

## Number Theory

Fermat's Last Theorem:

$$X^a + Y^a = Z^a$$

We want integer solutions for fixed  $a \geq 2$

$a=2 \Rightarrow 3, 4, 5$  (Pythagorean triplet)

$a \geq 3 \Rightarrow$  No solution

For us we'll consider  $\mathbb{Z}_n: \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$  for  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  
series of integers mod  $n$ .

Also  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  is a group. Properties of the group:

$\hookrightarrow$  sum in mod  $n$

- CLOSURE:  $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n, a+b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
- IDENTITY:  $\exists 0 \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ , s.t.  $a+0=a \quad \forall a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
- COMMUTATIVE:  $a+b=b+a \quad \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
- INVERSE:  $\forall a \in \mathbb{Z}_n \exists -a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  such that  $a+(-a)=0$

Also notice that  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, \cdot)$  is NOT a group, because  
 $\hookrightarrow$  product mod  $n$   
not every  $a$  is invertible.

$\hookrightarrow$  greatest common divisor

THM If  $\gcd(a, n) > 1$  then  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  is not invertible  
with respect to mult. mod  $n$

Proof: By contradiction, assume  $a$  is invertible

$\exists b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  such that  $a \cdot b = 1 \pmod n$ . Then  
 $a \cdot b = 1 + qn$  for some  $q > 0$

But then  $\gcd(a, n)$  divides  $ab - qn = 1$   
Which means  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ . Contradiction!

Define  $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \gcd(a, n) = 1\}$

$||\mathbb{Z}_n^*|| = \varphi(n)$  → Euler's Totient Function

If  $n = p$  a prime, then  $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ , and

$$\varphi(p) = p-1$$

Operations in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ :

- Additions and multiplications take  $O(\log^2 \lambda)$  where  $\lambda = |a|$
- Inverse (if it exists) can also be computed efficiently by means of the EUCLIDIAN ALGORITHM

LEMMA: Let  $a, b$  s.t.  $a \geq b > 0$ . Then  $\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a \bmod b)$

Proof: We have  $a = qb + a \bmod b$  for  $q > 0$  where  
 $q = \lfloor a/b \rfloor$  is the quotient.

⇒ A common divisor for  $a$  and  $b$  is also a common divisor  
of  $a - qb = a \bmod b$

Also, a common divisor of  $b$  and  $a \bmod b$  is a common divisor of  $a = qb + a \bmod b$   
 $\Rightarrow \gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a \bmod b)$

THM: Given  $a, b$  we can compute  $\gcd(a, b)$  in poly time.

Also, we can find  $u, v$ , such that

$$\gcd(a, b) = au + bv \quad \text{Bézout's identity}$$

Proof: Apply lemma:

$$a = bq_1 + r_1 \quad \text{with } 0 \leq r_1 < b$$

$$r_1 = a \bmod b$$

and  $\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, r_1)$ . Similarly

$$b = r_1 q_2 + r_2 \quad \text{with } 0 \leq r_2 < r_1$$

Keep going until  $r_{t+1} = 0$ , then

$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, r_1) = \dots = \gcd(r_t, r_{t+1}) = r_t$$

Complexity: We show  $t$  is bounded by a poly in  $\lambda = |b|$ .

We claim that  $r_{i+2} \leq r_i / 2 \quad \forall 0 \leq i \leq t-2$

(every two steps in the algo, the remainder is halved)

Clearly  $r_{i+1} < r_i$  so the series decreases.

Now if  $r_{i+1} \leq r_i / 2$  we are done, because  $r_{i+2} < r_{i+1} \leq r_i / 2$ .

So, assume  $r_{i+1} > r_i / 2$ . Then

$$r_{i+1} = r_i \bmod r_{i+1} = r_i - q_{i+2} \cdot r_{i+1}$$

$$\leq r_i - r_{i+1}$$

$$< r_i - r_i/2 = r_i/2$$

$$\Rightarrow \# \text{ steps is } 2(\lambda - 1)$$

The values  $u, v$  can be formed by reversing the steps of the algorithm.

EXAMPLE: Take  $a = 14, b = 10$ . Then

$$14 = 1 \cdot 10 + 4; 10 = 2 \cdot 4 + 2; 4 = 2 \cdot 2 + 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \gcd(14, 10) = 2$$

Moreover, if we revert the steps:

$$2 = 10 - 2 \cdot 4 = 10 - 2(14 - 1 \cdot 10) = 3 \cdot 10 + (-2) \cdot 14$$

$$\Rightarrow u = -2, v = 3$$

So we can compute the inverse of  $a \bmod n$  if  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$  we can find  $u, v$  s.t.

$$a \cdot u + n \cdot v = 1 \Rightarrow u = a^{-1} \bmod n$$

Next: exponentiation mod  $n$ :  $a^b \bmod n$ .

This is also poly-time by SQUARE and MULTIPLY.

Write  $b = b_0 b_1 \dots b_t$  in binary

$$\begin{aligned} a^b &= a^{\sum_i b_i \cdot 2^i} = \prod_{i=0}^t a^{b_i \cdot 2^i} = \prod_{i: b_i=1} a^{2^i} \\ &= a^{b_0} \cdot (a^2)^{b_1} \cdot (a^4)^{b_2} \dots (a^{2^t})^{b_t} \bmod n \end{aligned}$$



We now turn to study primes

THM (PNT): There are infinitely many primes, and

$$\pi(x) = \text{"number of primes } \leq x" \geq \frac{x}{3 \log_2 x} \approx \frac{x}{\log x}$$

Hence,  
Here,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[x \text{ PRIME}; x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}[2^\lambda - 1]] &\geq \\ &\geq \frac{2^{\lambda-1} / 3 \log(2^\lambda - 1)}{2^{\lambda-1}} \geq \frac{1}{3\lambda} \end{aligned}$$

THM (Miller-Rabin) We can test in poly-time if  $n=p$  is prime

Then we can efficiently sample LARGE PRIMES

Sample  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}[2^\lambda - 1]$  and test if prime

(If not, sample again)

$$\Pr[\text{No output after } t \text{ steps}] \leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{3\lambda}\right)^t$$

$$\text{for } t = 3\lambda^2, \Pr \leq e^{-\lambda} \quad \text{NEPHERO CONSTANT}$$

Given two  $\lambda$ -bit primes  $p$  and  $q$  we can compute  $n = p \cdot q$  in  $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ -time.

CONJECTURE Integer multiplication of two  $\lambda$ -bit primes is a OWF.

Many attempts: QUADRATIC SIEVE, NUMBER FIELD SIEVE

Complexity is sub-exponential in  $\lambda$ .

## DISCRETE LOG

THM (Lagrange). If  $H$  is a subgroup of  $G$ , then  
 $\# H \mid \# G$  → it is possible to divide the cardinalities

COR For all  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$  it holds that:

$$a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n} \quad (a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \text{ when } n=p \text{ a prime})$$

FERMAT'S LITTLE THEOREM

$$a^b \equiv a^{b \bmod \varphi(n)} \pmod{n}$$

PROOF:  $(\mathbb{Z}_n^*, \cdot)$  is a group with  $\varphi(n)$  elements  $\# \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ .

By Lagrange, the SUBGROUP of the powers of  $a$

$$a^0 = 1, a^1, a^2, \dots, a^{d-1}$$

has multiplicative order  $d$  divides  $\varphi(n)$

$$\therefore d \cdot k = \varphi(n) \text{ for some } k$$

$$\Rightarrow a^{\varphi(n)} = (a^d)^k = 1 \pmod{n}$$

$$\text{Also } a^b \equiv a^{q \cdot \varphi(n) + b \bmod \varphi(n)}$$

$$\equiv \underbrace{a^{q \cdot \varphi(n)}}_{=1} \cdot a^{b \bmod \varphi(n)} \equiv a^{b \bmod \varphi(n)}$$

Notice that  $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, +, \cdot)$  is a FIELD, because

$$\forall a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \quad \gcd(a, p) = 1$$

But there's more!  $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot)$  is a CYCLIC GROUP.

$\exists g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  s.t.  $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{p-2}\}$

*generator*

EXAMPLE: 3 is generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$ , but 2 is not.

Indeed,  $\mathbb{Z}_7^* = \{3^0, 3^1, 3^2, 3^3, 3^4, 3^5\} = \{1, 3, 2, 6, 4, 5\}$

FACT We can sample efficiently a random generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  if we are given the factorization of  $p-1$ .

DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE (first PKE)

$(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot)$  with generator  $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

<u>Alice</u>		<u>Bob</u>
$x \leftarrow \$ \{0, \dots, p-2\}$	$\xrightarrow[g^y]{g^x}$	$y \leftarrow \$ \{0, \dots, p-2\}$
$k = (g^y)^x = g^{xy} \bmod p$	$\xleftarrow{g^y}$	$k = (g^x)^y = g^{xy} \bmod p$

What about security? Assume Eve is passive (only observes the communication).

Intuition: It should be hard to compute  $k$

CONJECTURE: For  $\lambda$ -bit prime  $p$  the function

$f_{g,p}(x) = g^x \bmod p$  is a OWF

DISCRETE LOG ASSUMPTION

Many attempts: Only know SUB-EXP. algorithms.


Passive security of DH key exchange requires to assume DL problem is hard.

Is it enough? Maybe, we don't know.

There could be another way to compute  $K = g^{xy}$  without computing  $x$  and  $y$ .

CONJECTURE. (computational DH assumption - CDH)

No PPT  $A$  can win the following



CDH implies DL (as discussed above)

Does DL imply CDH? We don't know.

The only way we know how to break CDH is by breaking DL!