

A history of the application of MDS matrices in cryptography

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Chapter 1

A history of the application of MDS matrices in cryptography

MDS matrices have been widely used in the construction of diffusion layers for block ciphers such as SHARK [23], SQUARE [11], BKSQ [12], KHAZAD [3], ANUBIS [2], Hierocrypt-3 [9], Rijndael (AES) [13] and Curupira [4]. They have also been applied in the design of hash functions (e.g Whirlwind [1] and Grøstl [14]). The choice is due to the fact that MDS codes provide transformations with optimal linear and differential branch numbers (see e.g [11] or [23]), thus contributing to security against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis attacks.

When a matrix is MDS, optimal *branch number* (a measure of diffusion power) is ensured, therefore, from the theoretical security perspective, any two distinct $n \times n$ MDS matrices present equal contribution to a cipher's design in terms of diffusion power. However, their computational cost, which is a relevant practical implementation criterion, *is not* necessarily the same. This motivates not only the search for MDS matrices, but the search for *MDS matrices with low computational cost*. In this work, the computational cost of a matrix A is measured by the amount of **xor** and **xtime** operations required when multiplying a cipher's state column vector by A .

Due to the computational cost of matrix multiplication, there is an interest in finding MDS matrices with coefficients as small as possible, in order to minimize the required amount of **xor** and **xtime** operations required by the implementations. However, the complexity of finding MDS matrices through random search increases proportionally to the dimension, which led to the investigation of systematic methods to construct (or find) MDS matrices. One possible avenue is trying to find direct mathematical constructions which ensure the MDS property, and another is to impose restrictions to limit the random search space (e.g imposing the matrix should be circulant, as was done by the authors of [11]). Furthermore, there is an interest in finding involutory MDS

matrices (as pointed by [3] and [2]), so that the encryption and the decryption computational cost are the same.

It is also worth noting that, although MDS matrices are widely used in cryptographic algorithms, there are designs which prefer not to make use of them. The block ciphers Serpent [7], IDEA [17] and PRESENT [8], for instance, do not include MDS matrices in their design. The hash function Keccak [6], which was later selected by NIST to become the SHA-3 standard, also does not use MDS matrices. The computational cost can be related to this choice.

In this chapter, we aim at providing a history of the application of MDS matrices in cryptography, listing the matrices, the ciphers in which they have been applied, the respective Finite Fields (order and irreducible polynomial), and their cost (amount of **xor** and **xtime** operations).

Note: this is a partial report. For the moment, it contains only Preliminaries and information about the ciphers SHARK and SQUARE. It will be expanded in the future.

We assume the reader is familiar with:

- Linear branch number (see [Chapter X](#))
- Differential branch number (see [Chapter X](#))
- Differential Cryptanalysis (see [Chapter X](#))
- Linear Cryptanalysis (see [Chapter X](#))
- MDS codes (see [Chapter X](#) and, for further detail, reference [19])
- Diffusion property in cryptography (see [Chapter X](#))
- Groups, rings and fields in abstract algebra (see [Chapter X](#))

1.1 Notation

- $\det(A)$: determinant of the matrix A
- A^{-1} : inverse matrix of A
- n, k, d : parameters of a code
- \mathcal{C} : a code
- G : generator matrix of a code
- I_n : the $n \times n$ identity matrix
- $[I_n B]$: matrix obtained by placing the $n \times n$ matrix B to the right of the $n \times n$ identity matrix I_n . For example, for $B = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$, $[I_n B] = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 2 \\ 0 & 1 & 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$

1.2 Acronyms

- **MDS**: Maximum Distance Separable
- **AES**: Advanced Encryption Standard (Rijndael's name after being chosen by NIST)
- **xor**: bitwise XOR between two bit strings
- **xtime**: refers to the multiplication by the polynomial x in the finite field $\text{GF}(2^m)$ for an integer m

1.3 Preliminaries

1.3.1 Linear codes

Definition 1 (Hamming weight [19]) *The Hamming weight $w(x)$ of a vector x is the number of nonzero components of the vector x .*

Definition 2 (Hamming distance [19]) *The Hamming distance between two vectors x and y is $w(x - y)$, which is equal to the Hamming weight of the difference of the two vectors.*

Definition 3 (Linear code [19]) *A linear $[n, k, d]$ code over a field \mathbb{F} is a k -dimensional subspace of the vector space \mathbb{F}^n , where any two different vectors of the subspace have a Hamming distance of at least d , and d is the largest number with this property.*

The distance d of a linear code equals the minimum weight of a non-zero codeword in the code. A linear code can be described by generator and/or parity-check matrices.

Definition 4 (Generator matrix [19]) *A generator matrix G for an $[n, k, d]$ code C is a $k \times n$ matrix whose rows form a vector space basis for C . The choice of a basis in a vector space is not unique, thus a code has many different generator matrices which can be reduced to one another by performing elementary row operations.*

Definition 5 (Parity-check matrix [19]) *A parity-check matrix H for an $[n, k, d]$ code C is an $(n - k) \times k$ matrix with the property that a vector x is a codeword of C iff $Hx^T = 0$.*

Theorem 1 (Singleton Bound [19]) *If C is an $[n, k, d]$ code, then $d \leq n - k + 1$.*

Definition 6 (MDS code [19]) *An MDS code is a linear code that meets the Singleton bound, i.e. a linear code with $d = n - k + 1$.*

An MDS matrix associated to a $[n, k, d]$ code has *branch number* equal to d , which is the maximum possible branch number, thus providing optimal diffusion.

1.3.2 Matrices

Obs: eu escrevi essas primeiras definições (matriz singular, involutória, circulante, circulante à esquerda, circulante à direita) com base no que eu lembrava de matemática mesmo, então por hora ainda não coloquei uma referência bibliográfica, já que são definições mais gerais e não chegam a ser específicas de cripto. Mas posso colocar depois se necessário.

Definition 7 (Singular matrix) *A square matrix A is singular if and only if $\det(A) = 0$.*

Definition 8 (Non-singular matrix) *A is non-singular if and only if $\det(A) \neq 0$.*

Definition 9 (Involutory matrix) *An $n \times n$ square matrix A is involutory if $A \times A = I_n$, where I_n is the identity matrix. In other words, A is involutory when $A = A^{-1}$.*

Definition 10 (Circulant matrix) *An $n \times n$ matrix A is circulant if each row i is formed by a cyclical shift of i positions of the same set of elements $\{a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n-1}\}$.*

Definition 11 (Left circulant matrix) *A circulant matrix in which the shift is a cyclical shift to the left, i.e*

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_1 & \dots & \dots & a_{n-1} \\ a_1 & a_2 & \dots & a_{n-1} & a_0 \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ a_{n-1} & a_0 & \dots & \dots & a_{n-2} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Definition 12 (Right circulant matrix) *A circulant matrix in which the shift is a cyclical shift to the right, i.e*

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_1 & \dots & \dots & a_{n-1} \\ a_{n-1} & a_0 & a_1 & \dots & a_{n-2} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ a_1 & \dots & a_{n-2} & a_{n-1} & a_0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Note that circulant matrices can be defined by just one row, since all the other rows are cyclical shifts of the first. Therefore, they can be denoted as $\text{circ}(a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1})$. In the case of left circulant and right circulant matrices, respectively, $\text{lcirc}(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$ and $\text{rcirc}(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$. For example, matrices (1.11) and its inverse (1.11), used in the Rijndael cipher, can be denoted as $\text{rcirc}(02_x, 03_x, 01_x, 01_x)$ and $\text{rcirc}(0e_x, 0b_x, 0d_x, 09_x)$.

Definition 13 (Transpose matrix) *The transpose of a matrix A , denoted by A^T , is the matrix such that $A^T[i][j] = A[j][i]$. In other words, it is the matrix obtained by writing the rows of A as columns. Note that, if A is an $m \times n$ matrix, then A^T will be $n \times m$.*

Definition 14 (Submatrix) *Given a matrix M , a submatrix of M is the matrix obtained after removing z rows and columns of M , $z \geq 1$, provided that there are sufficient rows (and columns) to be removed.*

Theorem 2 (MDS codes [19]) *An (n, k, d) -code \mathcal{C} with generator matrix $G = [I_n B]$, where B is a $k \times (n - k)$ matrix, is MDS if and only if every square submatrix of B is non-singular.*

We call the B matrix of Theorem 2 the *MDS matrix* throughout this work, i.e the MDS matrices we study are the B matrices of the respective MDS codes chosen when designing them. Note that Definition 6 establishes the conditions for a code to be MDS, therefore Theorem 2 is an alternative way of evaluating a code, or a matrix, with respect to the MDS property. For further detail on matrices, determinants and linear algebra, the reader may refer to [18].

Definition 15 (Cauchy matrix) *Given x_0, \dots, x_{n-1} and y_0, \dots, y_{n-1} , the matrix A where $A[i][j] = \frac{1}{x_i + y_j}$ is called a Cauchy matrix. According to [24], provided that $x_i \neq x_j$ for $0 \leq i, j \leq n - 1$, that $y_i \neq y_j$ for $0 \leq i, j \leq n - 1$ and that $x_i + y_j \neq 0$ for all i, j , any square submatrix of a Cauchy matrix is nonsingular over any field.*

An $n \times n$ matrix possesses n^2 elements and thus, when constructing one e.g by selecting random elements, n^2 choices must be made. However, Cauchy and circulant matrices allow us to lower the number of elements we need to select. A circulant matrix can be defined by one row only, therefore only n elements are required. However, there are no guarantees about the MDS property. One must check whether Theorem 2 holds to ensure the obtained matrix is MDS. On the other hand, a Cauchy matrix construction directly ensures the MDS property, as can be seen in Definition 15, requiring $2n$ choices of elements (the x_i and the y_i) to be defined. Furthermore, it is relevant to note that, albeit most matrices in this work have their dimension n be a power of two such as 4 or 8, this is not a requirement for the construction. One can construct $n \times n$ circulant (or Cauchy) matrices for any arbitrary n .

Definition 16 (Hadamard matrix [5]) *Given n elements a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1} , n being a power of 2, the matrix H such that $H[i][j] = a_{i \oplus j}$ is a Hadamard matrix.*

Definition 17 (Vandermonde matrix [15]) *Given z elements a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{z-1} , the $z \times n$ matrix V such that*

$$V = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & a_0 & a_0^2 & \dots & a_0^{n-1} \\ 1 & a_1 & a_1^2 & \dots & a_1^{n-1} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ 1 & a_{z-1} & a_{z-1}^2 & \dots & a_{z-1}^{n-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.1)$$

is a Vandermonde matrix.

Note that Hadamard and Vandermonde constructions too allow us to lower the number of required choices to obtain a matrix. Only n elements are necessary for a Hadamard matrix to be defined, provided that n is a power of 2. In the case of the Vandermonde matrix, z elements are required and then we must choose the number of columns n . Not all Vandermonde matrices are square matrices, but the notion of MDS matrix applies only to square matrices. Therefore, z must be equal to n if we wish to construct a Vandermonde MDS matrix. There are no guarantees about the MDS property with Hadamard or Vandermonde constructions, so we must construct the matrices and then evaluate whether they are MDS or not, e.g using Theorem 2.

Evaluating a matrix for MDS property

If Theorem 2 is used, the determinant of the matrix itself must be calculated, as well as the determinants of its submatrices. First, we derive a formula for the cost of calculating the determinant of an $n \times n$ matrix. Our cost unit is *the number of multiplications in the finite field*.

The determinant of a 2×2 matrix $\begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix}$ can be computed by means of the formula $ad - bc$, requiring therefore two multiplications.

The determinant of a 3×3 matrix can be computed by calculating cofactors of 2×2 submatrices obtained by removing a row i and a column j . For example,

the determinant of $\begin{bmatrix} a & b & c \\ d & e & f \\ g & h & i \end{bmatrix}$ can be computed as $a \begin{vmatrix} e & f \\ h & i \end{vmatrix} + b \begin{vmatrix} d & f \\ g & i \end{vmatrix} + c \begin{vmatrix} d & e \\ g & h \end{vmatrix}$,

where $\begin{vmatrix} e & f \\ h & i \end{vmatrix}$ denotes the determinant of the submatrix $\begin{bmatrix} e & f \\ h & i \end{bmatrix}$.

The cost is therefore $3 + 3t(2)$, where $t(2)$ is the number of multiplications required to compute the determinant of a 2×2 matrix. We know that $t(2) = 2$, therefore the cost to obtain the determinant of a 3×3 matrix is $3 + 3 \times 2 = 9$, i.e $t(3) = 9$. Extending this logic, let $t(n)$ be the cost of obtaining the determinant of an $n \times n$ matrix. Then $t(n) = n + nt(n-1) = n + n(n-1 + (n-1)t(n-2)) = n + n(n-1) + n(n-1)t(n-2) = n + n(n-1) + n(n-1)(n-2) + \dots + n(n-1)(n-2) \dots 2$. For example, for $n = 4$, $t(4) = 4 + 4 \times 3 + 4 \times 3 \times 2 = 4 + 12 + 24 = 40$ multiplications in the finite field.

Quantas submatrizes quadradas existem dentro de uma matriz $n \times n$? Preciso disso pra saber como fica o custo de testar se uma matriz é MDS.

1.3.3 Abstract algebra

Aqui pretendo colocar definições de grupo, grupo abeliano, corpo etc. A parte de álgebra abstrata que não é específica de corpos finitos e que a gente geralmente vê na faculdade

1.3.4 Finite fields — $\text{GF}(2^m)$

(Finite field [13]) A finite field is a field with a finite number of elements. The number of elements in the set is called the order of the field.

(Characteristic and order [13]) A field with order r exists if and only if r is a prime power, i.e. $r = p^m$ for some integer m , where p is a prime integer. p is called the characteristic of the field. For each prime power there is exactly one finite field, denoted by $\text{GF}(p^m)$.

(Representing finite fields with prime order [13]) Elements of a finite field $\text{GF}(p)$ can be represented by the integers $0, 1, \dots, p-1$, and the field operations are integer addition modulo p and integer multiplication modulo p .

(Representing finite fields with non-prime order [13]) For finite fields with an order $r = p^m$ that is not prime, addition and multiplication cannot be represented by addition and multiplication modulo r , and instead other representations must be used. One of the possible representations for $\text{GF}(p^m)$ is by means of polynomials over $\text{GF}(p)$ with degree at most $m-1$. Addition and multiplication are then defined modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree m .

(Polynomial [13]) A polynomial over a field \mathbb{F} is an expression of the form

$$b(x) = b_{m-1}x^{m-1} + b_{m-2}x^{m-2} + \dots + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0,$$

where x is the indeterminate and $b_i \in \mathbb{F}$ are the coefficients. The degree of the polynomial equals l if $b_j = 0$ for all $j > l$ and l is the smallest number with this property.

Note that, when using polynomials over $\text{GF}(p)$ to represent the $\text{GF}(p^m)$ field, the degree is at most $m-1$.

In this chapter, we focus particularly on fields with characteristic $p = 2$, due to their wide application in cryptography.

Addition and multiplication are defined on polynomials as follows.

(Polynomial addition [13]) Summing two polynomials $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ consists of summing the coefficients with equal powers of x , with the sum occurring in the underlying field \mathbb{F} . The neutral element is 0 (the polynomial with all coefficients equal to 0). The inverse element can be found by replacing each coefficient by its inverse element in \mathbb{F} . The degree of $a(x) + b(x)$ is at most the maximum of the degrees of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$, therefore addition is closed.

For polynomials over $\text{GF}(2)$ stored as integers in a cryptographic software implementation, addition can be implemented with a bitwise XOR instruction.

(Polynomial multiplication [13]) In order to make multiplication closed, we select a polynomial $p(x)$ of degree l , called the reduction polynomial. Multiplication of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ is then defined as the algebraic product of the polynomials modulo the reduction polynomial $p(x)$.

The neutral element is 1 (the polynomial of degree 0 and with coefficient of x^0 equal to 1). The inverse element of $a(x)$ is $a^{-1}(x)$ such that $a(x) \times a^{-1}(x) = 1 \bmod p(x)$. Note that $a^{-1}(x)$ exists only when $a(x) \neq 0$.

For polynomials over $\text{GF}(2)$ stored as integers in a cryptographic software implementation, multiplication by x can be implemented as a logical bit shift followed by conditional XOR (i.e subtraction) of the reduction polynomial (the **xtime** operation). Multiplication by other polynomials can be implemented as a series of **xtime**.

The reduction polynomial is chosen as an irreducible polynomial.

(Irreducible polynomial [13]) A polynomial $d(x)$ is irreducible over the field $\text{GF}(p)$ if and only if there exist no two polynomials $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ with coefficients in $\text{GF}(p)$ such that $d(x) = a(x) \times b(x)$, where $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ are of degree greater than 0.

For further reference on abstract algebra and Finite Fields, the reader may refer to [20], [22] and [21].

1.3.5 Computational cost unit

Computational cost of multiplication in $\text{GF}(2^8)$

Consider T a state byte, which we multiply by the polynomial $2e_x = 00101110_2 = x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x$ in $\text{GF}(2^8)$. Note that

$$T \cdot 2e_x = T \cdot x^5 + T \cdot x^3 + T \cdot x^2 + T \cdot x = T \cdot x \cdot x \cdot x \cdot x \cdot x + T \cdot x \cdot x \cdot x + T \cdot x \cdot x + T \cdot x,$$

where \cdot denotes multiplication and $+$ denotes addition (which, in $\text{GF}(2^8)$, is equivalent to a bitwise XOR). Multiplication by the x polynomial is performed by **xtime**, and addition is performed by **xor**.

Let $T \cdot x = Y$. Then $T \cdot 2e_x = Y + Y \cdot x + Y \cdot x \cdot x + Y \cdot x \cdot x \cdot x$.

Let $Y \cdot x = W$. Then $T \cdot 2e_x = Y + W + W \cdot x + W \cdot x \cdot x$.

Let $W \cdot x = Z$. Then $T \cdot 2e_x = Y + W + Z + Z \cdot x$.

The total number of **xtime** operations in this process is 5 (1 to obtain Y from T , 1 to obtain W from Y , 1 to obtain Z from W , 2 to compute $Z \cdot x$), since we can reuse intermediate **xtime** calls. The total number of **xor** operations is 3. For multiplication in $\text{GF}(2^8)$, in the worst case, 7 **xtime** would be necessary, since the maximum degree of polynomials in $\text{GF}(2^8)$ is 7.

Computational cost of a matrix

The computational cost of an n matrix A is given by the necessary **xor** and **xtime** operations when multiplying a $n \times 1$ column vector by A . As an example, we calculate the cost of matrix (1.5), used in the SQUARE [11] cipher.

A row of matrix (1.5) contains the elements $01_x = 1$, $02_x = x$ and $03_x = x+1$ only. Multiplying by 01_x does not require **xtime** or **xor**, since $01_x \cdot T = T$.

Computing $02_x \cdot T = x \cdot T$ requires 1 **xtime**. Computing $03_x \cdot T = (x + 1) \cdot T = T \cdot x + T$ requires 1 **xtime** and 1 **xor**. Furthermore, adding the row multiplication results costs 3 **xor**. Therefore, the cost of a row is 2 **xtime** and 4 **xor**. Equation 1.2 illustrates this, with t_1, t_2, t_3 and t_4 being bytes of the state column vector.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 02_x & 01_x & 01_x & 03_x \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} t_1 \\ t_2 \\ t_3 \\ t_4 \end{bmatrix} = 02_x \cdot t_1 + 01_x \cdot t_2 + 01_x \cdot t_3 + 03_x \cdot t_4 \quad (1.2)$$

Note that matrix (1.5) contains 4 rows, yielding a total cost of 8 **xtime** and 16 **xor**.

1.4 MDS matrix catalogue

In Table 1.1, the **Ord** column refers to the matrix dimensions, the **Inv** column refers to whether they are involutory or not, **Use** refers to application in e.g a block cipher or hash function, **Bib** contains the bibliographic reference, **#xor** refers to the necessary amount of **xor** operations, and **#xtime** refers to the necessary amount of **xtime** operations. All finite fields of Table 1.1 have characteristic $p = 2$. The order is 2^m , with m being given by the degree of the irreducible polynomial in the column $GF(2)[x]/(p(x))$. For example, $m = 8$ for SHARK, SQUARE, BKSQ, KHAZAD, ANUBIS, Hierocrypt, Rijndael and the Cauchy matrix found by [24].

Year	Ord	Type	Inv	Use	Bib	$GF(2)[x]/(p(x))$	#xor	#xtime	Matrices
1996	8	—	no	SHARK	[23]	$x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1$	235 223	369 393	(1.3) (1.4)
1997	4	right circulant	no	SQUARE	[11]	$x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1$	16 40	8 48	(1.5) (1.6)
1997	8	Cauchy	yes	—	[24]	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$	240	344	(1.7)
1998	3	right circulant	no	BKSQ	[12]	$x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1$	9 39	9 63	(1.13) (1.14)
1999	4	right circulant	no	Rijndael (AES)	[13]	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$	16 40	8 48	(1.11) (1.12)
2000	8	Hadamard	yes	KHAZAD	[3]	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$	112	120	(1.8)
2000	4	Hadamard	yes	ANUBIS	[2]	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$	16	20	(1.9)
2000	4	Vandermonde	no	ANUBIS key schedule	[2]	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$	20	32	(1.10)
2000	4	right circulant	no	Hierocrypt-3, Hierocrypt-L1	[9], [10]	$x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x + 1$	52 52	108 104	(1.15) (1.16)
2000	4	right circulant	no	Hierocrypt-3	[9]	$x^4 + x + 1$	32 40	40 44	(1.17) (1.18)

2000	4	—	no	Hierocrypt-L1	[10]	$x^4 + x + 1$	8 7	10 11	(1.19) (1.20)
2004	4	—	no	FOX	[16]	$x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1$	30	25	(1.21)
2004	8	—	no	FOX	[16]	$x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1$	141	169	(1.22)
2007	3	—	yes	Curupira	[4]	$x^8 + x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$	12	15	(1.23)
2007	3	right circulant	no	Curupira key schedule	[4]	$x^8 + x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$	27	36	(1.24)
2009	8	right circulant	no	Grøstl	[14]	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$	104	96	(1.25)
2010	8	dyadic	no	Whirlwind	[1]	$x^4 + x + 1$	104	136	(1.26)
2010	8	dyadic	no	Whirlwind	[1]	$x^4 + x + 1$	128	128	(1.27)

Table 1.1: MDS matrix usage and cost

Matrix (1.3) and its inverse (1.4) are used in the SHARK [23] cipher.

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 ce_x & 95_x & 57_x & 82_x & 8a_x & 19_x & b0_x & 01_x \\
 e7_x & fe_x & 05_x & d2_x & 52_x & c1_x & 88_x & f1_x \\
 b9_x & da_x & 4d_x & d1_x & 9e_x & 17_x & 83_x & 86_x \\
 d0_x & 9d_x & 26_x & 2c_x & 5d_x & 9f_x & 6d_x & 75_x \\
 52_x & a9_x & 07_x & 6c_x & b9_x & 8f_x & 70_x & 17_x \\
 87_x & 28_x & 3a_x & 5a_x & f4_x & 33_x & 0b_x & 6c_x \\
 74_x & 51_x & 15_x & cf_x & 09_x & a4_x & 62_x & 09_x \\
 0b_x & 31_x & 7f_x & 86_x & be_x & 05_x & 83_x & 34_x
 \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.3)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 e7_x & 30_x & 90_x & 85_x & d0_x & 4b_x & 91_x & 41_x \\
 53_x & 95_x & 9b_x & a5_x & 96_x & bc_x & a1_x & 68_x \\
 02_x & 45_x & f7_x & 65_x & 5c_x & 1f_x & b6_x & 52_x \\
 a2_x & ca_x & 22_x & 94_x & 44_x & 63_x & 2a_x & a2_x \\
 fc_x & 67_x & 8e_x & 10_x & 29_x & 75_x & 85_x & 71_x \\
 24_x & 45_x & a2_x & cf_x & 2f_x & 22_x & c1_x & 0e_x \\
 a1_x & f1_x & 71_x & 40_x & 91_x & 27_x & 18_x & a5_x \\
 56_x & f4_x & af_x & 32_x & d2_x & a4_x & dc_x & 71_x
 \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.4)$$

Matrix (1.5) and its inverse (1.6) are used in the SQUARE [11] cipher. They are circulant.

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 02_x & 01_x & 01_x & 03_x \\
 03_x & 02_x & 01_x & 01_x \\
 01_x & 03_x & 02_x & 01_x \\
 01_x & 01_x & 03_x & 02_x
 \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.5)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 0e_x & 09_x & 0d_x & 0b_x \\
 0b_x & 0e_x & 09_x & 0d_x \\
 0d_x & 0b_x & 0e_x & 09_x \\
 09_x & 0d_x & 0b_x & 0e_x
 \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.6)$$

Matrix (1.7) is involutory, and was obtained by [24] with a Cauchy construction.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 93_x & 13_x & 57_x & da_x & 58_x & 47_x & 0c_x & 1f_x \\ 13_x & 93_x & da_x & 57_x & 47_x & 58_x & 1f_x & 0c_x \\ 57_x & da_x & 93_x & 13_x & 0c_x & 1f_x & 58_x & 47_x \\ da_x & 57_x & 13_x & 93_x & 1f_x & 0c_x & 47_x & 58_x \\ 58_x & 47_x & 0c_x & 1f_x & 93_x & 13_x & 57_x & da_x \\ 47_x & 58_x & 1f_x & 0c_x & 13_x & 93_x & da_x & 57_x \\ 0c_x & 1f_x & 58_x & 47_x & 57_x & da_x & 93_x & 13_x \\ 1f_x & 0c_x & 47_x & 58_x & da_x & 57_x & 13_x & 93_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.7)$$

Matrix (1.8) is Hadamard and involutory. It is used in the KHAZAD [3] cipher.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 06_x & 08_x & 0b_x & 07_x \\ 03_x & 01_x & 05_x & 04_x & 08_x & 06_x & 07_x & 0b_x \\ 04_x & 05_x & 01_x & 03_x & 0b_x & 07_x & 06_x & 08_x \\ 05_x & 04_x & 03_x & 01_x & 07_x & 0b_x & 08_x & 06_x \\ 06_x & 08_x & 0b_x & 07_x & 01_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x \\ 08_x & 06_x & 07_x & 0b_x & 03_x & 01_x & 05_x & 04_x \\ 0b_x & 07_x & 06_x & 08_x & 04_x & 05_x & 01_x & 03_x \\ 07_x & 0b_x & 08_x & 06_x & 05_x & 04_x & 03_x & 01_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.8)$$

Matrix (1.9) is Hadamard and involutory. It is used in the ANUBIS [2] cipher.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 02_x & 04_x & 06_x \\ 02_x & 01_x & 06_x & 04_x \\ 04_x & 06_x & 01_x & 02_x \\ 06_x & 04_x & 02_x & 01_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.9)$$

Still regarding the ANUBIS cipher, while (1.9) is used as its linear transformation layer, (1.10) is used in the key extraction. It is a Vandermonde construction. When $N = 4$, it is an MDS matrix (see Theorem 2).

$$\begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & \dots & 01_x \\ 01_x & 02_x & 02_x^2 & \dots & 02_x^{N-1} \\ 01_x & 06_x & 06_x^2 & \dots & 06_x^{N-1} \\ 01_x & 08_x & 08_x^2 & \dots & 08_x^{N-1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 01_x \\ 01_x & 02_x & 04_x & 08_x \\ 01_x & 06_x & 14_x & 78_x \\ 01_x & 08_x & 40_x & 3a_x \end{bmatrix} \text{ for } N = 4 \quad (1.10)$$

Matrix (1.11) and its inverse (1.12) are used in the Rijndael [13] cipher, which was selected to become AES. They are circulant. We show the hexadecimal notation and the corresponding polynomials to emphasize that, albeit stored as integers in cryptographic software implementation, all matrix elements are actually polynomials in a Finite Field. This applies not only to the Rijndael cipher's matrices but to all matrices listed in this work.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 02_x & 03_x & 01_x & 01_x \\ 01_x & 02_x & 03_x & 01_x \\ 01_x & 01_x & 02_x & 03_x \\ 03_x & 01_x & 01_x & 02_x \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x & x+1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & x & x+1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & x & x+1 \\ x+1 & 1 & 1 & x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.11)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0e_x & 0b_x & 0d_x & 09_x \\ 09_x & 0e_x & 0b_x & 0d_x \\ 0d_x & 09_x & 0e_x & 0b_x \\ 0b_x & 0d_x & 09_x & 0e_x \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x^3+x^2+x & x^3+x+1 & x^3+x^2+1 & x^3+1 \\ x^3+1 & x^3+x^2+x & x^3+x+1 & x^3+x^2+1 \\ x^3+x^2+1 & x^3+1 & x^3+x^2+x & x^3+x+1 \\ x^3+x+1 & x^3+x^2+1 & x^3+1 & x^3+x^2+x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.12)$$

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Rijndael's matrix (1.11) is the transpose of SQUARE's matrix (1.5) and this also happens to the inverses (matrix (1.6) is the transpose of (1.12)).

Matrices (1.13) and its inverse (1.14) is used in the BKSQ [12] cipher. They are circulant.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 03_x & 02_x & 02_x \\ 02_x & 03_x & 02_x \\ 02_x & 02_x & 03_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.13)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} ac_x & ad_x & ad_x \\ ad_x & ac_x & ad_x \\ ad_x & ad_x & ac_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.14)$$

The Hierocrypt-3 cipher makes use of two MDS matrices, one for lower level diffusion and another for higher level diffusion on the cipher, which follows a nested Substitution Permutation Network design (for more detail the reader may refer to [9]). Matrix (1.15) and its inverse (1.16) are used for lower level diffusion. (1.17) and (1.18) (the inverse) are used for higher level diffusion. It is worth noting that, for lower level diffusion, the finite field is $GF(2^8)$, whilst, for higher level diffusion, the authors choose $GF(2^4)$.

$$\begin{bmatrix} c4_x & 65_x & c8_x & 8b_x \\ 8b_x & c4_x & 65_x & c8_x \\ c8_x & 8b_x & c4_x & 65_x \\ 65_x & c8_x & 8b_x & c4_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.15)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 82_x & c4_x & 34_x & f6_x \\ f6_x & 82_x & c4_x & 34_x \\ 34_x & f6_x & 82_x & c4_x \\ c4_x & 34_x & f6_x & 82_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.16)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 5_x & 5_x & a_x & e_x \\ e_x & 5_x & 5_x & a_x \\ a_x & e_x & 5_x & 5_x \\ 5_x & a_x & e_x & 5_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.17)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_x & e_x & e_x & 6_x \\ 6_x & b_x & e_x & e_x \\ e_x & 6_x & b_x & e_x \\ e_x & e_x & 6_x & b_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.18)$$

The Hierocrypt-L1 cipher too uses matrix (1.15) and the inverse (1.16) in its lower diffusion layer. However, for the higher layer, (1.19) and (1.20) (inverse) are used. Analogously to Hierocrypt-3, the higher layer uses $GF(2^4)$.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 5_x & 7_x \\ a_x & b_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.19)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} c_x & a_x \\ 5_x & b_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.20)$$

Matrices (1.21) and (1.22) are used in the FOX block cipher family, with $z = x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$, $a = x + 1$, $b = x^7 + x$, $c = x$, $d = x^2$, $e = x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2$ and $f = x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x$.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & x \\ 1 & z & x & 1 \\ z & x & 1 & 1 \\ x & 1 & z & 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 02_x \\ 01_x & fd_x & 02_x & 01_x \\ fd_x & 02_x & 01_x & 01_x \\ 02_x & 01_x & fd_x & 01_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.21)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & a \\ 1 & a & b & c & d & e & f & 1 \\ a & b & c & d & e & f & 1 & 1 \\ b & c & d & e & f & 1 & a & 1 \\ c & d & e & f & 1 & a & b & 1 \\ d & e & f & 1 & a & b & c & 1 \\ e & f & 1 & a & b & c & d & 1 \\ f & 1 & a & b & c & d & e & 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 01_x & 03_x \\ 01_x & 03_x & 82_x & 02_x & 04_x & fc_x & 7e_x & 01_x \\ 03_x & 82_x & 02_x & 04_x & fc_x & 7e_x & 01_x & 01_x \\ 82_x & 02_x & 04_x & fc_x & 7e_x & 01_x & 03_x & 01_x \\ 02_x & 04_x & fc_x & 7e_x & 01_x & 03_x & 82_x & 01_x \\ 04_x & fc_x & 7e_x & 01_x & 03_x & 82_x & 02_x & 01_x \\ fc_x & 7e_x & 01_x & 03_x & 82_x & 02_x & 04_x & 01_x \\ 7e_x & 01_x & 03_x & 82_x & 02_x & 04_x & fc_x & 01_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.22)$$

Matrix (1.23) is used in Curupira's diffusion layer. It is involutory.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 03_x & 02_x & 02_x \\ 04_x & 05_x & 04_x \\ 06_x & 06_x & 07_x \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.23)$$

Matrix (1.24) is used in Curupira's key scheduling process, with $c(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x^2$.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 + c(x) & c(x) & c(x) \\ c(x) & 1 + c(x) & c(x) \\ c(x) & c(x) & 1 + c(x) \end{bmatrix} \quad (1.24)$$

Matrix (1.25) is used in the Grøstl hash function. It is circulant.

$$\begin{bmatrix}
02_x & 02_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 03_x & 05_x & 07_x \\
07_x & 02_x & 02_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 03_x & 05_x \\
05_x & 07_x & 02_x & 02_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 03_x \\
03_x & 05_x & 07_x & 02_x & 02_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x \\
05_x & 03_x & 05_x & 07_x & 02_x & 02_x & 03_x & 04_x \\
04_x & 05_x & 03_x & 05_x & 07_x & 02_x & 02_x & 03_x \\
03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 03_x & 05_x & 07_x & 02_x & 02_x \\
02_x & 03_x & 04_x & 05_x & 03_x & 05_x & 07_x & 02_x
\end{bmatrix} \quad (1.25)$$

Matrices (1.26) and (1.27) are used in the Whirlwind hash function.

$$\begin{bmatrix}
5_x & 4_x & a_x & 6_x & 2_x & d_x & 8_x & 3_x \\
4_x & 5_x & 6_x & a_x & d_x & 2_x & 3_x & 8_x \\
a_x & 6_x & 5_x & 4_x & 8_x & 3_x & 2_x & d_x \\
6_x & a_x & 4_x & 5_x & 3_x & 8_x & d_x & 2_x \\
2_x & d_x & 8_x & 3_x & 5_x & 4_x & a_x & 6_x \\
d_x & 2_x & 3_x & 8_x & 4_x & 5_x & 6_x & a_x \\
8_x & 3_x & 2_x & d_x & a_x & 6_x & 5_x & 4_x \\
3_x & 8_x & d_x & 2_x & 6_x & a_x & 4_x & 5_x
\end{bmatrix} \quad (1.26)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix}
5_x & e_x & 4_x & 7_x & 1_x & 3_x & f_x & 8_x \\
e_x & 5_x & 7_x & 4_x & 3_x & 1_x & 8_x & f_x \\
4_x & 7_x & 5_x & e_x & f_x & 8_x & 1_x & 3_x \\
7_x & 4_x & e_x & 5_x & 8_x & f_x & 3_x & 1_x \\
1_x & 3_x & f_x & 8_x & 5_x & e_x & 4_x & 7_x \\
3_x & 1_x & 8_x & f_x & e_x & 5_x & 7_x & 4_x \\
f_x & 8_x & 1_x & 3_x & 4_x & 7_x & 5_x & e_x \\
8_x & f_x & 3_x & 1_x & 7_x & 4_x & e_x & 5_x
\end{bmatrix} \quad (1.27)$$

1.5 Computing xtime and xor of the matrices

One can compute the costs manually, however, the following following C code can also be used for this purpose, considering that polynomials in $\text{GF}(2^8)$ are stored in integers (a set bit means coefficient equal to 1, a zero bit means coefficient equal to 0).

For e.g SHARK and SQUARE, the field order is equal to 8, therefore `ORDER` must be set to 8 and `DEGREE_LIMIT_MASK` must be set to x^8 .

```
#define DEGREE_LIMIT_MASK 0x100
#define ORDER 8
```

The following function obtains the amount of `xtime` required to multiply by the polynomial.

```
unsigned int poly_xtime_cost(unsigned int poly) {
    unsigned int degree_mask = DEGREE_LIMIT_MASK;
```



```

    unsigned int degree = ORDER;
    while ((poly & degree_mask) == 0) {
        degree_mask >>= 1;
        degree--;
    }
    return degree;
}

```

The following function obtains the amount of **xor** required to multiply by the polynomial.

```

unsigned int poly_xor_cost(unsigned int poly) {
    unsigned int mask = 1;
    unsigned int set_bits = 0;
    unsigned int current_bit = 0;
    while (current_bit <= ORDER) {
        set_bits += ((poly & mask) != 0);
        mask <<= 1;
        current_bit++;
    }
    return set_bits - 1;
}

```

And, to compute the **xtime** and **xor** costs of a matrix, we must sum the costs of each row, which is accomplished by the following functions. Note that for e.g SHARK DIM must be set to 8, for SQUARE, to 4, and so forth.

#define DIM 8

```

unsigned int matrix_xtime_cost(unsigned int mat [DIM][DIM]) {
    unsigned int total_cost = 0;
    for (int row = 0; row < DIM; row++) {
        unsigned int row_cost = 0;
        for (int col = 0; col < DIM; col++) {
            row_cost += poly_xtime_cost(mat[row][col]);
        }
        printf("Row %d costs %d xtime\n", row, row_cost);
        total_cost += row_cost;
    }
    printf("The full matrix costs %d xtime\n", total_cost);
    return total_cost;
}

```

```

unsigned int matrix_xor_cost(unsigned int mat[DIM][DIM]) {
    unsigned int total_cost = 0;
    for (int row = 0; row < DIM; row++) {
        unsigned int row_cost = DIM - 1; //sum elements
    }
}

```

```

        for (int col = 0; col < DIM; col++) {
            row_cost += poly_xor_cost(mat[row][col]);
        }
        printf("Row %d costs %d xor\n", row, row_cost);
        total_cost += row_cost;
    }
    printf("The full matrix costs %d xor\n", total_cost);
    return total_cost;
}

```

1.5.1 SQUARE manual calculation example

The computational cost for matrix (1.3), used in the SQUARE cipher, was explained in Section 1.3.5.

For matrix (1.6), used in SQUARE's decryption process, each row contains elements from $\{0e_x, 09_x, 0d_x, 0b_x\}$.

$$0e_x = 00001110_2 = x^3 + x^2 + x \text{ requires 3 \textbf{xtime} and 2 \textbf{xor}}$$

$$09_x = 00001001_2 = x^3 + 1 \text{ requires 3 \textbf{xtime} and 1 \textbf{xor}}$$

$$0d_x = 00001101_2 = x^3 + x^2 + 1 \text{ requires 3 \textbf{xtime} and 2 \textbf{xor}}$$

$$0b_x = 00001011_2 = x^3 + x + 1 \text{ requires 3 \textbf{xtime} and 2 \textbf{xor}}$$

There are 3 **xor** to add the intermediate row multiplication results, totalizing 12 **xtime** and 10 **xor** per row. There are 4 rows, hence 48 **xtime** and 40 **xor**.

1.6 Conclusions

yet to be written

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