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FINAL REPORT:

Amphor

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1. Project Details

Project	Amphor
Website	https://amphor.io
Type	Vault
Language	Solidity
Methods	Manual Analysis
Github repository	https://github.com/AmphorProtocol/synthetic-vault

2. Detections Overview

Severity	Found	Resolved	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged (no change made)
High	0			
Medium	0			
Low	0			
Informational	6	1		4
Governance	1			1
Quality assurance	1	1		
Total	8	2		5

2.1 Detection Definitions

Severity	Description
High	The problem poses a significant threat to the confidentiality of a considerable number of users' sensitive data. It also has the potential to cause severe damage to the client's reputation or result in substantial financial losses for both the client and the affected users.
Medium	While medium level vulnerabilities may not be easy to exploit, they can still have a major impact on the execution of a smart contract. For instance, they may allow public access to critical functions, which could lead to serious consequences.
Low	Poses a very low-level risk to the project or users. Nevertheless the issue should be fixed immediately
Informational	Effects are small and do not post an immediate danger to the project or users
Governance	Governance privileges which can directly result in a loss of funds or other potential undesired behavior
Quality assurance	Aggregated minor issues, ensuring a high quality codebase.

3. Detection

AmphorSyntheticVault.sol

This audit delves into a distinctive vault contract that seamlessly amalgamates OpenZeppelin's reputable ERC4626 library functionalities with innovative features tailored for specific operational requirements.

At its core, the contract facilitates the standard deposit and withdrawal of tokens by users. However, the unique twist lies in its custodial mechanism: the owner can, at opportune moments, transition the vault into a 'custody mode', thereby assuming control over the vault's assets.

During this phase, standard user operations like deposits and withdrawals are temporarily suspended, effectively freezing the vault's activities. The ownership's subsequent ending of the 'custody mode' comes with expectations of a repayment amount that ideally exceeds the original withdrawal, suggesting a gainful interim use of the funds. If this scenario materializes, the contract astutely applies a fee on the differential profit.

While this fee rate is mutable at the discretion of the owner, it's been capped at 30% to foster a sense of balance and deter potential profiteering. The vault's operational heartbeat is regulated by the `vaultIsOpen` state variable, toggling between two primary modes:

The 'Open Mode': A user-centric phase permitting the free flow of deposits and withdrawals, also serving as the default stance after the contract's deployment.

The 'Custody Mode': An owner-centric phase, activated when the owner appropriates the vault's assets, leading to a temporary cessation of standard user activities.

Supplementing these core functionalities, the vault is fortified with a pause mechanism, a prudent inclusion to counteract unforeseen vulnerabilities or external adversities, ensuring a sanctuary for the staked assets, which at this point, only limitates supplying the vault, not withdrawing.

In summation, the vault contract is a harmonious blend of traditional ERC20 functions and avant-garde custodial and profit-sharing protocols. While its architectural aspirations are aimed at augmenting profitability and ensuring asset security, it

mandates an exhaustive audit to guarantee its reliability in the decentralized finance landscape.

The Amphor development team ensured that the start and end operations will be done using a multisig contract, which provides additional safety mechanisms in the scenario of a private key leakage.

Addition:

The Amphor team provided the following commit as audit addition:
dac041f25ef9b5ecf7ecc3e6b173da12bcc4d46d, which includes two additions:

1. ERC20Permit is inherited by the AmphorSyntheticVault. This allows the transmission of approvals if the token owner signs a correct message.

A simple example will illustrate this scenario:

Bob has 10e18 vault tokens but no gas token in his wallet. Bob can sign an off-chain message, which allows anyone to call the `_approve` function on behalf of Bob. Such that Bob can make an approval for Alice, allowing her to spend his 10 vault tokens.

2. A `restruct` function has been implemented, which artificially emits the event emission of an epoch end and an epoch start, atomically. This is likely used to track the intermediate state of the investment strategy.

Issue	<i>lastSavedBalance might be misinterpreted</i>
Severity	Informational
Description	Whenever the restructure function is called, the lastSavedBalance will still be the balance which was initially used to start the latest round. However, since the underlying investment strategy might already have been profitable, we are of the opinion that it might make sense to return the intermediate asset value of the vault.
Recommendations	We recommend thinking about this suggestion and eventually allowing to pass a parameter to this function which reflects the intermediate balance in the underlying strategy. This parameter could also be similar to the virtualReturnedAsset parameter, indicating that the full amount was paid back artificially.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue	Governance privileges
Severity	Governance
Description	The vault grants the owner extensive centralized control over its operations, including asset transfers and opening/closing mechanisms. If the owner's private keys were compromised, an attacker could potentially misuse these privileges, leading to loss of funds, inaccurate asset accounting, and disruption of the vault's functions.
Recommendations	The owner should be strictly kept under a multisig with trusted participants.
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged.

Issue	Virtual shares concept is not a guarantee for preventing inflation attacks
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The virtual shares concept was implemented by OpenZeppelin to prevent the inflation attack. This happens by increasing the totalSupply artificially, with the following desired effect:</p> <p>a) Preventing the following calculation to round down to zero:</p> $\text{assets} * \text{totalSupply} / \text{totalAssets}$ <p>b) Decreasing the value which is received during a withdrawal</p> <p>We will illustrate this logic with a simple PoC, using OpenZeppelin's standard configuration offset = 0:</p> <p>1) Alice deposits 1 WEI</p> <p>totalAssets = 1 totalSupply = 1 shares[Alice] = 1</p> <p>2) Alice sends 100 000e18 tokens directly to the vault</p> <p>totalAssets = 100 000e18 + 1 wei (to simplify this PoC, we will ignore this 1 wei) totalSupply = 1 shares[Alice] = 1</p> <p>3) Bob deposits 10 000e18 tokens</p> $\text{assets} * \text{totalSupply} + 1 / \text{totalAssets} + 1$


```
10 000e18 * 2 / 100000e18 = 0
```

```
totalAssets = 110 000e18
```

```
totalSupply = 1
```

```
shares[Alice] = 1
```

```
shares[Bob] = 0
```

Bob therefore did not receive any shares.

4) Alice attempts to redeem her 1 share

```
1 * 110 000e18 / 2 = 55 000e18
```

As one can see, this attack was not profitable for Alice due to the virtual shares concept. However, within the normal business logic, this will not be the case, if Bob would have deposited multiple times or other deposits would have followed, Alice's attack would then be profitable.

This issue can be fixed with increasing the offset to a larger value, however, it must be noted that the larger the offset, the larger potential losses for users during the withdrawal, since the virtual shares will gather a part of the deposits, OpenZeppelin commented on this issue as follows:

The drawback of this approach is that the virtual shares do capture (a very small) part of the value being accrued to the vault. Also, if the vault experiences losses, the users try to exit the vault, the virtual shares and assets will cause the first user to exit to experience reduced losses in detriment to the last users that will experience bigger losses. Developers willing to revert back to the pre-v4.9 behavior just need to override the `_convertToShares` and `_convertToAssets` functions.

While the offset is increased, this will make it almost impossible for an

attacker to become profitable, however, it can still result in a loss of user funds, which is illustrated in the two following PoC's:

For both PoC's, an offset of 4 is selected, which is derived from Uniswap V2's logic of burning an initial amount:

<https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core/blob/master/contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol#L121>

1) Alice deposits 1 WEI and sends 10_000_000e18 tokens directly to the contract

$$\text{assets} * (\text{totalSupply} + 1e4) / (\text{totalAssets} + 1)$$
$$1 * 1e4 / 1 = 1e4$$

-> totalSupply = 1e4

-> totalAssets = 100_000e18 + 1 wei (we will ignore the 1 wei to simplify this PoC)

2) Bob deposits 100e18 tokens, now we will use the virtual share solution using a valid amount of 1e4 as offset:

$$\text{assets} * (\text{totalSupply} + 1e4) / (\text{totalAssets} + 1)$$
$$100e18 * (1e4 + 1e4) / 10_000_000e18 = 0.2 \rightarrow 0 \text{ since solidity rounds down}$$

As one can see, Bob's value still rounds down to zero, which is essentially determined by the offset <-> totalAssets ratio, the higher the offset, the larger the totalAssets, to execute this attack.

Of course, this attack will not be profitable for Alice, but funds can still be lost for Bob.

The strategy to prevent this issue is simply by reverting if the shares are zero.

However, there is yet another PoC that even circumvents the zero check:

1) Alice deposits 1 WEI and sends 10_000_000e18 tokens directly to the contract

$$\text{assets} * (\text{totalSupply} + 1\text{e}4) / (\text{totalAssets} + 1)$$

-> totalSupply = 1e4

-> totalAssets = 10_00_000e18 + 1 wei (we will ignore the 1 wei to simplify this PoC)

2) Bob deposits 9900e18 tokens, now we will use the virtual share solution using a valid amount of 4 as offset:

$$\text{assets} * (\text{totalSupply} + 1\text{e}4) / (\text{totalAssets} + 1)$$

$9900\text{e}18 * (1\text{e}4 + 1\text{e}4) / 10_000_000\text{e}18 = 19.8 \rightarrow 19$ since solidity rounds down.

As one can see, it is not only possible to manipulate the vault to return zero shares, but also possible to create such an environment to round shares down so that a user receives less than he should and bypass a potential non-zero check.

Recommendations

We understand that multiple PoC's might be confusing, therefore we will keep the fix recommendation as simple as possible:

- a) Reverting if the share calculation returns zero
- b) Allowing the user to input a minShares/AssetsOut parameter (this should be applied to deposit/withdraw/redeem/mint, with the corresponding parameter. This will then prevent if accidentally a user

	<p>receives less shares than expected.</p> <p>While resolution b) is quite trivial, it is unfortunately not common knowledge yet. BailSec attempts to improve the web3 security space by recommending best-practices which we think should be implemented by all protocols.</p>
Comments / Resolution	Resolved, the Amphor team implemented a depositMinShares and mintMaxAssets function.

Issue	<i>claimToken can be bypassed for tokens with multiple entry points</i>
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>Specific tokens, such as TrueUSD, might have different entry points, which can be abused to bypass address checks, such as in the claimToken function.</p> <p>More information on this topic can be found here:</p> <p>https://medium.com/chainsecurity/trueusd-compound-vulnerability-bc5b696d29e2</p>
Recommendations	<p>While we do not see any bad impact at this point, we still are of the opinion that it is necessary to raise awareness for this potential issue.</p> <p>No action is needed here besides of double checking that no such tokens are added.</p>
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged

Issue	Vault does not work with transfer-tax tokens
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>Within the vault + custody architecture are multiple spots which do not align with transfer-tax tokens.</p> <p>As an example, within the start and end functions, tokens will be lost during the transfer, which will leave users with a loss. Moreover, users would receive shares based on the amount pre-tax, when depositing.</p>
Recommendations	<p>Consider simply not using such tokens or ensure that they are whitelisted.</p> <p>Making vaults transfer-tax compatible will come with potential reentrancy risk which must be carefully inspected, since the Amphor team does not plan to use such tokens, we do not see a fix necessity here.</p>
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged, such tokens will not be used.

Issue	Checks-effects-interactions pattern is violated
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The checks-effects-interactions pattern is a fundamental best practice in smart contract design to prevent reentrancy attacks. In the end function, the <code>vaultIsOpen</code> status is set to <code>true</code> after funds have already been transferred out.</p> <p>This sequence deviates from the recommended pattern, wherein state changes (like setting <code>vaultIsOpen</code>) should be executed before</p>

	<p>any external calls or transfers.</p> <p>Generally speaking, such deviations can expose the contract to vulnerabilities, potentially leading to unauthorized access or fund theft. Adhering to the checks-effects-interactions pattern is essential to ensure the contract's robustness and security.</p> <p>More information about this topic can be found here:</p> <p>https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.6.11/security-considerations.html</p>
Recommendations	The state variable change should be executed before the asset transfer.
Comments / Resolution	<p>Acknowledged</p> <p>Amphor Team comment: <i>"We've decided not to apply this recommendation because setting the vaultIsOpen variable to false locks out withdrawals. It therefore seems more logical to us to perform this lock before calling an external contract."</i></p>

Issue	Codebase is vulnerable for frontend phishing
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>Multiple functions such as the deposit or mint function allow for a receiver parameter, this will be the address receiving the shares.</p> <p>In the scenario of a compromised frontend, this can lead to a direct loss of user funds.</p>
Recommendations	Maintaining a strong emphasis on the security of the web2 component is crucial, especially given the increasing prevalence of frontend attacks in today's landscape.

Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged
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Issue	Quality assurance
Severity	Quality assurance
Description	<p>All typographical and minor issues have been aggregated in the Quality Assurance section for clarity and comprehensive review.</p> <p>L 63:</p> <p>address public immutable asset;</p> <p>This variable can be directly casted to type IERC20, which saves operational overhead during the business logic.</p> <p>L 455:</p> <p>An inconsistency between withdraw/redeem and deposit/mint is present, regarding the visibility, to comply with best practices, all functions should have the same visibility. Moreover, the virtual keyword can be removed as these functions are not overridden.</p> <p>L 614:</p> <p>For consistency reasons, the lastSavedBalance variable should be reset during the end function.</p>
Recommendations	All aforementioned issues should be fixed.
Comments / Resolution	Resolved