



APPSEC
EUROPE

Automated Mobile Application Security Testing with Mobile Security Framework



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About Me

- Security Engineering @  IMMUNIO
 - Next Gen Runtime Application Self Protection (RASP)
- Author of OWASP Xenotix XSS Exploit Framework, Mobile Security Framework.
- Teach Security via <https://opsecx.com>

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The Takeaways

- ❶ A FREE and Open Source Security Tool for Mobile App Security Assessment.
- ❷ Mobile App Pentesters/Mobile Malware Analysts - How to make your job easier with MobSF.
- ❸ Developers – Build secure mobile Apps identifying vulnerabilities at all stages of development. (SDLC Integration)
- ❹ Web Pentesters – REST API Fuzzer capable of detecting vulnerabilities like SSRF, XXE, IDOR etc.





Agenda

- What is MobSF?
- MobSF Architecture
 - Static Analyzer
 - Dynamic Analyzer
 - Web API Fuzzer
- Static Analysis
 - Static Analysis & some Statistics
 - Top Indian and European Bank Mobile Apps
 - Top Indian and European Wallet Mobile Apps
 - Observations
- Dynamic Analysis
 - Dynamic SSL Testing
 - Exported Activity Tester
 - Challenges in Dynamic Analysis
 - Dynamic Analysis on Custom VM/ Rooted Android Device.
- Web API Fuzzer
 - Vulnerabilities API Fuzzer detects.
 - Explains the API Fuzzer Logic.
- Conclusion



What is MobSF?

Mobile Security Framework is an open source mobile application (Android/iOS) automated pentesting framework capable of performing end to end security testing of mobile Apps.



Hosted in your environment. Your application and data is never send to the cloud.



There is no cloud
it's just someone else's computer

MobSF Architecture

Static Analyzer



Demo

Static Analysis & Report
Generation



Static Analysis & Some Statistics

- Static Analysis on Top Financial Apps - Criteria
 - SSL bypass in Native Code
 - SSL bypass in WebView
 - Weak Crypto
 - Remote Web View Debugging
 - Hardcoded Secrets




Top Indian Bank Apps Analyzed







Bank App	Native SSL Bypass	WebView SSL Bypass	Remote Webview Debug	Hardcoded Secrets	Root Detection
	Yes	No	No	No	No
	No	No	No	No	No
	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
	No	No	No	Yes	No
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
	No	No	No	Yes	No
	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
	No	No	No	No	Yes
	Yes	No	No	No	No
	No	No	No	No	No
	No	No	No	No	Yes



Face palm



Top Indian Wallet Apps Analyzed








Wallet App	Native SSL Bypass	Webview SSL Bypass	Remote Webview Debug	Hardcoded Secrets	Root Detection
	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
	No	Yes	No	No	No
	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Yes	No	No	No	No
	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Top EU Bank Apps Analyzed

Bank App	Weak Crypto	Native SSL Bypass	WebView SSL Bypass	Hardcoded Secrets	Root Detection/ Pinning
[REDACTED]	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
[REDACTED]	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
[REDACTED]	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
[REDACTED]	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
[REDACTED]	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
[REDACTED]	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
[REDACTED]	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
[REDACTED]	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
[REDACTED]	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
[REDACTED]	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES



Top EU Wallet Apps Analyzed

Wallet App	Weak Crypto	Native SSL Bypass	WebView SSL Bypass	Hardcoded Secrets	Root Detection/ Pinning
	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES

Observations

- State of Mobile App Security, Not evolved as Web Security.
- Most common issue are:
 - Indian Apps: SSL Bypass in (Both Native Code and WebView)
 - European Apps : Weak Crypto and Hardcoded Secrets
- SSL Error bypassed in WebViews are really really bad.



Real-world Exploitation

Request to [redacted]:443 [180.179.139.114]

Forward Drop Intercept is on Action

Comment this item

Raw Params Headers Hex

POST /submitTransaction?MID=zDjdto21650155633150&ORDER_ID=1314672918&route=webjvm5 HTTP/1.1

Host: secure.paytm.in

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Length: 165

Cache-Control: max-age=0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Origin:

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.1.1; XT1572 Build/LPH23.116-18; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/46.0.2490.76 Mobile Safari/537.36

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Referer: /paymentForm.jsp?txn_Mode=DC&MID=zDjdto21650155633150&ORDER_ID=1314672918&route=webjvm5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Accept-Language: en-IN,en-US;q=0.8

Cookie: JSESSIONID=358CD6F19A0D810EEE165D1B707628EC.zDjito216501556331501314672918.webjvm5; testcookie=true

X-Requested-With:

txn_Mode=DC&txn_Mode=DC&channelId=WAP&AUTH_MODE=3D&CARD_TYPE=&savedCardId=&walletAmount=0&cardNumber=4530554160000099&ccExpiryMonth=05&ccExpiryYear=2019&cvvNumber=567


Insecure WebView Implementation. WebView ignores SSL Certificate Errors.

High

[AJRAppWebView.java](#) [AJREmbedWebView.java](#) [AJRRechargePaymentActivity.java](#) [AJRWebViewActivity.java](#)

```
public void onReceivedSslError(Webview webView, SslErrorHandler sslErrorHandler, SslError sslError) {
    try {
        sslErrorHandler.proceed();
        return;
    }
}
```


Dynamic Analyzer



Mobile Security Framework



Dynamic Analyzer - Architecture



DEMO

(LockX)

Dynamic SSL Testing

- ⦿ Dynamically verify if SSL connections are securely implemented.
- ⦿ Disable JustTrustMe and Remove MobSF Root CA.
- ⦿ If you can still access the decrypted HTTPS Web Traffic then that means the app is bypassing SSL errors.

Exported Activity Tester

- Android Exported Activities.

```
<activity
    android:name=".ExportedActivity"
    android:label="ExportedActivity"
    android:exported="true">
</activity>
<activity
    android:name=".ImplicitlyExportedActivity"
    android:label="ImplicitlyExportedActivity" >
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="opensecurity.vulnapp.INTENT"/>
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
```

DEMO

Challenges in Dynamic Analysis

- Some Android Apps are built with security in mind.
 - Anti VM Detection
 - Anti Root Detection
 - Anti MITM with Certificate Pinning.
 - Missing Libraries/Dependencies
- Some Apps / Malwares have sophisticated methods to detect Virtual Machines.



How to deal with these Challenges

- ⚙️ API overriding with Xposed Framework
 - ⚙️ Anti VM Detection Bypass → Android Blue Pill
 - ⚙️ Anti Root Detection Bypass → RootCloak
 - ⚙️ Anti MITM Certificate Pinning Bypass → JustTrustMe
- ⚙️ APK smali Patching, Custom Xposed Module
- ⚙️ For sophisticated apps and malware, Use a real device for dynamic analysis.


Dynamic Analysis on Device

- 🌐 MobSFy Script – Convert your VM/ Device to support MobSF Dynamic Analysis

- 🌐 Documentation here:

<https://github.com/ajinabraham/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/wiki/2.-Configure-MobSF-Dynamic-Analysis-Environment-in-your-Android-Device-or-VM>

Web API Fuzzer



Fuzzing REST APIs

- ❁ Why most web scanners suck at API Testing?
- ❁ We have knowledge about the application and generic API routes (Login, Logout, Register).
- ❁ So we use more of Whitebox approach than Blackbox approach.



❁ Detects vulnerabilities like IDOR, SSRF and XXE.


What We Detect

- ⚬ XXE
- ⚬ SSRF
- ⚬ IDOR
- ⚬ Directory Traversal or Path Traversal
- ⚬ Logical and Session Related
- ⚬ API Rate Limiting



How we Detect


SSRF & XXE




Cloud Server: `APITester/cloud/cloud_server.py`

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)


Without Credentials.




With multiple user credentials (needs two login attempts)



Session Related Checks



Rate Limiter



Other Checks

- Security Headers and Info Gathering
- Directory/ Path Traversal

DEMO

What's Coming Soon?

- ⚙ Windows App Security Analyzer.
- ⚙ iOS App Dynamic Analysis with Device.
- ⚙ API Fuzzer to support detection of SQLi and RCE.
- ⚙ Export Proxy logs to Burp Suite/IronWASP/ZAP



Useful Links

- Source: <https://github.com/ajinabraham/Mobile-Security-Framework>
- Issues: <https://github.com/ajinabraham/Mobile-Security-Framework/issues>
- Documentation: <https://github.com/ajinabraham/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/wiki>
- Video Course: <https://opsecx.com/index.php/product/automated-mobile-application-security-assessment-with-mobsf/>

Thanks & Credits

QA

- Sachinraj Shetty
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