Quantum Oblivious Key Distribution with Discrete Variables

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








The QOKD system enables two parties (Alice and Bob) to share a set of keys. These keys have the particularity of being half right and half wrong. Only Bob knows which are right and wrong keys.







- Alice only knows that at some tabs there are the same number of right and wrong measurements.
- They have been building these sets during all the protocol. Therefore they
 have been applying methods to correct possible errors in transmission as
 well as to test the honesty of each other.
- Alice randomly generates the following sets $S_{A1'}$ (for basis) and $S_{A2'}$ (for keys) in order to encode photons.
- ullet Alice sends to Bob throughout a quantum channel l photons encoded using the previous values,

$$S_{AB} = \{\uparrow, \uparrow, \nearrow, \searrow, \searrow, \rightarrow, \rightarrow, \searrow, \nearrow, \uparrow, \rightarrow, \searrow, \nearrow, \searrow, \uparrow, \nearrow\}$$



- ullet Bob also randomly generates l=16 bits, which are going to define his measurement basis, $S_{B1'}$.
- ullet After measure the photons using the basis generated in $S_{B1'}$, he got:

$$S_{B2'} = \{1, -, \underline{0}, 0, -, 1, \underline{1}, -, 1, -, 1, 0, 1, 1, \underline{0}, 1\},\$$

where "—" corresponds to no clicks in Bob's detector, due to attenuation and the underlined values to measurements with a correct basis but an error has occurred due to imperfections in the quantum communication system.



Bob sends to Alice,

$$S_{BH1} = \{S_1, -1, S_2, S_3, -1, S_4, S_5, -1, S_6, -1, S_7, S_8, S_9, S_{10}, S_{11}, S_{12}\},\$$

where "-1" correspond to no clicks at the detector and the other values are Hash values calculated using SHA256.

- ullet After Alice has received S_{BH1} , she sends throughout a classical channel the basis which she has used to codify the photons updated with the information about the no received photons.
- Due to attenuation them sets are reduced,

$$S_{A1} = \{0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1\}, S_{A2} = \{1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1\},$$

$$S_{B1} = \{0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1\}, S_{B2} = \{1, \underline{0}, 0, 1, \underline{1}, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, \underline{0}, 1\}$$



- ullet In order to know which photons were measured correctly, Bob does the operation $S_{B3}=S_{B1}\oplus S_{A1}.$
- Bob got $S_{B3} = \{1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1\}.$
- The values "1" correspond to the values he measured correctly and "0" to the values he just guessed.
- Bob is building two sets of keys, one with correct basis measurements values and other with the wrong basis measurement values that he just guessed.
- They have been applying a modified version of Cascade Algorithm in order to correct error due transmission in the right set of measurements.
 Furthermore, they have been testing the honesty of each other using the estimated QBER from Alice and the Hash Function committed by Bob.



 By the end, Bob has four sets in order to have the capability of decode messages sent by Alice:


$$S_{B_{rp}} = \{1, 2, 5, 6, 8\}$$

 $S_{B_{rb}} = \{1, 1, 0, 1, 0\}$
 $S_{B_{wp}} = \{3, 4, 7, 9\}$
 $S_{B_{wb}} = \{0, 1, 1, 0\}$



1-out-of-2 OT Protocol: top level system

The two parties Alice and Bob communicate through two classical channels (or one bi-directional) and one quantum channel from Alice to Bob.







1-out-of-2 OT Protocol: starting conditions

- Alice has two messages m_1 and m_2 and Bob wants to know one of them, m_b , without Alice knowing which one, i.e. without Alice knowing b, and Alice wants to keep the other message private, i.e. without Bob knowing $m_{\bar{b}}$.
- In order to implement OT between two parties (Alice and Bob) they must be able to exchange continuously oblivious keys, i.e a QOKD system must exist between them.
- ullet Two basis are required: '+' rectilinear basis and $'\times'$ diagonal basis. Lets assume,

	Basis "+"		Basis " $ imes$ "
0	$ ightarrow (0^{\circ})$	0	<u>√ (−45°)</u>
1	\uparrow (90°)	1	





1-out-of-2 OT Protocol with QOKD system

Lets assume Alice sends the following two messages with size s=4, $m_0=\{0011\}$ and $m_1=\{0001\}$. At t=8 Alice does not need to eliminate any bits.

Step 1 Bob defines two sub-sets with size s=4:

$$I_0 = \{3,4,7,9\},$$

and

$$I_1 = \{1, 2, 6, 8\},\$$

where I_0 is the sequence of positions in which Bob was wrong about basis measurement and I_1 is the sequence of positions in which Bob was right about basis measurement.



1-out-of-2 OT Protocol with QOKD system

Step 2 Bob sends to Alice the set S_b . Lets assume he wants to know m_0 , therefore he sends $S_0 = \{I_1, I_0\}$. Alice is sure about Bob's honesty, since she knows he only has 4 right basis to measure the photons. In addition, Alice cannot know which message Bob chose because she did not know the order that he sent the sets.

Step 3 Alice defines two encryption keys K_0 and K_1 using the values in positions defined by Bob in the set sent by him. Lets assume,

$$K_0 = \{1, 1, 1, 0\}$$

$$K_1 = \{0,0,0,1\}.$$

Alice does the following operations:

$$m = \{m_0 \oplus K_0, m_1 \oplus K_1\}.$$





1-out-of-2 OT Protocol with QOKD system

Step 3 -cont Alice sends to Bob through a classical channel

$$m = \{1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0\}.$$

Step 4 Bob uses S_{B1} , values of positions given by I_1 and I_0 and does the decrypted operation.

The first four bits corresponds to message 1 and he received $\{0,0,1,1\}$, which is the right message m_0 and $\{0,1,1,0\}$ which is a wrong message for m_1 .









