

Mixed strategy



Frederik Mallmann-Trenn
6CCS3AIN

Mixed strategy

- Chances are you would play a **mixed** strategy.
- You would:
 - sometimes play rock,
 - sometimes play paper; and
 - sometimes play scissors.
- A fixed/pure strategy is easy for an adaptive player to beat.

Mixed strategy

- A mixed strategy is just a probability distribution across a set of pure strategies.
- So, for a game where agent i has two actions a_1 and a_2 , a mixed strategy for i is a probability distribution:

$$MS_i = \{P(a_1), P(a_2)\}$$

- Given this mixed strategy, when i comes to play, they pick action a_1 with probability $P(a_1)$ and a_2 with probability $P(a_2)$.

Mixed strategy

- To determine the mixed strategy, i can compute the **best values** of $P(a_1)$ and $P(a_2)$.
- These will be the values which **give i the highest expected payoff** given the options that j can choose and the joint payoffs that result.
- We could write down the expected payoffs of different mixed strategies and pick the one that optimises expected payoff.
- There is also a simple graphical method which works for very simple cases.
- Will look at this method next.

Mixed strategy

- Let's consider the payoff matrix:


		j	
		a_3	a_4
i	a_1	-3 3	1 -1
	a_2	0 0	-1 1

- We want to compute mixed strategies to be used by the players.
- That means decide $P(a_1)$ and $P(a_2)$ etc.

Mixed strategy


- i 's analysis of this game would be something like this.

Mixed strategy




- Consider it from i 's perspective. Let's say you know that j plays a_3 .
- i 's payoff will be 3 or 0 depending on whether i picks a_1 or a_2 .
- The expected payoff therefore varies along the line, as $P(a_1)$ varies from 0 to 1.

Mixed strategy



- Consider it from i 's perspective. Let's say you know that j plays a_4 .
- i 's payoff will be -1 or 1 depending on whether i picks a_1 or a_2 .
- The expected payoff therefore varies along the line, as $P(a_1)$ varies from 0 to 1.


Mixed strategy



- Where the lines intersect, i has the same expected payoff whatever j does.
- This is a rational choice of mixed strategy.

Mixed strategy

- j can do the same kind of analysis:



Mixed strategy

- This analysis will help i and j choose a mixed strategy in zero-sum games.



(Archives of the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton)

- This approach is due to von Neumann.

General sum games

- Battle of the Outmoded Gender Stereotypes
 - aka Battle of the Sexes

	this	that
this	1 2	0 0
that	0 0	2 1



(Time-Life/Getty)

- Game contains elements of cooperation and competition.
- The interplay between these is what makes general sum games interesting.

Negotiation

- Interplay between cooperation and competition leads to **negotiation**
- See, for example, the work of Sarit Kraus.



(law-train.eu)

Nash equilibrium

- Earlier we introduced the notion of **Nash equilibrium** as a solution concept for general sum games.
- (We didn't describe it in exactly those terms.)
- Looked at pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
- Issue was that not every game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Nash equilibrium

- For example:

		j	
		D	C
i	D	2 1	1 2
	C	0 2	1 1

- Has no pure strategy NE.

Nash equilibrium

- The notion of Nash equilibrium extends to mixed strategies.
- And **every** game has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Nash equilibrium

- For a game with payoff matrices A (to i) and B (to j), a mixed strategy (x^*, y^*) is a Nash equilibrium solution if:

$$\forall x, x^* A y^{*T} \geq x A y^{*T}$$

$$\forall y, x^* B y^{*T} \geq x^* B y^T$$

- In other words, x^* gives a higher **expected** value to i than any other strategy when j plays y^* .
- Similarly, y^* gives a higher **expected** value to j than any other strategy when i plays x^* .

Nash equilibrium

- Unfortunately, this doesn't solve the problem of **which** Nash equilibrium you should play.