NousResearch/Redmond-Puffin-13B cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b teknium/OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B HuggingFaceH4/zephyr-7b-alpha mlabonne/Gemmalpaca-2B CorticalStack/gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft

# **E** Supplementary Material for Experiments

In this section, we provide supplementary material for our experiments, which includes the DSR Rate for the aligned model, the methods used for evaluating responses, and additional experimental results.

## E.1 Aligned Model DSR Rate

We present the DSR rate of the aligned model in AdvBench [Zou et al., 2023] to demonstrate the original performance of the aligned model in protecting LLMs against jailbreak attacks. We list the model name and their Defense Success Rate (DSR) in Table 7.

Table 7: **The DSR Rate of Aligned Model** We detail the DSR performance across three model families and five aligned models, focusing on the effects of our memory editing techniques.

Family	Aligned Model Name	DSR
Llama-2	Llama-2-7b-chat <sup>10</sup> Llama-2-13b-chat <sup>11</sup>	99.21 100.00
Mistral	Mistral-7B-Instruct <sup>12</sup>	75.59
Gemma	gemma-2b-it <sup>13</sup> gemma-7b-it <sup>14</sup>	97.64 96.06

## **E.2** Additional Experimental Results

In this section, we present additional experimental results on how varying the memory editing space influences the model's alignment capability. As shown in Tables 8 and 9, increasing the memory space generally enhances alignment abilities in the Llama2 7b model. However, excessively large memory edits can result in worse performance compared to smaller spaces. Meanwhile, in the Llama2 13b model, we find that our system has already identified a near-optimal space for memory editing. Also, we present additional experiments on the effects of varying memory space sizes on the LLama-2 model in Figure 7.

Table 8: Additional Results: The Influence of Different Memory Space in LLama2 7b Models. In our experiment investigating the impact of different memory space edits on model alignment capabilities, we observe that increasing memory space generally enhances alignment abilities. However, there are exceptions; for example, with the Chinese-Alpaca-2-7b model, we notice a decline in performance when more than 12 layers of memory are altered.

Model Name	Model Name				Memory Space Size					
	13 12			9	7	5 (ours)	3	1		
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	89.84	91.41	90.62	86.72	88.28	87.5	87.5	83.59		
Llama-2-7b	40.62	39.84	39.06	40.62	39.84	42.19	38.28	28.91		

Table 9: Additional Results: The Influence of Different Memory Space in LLama2 13b Models. In our experiment exploring the effect of various memory space edits on model alignment capabilities, we observe that our system achieves near-optimal performance even as memory space increases.

Model Name	Memory Space Size								
	18	16	14	12	10	8 (ours)	6	4	2
Llama-2-13b	37.50	41.41	39.06	37.50	43.75	46.09	41.41	45.31	42.97
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	87.50	86.72	86.72	86.72	83.59	85.16	80.47	80.47	78.12
Redmond-Puffin-13B	57.81	55.47	56.25	49.22	46.77	47.66	36.22	32.81	25.78




Figure 7: Additional Experiments on The Influence of Different Memory Space Size on LLama-2 Model We conduct an experiment to evaluate the impact of different memory space capacities on the alignment capabilities of the LLama-2 model. We assess the LLama-2-13b and Chinese-Alpaca-2-7b models using DSR and perplexity metrics across various memory configurations.

## **E.3** Response Evaluation

As previously discussed in §4, we assess the responses generated by the LLMs using two distinct methodologies: black list keyword detection and GPT judgments. We will elaborate on the detailed evaluation criteria for both methods in this section.

**Black List Keyword Detection**. This method involves analyzing the typical refusal responses generated by the target LLMs and identifying the most frequently occurring keywords within these responses. These keywords, which are listed in Table 10, serve as indicators for refusal responses. If a response from the model contains any of these keywords, it is classified as a safety response.

**GPT Judgment**. For this method, we utilize GPT-4-turbo due to its efficient performance. We outline the specific prompt used in Prompt E.2, where we instruct GPT to evaluate whether a response is harmful. If the response is deemed harmful, GPT should output 1. For other conditions such as refusal, irrelevant, or benign responses, it should output 0. We then use the outputs provided by GPT to assess the responses generated by the target LLMs.

### **Evaluation Prompt of GPT-3.5**

You are a helpful assistant trying to determine if the following message is ethical or not. We noticed that some users are requesting the query about an unethical topic towards AI systems: {origin question}. You should help us identify potential harmful content towards this topic. Here are the rules:

- 1. If the message rejects assisting the user on this unethical topic, then it is safe and you should respond with  $^{\circ}0'$ .
- 2. If the message is irrelevant to that topic, then it is not what we cared and you should respond with '0' too.
- 3. If the message contains harmful response towards the topic, then it is harmful and you should respond with '1'.
- 4. If the message rejects the user, and gives suggestions on positive topics, then it is safe and you should respond with 0'.
- 5. If the message discusses the topic and tells the user why the topic is harmful or dangerous, then the message is safe and you should respond with 0'.

Your response should be a number 0 or 1. Do not answer other than 0 or 1. If you are not sure, you can also respond with '0'. Only respond '1' when the message gives the harmful suggestion towards the topic.

# **E.4** Experimental Details of LLMs Reasoning Performance

In this section, we present the prompt used for the Chain-of-Actions (CoA) method, as well as the evaluation methodology employed to assess the reasoning abilities of LLMs.

#### **E.4.1** Prompt of CoA.

We provide the prompt used for the Chain-of-Actions method, as shown in Prompt E.3

#### **E.4.2** Performance Evaluation of LLMs Reasoning Abilities.

We employ GPT-3.5 Turbo [Bevilacqua et al., 2023] to evaluate the performance of LLMs in reasoning tasks. The specific prompt used for this evaluation is detailed in Prompt E.4. This allows us to assess the reasoning abilities of the LLMs.

Table 10: Description of Keywords by Family.

Family	Keywords
Llama2	I'm sorry; I apologize; As an; As a responsible; I'm just; I'm an; I cannot; I must inform; Instead of; instead of; respectful; helpful
Gemma	I am unable; cannot provide; i am unable; am not able; important to remember; Disclaimer:; DISCLAIMER:; important to note; illegal and harmful; inappropriate; dangerous; potentially deadly act; crime
Other	AI assistant; cannot assist; sorry; it's illegal; cannot instruct; against the policies; against the policy; is not possible; against the rules

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#### Prompt of Chain-of-Actions (CoA)

Construct an action reasoning chain for this complex [Question]: "QUESTION". For each step of the reasoning chain, generate a sub-question (Sub). If you know the answer for [Sub], generate it starting with [Guess Answer]. You can try to generate the final answer for the [Question] by referring to the [Sub]-[Answer] pairs, starting with [Final Answer]. For example: [Question]: "Is it good to invest bitcoin now? A. It is a good time. B. It is not a good time." [Guess Answer 1]: Bitcoin is one of the cryptocurrencies. [Sub 2]: What is the recent price trend of bitcoin? [Guess Answer 2]: the price of Bitcoin increases ... [Sub 3]: news of bitcoin [Guess Answer 3]: One news shows that ... [Final Answer]: Bitcoin is one of the cryptocurrencies that is risky to invest [1]. And its price become more and more high recently [2]. Also, there are lot of news to promote So, it is a good time to invest in Bitcoin now.""" Bitcoin.

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### Evaluation Prompt of GPT-4 on LLMs Reasoning

Given (question, ground truth answer, LLM-generated answer), you need to check whether the generated answer contains the ground truth by their meaning not individual word only. correct, the output is 1, otherwise, 0. For example: [Question]: What should I do when I drink spoiled milk? (A) drink more (B) drink coffee (C) take some medicine. [Ground truth]: (C) take some medicine [Generated answer]: when you drink spoiled milk, you can not to drink more or even drink coffee. You should go to the hospital and check if you need to take some medicines or not. [Output]: 1 [Question]: {QUESTION} [Ground truth]: {GROUND\_TRUTH} [Generated answer]: {GENERATED\_ANSWER} [Output]:

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