https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/06/frankenstein-campaign.html

The threat actors sent the trojanized Microsoft Word documents, probably via email. Talos discovered a document named MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx. Once the victim opens the document, it fetches a remove template from the actor-controlled website, hxxp://droobox[.]online:80/luncher.doc. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine. After the exploit, the file would write a series of base64-encoded PowerShell commands that acted as a stager and set up persistence by adding it to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.



(A) Manually generated attack graph



(D) Attack graph by "EXTRACTOR"



(E) Knowledge-enhanced attack graph

(FP) T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | T1203: Exploitation | T1547: Boot Autostart

Sent: microsoft word document (MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx)

Use: Exploit (CVE-2017-11882)

Adding to: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

(B) Part of attack techniques extracted with "TTPDrill"



(C) Attack chain extracted with "ChainSmith"

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

(A) Manually generated ground-truth



(D) Attack graph generated by "EXTRACTOR"



(E) Attack technique graph generated by us

(×) T1203: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol



T1203: Exploitation



T1547: Boot Autostart



(B) Attack techniques extracted with "TTPDrill"



(C) Attack chain extracted with "ChainSmith"

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

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

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

(A) Manually generated ground-truth



(B) Attack graph generated by "EXTRACTOR"



(C) Attack technique graph generated by AttackG



Manually generated ground-truth



Attack graph generated by EXTRACTOR



Attack technique graph generated by our system

20180410 1200 TRACE – Phishing E-mail Link

The attacker ran an attack against ClearScope. The attacker found the e-mail address of the phone user, bob@bovia.com, previously from a data dump from a hacked website. The attacker sent a phishing e-mail to Bob impersonating the Bovia Company Benefits Open Enrollment group. The phishing e-mail included a link to a website hosted at www.nasa.ng, address 208.75.117.3:80. The website hosted a form asking for name, e-mail address, and password. The user unfortunately clicked on the link, entered the requested information, and submitted it. The results were sent back to www.foo1.com, address 208.75.117.2:80. The attacker now has access to Bob's e-mail account, including contact information for other Bovia company employees.




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
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