

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr[A' \text{ wins}] &= \Pr[A' \text{ wins} \wedge A' \text{ guesses } j] \\
 &= \Pr[A' \text{ guesses } j] \cdot \Pr[A' \text{ wins} \mid A' \text{ guesses } j] \\
 &\geq \frac{1}{q_h} \cdot \frac{1}{\text{poly}} = \frac{1}{\text{poly}}
 \end{aligned}$$

## The POWER of RO<sub>s</sub>

1  $H(x) = \text{RO}(x)$  is a CRH collision resistant hash function

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\Pr[H(x) = H(x') : (x, x') \leftarrow \$ A^{\text{RO}(\cdot)}(1^\lambda)] \\
 &= \Pr[\exists x_i \neq x_j : H(x_i) = H(x_j) \text{ for the queries } x_1, \dots, x_q] \\
 &\leq \binom{q}{2} \cdot 2^{-u} \leq q^2 \cdot 2^{-u} \quad u = \text{bit size of } x \\
 &= \text{negl}(\lambda) \text{ for } u = \omega(\log \lambda) \\
 &\quad q = \text{poly}(\lambda)
 \end{aligned}$$

2  $G^{\text{RO}}(x) = \text{RO}(x \parallel 0) \parallel \text{RO}(x \parallel 1)$  is a PRG

3  $F^{\text{RO}}(x) = \text{RO}(K \parallel x)$  is a PRF

4 CCA-2 PKE: OAEP (PKCS #2) from RSA

## LECTURE 18 9/12

### SIGNATURE SCHEMES

Bilinear groups

$$(G, \overset{\text{base, target}}{G_T}, g, q, \hat{e}) \leftarrow \$ \text{BilGroupGen}(1^\lambda)$$

i  $G, G_T$  cyclic order  $q$

ii)  $g \in G$  a generator

iii)  $\hat{e} : G \times G \rightarrow G_T$  is EFF. COMPUTABLE and

bilinear:

bilinearità

1  $\forall g, h \in G, \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$   
 $\hat{e}(g^a, h^b) = \hat{e}(g, h)^{ab} \in G_T$


2  $\hat{e}(g, g) \neq 1$  non degeneracy

Example: Elliptic curves Groups

$$y = x^3 + ax^2 + bx + c \pmod{p}$$

$$p \in G$$

$$Q \in G$$



$$aP = Q$$

$$a = d \log_p(a)$$

discrete

Obs: DDH does not hold in  $G$

$$\text{DDH Tuple: } g, g^a, g^b, g^c = g^{ab}$$

$$\hat{e}(g, g^c) = \hat{e}(g, g^b) \leftarrow \text{DDH can be eff.}$$

broken  
if this holds, this  
is a DDH tuple

Yet, CDH believed to hold

WATER, SIGNATURE

$$KGen(1^\lambda): \text{params} = (G, G_T, g, q, \hat{e}) \leftarrow \$\text{BilGroupGen}(1^\lambda)$$

$$a \leftarrow \$\mathbb{Z}_q, g_1 = g^a$$

$$g_2, u_0, \dots, u_K \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$$

$$pk = (\text{params}, g_1, g_2, u_0, \dots, u_K)$$

$$sk = g_2^a$$

$$\text{Sign}(sk, m \in \{0, 1\}^K): m = m[1], \dots, m[K]$$

encoding  $\alpha(m) = u_0 \prod_{i=1}^K u_i^{m[i]}$

$$r \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$\sigma = \left( \underbrace{g_2^a}_{sk} \alpha(m)^r, g^r \right) = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$$

$$\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$$

$$\text{Check } \hat{e}(g, \sigma_1) = \hat{e}(\sigma_2, \alpha(m)) \cdot \hat{e}(g_1, g_2)$$

Why does it work?

Correctness:  $\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1) = \hat{e}(g, g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^r) =$

BILINEARITY =  $\hat{e}(g, g_2^a) \cdot \hat{e}(g, \alpha(m)^r) =$

$$= \hat{e}(g^a, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(g^r, \alpha(m)) =$$

$$= \hat{e}(g_1, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(\sigma_2, \alpha(m))$$


THM: WATER's signature is UFMA assuming CDH

PROOF (Reduction to CDH):

$A(1^\lambda)$

$B(1^\lambda)$

$\mathcal{C}(1^\lambda)$



$\leftarrow \text{params}, g_1, g_2$

$$\begin{aligned} g_1 &= g^a \\ g_2 &= g^b \\ a, b &\leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_q \end{aligned}$$

$$\xrightarrow{m^*, \sigma^*} \quad \xrightarrow{\textcircled{3} \quad g_3}$$

① The public Key : params =  $(G, G_T, g, q, \hat{e})$   
 $g_1, g_2$  from  $\mathcal{C}(1^\lambda)$

Let  $l = 2q$ , be a parameter

$$u_i = g_2^{x_i} \cdot g^{y_i} \quad \forall i \in [0, K]$$

$$\text{where } y_0, \dots, y_K \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$x_1, \dots, x_K \leftarrow \$ \{0, \dots, l\}$$

$$x_0 \leftarrow \$ \{-Kl, \dots, 0\}$$

→ Since  $y_i$ 's are uniform so are  $u_i$ 's

Why this strange choice?

$$\text{let } \beta(m) = x_0 + \sum_{i=1}^K m[i] \cdot x_i$$

$$\gamma(m) = y_0 + \sum_{i=1}^K m[i] \cdot y_i$$

Look:

$$\alpha(m) = u_0 \prod u_i^{m[i]}$$

$$= g_2^{x_0} g^{y_0} \prod (g_2^{x_i} g^{y_i})^{m[i]}$$

$$= g_2^{x_0 + \sum x_i m[i]} \cdot g^{y_0 + \sum y_i m[i]}$$

$$= g_2^{\beta(m)} \cdot g^{\gamma(m)}$$

② Signature queries  $m$ :

$$\text{If } \beta = \beta(m) = 0 \pmod q$$

ABORT

Else  $\beta^{-1}$  exists. Let  $\gamma = \gamma(m)$

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma &= (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \\ &= (g_2^{\beta r} \cdot g^{\gamma r} \cdot g_1^{-\gamma \beta^{-1}}, g^r g_1^{-\beta^{-1}})\end{aligned}$$

CLAIM: The above signature  $\sigma$  is distributed as a REAL SIGNATURE with coins  $\bar{r} = r - a\beta^{-1}$

PROOF (by inspection):

$$\sigma_2 = g^{\bar{r}} = g^{r - a\beta^{-1}} = g^r \cdot g^{-a\beta^{-1}} = g^r \cdot g_1^{-\beta^{-1}} \quad \checkmark$$

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_1 &= g_2^a \alpha(m)^{\bar{r}} = g_2^a \alpha(m)^{r - a\beta^{-1}} = g_2^a \cdot (g_2^\beta \cdot g^\gamma)^{r - a\beta^{-1}} = \\ &= g_2^a g_2^{\beta r - a} \cdot g^{\gamma r - \gamma a \beta^{-1}} = \\ &= g_2^{\beta r} \cdot g^{\gamma r} \cdot g_1^{-\gamma \beta^{-1}} \quad \checkmark\end{aligned}$$

Also if  $r$  is UNIFORM, so is  $\bar{r}$  ■

### ③ Solving CDH

Let  $(m^*, \sigma^*)$  be the forgery

If  $\beta(m^*) \neq 0 \pmod q$

ABORT

Else OUTPUT  $g_3 = \sigma_1^* / (\sigma_2^*)^{\gamma(m^*)}$

CLAIM: If  $\mathcal{B}$  does not abort, it solves CDH

PROOF: If the forgery is valid,

$$\frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}(\sigma_2^*, \alpha(m^*))} = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2) = \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab}$$

$$\Rightarrow \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab} = \frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}(\sigma_2^*, \alpha(m^*))}$$

$$\text{Now, } \alpha(m^*) = g_2^{\beta(m^*)} \cdot g^{\gamma(m^*)} = g_2^0 \cdot g^{\gamma(m^*)}$$

$$\Rightarrow \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab} = \frac{\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1^*)}{\hat{e}(\sigma_2^*, g^{\gamma(m^*)})}$$

$$\Rightarrow g^{ab} = \sigma_1^* / (\sigma_2^*)^{\gamma(m^*)} \quad \text{by BILINEARITY}$$

