

The very basics of coalgebraic modal logics

First, we look at some concrete modal logics.

The logic K - the mother of all modal logics.

$$\varphi, \psi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid \boxed{\varphi} \mid \Diamond \varphi$$

$\underbrace{\quad}_{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{AP}}} \quad \underbrace{\quad}_{\substack{\text{Standard} \\ \text{propositional} \\ \text{logic}}} \quad \underbrace{\quad}_{\substack{\text{two modalities}}}$

- Syntax of formulas

The semantics is defined on a given Kripke structure.

A Kripke structure is a coalgebra of type

$$c: X \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(X) \times \mathcal{P}(\text{AP})$$

where AP is a constant set of atomic propositions (the one from the syntax). Hence the functor is $\mathcal{P}(-) \times \mathcal{P}(\text{AP})$

Remark: Atomic propositions are not so important when it comes to the coalgebraic treatment, so one could focus only on Kripke frames which are just \mathcal{P} -coalgebras like $c: X \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(X)$.

Given a Kripke structure (for now with atomic propositions)

$$c: \mathbb{W} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{W}) \times \mathcal{P}(\text{AP})$$

the semantics of a K-formula is given as follows

(here $w \in \mathbb{W}$ is a state of the Kripke structure)



Note that usually logicians use W for a set of states (rather than S or X) because they like to call states "worlds", so W is the set of worlds (and a formula is true in some world ω)

For K , we have

$$\left. \begin{aligned} w \models p, \text{ for } p \in AP & \text{ iff } p \in \pi_2(c(w)) \\ w \models \perp & \\ w \models \neg \phi & \text{ iff } w \not\models \phi \\ w \models \phi \wedge \psi & \text{ iff } w \models \phi \text{ and } w \models \psi \\ w \models \Box \phi & \text{ iff } \forall w' \in W. (w \rightarrow w' \Rightarrow w' \models \phi) \\ & \quad \quad \quad \underbrace{w' \in \pi_1(c(w))} \\ w \models \Diamond \phi & \text{ iff } \exists w' \in W. (w \rightarrow w' \wedge w' \models \phi) \end{aligned} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{standard} \\ \text{for the} \\ \text{propositional} \\ \text{formulas} \end{array}$$

Having defined the satisfiability relation \models , we can also define truth-sets, so

$$\llbracket \phi \rrbracket = \{w \in W \mid w \models \phi\}$$

Hennnessy-Milner Logic

SYNTAX:

$$\phi, \psi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \Box_a \phi \mid \Diamond_a \phi, \text{ for } a \in A$$

The semantics is given in terms of LTS (with atomic propositions labelling the states) so

$$c: X \rightarrow \underbrace{\mathcal{P}(X)^A}_{\cong \mathcal{P}(A \times X)} \times \underbrace{\mathcal{P}(AP)}_{\text{we can forget about this for a while}}$$

more convenient modelling for modal logics

The semantics (interpretation) of propositional formulas is as usual.

The modelities talk about a-successors.

Given a fixed LTS (with AP)

$$c: W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)^A \times \mathcal{P}(AP)$$

^{and} \forall a state $w \in W$, we have

$$w \models \Box_a \varphi \text{ iff } \forall w' \in W. (\underbrace{w \xrightarrow{a} w'}_{w' \in \pi_1(c(w))(a)} \Rightarrow w' \models \varphi)$$

$$w \models \Diamond_a \varphi \text{ iff } \exists w' \in W. (w \xrightarrow{a} w' \wedge w' \models \varphi)$$

Probabilistic Model Logic

Syntax

$$\varphi, \psi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \top \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid L_r \varphi \quad \text{for } r \in \mathbb{Q} \cap [0,1] \text{ }^{P \in AP}$$

↓
probabilistic modelities

The intended meaning of L_r is

"with probability at least $r \dots$ "

(I did not mention by the intended meaning of

\Box is "all successors ..."

\Diamond is "there exists a successor ..."

\Box_a is "for all a-successors"

\Diamond_a is "there exists an a-successor"

Probabilistic modal logic is interpreted over

so-called probabilistic frames

[Markov chains (with atomic propositions as labels on states)]

as we know before, we can forget about these

Probabilistic frames are coalgebras

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$$c: X \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(X)$$

if also atomic propositions then

$$c: X \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(X) \times \mathcal{P}(AP)$$

Where \mathcal{D} is the probability distribution functor
(on sets - all this is on sets) ↗ finely supported

given on objects as

$$\mathcal{D}(X) = \{ \mu: X \rightarrow [0,1] \mid \sum_{x \in X} \mu(x) = 1, \text{ supp}(\mu) \text{ is finite} \}$$

where for $\mu: X \rightarrow [0,1]$, the support set of μ is defined as

$$\text{supp}(\mu) = \{ x \in X \mid \mu(x) > 0 \}$$

and on functions, for $f: X \rightarrow Y$, $\mathcal{D}f: \mathcal{D}(X) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(Y)$

$$\mathcal{D}f(\mu) = \lambda y. \sum_{x: f(x)=y} \mu(x)$$

Now given a Probabilistic frame $c: W \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(W) \times \mathcal{P}(AP)$
satisfiability is defined as (for $w \in W$)

$$w \models Lr \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \sum_{w': w' \models \varphi} \pi_1(c(w))(w') \geq r$$

reaching
The probability of the set $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$
~~from~~ from state w .

There are many other examples - Graded modal logic,

Coalition logic,

(see the lecture notes of Dirk Pattinson on the web)

Why modal logics?

- For verification

- simply theoretically, the theory of logics and modal logics is huge

One thing that made Hennessy-Milner logic famous is the property called "expressivity" or nowadays just "Hennessy-Milner property" which says that the logic exactly characterizes bisimilarity (for LTS (with atomic propositions))

Let's see what this property is

Given a logic on some kind of transition systems (frames, actually coalgebras) it induces logical equivalence on the set of states, defined as

$$w \equiv u \quad \text{iff} \quad \{v \mid w \models v\} = \{v \mid u \models v\}$$

w and u satisfy the same formulas.

Theorem [Hennessy-Milner]

For Hennessy-Milner logic on ~~finite~~ ^{image finite} ~~branching~~ LTSs
(coalgebras of type $c: X \rightarrow P_f(X)^A$ ($\times P(AP)$))

\downarrow
finite powerset

logical equivalence coincides with bisimilarity.

Similar results exist (are of interest) for many (all?) modal logics.

(Certainly for K and for Probabilistic modal logic) - 6.

↳ REMARK: If no atomic propositions, then for K and for Prob. mod. logic this is a trivial property
Since it is not difficult to see that

$$\sim = \equiv = \nabla$$

where $\nabla = W \times W$ is the largest equivalence on the set of states (everything is bisimilar, everything is logically equivalent). But when adding labels/atomic-propositions, things get more interesting.

[Important result of Desharnais, Panayaden, et al. shows that negation-free prob. modal logic is expressive for bisimilarity of probabilistic systems]

One of the most developed lines of research in coalgebras deals with modal logics

(see Computer Journal article by Cirstea et al.)
54(1):31-41 (2011)

"Modal logics are coalgebraic"

There are different approaches and plenty of results and papers.
We focus only a bit on the nowadays standard approach and only on "Hennessy-Milner property"

↙ and here, in the coalgebraic setting
↘ behavioral equivalence is more handy than bisimilarity
why it was discovered at all

Main intuitive idea:

Given $c: X \rightarrow FX$

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A modelized formula

$\heartsuit \varphi$ asserts a property of successor states.

φ ... interpreted over states

$\heartsuit \varphi$... interpreted over successors in FX

Hence, a unary model operator \heartsuit maps a property $S \subseteq W$ of states, to a

property $\lambda(S) \subseteq FW$ of successors.

Why is this a property? Think of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$

or unary predicate in general

property $\lambda(S) \subseteq FW$ of successors.

So, in order to interpret \heartsuit in a coalgebra $c: W \rightarrow FW$

we need a λ such that

$w \models \heartsuit \varphi$ iff $c(w) \in \lambda(\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket)$

! ---> so, we see that powerset becomes very important

In other words to interpret modal logics over F -coalgebras we need to associate a predicate lifting

$\lambda_w: PW \rightarrow PFW$

to each unary model operator of the logic, uniformly in w .

(for n -ary model operator we'd need

$\lambda_w: (PW)^n \rightarrow PFW$.)

Therefore a unary predicate lifting is simply a natural transformation $\lambda: P \Rightarrow PF$ with P contravariant powerset, i.e. a set-indexed family of ways $\lambda_x: PX \rightarrow PFx$ that satisfies

$$\begin{array}{ccc} PX & \xrightarrow{\lambda_x} & PFx \\ f^{-1} \uparrow & & \uparrow (Ff)^{-1} \\ PY & \xrightarrow{\lambda_y} & PFy \end{array}$$


for any $f: X \rightarrow Y$.

[The contravariance of P is necessary in order to show that model semantics is invariant under coalgebra homomorphism which then leads the Hennessy-Milner property]

We will see that in all our examples (and in all other as well) indeed interpretation happens via unary \heartsuit and we have λ_{\heartsuit} , the satisfiability relation is given by

$$\boxed{w \models \heartsuit e \text{ iff } c(w) \in \llbracket \heartsuit \rrbracket_w (\llbracket e \rrbracket)} \\ \Downarrow \\ w \in \llbracket \heartsuit e \rrbracket$$

Here come the examples

 (we forget about)
AP now

K on Kripke frames

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Here we have

$$c: W \rightarrow PW$$

$w \models \Box \varphi \Leftrightarrow$ all elements of "the" successor of w satisfy φ

In general in these examples it helps to think about "the" successor as an element of PW , if $c: W \rightarrow PW$.

\Leftrightarrow "the" successor $c(w)$ is a subset of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$

$\Leftrightarrow c(w) \in \{B \subseteq W \mid B \subseteq \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket\}$

$\Leftrightarrow c(w) \in \llbracket \Box \rrbracket_w (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket)$

where

$$\llbracket \Box \rrbracket_w: PW \rightarrow PPW$$

$$S \mapsto \llbracket \Box \rrbracket_w S = \{B \subseteq W \mid B \subseteq S\}$$

this point of view gives us a predicate lifting

it is direct to check that this is indeed a predicate lifting.

Similarly, for the diamond

$w \models \Diamond \varphi \Leftrightarrow c(w) \in \llbracket \Diamond \rrbracket_w (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket)$

for the predicate lifting $\llbracket \Diamond \rrbracket_w: PW \rightarrow PPW$

$$S \mapsto \llbracket \Diamond \rrbracket_w S = \{B \subseteq W \mid S \cap B \neq \emptyset\}$$

Why?

$w \models \Diamond \varphi \Leftrightarrow$ there is an element of "the" successor of w that satisfies φ

\Leftrightarrow "the" successor $c(w)$ of w has a non-empty intersection with $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$

$\Leftrightarrow c(w) \in \{B \subseteq W \mid \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cap B \neq \emptyset\}$

$\Leftrightarrow c(w) \in \llbracket \Diamond \rrbracket_w (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket)$

Hennessy-Milner logic over LTS

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$$c: W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}^A(W)$$

$$w \models \Box_a \varphi \iff c(w) \in [\Box_a]_w ([\varphi])$$

where now $[\Box_a]_w: \mathcal{P}W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\mathcal{P}^A(W)$

$$S \xrightarrow{[\Box_a]_w} \{ \varphi: A \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W) \mid \varphi(a) \subseteq S \}$$

(the correspondence is similar and quite obvious, convince yourself that it is really the case)

Probabilistic logic over probabilistic frames

we want $[\Box_r]_w$ (given a prob. frame $c: W \rightarrow \mathcal{D}W$)

so that $w \models \Box_r \varphi \iff c(w) \in [\Box_r]_w ([\varphi])$

we know $w \models \Box_r \varphi \iff \sum_{w' \in [\varphi]} c(w)(w') \geq r$

$$\iff c(w) \in \{ \mu \in \mathcal{D}W \mid \mu([\varphi]) \geq r \}$$

this is a usual notation

$$\mu(S) = \sum_{w \in S} \mu(w)$$

for $S \subseteq W$.

So a predicate lifting offers itself ☺

$$[\Box_r]_w: \mathcal{P}W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\mathcal{D}W$$

$$S \xrightarrow{[\Box_r]_w} \{ \mu \in \mathcal{D}W \mid \mu([\varphi]) \geq r \} \text{ for } S \subseteq W$$

That's the whole point:

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MODAL LOGICS VIA PREDICATE LIFTINGS

(can also be done modularly \rightarrow for modularly defined functors)

Now when does a Hennessy-Milner property hold?
(for a given logic over given type of coalgebras)

It holds under two conditions: \rightsquigarrow we can't expect to hold just any time

(1) A condition on F that limits the branching degree of the models (coalgebras) in question} — The functor F needs to be finitary (see Def. 2.3.7)

So (1) corresponds to the original image-finite condition of Hennessy & Milner.

[This D is finitary (finite support), Pf is finitary...]

(2) A completeness condition on the set of modal operators that ensures that one doesn't miss observable behavior. "There are enough modal operators"

(see Def. 2.3.1 for this)

Then the general coalgebraic H-M-theorem is

Thm. 2.3.10 \rightsquigarrow if interested and time, please read Chapter 1 & Chapter 2

from the notes by Pattinson (containing also the proof).
You already know most of Ch. 1, but there are interesting examples. But watch out for typos, which is why I also wrote these notes. THANK! CHEERS! Ana (😊)