

# Audit Report June, 2023



For





## **Table of Content**

Executive Summary	01
Checked Vulnerabilities	03
Techniques and Methods	04
Manual Testing	05
High Severity Issues	05
Medium Severity Issues	05
Low Severity Issues	05
Informational Issues	07
Functional Tests	08
Automated Tests	09
Closing Summary	10
About QuillAudits	11



## **Executive Summary**

**Project Name** Donbangseok

Overview The contract is an ERC721 token contract that integrates Openzeppelin

library; . The utilities aid in tracking token id counters, URI

management, and access control mechanism. The contract allows the

contract owner to mint a token to a recipient address while at the

same time assigning receivers for the token royalties.

**Timeline** 29th May, 2023 to 30th May, 2023

Method Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.

**Language** Solidity

**Blockchain** Polygon

**Scope of Audit** The scope of this audit was to analyze the Donbangseok codebase for

quality, security, and correctness.

https://gitlab.com/icraft-bdt-ngin/nft-royalty-contract/-/blob/main/

<u>contracts/DBSNft.sol</u>

Branch: Main

Commit: 13da102165e7b66fc322eda72b7c90b4c82372e6

Contracts in Scope DBSNft.sol

**Fixed in** 77a80c96d3b455cf207debe9ad07985d2c1772bd



	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0	0	0	0
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0
Resolved Issues	0	0	2	2

Donbangseok - Audit Report

01

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### **Types of Severities**

### High

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

#### **Medium**

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

#### Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

### Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

### **Types of Issues**

#### **Open**

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

#### **Resolved**

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

## **Acknowledged**

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

### **Partially Resolved**

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.

## **Checked Vulnerabilities**

Re-entrancy

✓ Timestamp Dependence

Gas Limit and Loops

Exception Disorder

✓ Gasless Send

✓ Use of tx.origin

Compiler version not fixed

Address hardcoded

Divide before multiply

Integer overflow/underflow

Dangerous strict equalities

Tautology or contradiction

Return values of low-level calls

Missing Zero Address Validation

Private modifier

Revert/require functions

✓ Using block.timestamp

Multiple Sends

✓ Using SHA3

Using suicide

✓ Using throw

✓ Using inline assembly

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## **Techniques and Methods**

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

#### **Structural Analysis**

In this step, we have analysed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

#### **Static Analysis**

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

#### **Code Review / Manual Analysis**

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analysed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

#### **Gas Consumption**

In this step, we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

#### **Tools and Platforms used for Audit**

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.

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## **Manual Testing**

### A. Contract - DBSNft.sol

## **High Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Medium Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Low Severity Issues**

#### A.1 Missing Zero Address Check

### **Description**

Some functions in the contract require providing an array of addresses to perform its functionality, however, it fails to check the inclusivity of a null address among the parameters. While it is certain that when the mintNFT function is called, it will revert when null address is passed into it due to the present of the null address check prevent in the safeMint internal function called from ERC721 inherited from Openzeppelin, there is a need to add the check to the updateRoyalties function to avoid setting a null address as a receiver of the null address.

#### Remediation

Add a null address check to the updateRoyalties to prevent making a null address as a receiver.

#### **Status**

#### Resolved

https://gitlab.com/icraft-bdt-ngin/nft-royalty-contract/-/commit/11c1263ae528880259b8a240bce2b1b9aba652ea

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### A.2 Transfer of Ownership Must be a Two-way process

### **Description**

ontracts are integrated with the standard Openzeppelin ownable contract, however, when the owner mistakenly transfers ownership to an incorrect address, ownership is completely removed from the original owner and cannot be reverted. The transferOwnership() function in the ownable contract allows the current owner to transfer his privileges to another address. However, inside transferOwnership(), the newOwner is directly stored in the storage, after validating the newOwner is a non-zero address, which may not be enough.

### Remediation

It would be much safer if the transition is managed by implementing a two-step approach: \_transferOwnership() and \_updateOwnership() . Specifically, the \_transferOwnership () function keeps the new address in the storage, \_newOwner , instead of modifying the \_owner() directly. The updateOwnership() function checks whether \_newOwner is msg.sender, which means \_newOwner signs the transaction and verifies himself as the new owner. After that, \_newOwner could be set into \_owner. You can also use the Openzeppelin Ownable2.

#### Status

#### Resolved

https://gitlab.com/icraft-bdt-ngin/nft-royalty-contract/-/commit/785747c81ba69a87d18b235bce26307561701903

### **Informational Issues**

#### A.3 Floating Solidity Version (pragma solidity ^0.8.11)

### **Description**

Contract has a floating solidity pragma version. This is present also in inherited contracts. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that the contract does not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively. The recent solidity pragma version also possesses its own unique bugs.

#### Remediation

Making the contract use a stable solidity pragma version prevents bugs occurrence that could be ushered in by prospective versions. It is recommended, therefore, to use a fixed solidity pragma version while deploying to avoid deployment with versions that could expose the contract to attack.

#### **Status**

#### Resolved

https://gitlab.com/icraft-bdt-ngin/nft-royalty-contract/-/commit/666a0d443a21155a5eb004bd074f6cf830a7624a

## A.4 Variable Overshadowing

### Description

At the constructor level, the name and symbol variables overshadow the similar variables names used in the original ERC721 contract inherited. This could cause possible breaks in the contract control flow.

#### Remediation

It is recommended to rename the variables or add an underscore to them to differentiate the variables.

#### <u>Reference</u>

#### **Status**

#### **Resolved**

https://gitlab.com/icraft-bdt-ngin/nft-royalty-contract/-/commit/666a0d443a21155a5eb004bd074f6cf830a7624a

## **Functional Tests**

### Some of the tests performed are mentioned below

- Should get the token details after the contract is deployed
- Should allow only owner to mint successfully to recipients, alongside the royalties receivers
- Should revert when the number of receivers in an array is unequal to the percentages
- Should revert when address zero is passed into the safeMint function
- Should revert when the total percentage provided for the receivers is not equal to 100
- Should update the royalties of previously minted tokens.
- Should revert when the receiver array has a null address included.
- Should split incoming funds according to identified shares in percentages.
- Should get royalty information from overridden function from ERC 2981.
- Should create a new instance of payment splitter contract on new token mint.
- Should get royalty percentage for the whole ERc 721 tokens.

## **Automated Tests**

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tools. All the other issues have been categorized above according to their level of severity.

```
INFO:Detectors:

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#60-65):

— (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#63):

Low level call in Address.functionCall\withValue(address,bytes,itring) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#128-137):

— (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)

Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#155-162):

— (success,returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#160)

Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#180-187):

— (success,returndata) = target.delegatecall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#180-187):

— (success,returndata) = target.delegatecall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#180-187):

NFO:Detectors:

Function ERC721.__unsafe_increaseBalance(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#503-505) is not in mixedCase

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

INFO:Slither: analyzed (14 contracts with 85 detectors), 39 result(s) found
```



## **Summary**

In this report, we have considered the security of Donbangseok. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Some issues of low and informational severity were found. Some suggestions and best practices are also provided in order to improve the code quality and security posture.

## **Disclaimer**

QuillAudits smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the Donbangseok Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the Donbangseok Team put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.

## **About QuillAudits**

QuillAudits is a secure smart contracts audit platform designed by QuillHash Technologies. We are a team of dedicated blockchain security experts and smart contract auditors determined to ensure that Smart Contract-based Web3 projects can avail the latest and best security solutions to operate in a trustworthy and risk-free ecosystem.



**850+**Audits Completed



**\$16B**Secured



**800K**Lines of Code Audited



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