

# VC-ZKLang

## Specification of Privacy-Enhancing Implementation of Verifiable Claims

Jan Camenisch      Manu Drijvers      ?

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### **Abstract**

This document specifies an language that allow one to describe the cryptographic protocols that will generate a cryptographic token as a witness to a verifiable claim. The cryptographic protocol that will then be executed from this specification should be (but need not be) such that the token is not linkable to the credentials on which it is based.

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# 1 ZKLang

If credentials are key-bound, they are required to be bound to the same (secret) key.

At this level, all message  $m_i$  are integers. Terms that the language supports are the following ones.

$$\text{NIZK}\{(m_i)_{i \in h}[m]_{i \notin h} : \text{Credential}(\text{issuer\_public\_key}, m_1, m_2, m_3)\} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{NIZK}\{() : \text{Nym}(\text{nym})\} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{NIZK}\{() : \text{SNym}(\text{nym}, \text{scope})\} \quad (3)$$

$$\text{NIZK}\{(m) : \text{Enc}(\text{epk}, m, \text{ctxt})\} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{NIZK}\{(m) : \text{Larger}(m, c)\} \quad (5)$$

$$\text{NIZK}\{(m) : \text{Smaller}(m, c)\} \quad (6)$$

$$\text{NIZK}\{(m) : \text{Member}(m, c)\} \quad (7)$$

Example composition of a statement.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NIZK}\{(m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4)[m_5] : \\ \text{Credential}(\text{ipk}_1, m_1, m_2, m_3) \wedge \text{Credential}(\text{ipk}_2, m_1, m_4, m_5) \wedge \\ \text{Nym}(\text{nym}) \wedge \text{Larger}(m_3, c)\} \end{aligned}$$

Explanations of stuff

## 2 Mapping Verifiable Claims to ZKLang

This mapping will depend on the credential specification of the issuer of a credentials.

### 2.1 Mapping the different types to integers

### 2.2 Age proof

### 2.3 Membership proof

## 3 Realization of ZKLang Components

We could do all of this with X509 credentials, but then have no privacy features. We here concentrate on how to do this with the privacy features.

We assume that the system parameters describe a groups  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ , of prime order  $q$ , with efficiently computable bilinear map  $e$ . We further assume here that all attributes  $m_i$  are elements of  $Z_q$ , and consider the encoding of other typed attribute values in different sections.

### 3.1 CL signatures

A credential will take the form of a signature created by an issuer. As we want to prove knowledge of credentials, we need “signatures with efficient protocols”, also called CL signatures [CL03]. Examples are the RSA-based CL signature [CL03], the pairing-based CL signature [CL04], and the BBS+ signature scheme [BBS04, ASMC13]. We recall the BBS+ signature scheme:

**Key Generation** Take  $(h_0, \dots, h_L) \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1^{L+1}$ ,  $x \leftarrow Z_q^*$ ,  $w \leftarrow g_2^x$ , and set  $sk = x$  and  $pk = (w, h_0, \dots, h_L)$ .

**Signature** On input message  $(m_1, \dots, m_L) \in Z_q^L$  and secret key  $x$ , pick  $e, s \leftarrow Z_q$  and compute  $A \leftarrow (g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^L h_i^{m_i})^{\frac{1}{e+x}}$ . Output signature  $\sigma \leftarrow (A, e, s)$ .

**Verification** On input a public key  $(w, h_0, \dots, h_L) \in \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_1^{L+1}$ , message  $(m_1, \dots, m_L) \in Z_q^L$ , and purported signature  $(A, e, s) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times Z_q^2$ , check  $e(A, w g_2^e) = e(g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^L h_i^{m_i}, g_2)$ .

We can use the following zero-knowledge proof to prove knowledge of a BBS+ signature, while selectively disclosing the attributes [CDL16]: The prover has signature  $\sigma \leftarrow (A, e, s)$  with  $A = (g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^L h_i^{m_i})^{\frac{1}{e+x}}$ . He can prove knowledge of a BBS+ signature while selectively disclosing messages  $m_i$  with  $i \in D$ . Randomize the credential by taking  $r_1 \leftarrow Z_q^*$ , set  $A' \leftarrow A^{r_1}$ , and set  $r_3 \leftarrow \frac{1}{r_1}$ . Set  $\bar{A} \leftarrow A'^{-e} \cdot b^{r_1} (= A'^x)$ . Choose  $r_2 \leftarrow Z_p$ , set  $d \leftarrow (g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^L h_i^{m_i})^{r_1} \cdot h_0^{-r_2}$ , and set  $s' \leftarrow s - r_2 \cdot r_3$ . The prover now proves

$$\pi \in SPK\{(\{m_i\}_{i \notin D}, e, r_2, r_3, s') : \bar{A}/d = A'^{-e} \cdot h_0^{r_2} \wedge g_1 \prod_{i \in D} h_i^{m_i} = d^{r_3} h_0^{-s'} \prod_{i \notin D} h_i^{-m_i}\}.$$

The resulting proof consists of  $(A', \bar{A}, d, \pi)$ . To verify a proof, the verifier checks  $A' \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_1}$ ,  $e(A', X) = e(\bar{A}, g_2)$ , and verifies  $\pi$ .

### 3.2 Pseudonyms

Pseudonyms will be formed from Pedersen commitments [Ped92]. Let  $g_1$  and  $h_1$  be generators of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ .

**Commit** To commit to a value  $m_1 \in Z_q$ , take  $r \leftarrow Z_q$  and output  $c \leftarrow g_1^{m_1} h_1^r$ .

**ComVf** To verify that  $c$  commits to  $m_1$  with opening  $r$ , check  $c \stackrel{?}{=} g_1^{m_1} h_1^r$ .

One can efficiently prove that a pseudonym  $nym$  is correctly constructed by proving

$$\pi \in SPK\{(m_1, r) : nym = g_1^{m_1} h_1^r\}.$$

### 3.3 Range proofs

### 3.4 Verifiable Encryption

### 3.5 Orchestration

## References

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