

Analyzing Amazon Sidewalk FSK Protocol

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Introduction

Background

- Amazon Sidewalk:
 - Low-bandwidth mesh Internet of Things (IoT) network
 - home automation and security
 - New proprietary FSK (Frequency Shift Keying) communication protocol

Research Goal

- Dissect and analyze the Amazon Sidewalk
 FSK Protocol
- Create a framework for analyzing IoT signals in general
- Important for:
 - Analyzing IoT traffic patterns
 - Evaluating IoT security/privacy

Challenges

- IoT protocols proprietary with little documentation publicly available
- Signals are:
 - Sparse/short in time domain
 - Separated on different frequency channels
 - Encoded with variable encoding schemes


Methodology

This project focuses on building a platform to analyze Software-Defined Radio (SDR)-captured waveforms using the GNU Radio Companion.


Software Setup

- OS: Ubuntu (Linux)
 - Both native Ubuntu and a pre-built Docker file were tested
 - Pre-built Docker image
- Collaboration: GitHub Repository
- Software Tools:
 - <u>GNU Radio</u>: Flowgraph-based programmable radio design





Inspectrum: Spectrogram (frequency versus time) for recorded radio signals; analyzes modulation of waveforms; generates decoded bitstream



- <u>Sublime</u>: Python/C++ editor
- <u>Universal Radio Hacker (URH)</u>: automatic radio signal analysis
- <u>CRC RevEng:</u> Python-evoked tool for reverse engineering Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) error correction codes


Experimental Setup

Amazon Echo isolated in a Faraday cage next to an SDR receiver




Results

Finding Data Packets in Time





- Received data packets are sparse
- Want packets to be back-to-back in the time dimension
- Input: raw signal capture
- <u>Power Squelch block</u>: threshold on signal energy to detect sections with valid data
- Output: file of back-to-back packets



Step 2 Detect packet frequency channel and convert to digital

Part 1: Recovering data bits on known fixed channel

- Shift to known channel and filter
- Latch onto preamble alternating bits as a clock
- Use clock to find bit boundaries and determine if each is a 1 or 0

Manual (Inspectrum)



Automatic (GNU Radio)

Options
Title: Not titled yet
Output Language: Python
Generate Options: No GU
Run Options: Prompt for Exit

File Source
File: ...faraday, overnight.iq
Repeat: No
Add begin tag: ()
Offset: 0
Length: 0
Length: 0

Low Pass Filter
Decimation: 1
Taps: firdes.low_pass(1.5a...
Center Frequency: -750k
Sample Rate: 2M

Cutoff Freq: 150k
Cransition Width: 50k
Window: Hamming
Beta: 6.76

Access Code: Tag Stream
Access Code: Tag Stream
Access Code: Tag Stream
Access Code: Tag Name: preamble

Decimation: 1
Throttle
Sample Rate: 2M

Correlate Access Code: Tag Stream
Access Code: 1100100000100111
Threshold: 2
Tag Name: preamble

Decimation: 1
Tags: firdes.low_pass(1.5a...
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
Decimation: 1
Tags: firdes.low_pass(1.5a...
Correlate Access Code: Tag Stream
Access Code: 1100100000100111
Threshold: 2
Tag Name: preamble

Part 2: Finding the channel

- Input: analog packets from Step 1
 Polyphase Chappelizer blocks
- Polyphase Channelizer block:
 - Divides bandwidth into multiple channels
 - Routes inputs to proper channels
 - Replicates bit recovery (part 1) on each channel
- Output: digital binary data

outo 9 channels; each Recovers bits like out2— known channel Polyphase Channelizer Taps: firdes.low_pass(1,sa...) Oversampling Ratio: 1 Attenuation: 100 Channel Map:

Step 3 Find and extract payload from binary



CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) detection:

Python / CRC RevEng:

- Python code loops through possible payload lengths and payload/CRC positions for 4+ different data+CRC strings
- Feeds to CRC RevEng to find CRC that matches
- Also try:
 - Different CRC lengths
 - Invert CRC bits (bitwise XOR)

Universal Radio Hacker (URH):

- URH can generate and check CRCs by testing different CRC parameters and other checksums
- Representations such as bit, hex, and ASCII viewable in URH can also be used to help identify CRCs

Discussion/
Conclusions

Accomplishments:


- Captured wireless signals of the Amazon's FSK radio and YoLink's LoRa protocols using SDR and analyzed them in Inspectrum
- Created programmable method of capturing, channelizing, and decoding FSK packets of Amazon Sidewalk
- Demonstrated both manual (Inspectrum + Python) and automatic (GNU Radio / Universal Radio Hacker) methods of processing packets
 - Manual: easier to grasp at first
 - Automatic: better for large-scale operations
- Extracted packet features like center frequency, bandwidth, bitrate, etc.
- Attempted to reverse engineer CRC (cyclic redundancy check) using RevEng tool

Future Research:

- Finding exact CRC algorithm and automatically validating CRC in GNU Radio
- Implementing real-time GNU Radio receiver automating packet processing from input signal to outputted payload data

Discussion:

- Long preamble with respect to packet size
 - Conjecture: reliable long range communication



- Fixed portions across several packets from same device can help with detecting encoding schemes (especially the sync word) and identifying possible sources
- Power-based packet detection was only tested for single channel case without multiple packets coming in simultaneously
- Same setup applicable to other IoT protocols
 - Steps customizable for different signal strengths, channels, and encoding schemes

Acknowledgements

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