

# HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet

**From OWASP**

## Contents

- 1 Introduction
- 2 HTML 5
  - 2.1 Browser Securability Chart
  - 2.2 Cross Origin Resource Sharing
  - 2.3 Input Validation
  - 2.4 Local Storage (a.k.a. Offline Storage, Web Storage)
  - 2.5 WebDatabase
  - 2.6 WebSockets
  - 2.7 Geolocation
  - 2.8 Use the "sandbox" attribute for untrusted content (iFrame)
  - 2.9 Content Deliverability
  - 2.10 Progressive Enhancements and Graceful Degradation Risks
- 3 CSS 3
- 4 Javascript and Javascript Frameworks
- 5 Related Cheat Sheets
- 6 Authors and Primary Editors

## Introduction

## HTML 5

### Browser Securability Chart

There are a few sites charting browser capabilities as they related to the HTML 5 / CSS 3 standard. I have not seen any that mention security. There may not be a need for it, but e.g. 'sandbox' will be ignored in down browsers, but which HTML 5 compliant browsers support it. If there are differences in implementations, my assumption is that there will be differences in security configuration / settings.

### Cross Origin Resource Sharing

- Validate URLs passed to XMLHttpRequest.open, current browsers allow these URLs to be cross domain.
- Ensure that URLs responding with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \* do not include any sensitive content or information that might aid attacker in further attacks. Use Access-Control-Allow-Origin header only on chosen URLs that need to be accessed cross-domain. Don't use that header for the whole domain.
- Take special care when using Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true response header. Whitelist the allowed Origins and never echo back the Origin request header in Access-Control-Allow-Origin.
- Allow only selected, trusted domains in Access-Control-Allow-Origin header. Prefer whitelisting domains over blacklisting or allowing any domain (either through \* wildcard or echoing the Origin header content).

## **Input Validation**

## **Local Storage (a.k.a. Offline Storage, Web Storage)**

## **WebDatabase**

## **WebSockets**

- Drop backward compatibility in implemented client/servers and use only protocol versions above hybi-00. Popular Hixie-76 version and olders are outdated and insecure.
- While it is relatively easy to tunnel TCP services through WebSockets (e.g. VNC, FTP), doing so enables access to these tunneled services for the in-browser attacker in case of a Cross-Site-Scripting attack. These services might also be called directly from a malicious page or program.
- The protocol doesn't handle authorisation and/or authentication. Application-level protocols should handle that separately in case sensitive data is being transferred.
- Endpoints exposed through ws:/ protocol are easily reversible to plaintext. Only wss:// (WebSockets over SSH) should be used for protection against Man-In-The-Middle attacks
- Spoofing the client is possible outside browser, so WebSockets server should be able to handle incorrect/malicious input. Always validate input coming from the remote site, as it might have been altered.
- When implementing servers, check the Origin: header in Websockets handshake. Though it might be spoofed outside browser, browsers always add the Origin of the page which initiated Websockets connection.
- As WebSockets client in browser is accessible through Javascript calls, all

Websockets communication can be spoofed or hijacked through Cross-Site-Scripting. Always validate data coming through WebSockets connection.

## Geolocation

### Use the "sandbox" attribute for untrusted content (iFrame)

[[1] (<http://blog.whatwg.org/whats-next-in-html-episode-2-sandbox>) ]

## Content Deliverability

CDN or src links to foreign domains = know your content

### Progressive Enhancements and Graceful Degradation Risks

The best practice now is to determine the capabilities that a browser supports and augment with some type of substitute for capabilities that are not directly supported. This may mean an onion-like element, e.g. falling through to a Flash Player if the <video> tag is unsupported, or it may mean additional scripting code from various sources that should be code reviewed.

## CSS 3

I haven't seen any specific to CSS 3 and it's been a while since I worried about url / !import. I think privacy leaks are the most well know - e.g. querying global history using :visited ([https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=147777](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=147777))

## Javascript and Javascript Frameworks

Do we have cheatsheets for Javascript (e.g. use closures, protect the global namespace) or any of the frameworks like JQuery, script.aculo.us, Prototype, Mootools

# Related Cheat Sheets

## Other Articles in the OWASP Cheat Sheet Series

- Authentication Cheat Sheet
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet
- Input Validation Cheat Sheet
- DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Forgot Password Cheat Sheet
- **HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet**
- SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Security Architecture Cheat Sheet
- Session Management Cheat Sheet
- Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet
- XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Web Service Security Cheat Sheet

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