A trace has been found.

Honest Process
Attacker
!
a_6665
d
!
!
Beginning of process ProcessInitiator(a_6665, d)
~M_6832 = sk(d)
(~M_6836,~M_6837) = (a_6665,encrypt(d,ltk(a_6665)))
{5}event startA(a_6665,d)
a_6668
a_6667
!
!
Beginning of process ProcessInitiator(a_6668, a_6667)
~M_6879 = sk(d)
(~M_6890,~M_6891) = (a_6668,encrypt(a_6667,ltk(a_6668)))
{5}event startA(a_6668,a_6667)
d
Beginning of process ProcessResponder(d)
a_6665
d
!
!
Beginning of process ProcessInitiator(a_6665, d)
~M_6945 = sk(d)
(~M_6949,~M_6950) = (a_6665,encrypt(d,ltk(a_6665)))
{5}event startA(a_6665,d)
a_6663
a_6662
!
!
Beginning of process ProcessInitiator(a_6663, a_6662)
Beginning of process ProcessServer
{22}new nb_6677
~M_6996 = sk(d)
(~M_7000,~M_7001) = (a_6663,encrypt(a_6662,ltk(a_6663)))
{5}event startA(a_6663,a_6662)
(a_6665,~M_6837) = (a_6665,encrypt(d,ltk(a_6665)))
~M_7015 = aenc(nb_6677,pk(decrypt(encrypt(d,ltk(a_6665)),ltk(a_6665))))
~M_7015 = aenc(nb_6677,pk(d))
{14}event startB(d,adec(aenc(nb_6677,pk(d)),sk(d)))
~M_7026 = encrypt(adec(aenc(nb_6677,pk(d)),sk(d)),ltk(d))
~M_7026 = encrypt(nb_6677,ltk(d))
{28}new Kab_6678
~M_7033 = encrypt(((aenc(Kab_6678,pk(decrypt(encrypt(d,ltk(a_6665)),ltk(a_6665)))),Kab_6678),nb_6677), ltk(a_6665))
a_6665
a_6672
!
!
Beginning of process ProcessInitiator(a_6665, a_6672)
~M_7073 = sk(d)
(~M_7077,~M_7078) = (a_6665,encrypt(a_6672,ltk(a_6665)))
{5}event startA(a_6665,a_6672)
~M_7033 = encrypt(((aenc(Kab_6678,pk(d)),Kab_6678), nb_6677),ltk(a_6665))
{8}event acceptA(a_6665,a_6672,nb_6677)
(~M_7091,~M_7092) = (aenc(Kab_6678,pk(d)),encrypt(nb_6677,Kab_6678))
The attacker has the message adec(~M_7091,~M_6832) = Kab_6678