Question 1

a)
$$\rho_A = 0.8$$
 UCB: $0.8 + 1\sqrt{\frac{\log 14}{10}} = 1.314$

choose B

choose A

C) A greedy policy chooses the action that maximizes pa. Greedy for part (a) : A

Greedy for part (6): A

In [part (b)] the greedy action was chosen by UCB because both arms had been tried the same number of times.

Question Z

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$$T(s'|s,a) = \frac{N(s,a,s')}{N(s,a')}$$

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Step 3:
$$V_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2} \log \theta_1 \\ -\frac{1}{2} \log \theta_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2} \log \theta_1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2} \log \theta_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

(continued on next page) 1+0-90 = 1


$$\nabla_{\Theta}(U) = \begin{bmatrix} -2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot 2.71 + \begin{bmatrix} -2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot 0.9.19 + \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot 0.9 = \begin{bmatrix} -7.04 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Question 4


$$\alpha = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{R(P, a)}{R(C, a)} \right]$$


$$\alpha_{J} = \begin{bmatrix} -5 \\ -5 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$\alpha_{W} = \begin{bmatrix} -10 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$



- C) You would never take action U because it is completely dominated by action W.
 - d) certainty-equivalence would avoid the U action loe cause the best action to take in state P is I and the best action to take in state C is W. U is an info-gathering action and CE assumes that there is no state uncertainty, so U will be avoided.








() Use the conditional plan backup equation: $U^{\mathcal{N}}(s) = \mathbb{R}(s, \pi(s) + y \left[\sum_{s'} T(s'|s, \pi(s)) \sum_{s} Z(o|\pi U, s') \right]$ Since $T(5'|5,4) \in \{1,0\}$, calculations one simplified. For action W, 5'=5.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} U^{T_{\alpha}}(P) \\ U^{T_{\alpha}}(C) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} R(P,W) + R(P,W) \\ R(C,W) + R(C,W) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -20 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
& For action J, s' = C \\
& \Delta_b = \begin{bmatrix} U^{T_b}(P) \\ U^{T_b}(C) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} R(P,J) + R(C,J) \\ R(C,J) + R(C,J) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -10 \\ -10 \end{bmatrix} \\
& For action U, s' = s, and o = s \\
& \Delta_c = \begin{bmatrix} U^{T_{c}}(P) \\ U^{T_{c}}(C) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} R(P,U) + R(P,J) \\ R(C,U) + R(C,W) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -16 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix}
\end{aligned}$$



$$\alpha_c$$
 is dominant at b, so α_c will be chosen, $\pi_c() = U$