Data Integrity

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client.py

Intercepted Data:

A legitimate message ("amount=100&to=alice") and its HMAC (intercepted mac) are captured.

Attacker's Goal:

Append malicious data (e.g. "&admin=true") to the message without knowing the secret key used in the HMAC.

Key Assumption:

The attacker assumes the secret key is of a certain length (key_length = 14).

The attack only works if the guessed length is correct.

Attack Execution:

Uses hashpumpy.hashpump() to generate:

A forged message: original + padding + malicious data

A forged MAC for the new message Verification:

The forged message and MAC are passed to the server's verify() function.

If the server accepts them, the attack succeeded.

```
C: > Users > User > Documents > ♥ client.py > ...
      import hashpumpy # type: ignore
      import server # Assuming server.py has the 'verify' function
      def perform attack():
          # Step 1: Intercepted values from the server
          intercepted message = b"amount=100&to=alice" # Original message intercepted
          intercepted mac = "614d28d808af46d3702fe35fae67267c" # Original MAC from server.py output
          # Step 2: Malicious data to append
          data to append = b"&admin=true" # Attack data
          # Step 3: Key length (this should match the secret key length used in the server)
          key length = 14  # Adjust based on the server's secret key length
          result = hashpumpy.hashpump(intercepted mac, intercepted message, data to append, key length)
          forged mac = result[0]
          forged message = result[1] # Already bytes, no need to encode
          # Step 5: Extract forged MAC and message
          # Print forged message and MAC
          print("=== Attacker Simulation ===")
          print("Forged message:", forged_message)
          print("Forged MAC:", forged mac)
          # Step 6: Use server's verify function to check if the forged MAC is valid
          if server.verify(forged message, forged mac):
              print("MAC verified successfully (attack succeeded!)")
          else:
              print("MAC verification failed (attack failed)")
      if name == " main ":
          perform_attack()
```

```
def perform attack():
   # Step 1: Intercepted values from the server
  intercepted message = b"amount=100&to=alice" # Original message intercepted
   intercepted mac = "614d28d808af46d3702fe35fae67267c" # Original MAC from server.py output
   # Step 2: Malicious data to append
   data to append = b"&admin=true" # Attack data
   # Step 3: Key length (this should match the secret key length used in the server)
  key length = 14 # Adjust based on the server's secret key length
  # Step 4: Perform length extension attack using hashpumpy
   result = hashpumpy.hashpump(intercepted mac, intercepted message, data to append, key length)
   forged mac = result[0]
   forged_message = result[1] # Already bytes, no need to encode
```

Steps 1 to 4

Step 1: Intercept original message and MAC

- The attacker captures a valid message and its MAC from a real request.
- •Step 2: Prepare malicious data to append
- •The attacker defines new data they want to add to the message.
- •Step 3: Guess the secret key length
- •The attacker makes an educated guess about how long the secret key is.
- •This guess is important for the attack to succeed.
- •Step 4: Run the length extension attack
- •Using hashpumpy, the attacker creates:
 - •A new forged message (original + padding + malicious data)
 - •A new forged MAC that looks valid

Step5 and 6

Step 5: Display forged data

The attacker prints the results of the attack:

- forged_message: the new message (original + padding + &admin=true)
- forged_mac: the fake MAC that was generated using hashpumpy

Step 6: Test if the attack worked

- This line asks the server to verify the forged message and MAC.
- If the server accepts them, the attack was successful.
- If not, the attack failed (probably due to incorrect key length).

```
# Step 5: Extract forged MAC and message
# Print forged message and MAC
print("=== Attacker Simulation ===")
print("Forged message:", forged_message)
print("Forged MAC:", forged mac)
# Step 6: Use server's verify function to check if the forged MAC is valid
if server.verify(forged_message, forged_mac):
   print("MAC verified successfully (attack succeeded!)")
else:
    print("MAC verification failed (attack failed)")
perform_attack()
```

client_mitg.py

To demonstrate that a server using insecure MAC generation (e.g., raw SHA256(secret + message)) can be tricked into accepting a tampered message with a valid MAC, using only the original message and MAC.

- The attack exploits weaknesses in hash functions like MD5 or SHA1 when used improperly in MAC construction.
- Proper use of HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) prevents such attacks.
- The attacker must guess the secret key length correctly for the attack to work

```
> Users > User > Documents > 🏺 client_mitq.py > ...
 import hashpumpy # type; ignore
    import server mitg # Assuming server.py has the 'verify' function
    def perform attack():
        # Step 1: Intercepted values from the server
        intercepted message = b"amount=100&to=alice" # Original message intercepted
        intercepted mac = "a86f897948d15c923c1f77133e805c707ca4fa752e3960efde47d618425027d5" # Original MAC from server mitg.py output
        # Step 2: Malicious data to append
        data to append = b"&admin=true" # Attack data
        # Step 3: Key length (this should match the secret key length used in the server)
        key length = 14 # Adjust based on the server's secret key length
        # Step 4: Perform length extension attack using hashpumpy
        result = hashpumpy.hashpump(intercepted mac, intercepted message, data to append, key length)
        forged mac = result[0]
        forged message = result[1] # Already bytes, no need to encode
        # Step 5: Extract Forged MAC and message
        # Print forged message and MAC
        print("=== Attacker Simulation ===")
        print("Forged message:", forged message)
        print("Forged MAC:", forged mac)
        # Step 6: Use server's verify function to check if the forged MAC is valid
        if server mitg.verify(forged message, forged mac):
            print("MAC verified successfully (attack succeeded!)")
            print("MAC verification failed (attack failed)")
    if name = " main ":
        perform attack()
```

Steps 1 to 4

- Step 1: Intercepted values from the server
- The attacker captures the original message (amount=100&to=alice) and its corresponding MAC from the server.
- These are necessary to craft a forged message.

Step 2: Malicious data to append

• The attacker defines extra data (&admin=true) they want to add to the original message to escalate privileges.

Step 3: Key length

- The attacker guesses the length of the secret key used by the server in the MAC.
- This guess must be correct for the attack to work.
- Step 4: Perform length extension attack using hashpumpy
- The attacker uses hashpumpy.hashpump to generate:
 - A forged MAC valid for the extended message.
 - A forged message consisting of the original message plus padding and the malicious appended data
- Step 5: Print forged message and MAC
- The forged message and forged MAC are printed for inspection.
- This shows the attacker's modified message and its new valid MAC.
- Step 6: Verify forged MAC using the server's function
- The forged message and MAC are sent to the server's verify() function.
- If verification passes, the attack succeeded; otherwise, it failed

server.p

Secret key:

A 14-byte secret key (b'supersecretkey') is defined but unknown to attackers.

MAC generation (generate_mac):

The MAC is computed by hashing the concatenation of the secret key and the message

MAC verification (verify):

The server recalculates the MAC for the received message and compares it to the provided MAC.

f they match, the message is considered authentic.

Simulation in main():

The server generates a MAC for an original message (b"amount=100&to=alice").

It verifies this original message successfully.

Then, a forged message is created by appending &admin=true to the original message.

The attacker naïvely reuses the original MAC to verify the forged message.

Verification fails as expected, showing that the server rejects this tampered message if no length extension attack is done.

```
> Users > User > Documents > 🕏 server.py > ...
    import hashlib
    SECRET KEY = b'supersecretkey' #14 byte Unknown to attacker
    print(len(b'supersecretkey'))
    def generate mac(message: bytes) -> str:
        return hashlib.md5(SECRET_KEY + message).hexdigest()
    def verify(message: bytes, mac: str ) -> bool:
        expected mac = generate mac(message)
        return mac == expected mac
    def main():
        message = b"amount=100&to=alice"
        mac = generate mac(message)
        print("=== Server Simulation ===")
        print(f"Original message: {message}")
        print(f"MAC: {mac}")
        print("\n- Verifying legitimate message --")
        if verify(message, mac):
            print("MAC verified successfully. Message is authentic.\n")
        # Simulated attacker-forged message
        forged message = b"amount=100&to=alice" + b"&admin=true"
        forged mac = mac # Attacker provides same MAC (initially)
        print("--- Verifying forged message ---")
        if verify(forged message, forged mac):
            print("MAC verified successfully (unexpected).")
            print("MAC verification failed (as expected).")
    if name _ _ _ main ":
        main()
```

• Secret key:

A 14-byte secret key (b'supersecretkey') is used to sign messages. The key is unknown to the attacker.

MAC generation (generate_mac):

The MAC is generated using Python's hmac module with SHA-256: <hmac.new(SECRET_KEY, message, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() > This method securely combines the key and message to prevent vulnerabilities.

MAC verification (verify):

Recomputes the MAC on the received message and compares it with the provided MAC.

Returns True if they match, indicating authenticity.

Simulation in main():

Generates a MAC for the original message "amount=100&to=alice".

Verifies the original message successfully.

Attempts to verify a forged message with appended data "&admin=true" but using the original MAC.

Verification fails, showing the system correctly detects tampering.

server_mitg.p

```
> Users > User > Documents > ♦ server_mitg.py > ...
     import hmac
     import hashlib
     SECRET KEY = b'supersecretkey' # 14 byte Unknown to attacker
     def generate mac(message: bytes) -> str:
         # Using HMAC with SHA-256
         return hmac.new(SECRET_KEY, message, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
     def verify(message: bytes, mac: str) -> bool:
         expected mac = generate mac(message)
         return mac == expected mac
     def main():
         message = b"amount=100&to=alice"
         mac = generate_mac(message)
         print("=== Server Simulation ===")
         print(f"Original message: {message.decode()}")
         print(f"MAC: {mac}")
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         print("\n--- Verifying legitimate message ---");
         if verify(message, mac):
             print("MAC verified successfully. Message is authentic.\n")
         # Simulated attacker-forged message
         forged message = b"amount=100&to=alice" + b"&admin=true"
         forged mac = mac # Attacker provides same MAC (initially)
         print("--- Verifying forged message ---")
         if verify(forged message, forged mac):
             print("MAC verified successfully (unexpected).")
         else:
             print("MAC verification failed (as expected).")
```

server_mitg.py

```
Users > User > Documents > 💠 server_mitg.py > ...
   if name == " main ":
   import hmac
   import hashlib
   SECRET KEY = b'supersecretkey' # 14 byte Unknown to attacker
   def generate mac(message: bytes) -> str:
       # Using HMAC with SHA-256
       return hmac.new(SECRET_KEY, message, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
   def verify(message: bytes, mac: str) > bool:
       expected mac = generate mac(message)
       return mac -- expected mac
   def main():
       # Example message
       message = b"amount=100&to=alice"
       mac = generate mac(message)
       print("--- Server Simulation ---")
       print(f"Original message: (message.decode())")
       print(f"MAC: {mac}")
       print("\n Verifying legitimate message ")
       if verify(message, mac):
           print("MAC verified successfully, Message is authentic.\n")
       # Simulated attacker forged message
       forged message = b"amount=100&to=alice" + b"&admin=true"
       forged mac - mac # Attacker provides same MAC (initially)
       print("--- Verifying forged message ---")
       if verify(forged message, forged mac):
           print("MAC verified successfully (unexpected).")
           print("MAC verification failed (as expected).")
```

This Python script simulates the generation and verification of a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using HMAC with SHA-256, which is a secure method to verify message integrity and authenticity.

Key points:

Secret key (SECRET_KEY) is used to generate the MAC and is unknown to any attacker.

MAC generation is done securely with hmac.new() using SHA-256.

The verify function recalculates the MAC for a given message and checks if it matches the provided MAC.

The script tests two cases:

Legitimate message: The original message and MAC match, so verification succeeds.

Forged message: The message is altered by appending &admin=true, but the attacker uses the original MAC. Verification fails, demonstrating the security of HMAC.

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