

## Judea Pearl and DAGs

- Judea Pearl and colleagues in Artificial Intelligence at UCLA developed DAG modeling to create a formalized causal inference methodology
- They causality concepts extremely clear, they provide a map to the estimation strategy, and maybe best of all, they communicate to others what must be true about the data generating process to recover the causal effect

**Judea Pearl, 2011 Turing Award winner, drinking his first IPA**



## Further reading

- ① Pearl (2018) The Book of Why: The New Science of Cause and Effect, Basic Books (*popular*)
- ② Morgan and Winship (2014) Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition (*excellent*)
- ③ Pearl, Glymour and Jewell (2016) Causal Inference In Statistics: A Primer, Wiley Books (*accessible*)
- ④ Pearl (2009) Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference, Cambridge, 2nd edition (*difficult*)
- ⑤ Cunningham (2021) Causal Inference: The Mixtape, Yale, 1st edition (*best choice, no question*)

## Causal model

- The causal model is sometimes called the structural model, but for us, I prefer the former as it's less alienating
- It's the system of equations describing the relevant aspects of the world
- It necessarily is filled with causal effects associated with some particular comparative statics
- To illustrate, I will assume a Beckerian human capital model


## Human capital model: statements *and* graphs

Let's describe my simplified Beckerian human capital model.

- Individuals maximize utility by choosing consumption and schooling (D) subject to multi-period budget constraint
- Education has current costs but longterm returns
- But people choose different levels of schooling based on a number of things we will call “background” (B) which won't be in the dataset (“unobserved”)
- And own-schooling will also be because of parental schooling (PE)
- Finally, wages (Y) are a function of parental schooling

## Becker's human capital causal model


We can represent that causal model visually




$PE$  is parental education,  $B$  is “unobserved background factors (i.e., “ability”)",  $I$  is family income,  $D$  is college education and  $Y$  is log wages. The DAG is an approximation of Becker's underlying (causal) human capital model.

## Arrows, but also *missing* arrows

Before we dive into all this notation, couple of things




$PE$  and  $D$  are caused by  $B$ . But why doesn't  $B$  cause  $Y$ ?? Do you believe this? Why/why not? We can dispute this, but notice – we can see the assumption, which is transparent and communicates the author's beliefs, as well as the needed assumptions in their forthcoming *empirical* model. Every empirical strategy makes assumptions, but oftentimes they are not as transparent to us as this is.



- $B$  is a **parent** of  $PE$  and  $D$
- $PE$  and  $D$  are **descendants** of  $B$
- There is a **direct (causal) path** from  $D$  to  $Y$
- There is a **mediated (causal) path** from  $B$  to  $Y$  through  $D$
- There are four **paths** from  $PE$  to  $Y$  but none are direct, and one is unlike the others



## Colliders



Notice anything different with this DAG? Look closely.

- $D$  is a **collider** along the path  $B \rightarrow D \leftarrow I$  (i.e., “colliding” at  $D$ )
- $D$  is a **noncollider** along the path  $B \rightarrow D \rightarrow Y$

## Summarizing Value of DAGs imo


- ① Facilitates the task of designing identification strategy for estimating average causal effects
- ② Facilitates the task of testing compatibility of the model with your data
- ③ Visualizes the identifying assumptions which opens up the model to critical scrutiny

## Creating DAGs

- The DAG is a *relevant* causal relationships describing the relationship between  $D$  and  $Y$
- It will include:
  - All direct causal effects among the *relevant* variables in the graph
  - All common causes of any pair of *relevant* variables in the graph
- No need to model a dinosaur stepping on a bug causing in a million years some evolved created that impacted your decision to go to college
- We get ideas for DAGs from theory, models, observation, experience, prior studies, intuition
- Sometimes called the data generating process.

## Confounding


- Omitted variable bias has a name in DAGs: “confounding”
- Confounding occurs when the treatment and the outcomes have a common cause or parent which creates spurious correlation between  $D$  and  $Y$



The *correlation* between  $D$  and  $Y$  no longer reflects the causal effect of  $D$  on  $Y$

## Backdoor Paths

- Confounding creates **backdoor paths** between treatment and outcome ( $D \leftarrow X \rightarrow Y$ ) – i.e., spurious correlations
- Not the same as mediation ( $D \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y$ )
- We can “block” backdoor paths by conditioning on the common cause  $X$
- Once we condition on  $X$ , the correlation between  $D$  and  $Y$  estimates the causal effect of  $D$  on  $Y$
- Conditioning means calculating  $E[Y|D = 1, X] - E[Y|D = 0, X]$  for each value of  $X$  then combining (e.g., integrating)



## Blocked backdoor paths


A backdoor path is blocked if and only if:

- It contains a noncollider that has been conditioned on
- Or it contains a collider that has not been conditioned on

## Examples of blocked paths

Examples:

- 1 Conditioning on a noncollider blocks a path:



- 2 Conditioning on a collider opens a path (i.e., creates spurious correlations):



- 3 *Not* conditioning on a collider blocks a path:



## Backdoor criterion

### Backdoor criterion

Conditioning on  $X$  satisfies the backdoor criterion with respect to  $(D, Y)$  directed path if:


- 1 All backdoor paths are blocked by  $X$
- 2 No element of  $X$  is a collider

In words: If  $X$  satisfies the backdoor criterion with respect to  $(D, Y)$ , then controlling for or matching on  $X$  identifies the causal effect of  $D$  on  $Y$



## What control strategy meets the backdoor criterion?


- List all backdoor paths from  $D$  to  $Y$ . I'll wait.



- What are the necessary and sufficient set of controls which will satisfy the backdoor criterion?


## What if you have an unobservable?

- List all the backdoor paths from  $D$  to  $Y$ .



- What are the necessary and sufficient set of controls which will satisfy the backdoor criterion?
- What about the unobserved variable,  $U$ ?


## Multiple strategies



- Conditioning on the common causes,  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ , is sufficient
- ... but so is conditioning on  $X_3$

## Testing the Validity of the DAG

- The DAG makes testable predictions
- Conditional on  $D$  and  $I$ , parental education ( $PE$ ) should no longer be correlated with  $Y$
- Can be hard to figure this out by hand, but software can help (e.g., Daggity.net is browser based)







## Collider bias

- Conditioning on a collider introduces spurious correlations; can even mask causal directions

- There is only one backdoor path from  $D$  to  $Y$




- Conditioning on  $X_1$  blocks the backdoor path
- But what if we also condition on  $X_2$ ?




- Conditioning on  $X_2$  opens up a new path, creating new spurious correlations between  $D$  and  $Y$

- **Even controlling for pretreatment covariates can create bias**

- Name the backdoor paths. Is it open or closed?



- But what if we condition on  $X$ ?



## Living in reality - he doesn't love you

- **Fact #1:** We can't know if we have a collider bias (confounder) problem without making assumptions about the causal model (i.e. not in the codebook)
- **Fact # 2:** You can't just haphazardly throw in a bunch of controls on the RHS (i.e., "the kitchen sink") bc you may inadvertently be conditioning on a collider which can lead to massive biases
- **Fact # 3:** You have no choice but to leverage economic theory, intuition, intimate familiarity with institutional details and background knowledge for research designs.
- **Fact #4:** You can only estimate causal effects with **data** and **assumptions**.



## Examples of collider bias

## Bad controls


- Angrist and Pischke in MHE talk about a specific type of danger associated with controlling for an outcome – “bad controls”
- The problem is not controlling for an outcome;
- The problem is controlling for a collider and don't correct for *that*
- This has implications for when you work with non-random administrative data, too

## Sample selection example of collider bias

**Important:** Since unconditioned colliders block back-door paths, what exactly does conditioning on a collider do? Let's illustrate with a fun example and some made-up data

- CNN.com headline: Megan Fox voted worst – but sexiest – actress of 2009 ([link](#))
- Are these two things actually negatively correlated in the world?
- Assume talent and beauty are independent, but each causes someone to become a movie star. What's the correlation between talent and beauty for a sample of movie stars compared to the population as a whole (stars and non-stars)?

- What if the sample consists *only* of movie stars?




## Stata code

```
clear all
set seed 3444

* 2500 independent draws from standard normal distribution
set obs 2500
generate beauty=rnormal()
generate talent=rnormal()

* Creating the collider variable (star)
gen score=(beauty+talent)
egen c85=pctile(score), p(85)
gen star=(score>=c85)
label variable star "Movie star"

* Conditioning on the top 15%
twoway (scatter beauty talent, mcolor(black) msize(small) msymbol(smx)),
ytitle(Beauty) xtitle(Talent) subtitle(Aspiring actors and actresses)
by(star, total)
```



**Figure:** Top left figure: Non-star sample scatter plot of beauty (vertical axis) and talent (horizontal axis). Top right right figure: Star sample scatter plot of beauty and talent. Bottom left figure: Entire (stars and non-stars combined) sample scatter plot of beauty and talent.

## Stata


- Run Stata file star.do

## Occupational sorting and discrimination example of collider bias


- Let's look at another example: very common for think tanks and journalists to say that the gender gap in earnings disappears once you control for occupation.
- But what if occupation is a collider, which it could be in a model with occupational sorting
- Then controlling for occupation in a wage regression searching for discrimination can lead to all kinds of crazy results *even in a simulation where we explicitly design there to be discrimination*



## DAG



$F$  is female,  $d$  is discrimination,  $o$  is occupation,  $y$  is earnings and  $A$  is ability. Dashed lines mean the variable cannot be observed. Note, by design, being a female has no effect on earnings or occupation, and has no relationship with ability. So earnings is coming through discrimination, occupation, and ability.



Mediation and Backdoor paths

- ①  $d \rightarrow o \rightarrow y$
- ②  $d \rightarrow o \leftarrow A \rightarrow y$

## Stata model (Erin Hengel)

- Erin Hengel ([www.erinhengel.com](http://www.erinhengel.com)) and I worked out this code and she gave me permission to put in my Mixtape
- Let's look at `collider_discrimination.do` or `collider_discrimination.R` together

**Table:** Regressions illustrating collider bias with simulated gender disparity

Covariates:	Unbiased combined effect	Biased	Unbiased wage effect only
Female	-3.074*** (0.000)	0.601*** (0.000)	-0.994*** (0.000)
Occupation		1.793*** (0.000)	0.991*** (0.000)
Ability			2.017*** (0.000)
N	10,000	10,000	10,000
Mean of dependent variable	0.45	0.45	0.45

- Recall we designed there to be a discrimination coefficient of -1
- If we do not control for occupation, then we get the combined effect of  $d \rightarrow o \rightarrow y$  and  $d \rightarrow y$
- Because it seems intuitive to control for occupation, notice column 2 - the sign flips!
- We are only able to isolate the direct causal effect by conditioning on ability and occupation, but ability is unobserved

## Administrative data


- Admin data has become extremely common, if not absolutely necessary
- But naive use of admin data can be dangerous if the drawing of the sample is itself a collider problem (Heckman 1979; Elwert and Winship 2014)
- Let's look at a new paper by Fryer (2019) and a critique by Knox, et al. (2019)

## Collider bias and police use of force

- Claims of excessive and discriminator use of police force against minorities (e.g., Black Lives Matter, Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner)
- Challenging to identify
  - Police-citizen interactions are conditional on interactions having already been triggered
  - That initial interaction is unobserved
- Fryer (2019) is a monumental study for its data collection and analysis: Stop and Frisk, Police-Public Contact Survey, and admin data from two jurisdictions
- Codes up almost 300 variables from arrest narratives which range from 2-100 pages in length – shoeleather!

## Initial interaction

- Fryer finds that blacks and Hispanics were more than 50% more likely to have an interaction with the policy in NYC Stop and Frisk as well as Police-Public Contact survey
- It survives extensive controls – magnitudes fall, but still very large (21%)
- Moves to admin data
- Conditional on police interaction, *no* racial differences in officer-related shootings
- Fryer calls it one of the most surprising findings in his career
- Lots of eyes on this study as a result of the counter intuitive results; published in JPE
- Knox, et al (202) claim his data is itself a collider. What?



Fryer told us  $D \rightarrow M$  exists from both Stop and Frisk and Police-Public. But note: admin data is instances of  $M$  stops, which is itself a collider. If this DAG is true, then spurious correlations enter between  $M$  and  $Y$  which may dilute our ability to estimate causal effects.



## Knox, et al (2020)

- Move from DAG to more contemporary potential outcomes notation to design relevant parameters
- Use potential outcomes and bounds
- Even with lower bound estimates of the incidence of police violence against civilians is more than 5x higher than what Fryer (2019) finds
- Heckman (1979) – we *cannot* afford to ignore sample selection

## Summarizing all of this

- Your dataset will not come with a codebook flagging some variables as “confounders” and other variables as “colliders” because those terms are always context specific
- Except for some unique situations that aren’t generally applicable, you also don’t always know statistically you have an omitted variable bias problem; but both of these are fatal for any application
- You only know to do what you’re doing based on *knowledge about data generating process*.
- All identification must be guided by theory, experience, observation, common sense and knowledge of institutions
- DAGs absorb that information and can be then used to write out the explicit identifying model

## DAGs are not panacea

- DAGs cannot handle, though, reverse causality or simultaneity
- So there are limitations. “All models are wrong but some are useful”
- They are also not popular (see Twitter ongoing debates which have descended into light hearted jokes as well as aggressive debates)
- But I think they are helpful and while not *necessary*, showcase what is necessary – assumptions
- Heckman (1979) can maybe provide some justification at times