

# The distributional implications of a carbon tax in Ireland

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## ABSTRACT

We study the effects of carbon tax and revenue recycling across the income distribution in the Republic of Ireland. In absolute terms, a carbon tax of €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> would cost the poorest households less than €3/week and the richest households more than €4/week. A carbon tax is regressive, therefore. However, if the tax revenue is used to increase social benefits and tax credits, households across the income distribution can be made better off without exhausting the total carbon tax revenue.

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## 1. Introduction

Climate policy necessarily increases the price of energy, either explicitly through taxes or tradable permits or implicitly by mandating the use of different fuels from those that a free market would choose. As energy is a necessary good, climate policy is regressive: it will disproportionately harm poorer households.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, there should be an additional policy reform to offset the negative effects of climate policy on the distribution of income. This paper investigates the issue for a carbon tax and revenue recycling for the Republic of Ireland.

The *Programme for Government* 2007–2012 states that “[a]ppropriate fiscal instruments, including a carbon levy, will be phased in on a revenue-neutral basis over the lifetime of this Government.”<sup>2</sup> Details of the carbon tax will not be decided before late 2009, but it seems likely that the carbon tax would be levied on carbon dioxide emissions only,<sup>3</sup> and on emissions that are not already regulated by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and that the tax would be roughly equal to

the expected permit price in the EU ETS. We will work on these assumptions.

In contrast to the other policy instruments, a carbon tax has the distinct advantage that it generates tax revenue that can be used to even out undesired side-effects of greenhouse gas emission reduction. The purchasing power of households can be targeted through income taxes and, as the negative effects of a carbon tax are concentrated in the lower income groups, social welfare payments. This is essential for the political acceptability of a carbon tax. The previous attempt to introduce such a tax in Ireland was abandoned (in 2004) at least partly due to distributional concerns,<sup>4</sup> although concerns about the competitiveness of Irish exports also played a role.

This paper is not the first to look at these issues, as shown by the literature review in Section 2. However, there are only a few papers, and none on Ireland using recent data. As each country is idiosyncratic in its taxes and benefits, this paper does add useful information. Section 3 discusses the distributional implications of a carbon tax, using data from the latest Household Budget Survey. Section 4 shows the results for income recycling, using a detailed model of direct taxes and transfer payments. Section 5 concludes.

## 2. Previous literature

The impact of energy and carbon taxes on household income distribution has been investigated in a number of studies, although almost all of them refer exclusively to developed

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<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the long-term benefits of climate policy will be reaped by poorer countries. However, this paper is focussed on domestic distribution.

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached\\_files/Pdf%20files/Eng%20Prog%20for%20Gov.pdf](http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Eng%20Prog%20for%20Gov.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Note that Ireland has substantial methane emissions, and fast-growing halocarbon emissions. These emissions originate in export-oriented sectors which will probably be exempt from the carbon tax. However, even if they would be subject to the carbon tax, this would hardly affect consumers in Ireland Tol (2007).

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.rte.ie/business/2004/0910/carbon.html>.

economies. This is arguably the case because in developed economies “green” taxes have been implemented more extensively and because the consumption of CO<sub>2</sub>-related fuels is more even across the population, which fact is at the root of the equity problem.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the literature on developed economies suggests that energy and carbon taxes tend to be regressive, whereas for developing economies it has been concluded that such taxes are either neutral or progressive.<sup>6</sup> Here follows a brief review of the literature on developed economies, with a focus on the studies that concern Ireland.

Among the earliest works is one by *Poterba (1991)*, who analyses the distributional effect of a gasoline tax in the US. Using the data from the US Consumer’s Expenditure Survey, *Poterba (1991)* calculates the fractions of household income and expenditure that are devoted to gasoline purchase.<sup>7</sup> He finds that the tax is only slightly regressive, especially when expressed as a share of expenditure. On the other hand, *Safirova et al. (2004)* find that the burden of congestion falls disproportionately on the rich (in and around Washington, DC), so that road pricing or fuel taxation would be strongly regressive.

With a view to the project of a European carbon tax, *Pearson and Smith (1991)* estimate the distributional impact of the tax in seven European countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Ireland. Augmenting *Poterba’s* approach by including price elasticities (although they do not estimate any demand system), they find that in the first five countries the tax would be weakly regressive, whereas it would be significantly regressive in the UK and strongly regressive in Ireland. By means of a substantially more comprehensive model (the E3ME model, a sectoral, regionalized, econometric model of the EU), *Barker and Köhler (1998)* upgrade *Pearson and Smith’s* work and draw similar conclusions,<sup>8</sup> although they also point out that the outcome would be progressive if the yield were recycled as lump-sum transfers.

A study for Canada was conducted by *Hamilton and Cameron (1994)*, who use an input-output model of the economy to translate the carbon tax into all consumer prices and then apply Statistics Canada’s micro-simulation model to assess the distributional impact of the price increases.<sup>9</sup> The simulated tax turns out to be moderately regressive. Similarly, *Cornwell and Creedy (1996)* investigate the distributional impact of a carbon tax in Australia. Again, the approach adopted is a combination of input-output analysis and estimation of the demand response of consumers, in this case based on the Australian Household Expenditure Survey. *Cornwell and Creedy (1996)* find that “The carbon tax involves an increase in total tax revenue and a reduction in the degree of progressivity, with an increase in inequality” (p. 35). In contrast, in a computable general equilibrium

analysis of the Susquehanna River Basin, *Oladosu and Rose (2007)* find that a carbon tax is progressive, because changes in the structure of the economy, higher transfer payments, and reduced profits more than offset the regressive direct effects.

More studies have been conducted with reference to European economies. *Labandeira and Labeaga (1999)* explore the effect of a carbon tax on Spanish household income. The authors use an input-output demand model to calculate the price changes induced by the tax, and then simulate consumers’ response via an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) estimated with the data from the Spanish Household Expenditure Survey. In contrast with other studies (in addition to those previously mentioned, see *Symons et al., 2000*), they do not find that a carbon tax in Spain would be regressive.

*Tiezzi (2001)* simulates the welfare effects of the carbon tax implemented (*de facto* only for one year) in Italy in 1999. Such effects are calculated using True Cost of Living indices and compensating variation; the parameters are obtained by estimating an AIDS with household consumption data. Surprisingly, *Tiezzi (2001)* finds that the Italian carbon tax is not regressive, but explains that this might be due to the fact that the tax mainly hits transport fuels because of the way it has been conceived. Indeed, in developed economies the pattern of household spending on transport fuels typically increases with income, as opposed to that of heating fuels, which is relatively flat instead.

*Brannlund and Nordstrom (2004)* analyse consumer response and welfare effects due to changes in energy or environmental policy in Sweden, where a carbon tax has existed since 1991. Thus, the authors are able to estimate an econometric model for the demand of non-durables (a quadratic AIDS). They then assume a doubling of the Swedish carbon tax and compare the outcomes of two alternative recycling options, namely a lower general VAT and a lower VAT on public transport (equivalent to a subsidy to public transport). Both reforms are found to be regressive, although the second one also has a regional distributional effect, in the sense that households living in less populated areas would carry a larger share of the tax burden.

*Wier et al. (2005)* assess the distributional impact of the Danish carbon tax. The method is standard, as it combines an input-output model and national consumer survey, but the data nicely “incorporate” the substitution effects, since the tax was introduced in 1992. The tax is found to be regressive, particularly to the disadvantage of rural households. *Kerkhof et al. (2008)* find that a carbon dioxide tax is regressive in the Netherlands as well, and that a tax on all greenhouse gases is less regressive.

*Van Heerden et al. (2006)* is probably the most advanced study, using a detailed computable general equilibrium model with multiple households for South Africa. The authors compute the marginal excess burden by income class, and find a triple dividend for selected ecological tax reforms: certain mixes of increased energy taxes and reduced food taxes reduce emissions, increase economic output, and reduce the income gap between rich and poor.

Finally, one relatively recent study has been devoted to Ireland,<sup>10</sup> where the tax has been on the government’s agenda for a few years. Using the data from the Irish Household Budget Survey, *Scott and Eakins (2004)*, updating earlier work by *Scott (1992)* and *O’Donoghue (1997)*, derive the pattern of household consumption of CO<sub>2</sub>-related fuels and calculate the distributional impact of a €20 tax per metric tonne of carbon.<sup>11</sup> The result is that

<sup>5</sup> The difference between developed and developing countries can be explained not only by the difference in household expenditure patterns: *Shah and Larsen (1992)* argue that “[in developing countries] factors such as market power, price controls, import quotas, rationed foreign exchange, the presence of black markets, tax evasion, and urban–rural migration, may cast doubt on the regressivity of environmental policies” (p. 8).

<sup>6</sup> *Boyce et al. (2005)* find, however, that the burden of a carbon tax in China would be borne more by rural households than urban ones. A study worthy of mention, especially for its innovative approach, is the one by *Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2007)* on the distributional effects of a carbon tax in Indonesia.

<sup>7</sup> The implicit assumptions in this approach are that (a) the tax is fully translated into the price of the fuel, and (b) the price elasticities of demands for fuels are zero. In addition, the supply side of the economy is not considered. Thus, this method is suited for the analysis of the so-called first-round effects.

<sup>8</sup> “The most regressive impact is on West Germany, the UK and Ireland, although the impact is weak” (p. 400).

<sup>9</sup> Actually, as the first step they determine the tax level that would bring about a given CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cut. This is calculated by means of a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy.

<sup>10</sup> For a comprehensive macroeconomic analysis of an Irish carbon tax, see *Bergin et al. (2004)*. Also, one may want to consult the earlier work by *Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992)*, inspired by the project (never realised) of a European carbon tax.

<sup>11</sup> No input-output model of the Irish economy is used. This means that the “indirect” effect of the tax, which operates through the price changes of all goods other than fuels, is not captured.

the tax before compensation would be markedly regressive<sup>12</sup> because consumption of heating fuels is almost the same across the household income distribution. The compensation strategies explored overcame this except for certain households that were difficult to target, where other means were suggested including promising energy efficiency retrofits (Healy, 2003; Clinch and Healy, 2000).

In this study, we use more recent data than do Scott and Eakins (2004). We use a simpler method for estimating the impact of the carbon tax—we ignore demand effects and indirect impacts. However, we pay explicit attention to the distributional impacts of tax recycling.

### 3. The impact of a carbon tax on income distribution

A carbon tax (on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion) is a tax on energy use, that is, a tax on a necessary good. One would expect that a carbon tax would be regressive. Fig. 1 shows that this is the case for a carbon tax of €20/tCO<sub>2</sub>. A carbon tax would thus further skew the income distribution. A tax like this would reduce emissions by 1.2% from baseline (Conefrey et al., 2008).

The data in Fig. 1 are based on the *Household Budget Survey 2004–2005* (CSO, 2007), using the micro-data on quantities of energy used for home heating, quantities of electricity used, and expenditures on motor fuels.<sup>13</sup> Price data and emissions coefficients are taken from SEI<sup>14</sup> and Scott and Eakins (2004). Note that we include direct emissions only. Indirect effects—for example, retailers passing on their carbon taxes to consumers—are not included, because this would require a recent input-output table (cf. O'Doherty and Tol, 2007), estimates of price elasticities (cf. Lyons et al., 2007), and indices of market concentration (cf. Boyle, 2004), information which is not available.

Fig. 1 shows that the richest households emit only 37% more carbon dioxide than do the poorest households—while the equivalised disposable income<sup>15</sup> of the richest households is eight times that of the poorest. It also shows that electricity, already regulated under the EU ETS, is only a small part of the total burden of climate policy.<sup>16</sup> Electricity use is rather flat across the income distribution: The top decile use only 26% more electricity than do the bottom decile. The distribution of “other energy”, mostly for home heating, is even flatter: The top decile use 8% more than the bottom. O'Doherty et al. (2008) show that energy-saving behaviour is more common at the top end on the income distribution. The big difference between income deciles is in motor fuels: The top decile use 132% more than the bottom one.




Fig. 1. The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon tax per income decile, split between electricity, motor fuels and other energy.




Fig. 2. The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon tax per income decile, split between urban and rural households; non-electric energy only.

Fig. 2 splits the implications of the carbon tax for rural and urban households. Because in the countryside houses are bigger, distances are longer and more transport is by car, rural households tend to use more energy and more (carbon-intensive) solid fuels than urban households in the same income decile. Therefore, a carbon tax would weigh more heavily on rural households. Note that the absolute difference is small: less than one euro per household per week in the lower income deciles. Note also that the Irish tax and benefit system does not distinguish between rural and urban households. Rural households, therefore, cannot be compensated straightforwardly.

Fig. 3 shows the carbon tax per person and per household, as a function of household size and Fig. 4 repeats this for each household type. Energy is a common good within a household. This is obvious for space heating, but it also holds, to a lesser extent, for transport. Children add somewhat to the energy use of a household, but relatively little.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, a carbon tax would hit people in a smaller household harder—but the absolute differences between households are small. Note that rural households tend to be larger than urban households, and this dampens the tendencies seen in Figs. 2 and 3. It also implies that small, rural households would be hit harder by a carbon tax than suggested by these numbers.

Fig. 5 shows the carbon tax relative to the total benefits received and the total direct taxes paid (before revenue recycling;

<sup>12</sup> Results broadly similar to those in Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) were found. A household in the first income decile would pay a tax that corresponds to roughly 3% of its disposable income, while for one in the tenth decile the figure would be 0.5%.

<sup>13</sup> Note that we do not have data by income decile on fuel used in international travel, but it seems likely that aviation emissions will be regulated under the EU ETS in the future which will raise the price of air travel.

<sup>14</sup> Prices are from <http://www.sei.ie/index.asp?locID=1017&docID=-1>; emission factors are derived from data in SEI's online publications *Energy in Ireland, Comparison of Energy Costs for Domestic Fuels: Explanatory and Guidance Notes and Energy Map*.

<sup>15</sup> Households differ in size across the income distribution. The distribution of simple household income therefore gives a distorted picture. Equivalisation corrects for that by expressing the household income as income per adult equivalent, and re-ranking the households. All figures of deciles are here formulated on this basis.

<sup>16</sup> The EU ETS has raised the price of electricity since 2007. This has been included in the relevant price indices that are used for setting benefits and in wage negotiations. We will therefore not consider it further.

<sup>17</sup> The difference between the average married couple with two children and three children is due to income. Richer families tend to be larger.




Fig. 3. The impact (euro per household per week and euro per person per week) of a €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon tax per household size; non-electric energy only.




Fig. 4. The impact (euro per household per week, and euro per person per week) of a €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon tax per household type; non-electric energy only.




Fig. 5. The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon tax (right axis), and total benefits received and total direct taxes paid (left axis) per income decile; non-electric energy only.

all data for 2005). The crucial insight from this chart is that the carbon tax is measured in euros per week, while benefits and taxes are measured in hundreds of euros per week. For the bottom four deciles of the income distribution, the carbon tax is at most 2.0% of total benefits. For the top four deciles, the carbon tax is at most 2.6% of total direct taxes. Therefore, one can compensate for the impact of a carbon tax with a relatively small increase in benefits, and a relatively small decrease in income taxes.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> In the middle parts of the income distribution, people would benefit from both higher benefits and lower taxes.

#### 4. The impact of revenue recycling on income distribution

We use the SWITCH model (Callan et al., 2008) to study the distributional implications of revenue recycling. SWITCH is a model of direct taxes and welfare payments. It is based on the CSO's Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC, CSO, 2006). This nationally representative survey captures the variability in the household population across such dimensions as age, household composition, income, employment, and disability. Results are grossed up to provide information on incomes, taxes and benefits that represents the national situation. SWITCH is regularly used by the Department of Finance for distributional analysis of the impact of the annual budget.

Income taxes in Ireland are relatively straightforward. A 20% tax is paid on income below €35,400 per year. Above that, a tax of 41% is paid. There is a standard tax credit of €3660, so that the first €18,300 earned is essentially tax-free. There are additional tax credits for mortgage and rent, for family circumstances, and for disabilities. The Irish benefit system is considerably more complex, with income supplements, child benefits, maternity and homemaker benefits, carers benefits, illness and disability benefits, jobseeker and training benefits, pre-retirement allowances and pensions; many of these benefits come in both an entitlement and a means-tested mode.

Using the SWITCH model, we increased social welfare payments, and decreased taxes. The social welfare package would involve a €2 increase per week in personal rates for *all* social welfare payments (pensions, unemployment compensation, short-term illness and long-term disability, one parent families). The qualified adult allowance (QAA), which covers spouses without an independent income, is also increased by €2 per week. Optionally, a further €0.80 per week is allowed in respect of each qualifying child of a social welfare recipient. For income taxes, we consider two scenarios. In the first, the basic personal tax credit is increased by €104 per year. Tax credits for one-parent families are adjusted in line with this. In the context of compensation for carbon taxes, a tax credit increase is more suitable than a tax rate cut, as the amount of carbon tax paid by taxpayers is broadly constant, whereas compensation via tax rate cuts would be concentrated towards the top of the income distribution. Nonetheless, in the second scenario, we reduce the tax rate in the lower band from 20.0% to 19.5%.


Figs. 6 and 7 show the results, per income decile, of higher benefits and higher tax credits. The increase in social welfare payments benefits households in the lower half of the income distribution, and the increased tax credit benefits households in the upper half (Fig. 6). Subtracting the carbon tax, there are gains across the income distribution<sup>19</sup>—but the gains are minimal for deciles 1, 4, and 10. Fig. 7 adds an increase in the qualified child allowance for social welfare recipients, which has clear benefits for the lower incomes.

Turning to tax rates, Figs. 8 and 9 show the results of higher benefits and a lower tax rate. Again, there are gains across the income distribution, but minimal ones for deciles 1 and 4. Rich households gain more (Fig. 8). Fig. 9 adds an increase in the qualified child allowance for social welfare recipients. As this mainly benefits households at the bottom of the income distribution, the distribution of gains is more equitable.


Note that SWITCH estimates suggest that about 35,000 households in the bottom 3 deciles (and about 55,000 in total, all in the bottom half of the income distribution) would not be assisted by the tax/welfare compensation package. Some of these

<sup>19</sup> Recall that we exclude the indirect effects of carbon taxes on the income distribution.






**Fig. 6.** The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, and tax credit increase per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.




**Fig. 7.** The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, child benefit increase, and tax credit increase per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.



**Fig. 8.** The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, and tax rate reduction per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.

would be households with a low self-employment income, subject neither to tax nor eligible for social welfare payments. Figs. 6–9 suggest that these households are concentrated in the income deciles 1 and 4.

Table 1 shows the effects on the government budget. The increase in social welfare would cost €122 million per year, or €138 million if child benefits are raised too. An increase in tax credits would cost the exchequer €222 million, and a decrease in the lower tax rate would cost €301 million. This compares with carbon tax revenue of €551 million, €266 million of which would come directly from households. Overall, the tax and benefit reform in Fig. 7 would bring €191 million net to the exchequer, and the reform of Fig. 9 would yield €112 million net. The remaining revenue can be used for other purposes, for instance lowering labour costs for businesses.



**Fig. 9.** The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, child benefit increase, and tax rate reduction per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.

**Table 1**  
Budget implications of a carbon tax reform

Description	Budget (million) <sup>a</sup>
Carbon tax, non-ETS, €20/tCO <sub>2</sub>	+€551
Of which on households	+€266
Social welfare increase, €2/person/week	–€122
Child benefit increase, €0.80/child/week	–€16
Tax credit increase, €104/person/year	–€222
Tax rate decrease, to 19.5%	–€301
Welfare+child, tax credit, carbon tax	+€191
Welfare+child, tax rate, carbon tax	+€112

Source: Own calculations.

<sup>a</sup> In 2007, Gross national income was €1,61,000 million, while exchequer receipts were €48,000; the carbon tax would thus be 0.3% of GNI and 1.2% of government revenue.

## 5. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we studied the impact of a carbon tax reform on the income distribution in Ireland. A carbon tax is regressive, as one would expect. This is more pronounced for home heating than for motor fuels. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme has the smallest distributional effect. The impact of a carbon tax of €20/tCO<sub>2</sub> is small compared to pre-existing taxes and benefits. A modest increase in welfare payments would offset the negative impacts of a carbon tax in the lower half of the income distribution. It is important that benefits for dependent children of welfare recipients are increased too. People in the top half of the income distribution can be compensated by a small increase in the tax credit or a small decrease in the base rate of the income tax. Higher tax credits are slightly progressive, while lower tax rates are slightly regressive. These compensation schemes use between 65% and 80% of the expected revenue of the carbon tax. Therefore, in a country like Ireland, distributional concerns need not deter the introduction of a carbon tax.

These findings are in line with the results for other countries as reviewed above. A carbon tax is regressive, but well developed tax and benefit systems mean that this can be remedied. This is no surprise as developed economies differ in detail but less so in broad terms. Expenditures on energy are a small share of total expenditures throughout the OECD, and therefore an increase in the price of energy can be readily compensated—if the tax revenue is available, which is true for the introduction of a carbon tax but not for a rise in the world market price of oil.

However, there are some 55,000 households that neither pay taxes nor receive benefits. These households cannot be compensated by the measures considered in this paper. Some of these are

students, whose grants could be increased. Other households are outside the income redistribution programmes of the State for a variety of reasons. If this is voluntary (e.g., the self-employed), there is no problem. In other cases, the problem is much wider than the carbon tax, and should be solved for other reasons than climate policy.

Further research also is needed on the impact of carbon taxes on fuel poverty (Healy and Clinch, 2002, 2004); on the range of effects within deciles (Ekins and Dresner, 2005); on the indirect effects; on the general equilibrium effects; and on the effects of carbon taxes on economic growth. We compensate the current impacts of a carbon tax with an increase in income—however, Scott (1996) argues that poorer households may be better served with capital expenditures on home insulation and heating energy efficiency. Wier et al. (2005) show that the indirect effects are substantial and differentiated across the income distribution in Denmark, and there is no reason to believe that this would be different in Ireland. As Ireland imports many energy-intensive goods (cf. Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Welsch, 2008), taxes abroad would impact Irish households too. International climate policy would affect energy prices, inducing a rebound effect (Brännlund et al., 2007). In the medium term, a carbon tax would also affect the structure of the economy and the labour market, and the impact on wages may vary with skill levels (Wissema and Dellink, 2007). Conefrey et al. (2008) show that a carefully recycled carbon tax would accelerate economic growth in Ireland. While this would be positive for the average household, the distributional effects are unclear. All of these issues are deferred to future research. This uncertainty, however, should not be used as a reason to introduce a modest carbon tax.

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