

# Part 8: Policy Evaluation- Marginal Treatment Effects

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Applied Econometrics

## Marginal Treatment Effects

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# One quantity to rule them all: MTE

- Consider a treatment effect  $\beta_i = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$ .
- Think about a single-index such that  $T_i = 1(v_i \leq Z_i'\gamma)$ .
- Think about the person for whom  $v_i = Z_i'\gamma$  (just barely untreated).

$$\Delta^{MTE}(X_i, v_i) = E[\beta_i | X_i, v_i = Z_i'\gamma]$$

- MTE is average impact of receiving a treatment for everyone with the same  $Z'\gamma$ .
- For any single index model we can rewrite

$$T_i = 1(v_i \leq Z_i'\gamma) = 1(u_{is} \leq F(Z_i'\gamma)) \text{ for } u_s \in [0, 1]$$

- $F$  is just the cdf of  $v_i$
- Now we can write  $P(Z) = Pr(T = 1|Z) = F(Z'\gamma)$ .

# MTE: Derivation

Now we can write,

$$Y_0 = \gamma'_0 X + U_0$$

$$Y_1 = \gamma'_1 X + U_1$$

$P(T = 1|Z) = P(Z)$  works as our instrument with two assumptions:

1.  $(U_0, U_1, u_s) \perp P(Z)|X$ . (Exogeneity)
2. Conditional on  $X$  there is enough variation in  $Z$  for  $P(Z)$  to take on all values  $\in (0, 1)$ .
  - This is much stronger than typical **relevance** condition. Much more like the **special regressor** method we will discuss next time.

# MTE: Derivation

Now we can write,

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= \gamma'_0 X + T(\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)' X + U_0 + T(U_1 - U_0) \\ E[Y|X, P(Z) = p] &= \gamma'_0 X + p(\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)' X + E[T(U_1 - U_0)|X, P(Z) = p] \end{aligned}$$

Observe  $T = 1$  over the interval  $u_s = [0, p]$  and zero for higher values of  $u_s$ . Let  $U_1 - U_0 \equiv \eta$ .

$$\begin{aligned} E[T(U_1 - U_0)|P(Z) = p, X] &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^p (U_1 - U_0) f((U_1 - U_0)|U_s = u_s) du_s d(U_1 - U_0) \\ E[T(\eta)|P(Z) = p, X] &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^p \eta f(\eta|U_s = u_s) d\eta du_s \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^{MTE}(p) &= \frac{\partial E[Y|X, P(Z) = p]}{\partial p} = (\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)' X + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \eta f(\eta|U_s = p) d\eta \\ &= (\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)' X + E[\eta|u_s = p] \end{aligned}$$

What is  $E[\eta|u_s = p]$ ? The expected unobserved gain from treatment of those people who are on the treatment/no-treatment margin  $P(Z) = p$

# How to Estimate an MTE

Easy

1. Estimate  $P(Z) = Pr(T = 1|Z)$  nonparametrically (include exogenous part of  $X$  in  $Z$ ).
2. Nonparametric regression of  $Y$  on  $X$  and  $P(Z)$  (polynomials?)
3. Differentiate w.r.t.  $P(Z)$
4. plot it for all values of  $P(Z) = p$ .

So long as  $P(Z)$  covers  $(0, 1)$  then we can trace out the full distribution of  $\Delta^{MTE}(p)$ .

# Everything is an MTE

Calculate the outcome given  $(X, Z)$  (actually  $X$  and  $P(Z) = p$ ).

- ATE : This one is obvious. We treat everyone!

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \Delta^{MTE}(p) = (\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)'X + \underbrace{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} E(\eta|u_s) du_s}_0$$

- LATE: Fix an  $X$  and  $P(Z)$  varies from  $b(X)$  to  $a(X)$  and we integrated over the area between (compliers).

$$LATE(X) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \Delta^{MTE}(p) = (\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)'X + \frac{1}{a(X) - b(X)} \int_{b(X)}^{a(X)} E(\eta|u_s) du_s$$

- ATT

$$TT(X) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \Delta^{MTE}(p) \frac{Pr(P(Z|X) > p)}{E[P(Z|X)]} dp$$

- Weights for IV and OLS are a bit more complicated. See the Heckman and Vytlacil paper(s).

## Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (AER 2010)

- Estimate returns to college (including heterogeneity of returns).
- NLSY 1979
- $Y = \log(wage)$
- Covariates  $X$ : Experience (years), Ability (AFQT Score), Mother's Education, Cohort Dummies, State Unemployment, MSA level average wage.
- Instruments  $Z$ : College in MSA at age 14, average earnings in MSA at 17 (opportunity cost), avg unemployment rate in state.






FIGURE 1. MTE ESTIMATED FROM A NORMAL SELECTION MODEL

*Notes:* To estimate the function plotted here, we estimate a parametric normal selection model by maximum likelihood. The figure is computed using the following formula:

TABLE 4—TEST OF LINEARITY OF  $E(Y|\mathbf{X}, P = p)$  USING POLYNOMIALS IN  $P$ ; AND  
TEST OF EQUALITY OF LATEs OVER DIFFERENT INTERVALS ( $H_0: LATE^j(U_S^{Lj}, U_S^{Hj}) - LATE^{j+1}(U_S^{Lj+1}, U_S^{Hj+1}) = 0$ )

Panel A. Test of linearity of  $E(Y|\mathbf{X}, P = p)$  using models with different orders of polynomials in  $P^a$

Degree of polynomial for model	2	3	4	5
$p$ -value of joint test of nonlinear terms	0.035	0.049	0.086	0.122
Adjusted critical value	0.057			
Outcome of test	Reject			

Panel B. Test of equality of LATEs ( $H_0: LATE^j(U_S^{Lj}, U_S^{Hj}) - LATE^{j+1}(U_S^{Lj+1}, U_S^{Hj+1}) = 0$ )<sup>b</sup>

Ranges of $U_S$ for $LATE^j$	(0, 0.04)	(0.08, 0.12)	(0.16, 0.20)	(0.24, 0.28)	(0.32, 0.36)	(0.40, 0.44)
Ranges of $U_S$ for $LATE^{j+1}$	(0.08, 0.12)	(0.16, 0.20)	(0.24, 0.28)	(0.32, 0.36)	(0.40, 0.44)	(0.48, 0.52)
Difference in LATEs	0.0689	0.0629	0.0577	0.0531	0.0492	0.0459
$p$ -value	0.0240	0.0280	0.0280	0.0320	0.0320	0.0520
Ranges of $U_S$ for $LATE^j$	(0.48, 0.52)	(0.56, 0.60)	(0.64, 0.68)	(0.72, 0.76)	(0.80, 0.84)	(0.88, 0.92)
Ranges of $U_S$ for $LATE^{j+1}$	(0.56, 0.60)	(0.64, 0.68)	(0.72, 0.76)	(0.80, 0.84)	(0.88, 0.92)	(0.96, 1)
Difference in LATEs	0.0431	0.0408	0.0385	0.0364	0.0339	0.0311
$p$ -value	0.0520	0.0760	0.0960	0.1320	0.1800	0.2400
Joint $p$ -value	0.0520					

TABLE 5—RETURNS TO A YEAR OF COLLEGE

Model		Normal	Semiparametric
$ATE = E(\beta)$		0.0670 (0.0378)	Not identified
$TT = E(\beta S = 1)$		0.1433 (0.0346)	Not identified
$TUT = E(\beta S = 0)$		-0.0066 (0.0707)	Not identified
MPRTE			
Policy perturbation	Metric		
$Z_\alpha^k = Z^k + \alpha$	$ Z\gamma - V  < e$	0.0662 (0.0373)	0.0802 (0.0424)
$P_\alpha = P + \alpha$	$ P - U  < e$	0.0637 (0.0379)	0.0865 (0.0455)
$P_\alpha = (1 + \alpha)P$	$ \frac{P}{U} - 1  < e$	0.0363 (0.0569)	0.0148 (0.0589)
Linear IV (Using $P(Z)$ as the instrument)			0.0951 (0.0386)
OLS			0.0836 (0.0068)

*Notes:* This table presents estimates of various returns to college, for the semiparametric and the normal selection models: average treatment effect (ATE), treatment on the treated (TT), treatment on the untreated (TUT), and different versions of the marginal policy relevant treat




FIGURE 4.  $E(Y_1 - Y_0 | \mathbf{X}, U_s)$  WITH 90 PERCENT CONFIDENCE INTERVAL—  
LOCALLY QUADRATIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES

*Notes:* To estimate the function plotted here, we first use a partially linear regression of log wages on polynomials in  $\mathbf{X}$ , interactions of polynomials in  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $D$ , and  $E(D)$ , a locally quadratic function of  $D$  (where  $D$  is the graduated




FIGURE 6. WEIGHTS FOR IV AND MP RTE

*Note:* The scale of the y-axis is the scale of the MTE, not the scale of the weights, which are scaled to fit the picture.

## Diversion Example


I have done some work trying to bring these methods into merger analysis.

- Key quantity: **Diversion Ratio** as I raise my price, how much do people switch to a particular competitor's product

$$D_{jk}(p_j, p_{-j}) = \left| \frac{\partial q_k}{\partial p_j}(p_j, p_{-j}) / \frac{\partial q_j}{\partial p_j}(p_j, p_{-j}) \right|$$

- We hold  $p_{-j}$  fixed and trace out  $D_{jk}(p_j)$ .
- The **treatment** is leaving good  $j$ .
- The  $Y_i$  is increased sales of good  $k$ .
- The  $Z_i$  is the price of good  $j$ .
- The key is that all changes in sales of  $k$  come through people leaving good  $j$  (no direct effects).

# Diversion for Prius (FAKE!)



## Diversion Example

$$\widehat{D_{jk}^{LATE}} = \frac{1}{\Delta q_j} \int_{p_j^0}^{p_j^0 + \Delta p_j} \underbrace{\frac{\partial q_k(p_j, p_{-j}^0)}{\partial q_j}}_{\equiv D_{jk}(p_j, p_{-j}^0)} \left| \frac{\partial q_j(p_j, p_{-j}^0)}{\partial p_j} \right| dp_j$$

- $D_{jk}(p_j, p_{-j}^0)$  is the MTE.
- Weights  $w(p_j) = \frac{1}{\Delta q_j} \frac{\partial q_j(p_j, p_{-j}^0)}{\partial p_j}$  correspond to the lost sales of  $j$  at a particular  $p_j$  as a fraction of all lost sales.
- When is  $LATE \approx ATE$ ?
  - Demand for Prius is steep: everyone leaves right away
  - $D_{j,k}(p_j)$  is relatively flat.
  - We might want to think about raising the price to choke price (or eliminating the product from the consumers choice set) same as treating everyone!