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## **Executive Summary**

### Project Name VegasONE

**Overview** The contract is based on ERC721, but in order to save gas fee, they

chose to inherit ERC721A. In addition it is an upgradeable contract and integrates the eip-712 signature scheme. Here poll creator creates poll calling createPoll() and voters can vote() for the poll creator. A poll can be in waiting, success, expired status. If a poll is successful then poll

creator can mint NFT with the admin recommended signer.

Timeline 10 August, 2022 to 23 September, 2022.

Method Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.

**Scope of Audit** The scope of this audit was to analyse VegasONE codebase for quality,

security, and correctness.

https://github.com/taisys-technologies/audit-exchange/blob/main/contracts/

**Exchange.sol** 

**Fixed in** 44fd44d5bbd3dd6d7594855f89e47fc4143fe7e9



	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0	1	0	0
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0
Resolved Issues	0	1	3	3

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### **Types of Severities**

### High

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

#### **Medium**

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

#### Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

### Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

### **Types of Issues**

#### **Open**

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

#### **Resolved**

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

## **Acknowledged**

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

### **Partially Resolved**

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.

## **Checked Vulnerabilities**

Re-entrancy

✓ Timestamp Dependence

Gas Limit and Loops

Exception Disorder

✓ Gasless Send

✓ Use of tx.origin

Compiler version not fixed

Address hardcoded

Divide before multiply

Integer overflow/underflow

Dangerous strict equalities

Tautology or contradiction

Return values of low-level calls

Missing Zero Address Validation

Private modifier

Revert/require functions

✓ Using block.timestamp

Multiple Sends

✓ Using SHA3

Using suicide

✓ Using throw

✓ Using inline assembly

## **Techniques and Methods**

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

#### **Structural Analysis**

In this step, we have analysed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

#### **Static Analysis**

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

#### **Code Review / Manual Analysis**

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analysed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

### **Gas Consumption**

In this step, we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

#### **Tools and Platforms used for Audit**

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.

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## **Manual Testing**

### A. Contract - EXCHANGE

## **High Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Medium Severity Issues**

#### A1. Negligence for Users With Tokens Less Than Exchange Minimum Value

```
Line Function - ethToVegasONE & erc20ToVegasONE

164 function ethToVegasONE(address walletAddress) external checkIsEnableChange nonReentrant payable {
        uint256 amount = msg.value * ethRate;
        if (amount >= exchangeMinValue){
            require(erc20Token[0].tokenAddress.transfer(walletAddress, amount));
        }
        emit EthExchangeEvnet(walletAddress, msg.value, amount);
    }

172     uint256 vegasONEAmount = amount * token.tokenExchangeRate / token.tokenDecimals;
        require(token.tokenAddress.transferFrom(walletAddress, address(this), amount));
        if (vegasONEAmount >= exchangeMinValue){
                  require(erc20Token[0].tokenAddress.transfer(walletAddress, vegasONEAmount));
        }
```

### **Description**

These critical functions allow for users to interact with the contract with either ethers or one of the accepted ERC20 tokens. After the mathematical computation for the exchange to occur, there is a precondition that checks that the amount of VegasONE token to be sent to the user is greater than the exchange minimum value. However, the contract fails to handle users interacting with little amount. When values less than an ether are sent to the contract, the contract receives these funds without correspondingly sending VegasONE token to the users. If a person sends 1 wBtc, which is padded with 8 zeros, 100000000.

The contract sets the token exchange rate to 1 \* 1e13, which is 1000000000000, padded with 13 zeros.

And the token decimal of wBtc is 8, which is 100000000 According to erc20ToVegasONE, the amount of vegasONEAmount is computed as follows;



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amount \* token.tokenExchangeRate / token.tokenDecimal

100000000 \* 1000000000000 / 100000000

vegasONEAmount = 100000000000000

In that case, vegasONEAmount becomes less than exchangeMinValue (which is 1e18 - 10000000000000000).

Contract won't send any vegasToken because it ignores taking care of that instance. The user gets no VegasONE token in return.

#### Remediation

These functions can be designed to have a revert condition that explains the minimum amount required from users. This will inadvertently prevent receiving ethers or ERC20 tokens from users without giving them VegasONE tokens in return.

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

#### A2. Centralization Power of the Admin

### **Description**

The contract possesses the feature of centralization of power. This feature allows for Admin to withdraw all tokens and ethers sent into the contract.

#### Remediation

If there is any possibility of funds being moved from exchange to any address or platform. make sure to alert users before moving funds about it on social platforms in communities giving reasons why funds are getting moved.

#### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 

## **Low Severity Issues**

### A3. Missing Check for Address Zero

Line	Function - ethWithdraw
192	<pre>function ethWithdraw(address to, uint256 amount) external checkAdmin nonReentrant {     payable(to).transfer(amount);     emit EthDrawEvent(to , amount);</pre>

## **Description**

While the function is restricted to be called by the Admin and possesses a reentrancy prevention check, it fails to check for when address zero is passed as a parameter.

### Remediation

Quality check should be added to the function to avoid sending ethers to the null address.

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

#### A4. Missing Check for Token Existence

Line	Function - setERC20TokenExchangeRate
211	<pre>function setERC20TokenExchangeRate(uint256 tokenID, uint256 rate) external checkAdmin {    erc20Token[tokenID].tokenExchangeRate = rate;    emit SetERC20ExchangeRateEvent(address(erc20Token[tokenID].tokenAddress), rate); }</pre>

### **Description**

This function aids in setting the rate for a token exchange. It fails to check the existence of a token id with the checkTokenIDExist modifier before it sets. The present implementation will allow for setting of tokens that the contract doesn't even recognize.

#### Remediation

If there is any possibility of funds being moved from exchange to any address or platform. make sure to alert users before moving funds about it on social platforms in communities giving reasons why funds are getting moved.

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

### A.5 Use of SafeERC20 library to Avoid Function Call Failure of Some Token

## **Description**

Contract is designed to allow users to interact with several ERC20 tokens with different decimals. Due to the discrepancies of token decimals, there are possibilities of failure when the erc20ToVegasONE function is called, most especially USDT with a token decimal of 6.

#### Remediation

A good strategy to avoid the failure of the function call and to moderate safe token transfer, as a remedy, the integration of SafeERC20 library will aid in this regard.

#### Status

Resolved

## **Informational Issues**

### A6. Change Public Function Visibility to External Function

Line	Function - isEnableExchange
234	<pre>function isEnableExchange() public view returns (bool) {    return enableExchange;</pre>
	}

### **Description**

For gas optimization, public visibility costs more than an external function and from the contract, the isEnableExchange function was not called within the contract.

#### Remediation

It is recommended to declare this function as external to save gas.

#### Status

Resolved

## A7. Absence of Proper Code Comment

### **Description**

Proper code comment is a necessary feature of a standard smart contract because it details the motive behind the business logic and helps for quick understanding of smart contracts by prospective users and developers.

#### Remediation

It is recommended that the whole contract should be properly commented. The Natspec code format is mostly recommended.

#### **Status**

Resolved

#### A8. General Recommendations

### **Description**

The VegasONE exchange contract inherits the reentrancy guard and access enumerable from Openzeppelin. While these contracts aid in handling the administrative role and guarding reentrancy, it is recommended to give critical look to the highlighted issues above; proper code comments, use of external visibility to save gas, check for address zero for critical functions and the function that allows for the swaps of ethers or ERC20 token to VegasONE token.

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

## **Functional Testing**

- Should get the state of the isEnableExchange
- Should revert if not the admin adding an ERC20Token to contract
- Should emit exact events expected when token is added
- Should revert when an unknown account sets ETHExchangeRate
- Should emit expected values when ethExhangeRate is set by admin
- Should revert when an unknown account sets ERC20TokenExchangeRate
- Should emit expected values when ERC20Token Exchange Rate is set by admin
- Should revert when ERC20TokenExchangeRate is set for non-exist token id.
- Should revert when an unknown account sets setContractExchangeStatus
- Should emit expected values when Exchange Status is set by admin
- Should revert when an unknown account sets setTokenExchangeStatus
- Should emit expected values when Token Exchange Status is set by admin
- Should revert when Token Exchange Status is called but token does not exist.
- Should set ExchangeMin Value when admin calls setExchangeMinValue function.
- Should reverts when accounts exchange ethers for VegasONE token but checkIsEnableChange is not active
- Should revert when no ether is sent alongside the ethToVegasONE
- Should allow accounts exchange ethers for vegasONE Token
- Should allow accounts to exchange BUSD for vegasONE Token
- Should allow accounts to exchange USDC for vegasONE Token
- Should allow accounts to exchange BNB for vegasONE Token
- Should allow accounts to exchange wBTC for vegasONE Token
- Should withdraw all ethers to an address after an exchange of ethers to vegasONE token
- Should withdraw BUSD tokens after the exchange of BUSD to vegasONE token
- Should withdraw USDC tokens after the exchange of USDC to vegasONE token

## **Automated Tests**

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tools. All the other issues have been categorized above according to their level of severity

## **Closing Summary**

In this report, we have considered the security of the VegasONE. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Some issues of Medium, Low and informational severity were found, Some suggestions and best practices are also provided in order to improve the code quality and security posture. In the End, VegasOne Team Resolved almost all Issues except one Issue.

## **Disclaimer**

QuillAudits smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the VegasONE Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the VegasONE Team put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.

## **About QuillAudits**

QuillAudits is a secure smart contracts audit platform designed by QuillHash Technologies. We are a team of dedicated blockchain security experts and smart contract auditors determined to ensure that Smart Contract-based Web3 projects can avail the latest and best security solutions to operate in a trustworthy and risk-free ecosystem.



**600+**Audits Completed



**\$15B**Secured



**600K**Lines of Code Audited



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