

Composite consumption good modeled as Stone-Geary function of the individual consumption goods:

$$\textcircled{1} \quad \tilde{c}_t = \prod_{i=1}^N (c_{it} - b_{it})^{\beta_{it}}$$

$N = \#$  cons. goods

$b_{it} = \text{min required purchase of good } i \text{ at age } t$

$\beta_{it} = \text{share parameter that varies w/ age}$   
 → reflects changing composition of consumption over lifetime

→ NOTE:  $\sum_{i=1}^N \beta_{it} = 1$

→ FR give nice justification for this form

Fullerton + Rogers reference  
 Storratt (1988) and Summers (1981)  
 and say min cons helps w/  
 more realistic save behavior

consume maximized  $\Rightarrow$  ~~sub.~~ budget constraint:  $\sum_{i=1}^N p_i (c_{it} - b_{it}) = \tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t$

price of ag cons. good → price varies by age since composition of composite good varies by age  
 → ag cons. demand

\* Why don't min required purchases figure into the B.C.?  
 i.e. why subtract  $b_{it}$  here?

$p_i = \text{gross of tax price of good } i$   
 → constant in SS  
 → what @ outside?

→ varies over trans path, but not dynamic

± guess makes sense since  $\tilde{c}_t$  above defined as net of min cons and resulting demands do make sense

So do I do:

~~$$\sum_{i=1}^N p_i (c_{it} - b_{it}) = \tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t$$~~

but do we need to add cons. budget constraint → e.g. if  $c_{it} = b_{it} \forall i$  then  $\tilde{c}_t = 0$  but still outlay = purchase  $c_{it} = b_{it}$  right?

$$\mathcal{L} = \prod_{i=1}^N (c_{it} - b_{it})^{\beta_{it}} + \lambda (\tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t - \sum_{i=1}^N p_i (c_{it} - b_{it}))$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_{it}} = \frac{\beta_{it} \prod_{i=1}^N (c_{it} - b_{it})^{\beta_{it}}}{(c_{it} - b_{it})} - \lambda p_i = 0, \forall i, t$$

$$\Rightarrow \lambda p_i = \frac{\beta_{it}}{c_{it} - b_{it}} \prod_{i=1}^N (c_{it} - b_{it})^{\beta_{it}} \quad \forall i$$

$$\Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i (c_{it} - b_{it})} \prod_{i=1}^N (c_{it} - b_{it})^{\beta_{it}} \quad \forall i$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i (c_{it} - b_{it})} = \frac{\beta_{jt}}{p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})} \quad \forall i, j$$

$$\Rightarrow c_{it} - b_{it} = \frac{\beta_{it} p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt} p_i}$$

$$\Rightarrow c_{it} = \frac{\beta_{jt} p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt} p_i} + b_{it}$$

$$c_{it} = \frac{\beta_{jt}}{p_i} \left[ \frac{p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt}} \right] + b_{it}$$

plug this into:  $\leftarrow$

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_t \hat{c}_t &= \sum_{i=1}^N p_i (c_{it} - b_{it}) \\ \hat{p}_t \hat{c}_t &= \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i} \left[ \frac{p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt}} \right] + b_{it} \\ \hat{p}_t \hat{c}_t &= \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i} \left[ \frac{p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt}} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N p_i b_{it} \end{aligned}$$

note,  $\sum_i \beta_{it} = 1$

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_t \hat{c}_t &= \sum_{i=1}^N p_i c_{it} - \sum_{i=1}^N p_i b_{it} \\ \hat{p}_t \hat{c}_t &= \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i} \left[ \frac{p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt}} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N p_i b_{it} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N \left[ \frac{p_i (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt}} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N p_i b_{it} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N p_i c_{jt} - \sum_{i=1}^N p_i b_{it} \\ \Rightarrow \hat{p}_t \hat{c}_t &= \frac{p_j (c_{jt} - b_{jt})}{\beta_{jt}} \end{aligned}$$

$$p_{jt} = \frac{\beta_{jt} p_j}{\beta_{jt}} + b_{jt}$$

how determine cons. basket?

→  $\beta_{it}$  estimated

→ bid estimated

→  $\tilde{c}_t$  from individual optimization

→  $\tilde{p}_t = ?$  aggregate price level? -- price of avg + composite cons. good  
but varies w/ avg

→  $p_j =$  ~~from producers' problem~~ (?)  
from fixed coeff (transition matrix)  
mapping production goods to cons. goods

$$p_j = \sum_{i=1}^n \underset{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{det.} \\ \text{earlier}}} p_i^* \underset{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{trans} \\ \text{goods}}} z_{ij}$$

$$c_{it} = b_{it} + \frac{\tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t \beta_{it}}{p_i}$$

$$\sum_i c_{it} = \tilde{c}_t = \sum_i b_{it} + \sum_i \frac{\tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t \beta_{it}}{p_i}$$

$$\tilde{c}_t = \sum_i b_{it} + \tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t \sum_i \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i}$$

$$\tilde{c}_t - \tilde{B}_t = \tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t \sum_i \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i}$$

$$\frac{\tilde{c}_t - \tilde{B}_t}{\tilde{c}_t \sum_i \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i}} = \tilde{p}_t$$

→ could find this given info above

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\beta_{it} (c_{it} - b_{it})}{p_i} = \tilde{p}_t \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_{it}$$

$$\tilde{c}_t = \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{\tilde{p}_t \tilde{c}_t \beta_{it}}{p_i} + b_{it} - b_{it} \right) \beta_{it}$$

$$\tilde{p}_t = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i} \right) \beta_{it}} \Rightarrow \tilde{p}_t = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{\beta_{it}}{p_i} \right) \beta_{it}}$$

$$\Rightarrow \tilde{p}_t = \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{p_i}{\beta_{it}} \right) \beta_{it}$$

Consumer pays over <sup>production</sup> ~~production~~ goods

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$$\textcircled{3} \quad \underset{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{total cons. of} \\ \text{production goods}}}{Q_j} = \left[ \delta_j Q_j^c + (1-\delta_j) \left( Q_j^{nc} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}$$

$$\text{Max } \textcircled{3} \text{ s.t. : } P_j^c Q_j^c + P_j^{nc} Q_j^{nc} = P_j^Q Q_j^Q$$

$P_j^Q = \text{price of prod goods from corp}$

$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{L} = \left[ \delta_j Q_j^c + (1-\delta_j) \left( Q_j^{nc} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}} + \lambda (P_j^Q Q_j^Q - P_j^c Q_j^c - P_j^{nc} Q_j^{nc})$$

$$\textcircled{1} \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial Q_j^c} = \left( \frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1} \right) \left[ \delta_j Q_j^c + (1-\delta_j) \left( Q_j^{nc} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1} - 1} \left( \frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3} \delta_j Q_j^{c \frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} - 1 \right) - \lambda P_j^c = 0$$

$$\textcircled{2} \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial Q_j^{nc}} = \left( \frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1} \right) \left[ \delta_j Q_j^c + (1-\delta_j) \left( Q_j^{nc} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1} - 1} \left[ \left( \frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3} \right) (1-\delta_j) \left( Q_j^{nc} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3} - 1} \right] - \lambda P_j^{nc} = 0$$

$$\textcircled{3} \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = P_j^Q Q_j^Q - P_j^c Q_j^c - P_j^{nc} Q_j^{nc} = 0$$

① can be rewritten as:

$$\left[ \delta_j^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^c \frac{\varepsilon_3 - 1}{\varepsilon_3} + (1 - \delta_j)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} (Q_j^{nc})^{\frac{\varepsilon_3 - 1}{\varepsilon_3}} \right] \frac{\varepsilon_3 - (\varepsilon_3 - 1)}{\varepsilon_3 - 1} \\ \left( \delta_j^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^c \frac{\varepsilon_3 - 1}{\varepsilon_3} \right) = \lambda P_j^c$$

② as:

$$\left[ \delta_j^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^c \frac{\varepsilon_3 - 1}{\varepsilon_3} + (1 - \delta_j)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^{nc} \frac{\varepsilon_3 - 1}{\varepsilon_3} \right] \frac{1}{\varepsilon_3 - 1} \\ \left[ (1 - \delta_j)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} (Q_j^{nc})^{\frac{\varepsilon_3 - 1 - \varepsilon_3}{\varepsilon_3}} \right] = \lambda P_j^{nc}$$

$$\frac{①}{②} = \frac{\delta_j^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^c \frac{-1}{\varepsilon_3}}{(1 - \delta_j)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^{nc} \frac{-1}{\varepsilon_3}} = \frac{\cancel{\lambda P_j^c}}{\lambda P_j^{nc}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\delta_j^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^{nc} \frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}}{(1 - \delta_j)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} Q_j^c \frac{1}{\varepsilon_3}} = \frac{P_j^c}{P_j^{nc}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\delta Q_j^{nc}}{(1 - \delta) Q_j^c} = \left( \frac{P_j^c}{P_j^{nc}} \right)^{\varepsilon_3}$$

$$\Rightarrow Q_j^{nc} = \left( \frac{P_j^c}{P_j^{nc}} \right)^{\varepsilon_3} \cdot \frac{(1 - \delta)}{\delta} Q_j^c$$

Plug into (3):

$$P_j^Q Q_j = P_j^c Q_j^c + P_j^{nc} \left( \frac{P_j^c}{P_j^{nc}} \right)^{\varepsilon_3} \cdot \frac{(1 - \delta)}{\delta} Q_j^c$$

$$\delta \cdot P_j^Q Q_j = \left\{ Q_j^c \left[ P_j^c + P_j^{nc} \frac{1 - \varepsilon_3}{\varepsilon_3} P_j^c \frac{\varepsilon_3}{\delta} (1 - \delta) \right] \right\} \cdot \delta$$

$$\delta P_j^Q Q_j = Q_j^c \left[ \delta P_j^c + (1 - \delta) P_j^c \frac{\varepsilon_3}{\delta} P_j^{nc} \frac{1 - \varepsilon_3}{\varepsilon_3} \right]$$

$$\Rightarrow Q_j^c = \frac{\delta P_j^Q Q_j}{\left[ \delta P_j^c + (1 - \delta) P_j^c \frac{\varepsilon_3}{\delta} P_j^{nc} \frac{1 - \varepsilon_3}{\varepsilon_3} \right]}$$

$$\Rightarrow Q_j^c = \frac{\delta P_j^Q Q_j}{P_j^c \left[ \delta + (1 - \delta) P_j^{nc} \frac{1 - \varepsilon_3}{\delta} \right]}$$

Now find  $Q_j^{nc}$ :

$$Q_j^{nc} = \left( \frac{P_j^c}{P_j^{nc}} \right)^{\epsilon_3} \cdot \frac{(1-\delta)}{\delta} Q_j^c$$

$$= \left( \frac{P_j^c}{P_j^{nc}} \right)^{\epsilon_3} \frac{(1-\delta)}{\delta} \left[ \frac{\delta P_j^c Q_j}{P_j^c \left[ \delta P_j^{1-\epsilon_3} + (1-\delta) P_j^{nc 1-\epsilon_3} \right]} \right]$$

$$Q_j^{nc} = \frac{(1-\delta) P_j^c Q_j}{P_j^{nc \epsilon_3} \left[ \delta P_j^{1-\epsilon_3} + (1-\delta) P_j^{nc 1-\epsilon_3} \right]}$$

How determine amounts?

$\rightarrow P_j^c$  = price of composite output  
 $\rightarrow$  use same coeff matrix as before and prices of cons goods?

$\rightarrow Q_j$  = after determine demands for each cons. good, use transition matrix to map how these demands for cons. goods map into demands for production goods  
 ok

$\rightarrow P_j^{nc}$  = trans problem?

see pg 9  
 $\rightarrow$  from firm problem

$\rightarrow P_j^c =$

see  
 pg 8

$$\begin{aligned} P_j^c Q_j^c &= P_j^{nc} Q_j^{nc} + P_j^c Q_j^c \\ P_j^{nc} Q_j^{nc} &+ P_j^c Q_j^c \\ &= P_j^{nc} (1-\delta) P_j^c Q_j^c \\ &+ P_j^{nc \epsilon_3} \left[ \delta P_j^{1-\epsilon_3} + (1-\delta) P_j^{nc 1-\epsilon_3} \right] \\ &+ P_j^c \delta P_j^c Q_j^c \\ &P_j^{nc \epsilon_3} \left[ \delta P_j^{1-\epsilon_3} + (1-\delta) P_j^{nc 1-\epsilon_3} \right] \end{aligned}$$

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To determine  $P_j^0 \rightarrow$

$\rightarrow$  note that  $U(x, y)$  is linearly homogeneous:

$$\cancel{U(x, y)} \quad U(\lambda q_j^c, \lambda q_j^{nc}) = \lambda U(q_j^c, q_j^{nc}) \quad /$$

$$\cancel{U(q_j^c, q_j^{nc})} =$$

$\rightarrow$  Because  $U(\cdot, \cdot)$  is linearly homogeneous,  
we know indirect utility,  $V$ , is homogeneous  
of degree one in  $q$ :

$$V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, \lambda q_j) = \lambda V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, q_j)$$

and  $V$  is homogeneous of degree  $-1$

$$\text{in } P: \quad V(\lambda p_j^c, \lambda p_j^{nc}, q_j) = \frac{V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, q_j)}{\lambda}$$

also know that when utility is linearly  
homogeneous, ~~we can~~.

$$V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, q_j) = \frac{p_j^0 q_j}{e(p_j^c, p_j^{nc})}, \text{ where}$$

$e(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}) = \text{the "cost" for a unit of}$   
~~the~~  $\text{utility}$

$$\Rightarrow e(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}) = \frac{p_j^0 q_j}{V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, q_j)}$$

$$= \frac{q_j}{\left[ \gamma_j^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \left( \frac{\gamma_j p_j^0 q_j}{p_j^c \epsilon_3 [\cdot]} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} + (1-\gamma_j) \left( \frac{(1-\gamma_j) p_j^0 q_j}{p_j^{nc} \epsilon_3 [\cdot]} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}$$

$$\left( \gamma_j^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_3} \right) = \gamma_j^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} = \gamma_j \quad \left| \quad = \frac{q_j}{\left[ \gamma_j^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \left( \frac{\gamma_j p_j^0 q_j}{p_j^c \epsilon_3 [\cdot]} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} + (1-\gamma_j) \left( \frac{(1-\gamma_j) p_j^0 q_j}{p_j^{nc} \epsilon_3 [\cdot]} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}$$

$$e(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, q_j) = \frac{q_j}{\frac{p_j^c q_j}{[.]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}} [\sigma \frac{c}{p_j} + (1-\sigma) p_j^{nc}]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}$$

$$= \frac{[.]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}{p_j^c [.]^{\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}$$

$$= \frac{[.]^{1-\frac{\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}{p_j^c} = \frac{[.]^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1-\epsilon_3}{\epsilon_3-1}}}{p_j^c} = \frac{[.]^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon_3-1}}}{p_j^c}$$

Indirect Util:

$$V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, q_j) = \frac{p_j^c q_j}{p_j^c [.]^{\frac{\epsilon_3-1}{\epsilon_3-1}}} = \frac{q_j}{[.]^{\frac{1}{\epsilon_3-1}}}$$

$$e(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}) = \text{price of comp} = p_j^c = \frac{p_j^c q_j}{V(p_j^c, p_j^{nc}, p_j^c q_j)}$$

$$= \frac{p_j^c q_j}{\frac{p_j^c q_j}{[.]^{\frac{1}{\epsilon_3-1}}}}$$

$$= [.]^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon_3-1}} = [.]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon_3}}$$



How get  $P_j^{nc}, P_j^c$ ?

Zero profit condition?

→ I think yes

→ final price  $j = mc_j$

where  $mc_j$  is the cost of producing one unit of output of good  $j$  given optimal mix of capital and labor

→ this a function of  $r, w$

→ I haven't written this for supply side of model, but think I can do similar to what's done in Tax DSGE paper

→ so guess  $w, r$  → then all other prices fall out

→  $P_j^{nc}, P_j^c$

→  $P_j^{nc}, P_j^c \Rightarrow P_j^Q$

by CES utility from goods across sectors

→  $P_j^Q \Rightarrow P_i$  by transition matrix (price coeff)

$$\rightarrow P_i \Rightarrow \tilde{P}_i = \prod_{l=1}^N \left( \frac{P_l^i}{\beta_{il}} \right)^{\beta_{il}}$$

$\tilde{P}_i$  ~~is price level~~ price of composite cons. good for age + indiv

after aggregate, everything else here is static

except does seem like need to think @ how consumers forecast how

$r$  varies over time when make intertemporal cons/save decision → ok, but have whole path of  $\tilde{P}_i$  when guess  $w, r$  paths

What about quantities across levels of cons/prod?

(10)

$$\rightarrow Q_{jt}^c + Q_{jt}^p = Q_{jt}$$

$\rightarrow Q_{jt}^c \Rightarrow$  by "trans" matrix

$$\rightarrow \sum_t Q_{jt}^c = C$$

$$\rightarrow \sum_i C_{it} = \tilde{C} \quad (\text{right?})$$

~~or not?~~  
~~with cons?~~

$$\rightarrow \sum_t \tilde{C}_t = C$$

$$C + I + G = Y$$

(Note  $Q_{jt}^c$  also needs to be mapped into capital (FA's, land, inventories))

$\downarrow$

$\text{Invest } i$

$\rightarrow \sum_i K_{it} = K$

and so for govt cons