What's new with the triel? Candidate-oriented voting in the 2021 German federal election

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CDM Colloquium

8.12.2022

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Introduction

















- The Greens nominated Annalea Baerbock as Chancellor candidate.
- · From the duel to a triel.







- The Greens nominated Annalea Baerbock as Chancellor candidate.
- · From the duel to a triel.
- · Did the triel significantly change the voting behavior?

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Personalization of electoral competition

Whether and to which degree party leaders affect voter decisions

- The American voter: Candidate evaluation as relevant short-termed factor
- "Presidentialization" even in most parliamentary systems (Poguntke and Webb 2005)
- Increasing influence of party leaders on party vote over time, in particular from 60's to 90's (Garzia et al 2022)

Personalization in the electoral process

German case

- Consensus: Evaluation of chancellor candidates has significant effects on party choice.
 - The effects for the smaller parties are less pronounced (Jungmann et al 2022)
- · Increasing influence of chancellor candidates over time?
 - · Yes: Ohr (2000)
 - No: Brettschneider et al (2006), Pappi/Shikano (2001)
- · Why dissent?
 - Different periods of time investigated: Ohr's analysis ended in the 1998 election which is well known for its highly personalized campaign.
 - Different statistical models: Binary models vs multinomial models (Pappi/Shikano 2001).
 - Different model specifications: What is the best control to sort out the leader effect?

Personalization in the electoral process

Questions to be addressed

- Is there a long-term trend in personalization after 1998?
- Was personalization in Bundestag Election 2021 more profound and structurally different from the previous elections?
- Can we provide a more solid causal evidence for personalization of electoral campaign and the impact of chancellor candidacy?


Our analysis

- Replication of Pappi/Shikano (2001) by using GLES pre-election cross-sectional survey data in 2009-2021.
- Experimental data with manipulated presence of leading politicians on the ballot.

Evidence from survey data

analysis

Popularity and publicity of the candidates



The bottom of figure: Share of valid responses.

Multinomial logit models


$$\begin{array}{lcl} Y_{i,t} & \sim & \textit{Multin}(p_{ij}, n = 1) \\ \\ p_{ij} & = & \frac{V_i(j)}{\sum_{k}^{K} V_i(k)} \\ V_i(j) & = & \exp\left(\beta_{0j} + \beta_1 I(Y_{i,t-1} = j) + \beta_2 R P_{ij} + \beta_{3j} R C_{ij}\right) \end{array}$$

- $Y_{i,t} \in \{1,2,\ldots J\}$: Vote choice of Respondent i at the time point t
- RP_{ij}: Rating of Party j by i
- RC_{ij}: Rating of Party j's leader by i
- I(A): The indicator function for an event A

Estimation results

CDU/CSU Spitzenkandidat/in


SPD Spitzenkandidat



- · No clear trend over time
- Less regional differences

Scholz


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
Estimation results

Linke Spitzenkandidat/in



- · No clear trend over time
- · Less regional differences

Population-Averaged Predictions



The bottom of the figure: Density plot of the respondents' distance to candidates.

Consequences: Vote decision in 2017 and 2021

	West Germany Vote in 2017 election							East Germany Vote in 2017 election						
'21	S	С	G	F	L	Α	'21	S	С	G	F	L	Α	
S	72.8	18.0	17.2	12.4	20.6	15.0	S	71.4	23.1	22.0	10.3	18.2	4.9	
C	2.3	58.9	1.9	19.3	2.9	11.7	С	6.0	47.9	0.7	9.0	2.8	6.9	
G	17.9	7.3	72.7	10.6	23.5	0.8	G	10.1	7.4	67.4	6.4	14.4	1.4	
F	3.8	12.6	5.5	52.3	3.9	9.2	F	3.5	15.7	2.8	70.5	3.9	8.3	
L	1.3	0.9	2.7	0.5	46.1	1.7	L	5.5	1.3	7.1	0.0	58.6	2.1	
Α	1.9	2.3	0.0	5.0	2.9	61.7	Α	3.5	4.5	0.0	3.8	2.2	76.4	

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Column percents.

- In East Germany, Greens lost more voters to SPD than the opposite and won less voters from Linke.
- SPD could attract more previous CDU-voters than the Greens, in particular in East.

Evidence from an experimental

data

Evidence from survey data analysis


Effect of chancellor candidacy?

- · Comparison over time: Just effect of e.g. Baerbock as person?
- Comparison should be Baerbock as ChC and Baerbock as non-ChC.
- We simulate this by presenting/not presenting Baerbock on the ballot as leading candidate of the party list.
- This should induce different levels of salience of Baerbock in decision making process.


Experimental design

- · Field period: August 2021
- · 4110 subjects recruited by a Quota-procedure
- · Each subject was confronted with three ballots sequentially.
- · Within-subject manipulations
 - Candidate/party order on the ballot
 - · District candidate information (name, incumbency, Dr)
 - · Appearance of party leaders on the party list
 - · Ballot design (simultaneous or sequential)
- · Between-subject manipulations
 - Ballot design (simultaneous or sequential)

Experimental design



Experimental design



Statistical model

A slightly different specification is needed:


- Three immediately consecutive voting rounds.
 - Inclusion of vote decision in the last round can control all the party-related factors.
 - Short-termed party factors in the survey analysis can be assumed to be constant over the voting rounds.
 - ightarrow Exclusion of party rating.
- Since each round has the manipulation, the difference in manipulation between the current and last round is considered.
- We are not only interested in the mere exposure effect, but also the interaction with the leader rating.

Multinomial logit models


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- $Y_{i,t} \in \{1,2,\ldots J\}$: Vote choice of Respondent i at Round $t \in \{2,3\}$
- MC_{ij,t}: Manipulation of the names on the party j's list for i at the time point t. If the national leaders are displayed, one; otherwise zero.

Estimation results




Joint distribution of the evaluation of Scholz/Baerbock



- More respondents rate Scholz positively and Baerbock negatively.
- The opposite pattern is much less.

Population-Averaged Predictions (3rd round)



- Those who find Scholz positive and saw him on the ballot got more attracted to vote for SPD
- Those who find Baerbock negative and saw her on the ballot desert the Greens.

Discussion

From Duel to Triel

- Nominating a chancellor candidate could contributed better visibility, but did not bring voters to the Greens.
- Disapproval of Baerbock even pushed off the previous voters to SPD, in particular in East Germany.
- Nomination of a chancellor candidate is double-edged. With an unpopular candidate, the party becomes worse off.