



**MAR 2023** 

# Security Assessment ARB Museum Token

March 30, 2023





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## **Assessment Summary**

This report has been prepared for ARB Museum Token on the Arbitrum network. Analytix Audit provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders





## **Technical Findings Summary**

### **Classification of Risk**

Severity	Description	
Critical	Risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.	
<ul><li>Major</li></ul>	Risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.	
<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform	
Minor	Risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the Project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.	
<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	Errors are often recommended to improve the code's style or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.	

## **Findings**

Severity	Found	Pending	Resolved
Critical	0	0	0
Major	0	0	0
<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	0	0	0
Minor	3	3	0
<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	0	0	0
Total	3	3	0





## **Project Overview**

## **Token Summary**

Parameter	Result
Address	0xFa5680ED391AdDC53443d808594e6dDe41978B36
Name	ARB Museum
Token Tracker	ARB Museum (ARMU)
Decimals	9
Supply	1,000,000,000
Platform	Arbitrum
compiler	v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2
Contract Name	BuybackBabyToken
Optimization	Yes with 200 runs
LicenseType	MIT
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://arbiscan.io/address/0xfa5680ed391addc53443d80859 4e6dde41978b36#code
Payment Tx	Corporate









## Risk Analysis Summary

Parameter	Result
Buy Tax	6%
Sale Tax	6%
Is honeypot?	Clean
Can edit tax?	Yes
Is anti whale?	No
Is blacklisted?	No
Is whitelisted?	No
Holders	2
Confidence Level	Medium

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.







## Main Contract Assessed Contract Name

Name	Contract	Live	
ARB Museum	0xFa5680ED391AdDC53443d808594e6dDe41978B36	Yes	

#### **TestNet Contract was Not Assessed**

## **Solidity Code Provided**

SollD	File Sha-1	FileName
BuybackBabyToken	fef8144c68a616997cacbf6efb14c384	BuybackBabyToken.sol







## **Mint Check**

The project owners of ARB Museum do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.

The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

Mint Notes:

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 











## **Fees Check**


The project owners of ARB Museum do not have the ability to change fees, The contract currently has 6% buy and 6% sell taxes.

The team May have fees defined; however, they can't change those fees higher than 25% or may not be able to configure the same.

Tax Fee Notes:

Auditor Notes: Contract has 6% buy and 6% sell tax, however, owner can't change fees more than 25%

**Project Owner Notes:** 











## **Blacklist Check**

The project owners of ARB Museum do not have a blacklist function their contract.

The Project allow owners to transfer their tokens without any restrictions.

Token owner cannot blacklist the contract: Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.


Blacklist Notes:

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes: undefined** 









## MaxTx Check

The Project Owners of ARB Museum can't set max tx amount.

The Team allows any investors to swap, transfer or sell.


MaxTX Notes:

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 

**Project Has No MaxTX** 









## **Pause Trade Check**

The Project Owners of ARB Museum don't have the ability to stop or pause trading.

The Team has done a great job to avoid stop trading, and investors has the ability to trade at any given time without any problems

Pause Trade Notes:

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 

Owner can't pause trading









## **Contract Ownership**

The contract ownership of ARB Museum is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

The current owner is the address
Oxff11944301f6cB410c14D7c9A05A12648ec529b4
which can be viewed:

#### **HERE**

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the privileged functions chart below, if the owner's wallet is compromised, they could exploit these privileges.


We recommend the team renounce ownership at the right time, if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities regarding transparency and safety considerations.

We recommend the team use a Multisignature Wallet if the contract is not going to be renounced; this will give the team more control over the contract.









## **Liquidity Ownership**

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block

If liquidity is unlocked, then the token developers can do what is infamously known as 'rugpull'. Once investors start buying token from the exchange, the liquidity pool will accumulate more and more coins of established value (e.g., ETH or BNB or Tether). This is because investors are basically sending these tokens of value to the exchange, to get the new token. Developers can withdraw this liquidity from the exchange, cash in all the value and run off with it. Liquidity is locked by renouncing the ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a fixed time period, by sending them to a time-lock smart contract. Without ownership of LP tokens, developers cannot get liquidity pool funds back. This provides confidence to the investors that the token developers will not run away with the liquidity money. It is now a standard practice that all token developers follow, and this is what really differentiates a scam coin from a real one.

#### Read More









## **KYC Information**

The Project Owners of ARB Museum is not KYC.

**KYC Information Notes:** 

Auditor Notes: No information found.

**Project Owner Notes:** 









# Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-100	Pass	Function Default Visibility	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-101	Pass	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-102	Pass	Outdated Compiler Version file.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-103	Pass	A floating pragma is set.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-104	Pass	Unchecked Call Return Value.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-105	Pass	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-106	Pass	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-107	Pass	Read of persistent state following external call.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-108	Low x3	State variable visibility is not set	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 947 C: 12
SWC-109	Pass	Uninitialized Storage Pointer.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-110	Pass	Assert Violation.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-111	Pass	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0



ANALYTIX				
AUI	DIT			
ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-112	Pass	Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C.0
SWC-113	Pass	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-114	Pass	Transaction Order Dependence.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-115	Pass	Authorization through tx.origin.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-116	Pass	A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-117	Pass	Signature Malleability.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-118	Pass	Incorrect Constructor Name.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-119	Pass	Shadowing State Variables.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-120	Low x3	Potential use of block.number as source of randonmness.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 1567 C:
SWC-121	Pass	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-122	Pass	Lack of Proper Signature Verification.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-123	Pass	Requirement Violation.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-124	Pass	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-125	Pass	Incorrect Inheritance Order.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0



	<b>.</b>			
ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-126	Pass	Insufficient Gas Griefing.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C.0
SWC-127	Pass	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-128	Pass	DoS With Block Gas Limit.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-129	Pass	Typographical Error.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-130	Pass	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E).	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-131	Pass	Presence of unused variables.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-132	Pass	Unexpected Ether balance.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-133	Pass	Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-134	Pass	Message call with hardcoded gas amount.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-135	Pass	Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code).	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-136	Pass	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain.	BuybackBabyToken. sol	L: 0 C: 0

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry-standard security scanning tools.







## Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-108 - State Variable Default Visibility

**CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards** 

#### **Description:**

Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.


#### Remediation:

Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.

#### References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Explicitly mark visibility in functions and state variables







# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

## SWC-120 - Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes

**CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values** 

#### **Description:**

Solidity allows for ambiguous naming of state variables when inheritance is used. Contract A with a variable x could inherit contract B that also has a state variable x defined. This would result in two separate versions of x, one of them being accessed from contract A and the other one from contract B. In more complex contract systems this condition could go unnoticed and subsequently lead to security issues.

Shadowing state variables can also occur within a single contract when there are multiple definitions on the contract and function level.

#### Remediation:

Using commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO. Using external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize. Note that this approach requires trusting in oracle, thus it may be reasonable to use multiple oracles. Using Bitcoin block hashes, as they are more expensive to mine.

#### References:

How can I securely generate a random number in my smart contract?)

When can BLOCKHASH be safely used for a random number? When would it be unsafe?

The Run smart contract.







## **Inheritance**

The contract for ARB Museum has the following inheritance structure.

The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000









## **Social Media Checks**

Social Media	URL	Result
Twitter	https://twitter.com/arbmuseum	Pass
Other		N/A
Website	https://arbmuseum.com	Pass
Telegram	https://t.me/ARBITRUM_MUSEUM	Pass

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

**Social Media Information Notes:** 

**Auditor Notes: undefined** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 









## **Assessment Results**

#### **Score Results**

Review	Score
Overall Score	88/100
Auditor Score	82/100
Review by Section	Score
Manual Scan Score	41/50
SWC Scan Score	47/50
Advance Check Score	undefined/0

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximun score is 100, however to attain that value the project most pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 80 Points, if a project does not attain 80% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below.

#### **Audit Passed**

## **Audit Passed**

Current project reviewed successfully passed audit, meeting all requirements for approval per Analytix Audit guidelines.



@FreddyCryptos

Today's Date
Dubai - United Arab Emirates





## **Important Notes:**

• Safemath is no longer needed and is recommended to recode it

## Auditor Score =82 Audit Passed

# Audit Passed Current project reviewed successfully passed audit, meeting all requirements for approval per Analytix Audit guidelines. ©FreddyCryptos Founder & CEO Today's Date Dubai - United Arab Emirates



## **Appendix**



## **Finding Categories**

#### **Centralization / Privilege**

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that actagainst the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles incombination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

#### **Gas Optimization**

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimalEVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

#### **Logical Issue**

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on howblock.timestamp works.

#### **Control Flow**

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owneronly functionsbeing invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

#### **Volatile Code**

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that mayresult in a vulnerability.

#### **Coding Style**

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to makethe codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

#### **Inconsistency**

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setterfunction.

#### **Coding Best Practices**

BRC 20 Conding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meet a set of creterias and is readable by all the developers.



#### **Disclaimer**

Analytix Audit has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocation for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

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