

# Future Computing Architectures

Onur Mutlu


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May 15, 2017

ETH Zurich Inaugural Lecture

**ETH** zürich



**SAFARI**

# Why Do We Do Computing?

Answer

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To Solve Problems

# Answer Reworded

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To Gain Insight

To Enable  
a Better Life & Future

# How Does a Computer Solve Problems?

# Answer

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# Orchestrating Electrons

In today's dominant technologies


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# How Do Problems Get Solved by Electrons?

# The Transformation Hierarchy

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Computer Architecture  
(expanded view)



Computer Architecture  
(narrow view)

# Computer Architecture

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- is the **science** and **art** of designing **computing platforms** (hardware, interface, system SW, and programming model)
- to achieve a set of **design goals**
  - E.g., highest performance on earth on workloads X, Y, Z
  - E.g., longest battery life at a form factor that fits in your pocket with cost < \$\$\$ CHF
  - E.g., best average performance across all known workloads at the best performance/cost ratio
  - ...
  - Designing a supercomputer is different from designing a smartphone → But, many fundamental principles are similar

# Different Platforms, Different Goals

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# Different Platforms, Different Goals

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# Different Platforms, Different Goals

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
# Different Platforms, Different Goals

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# Different Platforms, Different Goals

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
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


Jack Dongara

# Different Platforms, Different Goals



**Figure 3.** TPU Printed Circuit Board. It can be inserted in the slot for an SATA disk in a server, but the card uses PCIe Gen3 x16.




**Figure 4.** Systolic data flow of the Matrix Multiply Unit. Software has the illusion that each 256B input is read at once, and they instantly update one location of each of 256 accumulator RAMs.

Jouppi et al., “In-Datacenter Performance Analysis of a Tensor Processing Unit”, ISCA 2017.

# Axiom

To achieve the highest **energy efficiency** and **performance**:

**we must take the expanded view**  
of computer architecture



**Co-design across the hierarchy:  
Algorithms to devices**

**Specialize as much as possible  
within the design goals**

# What Kind of a Future Do We Want?










# Challenge and Opportunity for Future

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Reliable, Secure, Safe






# Challenge and Opportunity for Future

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Sustainable  
and  
Energy Efficient








## High Performance

(to solve  
the **toughest & all** problems)





# Challenge and Opportunity for Future

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## Personalized and Private

(in every aspect of life:  
health, medicine,  
spaces, devices, robotics, ...)

# This Lecture is About ...

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- Questioning what limits us in designing the best computing architectures for the future
- Providing directions for fundamentally better designs
- Advocating principled approaches

# Increasingly Demanding Applications

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Dream


and, they will come

As applications push boundaries, computing platforms will become increasingly strained.

# Maslow's (Human) Hierarchy of Needs

Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation,"

Psychological Review, 1943.



- We need to start with **reliability and security...**

# Three Key Issues in Future Platforms

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- Fundamentally **Secure/Reliable/Safe** Architectures
- Fundamentally **Energy-Efficient** Architectures
  - **Memory-centric** (Data-centric) Architectures
- Architectures for **Genomics, Medicine, Health**








**Security is about preventing unforeseen consequences**

# The Problem

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We do not seem to have  
design principles for  
(guaranteeing)  
reliability and security


# Focus is on Data Storage Systems (Memory)



- Memory is a critical component of all computing systems: server, mobile, embedded, desktop, sensor, ...
- Main memory system must scale (in *size, technology, efficiency, cost, and management algorithms*) to maintain performance growth and technology scaling benefits

# As Memory Scales, It Becomes Unreliable


- Data from all of Facebook's servers worldwide
- Meza+, "Revisiting Memory Errors in Large-Scale Production Data Centers," DSN'15.



# The DRAM Scaling Problem


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- DRAM stores charge in a capacitor (charge-based memory)
  - Capacitor must be large enough for reliable sensing
  - Access transistor should be large enough for long data retention time



- As DRAM cell becomes **smaller**, it becomes **more vulnerable**

# Infrastructure to Understand Such Issues



# A Curious Discovery [Kim et al., ISCA 2014]

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One can  
predictably induce errors  
in most DRAM memory chips

# DRAM RowHammer

A simple hardware failure mechanism  
can create a widespread  
system security vulnerability

WIRED

Forget Software—Now Hackers Are Exploiting Physics

BUSINESS

CULTURE

DESIGN

GEAR

SCIENCE

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 08.31.16 7:00 AM


SHARE

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 TWEET

# FORGET SOFTWARE—NOW HACKERS ARE EXPLOITING PHYSICS


# Modern DRAM is Prone to Disturbance Errors




Repeatedly reading a row enough times (before memory gets refreshed) induces **disturbance errors** in adjacent rows in **most real DRAM chips you can buy today**

# Most DRAM Modules Are Vulnerable


A company



B company



C company




Up to  
 $1.0 \times 10^7$   
errors

Up to  
 $2.7 \times 10^6$   
errors




Up to  
 $3.3 \times 10^5$   
errors

# Recent DRAM Is More Vulnerable




*All modules from 2012–2013 are vulnerable*




# A Simple Program Can Induce Many Errors




```
loop:  
    mov (%X), %eax  
    mov (%Y), %ebx  
    clflush (%X)  
    clflush (%Y)  
    mfence  
    jmp loop
```






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
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


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
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```



# A Simple Program Can Induce Many Errors



```
loop:  
    mov (%X), %eax  
    mov (%Y), %ebx  
    clflush (%X)  
    clflush (%Y)  
    mfence  
    jmp loop
```



# Observed Errors in Real Systems

CPU Architecture	Errors	Access-Rate
Intel Haswell (2013)	22.9K	12.3M/sec
Intel Ivy Bridge (2012)	20.7K	11.7M/sec
Intel Sandy Bridge (2011)	16.1K	11.6M/sec
AMD Piledriver (2012)	59	6.1M/sec

A real reliability & security issue

# One Can Take Over an Otherwise-Secure System

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## Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors

*Abstract. Memory isolation is a key property of a reliable and secure computing system — an access to one memory address should not have unintended side effects on data stored in other addresses. However, as DRAM process technology*

# Project Zero

[Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them:  
An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors](#)  
(Kim et al., ISCA 2014)

News and updates from the Project Zero team at Google

[Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges](#) (Seaborn+, 2015)

Monday, March 9, 2015

Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges

# RowHammer Security Attack Example

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- “Rowhammer” is a problem with some recent DRAM devices in which repeatedly accessing a row of memory can cause bit flips in adjacent rows (Kim et al., ISCA 2014).
  - Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors (Kim et al., ISCA 2014)
- We tested a selection of laptops and found that a subset of them exhibited the problem.
- We built two working privilege escalation exploits that use this effect.
  - Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges (Seaborn+, 2015)
- One exploit uses rowhammer-induced bit flips to **gain kernel privileges** on x86-64 Linux when run as an unprivileged userland process.
- When run on a machine vulnerable to the rowhammer problem, the process was able to induce bit flips in page table entries (PTEs).
- It was able to use this to gain write access to its own page table, and hence gain read-write access to all of physical memory.

# Security Implications



It's like breaking into an apartment by repeatedly slamming a neighbor's door until the vibrations open the door you were after

# More Security Implications

**"We can gain unrestricted access to systems of website visitors."**

www.iaik.tugraz.at ■

Not there yet, but ...



ROOT privileges for web apps!



29

Daniel Gruss (@lavados), Clémentine Maurice (@BloodyTangerine),  
December 28, 2015 — 32c3, Hamburg, Germany

Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript (DIMVA'16)

# More Security Implications

**"Can gain control of a smart phone deterministically"**



Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer  
Attacks on Mobile Platforms, CCS'16<sup>61</sup>

# More Security Implications?

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# Apple's Patch for RowHammer

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- <https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT204934>

Available for: OS X Mountain Lion v10.8.5, OS X Mavericks v10.9.5

Impact: A malicious application may induce memory corruption to escalate privileges

Description: A disturbance error, also known as Rowhammer, exists with some DDR3 RAM that could have led to memory corruption. This issue was mitigated by increasing memory refresh rates.

CVE-ID

CVE-2015-3693 : Mark Seaborn and Thomas Dullien of Google, working from original research by Yoongu Kim et al (2014)

HP, Lenovo, and other vendors released similar patches

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# Better Solution Directions: Principled Designs

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Design fundamentally secure  
computing architectures


Predict and prevent such safety issues

# How Do We Keep Memory Secure?


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- **Understand:** Methodologies for failure modeling and discovery
  - Modeling and prediction based on real (device) data
- **Architect:** Principled co-architecting of system and memory
  - Good partitioning of duties across the stack
- **Design & Test:** Principled design, automation, testing
  - High coverage and good interaction with system reliability methods

# Understand and Model with Experiments (DRAM)




# Understand and Model with Experiments (Flash)



[DATE 2012, ICCD 2012, DATE 2013, ITJ 2013, ICCD 2013, SIGMETRICS 2014, HPCA 2015, DSN 2015, MSST 2015, JSAC 2016, HPCA 2017, DFRWS 2017]

NAND Daughter Board

# There are Two Other Solutions

- **New Technologies:** Replace or (more likely) augment DRAM with a different technology
    - Non-volatile memories
  - **Embracing Un-reliability:**  
Design memories with different reliability and store data intelligently across them
- 
- ...

**Fundamental solutions to security  
require co-design across the hierarchy**

## Challenge and Opportunity for Future

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Fundamentally  
Secure, Reliable, Safe  
Computing Architectures

# Three Key Issues in Future Platforms


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- Fundamentally Secure/Reliable/Safe Architectures
- Fundamentally Energy-Efficient Architectures
  - Memory-centric (Data-centric) Architectures
- Architectures for Genomics, Medicine, Health



# Maslow's (Human) Hierarchy of Needs, Revisited

Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation,"  
Psychological Review, 1943.



- We need to start with reliability and security...

# Sustainable and Energy Efficient

# The Problem

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Data access is the major performance and energy bottleneck

Our current  
design principles  
cause great energy waste

# The Problem


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Processing of data  
is performed  
far away from the data

# A Computing System


- Three key components
- Computation
- Communication
- Storage/memory

Burks, Goldstein, von Neumann, "Preliminary discussion of the logical design of an electronic computing instrument," 1946.




# Today's Computing Systems

- Are overwhelmingly processor centric
- All data processed in the processor → at great system cost
- Processor is heavily optimized and is considered the master
- Data storage units are dumb slaves and are largely unoptimized (except for some that are on the processor die)



# Yet ...

- “**It’s the Memory, Stupid!**” (Richard Sites, MPR, 1996)




# Perils of Processor-Centric Design

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- Grossly-imbalanced systems
  - Processing done only in **one place**
  - Everything else just stores and moves data: **data moves a lot**
    - Energy inefficient
    - Low performance
    - Complex
- Overly complex and bloated processor (and accelerators)
  - To tolerate data access from memory
  - Complex hierarchies and mechanisms
    - Energy inefficient
    - Low performance
    - Complex

# Perils of Processor-Centric Design



# Three Key Systems Trends

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## 1. Data access is a major bottleneck

- ❑ Applications are increasingly data hungry

## 2. Energy consumption is a key limiter


## 3. Data movement energy dominates compute

- ❑ Especially true for off-chip to on-chip movement

# Data Movement vs. Computation Energy

## Communication Dominates Arithmetic

Dally, HiPEAC 2015




A memory access consumes  $\sim 1000\times$  the energy of a complex addition

# We Need A Paradigm Shift To ...


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- Enable computation with **minimal data movement**
- Compute where it makes sense (**where data resides**)
- Make computing architectures more **data-centric**

# Goal: In-Memory Computation Engine




- Many questions ... How do we design the:
  - ❑ compute-capable memory?
  - ❑ processor chip?
  - ❑ software interface?
  - ❑ system software and languages?
  - ❑ algorithms?



# Starting Simple: Data Copy and Initialization


*memmove & memcp: 5% cycles in Google's datacenter [Kanев+ ISCA'15]*



**Forking**



**Zero initialization  
(e.g., security)**



**Checkpointing**




**VM Cloning  
Deduplication**



**Page Migration**

...  
Many more

# Today's Systems: Bulk Data Copy




1046ns, 3.6uJ (for 4KB page copy via DMA)

# Future Systems: In-Memory Copy

3) No cache pollution

1) Low latency




2) Low bandwidth utilization


4) No unwanted data movement

1906ns, 0.304uJ

# RowClone: In-DRAM Row Copy



# RowClone: Latency and Energy Savings



Seshadri et al., "RowClone: Fast and Efficient In-DRAM Copy and Initialization of Bulk Data," MICRO 2013.

# (Truly) In-Memory Computation

---

- Similarly, we can support **in-DRAM AND, OR, NOT**
- At low cost
- Using analog behavior of memory
- **30-60X performance and energy improvement**
  
- **New memory technologies** enable even more opportunities
  - Memristors, resistive RAM, phase change memory
  - Can operate on data **with minimal movement**

# Another Example: In-Memory Graph Processing

- Large graphs are everywhere (circa 2015)



36 Million  
Wikipedia Pages



1.4 Billion  
Facebook Users




300 Million  
Twitter Users



30 Billion  
Instagram Photos


- Scalable large-scale graph processing is challenging



# Key Bottlenecks in Graph Processing

```
for (v: graph.vertices) {  
    for (w: v.successors) {  
        w.next_rank += weight * v.rank;  
    }  
}
```


## 1. Frequent random memory accesses




## 2. Little amount of computation

# Tesseract System for Graph Processing


Interconnected set of 3D-stacked memory+logic chips with simple cores



# Tesseract System for Graph Processing




# Tesseract System for Graph Processing




# Evaluated Systems


DDR3-OoO




HMC-OoO



HMC-MC



**Tesseract**




102.4GB/s

640GB/s


640GB/s

**8TB/s**

# Tesseract Graph Processing Performance




# Tesseract Graph Processing Performance



# Tesseract Graph Processing Energy

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
# Fundamentally Energy-Efficient (Data-Centric) Computing Architectures

# Three Key Issues in Future Platforms

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- Fundamentally Secure/Reliable/Safe Architectures
- Fundamentally Energy-Efficient Architectures
  - Memory-centric (Data-centric) Architectures
- Architectures for Genomics, Medicine, Health

# Genome Sequence Alignment






→  
read1: ATCGCTTCC  
read2: TATCGCTTC  
read3: CTTCCATGA  
read4: CGCTTCCAT  
read5: CCATGACGC  
read6: TTCCATGAC

e.g. Smith-Waterman alignment algorithm

		A	C	G	T	A	T	G	C
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
C	0	0	4	2	1	0	1	0	2
G	0	0	2	6	4	3	2	3	1
A	0	2	1	4	5	6	4	3	2
T	0	0	0	0	3	7	5	4	3
G	0	0	2	4	2	5	6	4	6
C	0	0	2	3	1	4	4	5	6
A	0	0	2	1	2	3	3	3	7
T	0	0	0	1	3	2	5	3	5
T	0	0	0	0	3	2	4	4	4
G	0	0	0	2	1	2	2	6	4
C	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	4	8




## 1 Sequencing

## Genome

## Mapping 2

Bottlenecked in Mapping!

Illumina HiSeq4000  
300 M  
bases/min




on average

2 M  
bases/min  
(0.6%)

# Total Processing Time Breakdown

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# An Example Solution: GateKeeper


Novel Filter  
Algorithm



1<sup>st</sup>

FPGA-based  
Alignment Filter.

$\times 10^{12}$   
mappings



$\times 10^3$   
mappings

Scoring Matrix												
	O	A	C	G	T	A	T	G	C			
O	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
C	0	0	4	2	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	2
G	0	0	2	6	4	3	2	3	1	0	2	0
A	0	2	1	4	5	6	4	3	2	0	0	0
A	0	2	1	3	3	7	5	4	3	0	0	0
C	0	2	4	2	2	5	6	4	6	0	0	0
C	0	0	2	3	1	4	4	5	6	0	0	0
C	0	0	2	1	2	3	3	3	7	0	0	0
T	0	0	0	1	3	2	5	3	5	0	0	0
T	0	0	0	0	3	2	4	4	4	0	0	0
G	0	0	0	2	1	2	2	6	4	0	0	0
C	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	4	8	0	0	0

# Some Key Principles and Results

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- Two key principles:
  - Exploit the structure of the genome to minimize computation
  - Morph and exploit the structure of the underlying hardware to maximize performance and efficiency
- Algorithm-architecture co-design for DNA read mapping
  - Improves performance by 20-100X
  - Improves accuracy of alignment in the presence of errors
  - Leads to a much more comprehensive read mapper

Xin et al., "Accelerating Read Mapping with FastHASH," BMC Genomics 2013.

Xin et al., "Shifted Hamming Distance: A Fast and Accurate SIMD-friendly Filter to Accelerate Alignment Verification in Read Mapping," Bioinformatics 2015.

Alser et al., "GateKeeper: A New Hardware Architecture for Accelerating Pre-Alignment in DNA Short Read Mapping," arxiv 2016.

Kim et al., "Genome Read In-Memory (GRIM) Filter," PSB 2017.

# Concluding Remarks

# A Quote from A Famous Architect

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- “architecture [...] based upon principle, and not upon precedent”



# Another Example: Precedent-Based Design

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# Principled Design

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# Principle Applied to Another Structure



# Concluding Remarks


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- It is time to design principled computing architectures to achieve the highest **security, performance, and efficiency**
- Discover design principles for fundamentally secure and reliable computer architectures
- Design complete systems to be **balanced**, i.e., data-centric (or memory-centric)
- The expanded view of computer architecture can
  - Lead to **orders-of-magnitude** improvements
  - **Enable new applications & computing platforms**
  - ...

# The Future is Very Bright

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- Regardless of challenges
  - in underlying technology and overlying problems/requirements



# Future Computing Architectures

Onur Mutlu


[onur.mutlu@inf.ethz.ch](mailto:onur.mutlu@inf.ethz.ch)

<https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu>

May 15, 2017

ETH Zurich Inaugural Lecture

**ETH** zürich



**SAFARI**

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- My collaborators
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