

# Abdelrahman Amer

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## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Labor Economics, Spatial Economics, Applied Micro

## EDUCATION

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PhD in Economics, **University of Toronto** 2020 - 2026 (Expected)

*Committee:* Kory Kroft (supervisor), Ismael Mourifié, Nathaniel Baum-Snow

B.Sc. in Economics & Mathematics, **Univerisity of Toronto** 2016 - 2020

## RESEARCH

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**Monopsony in Space: Commuting Costs & Labor Market Power** (Job Market Paper)

**Decoding Gender Bias in Interviews** (Draft Complete)

*with Ashley C. Craig and Clémentine Van Effenterre*

**The Role of Production Hierarchies in Coordinating Specialization** (In Progress)

*with Kevin Lim and Aloysius Siow*

**Protectionist Tariffs with Third Country Effects** (In Progress)

*with Mahmood Haddara and Daniel Trefler*

## RESEARCH AWARDS AND GRANTS

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University of Toronto Doctoral Fellowship 2020 - 2025

## CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

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IZA Workshop: Matching Workers and Jobs Online 2023

Advances with Field Experiments (AFE) 2023

Columbia Management, Analytics, and Data Conference (MAD) 2024

# PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

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<b>Teaching Assistant: University of Toronto</b>	2020–2026
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Intermediate &amp; Advanced Undergraduate:</i> Intermediate Micro, Market Design, Economics of Careers &amp; Inequality</li><li>• <i>PhD Level:</i> Quantitative Macro, Microeconomic Theory</li></ul>	

<b>Research Assistant: University of Toronto</b>	2021–2024
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Prof. Kory Kroft:</i> Empirical analysis of subcontracting’s effect on firm organization; Theoretical derivations for labor market models with market power.</li><li>• <i>Prof. Peter Morrow:</i> Quantitative labor market model simulations in MATLAB; Model design &amp; theoretical derivations.</li></ul>	

# REFeree SERVICE

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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
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# LANGUAGES

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<b>Language:</b> Arabic (native), English (fluent)
<b>Programming:</b> Stata, R, MATLAB, Julia, Python, L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X

# REFERENCES

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Kory Kroft	Ismael Mourifié	Nathaniel Baum-Snow
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Rotman School of Management
University of Toronto	Washington University in St Louis.	University of Toronto
150 St. George St	One Brookings Drive	105 St. George St
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## Abstracts

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### **Monopsony in Space: Commuting Costs & Labor Market Power**

(Job Market Paper)

Attractive residential locations need not coincide with productive ones. To find good jobs workers often need to commute. Commuting costs are non-trivial and can limit workers' employment to local areas which are smaller than their prescribed CZs. Such distaste for commuting therefore generates imperfect substitutability between jobs, allowing employers to set wages a la Robinson (1969). Using a subway expansion shock in Vancouver, I provide reduced-form evidence on the effects of subway access on earnings and provide suggestive evidence that the effect is driven by improved worker outside options. Motivated by these results I build and identify a wage-setting model with explicit commuting costs & residential choice. Using a model-based measure of labor market concentration I show that workers who commute further are subject to lower concentration and work at more productive firms. Using a model-based variance decomposition I quantify the role of distance heterogeneity to employers in shaping the distribution of earnings and outside options within Commuting Zones.

### **Decoding Gender Bias in Interviews**

with Ashley C. Craig and Clémentine Van Effenterre

Performance evaluation in interviews is an important part of hiring decisions. We combine experiments, administrative data and video analysis to understand what drives gender bias during in-person evaluations in the technology industry. Leveraging 60,000 mock interviews on a platform for software engineers, we find that average ratings for code quality are 12 percent of a standard deviation lower for women. We use two field experiments to study what drives these gaps. Our first experiment shows that providing evaluators with automated performance measures does not reduce gender gaps. Our second experiment compares blind to non-blind evaluations without video interaction: There is no gender gap in either case. These results rule out traditional models of discrimination. Instead, we show that gender gaps widen with extended personal interaction, and are larger for evaluators from regions where implicit association test scores are higher. Video analysis of the interviews further shows that female candidates are more likely to apologize; and interviewers show more dismissive behavior toward women, which is linked to lower ratings. Our findings on the critical role of personal interactions provide a potential reason why correspondence studies often fail to detect gender bias.

### **The Role of Production Hierarchies in Coordinating Specialization**

with Kevin Lim and Aloysius Siow

This paper investigates how firms allocate employees with different skills in its hierarchy, and the consequences on within firm inequality. Since Ricardo, economists have recognized the gains from specialization and the division of labor. In order to take advantage of such specialization, the firm has to produce many task outputs and aggregate them into different final products. Each firm has to decide which tasks to do, who to hire to do them and to coordinate the production and aggregation of these different task outputs. Building on Chandler (1993), this paper provides an analytic framework which shows who does what in the organization which, in the end, produces different task outputs to be aggregated into different final products. The two level hierarchy, consisting of a supervisor and their subordinates, is the building block of this organizational perspective. Complex hierarchies are obtained by concatenating multiple two level hierarchies. Transfer pricing provides a mechanism to coordinate each

two level hierarchy to produce its efficient level of task output. The CEO chooses tasks and executive managers to do those tasks. Given the CEO choices, each executive manager chooses other tasks and subordinates to do those, and so on. The choice of tasks by the CEO affects the productivity of executive managers and propagate further down the chain of command. In this way, strategic and communicational skills of higher level managers have large productivity effects on the firm than the skills of lower level managers, explaining why the growth of managerial earnings increase with the level of the hierarchy.

Last Updated: August 18, 2025