

Sicurezza

CdL in Informatica – L31

Lezione 3 – Controllo degli accessi

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Access Control Definitions 1/2

NISTIR 7298 defines access control as:

“the process of granting or denying specific requests to:
(1) obtain and use information and related information processing services; and
(2) enter specific physical facilities”



Access Control Definitions 2/2

RFC 4949 defines access control as:

“a process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy”



Access Control Security Requirements (SP 800-171)

- 1** Limit information system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices (including other information systems).
- 2** Limit information system access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute.
- 3** Control the flow of CUI in accordance with approved authorizations.
- 4** Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.
- 5** Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and privileged accounts.
- 6** Use non-privileged accounts or roles when accessing nonsecurity functions.
- 7** Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions and audit the execution of such functions.
- 8** Limit unsuccessful logon attempts.
- 9** Provide privacy and security notices consistent with applicable CUI rules.
- 10** Use session lock with pattern-hiding displays to prevent access and viewing of data after period of inactivity.
- 11** Terminate (automatically) a user session after a defined condition.
- 12** Monitor and control remote access sessions.
- 13** Employ cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access sessions.
- 14** Route remote access via managed access control points.
- 15** Authorize remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-relevant information.
- 16** Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections.
- 17** Protect wireless access using authentication and encryption.
- 18** Control connection of mobile devices.
- 19** Encrypt CUI on mobile devices.
- 20** Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external information systems.
- 21** Limit use of organizational portable storage devices on external information systems.
- 22** Control CUI posted or processed on publicly accessible information systems.



Requisiti base di Sicurezza

1. Limitare l'accesso al sistema informativo
 1. ai soli utenti autorizzati,
 2. ai processi che operano per conto di utenti autorizzati, o
 3. a dispositivi (inclusi altri sistemi informativi)
2. Limitare l'accesso al sistema informativo ai tipi di transizioni e funzioni che gli utenti autorizzati sono autorizzati ad eseguire




Access Control Principles

- In a broad sense, all of computer security is concerned with access control
- RFC 4949 defines computer security as:

“measures that implement and assure security services in a computer system, particularly those that assure access control service”



Contesto del controllo degli accessi



- **Autenticazione**
 - Verifica credenziali
- **Autorizzazione**
 - Concessione diritto o permesso
- **Controllo**
 - Revisione e verifica
 - Accertare adeguatezza controlli
 - Assicurare conformità politiche sec
 - Rilevare violazioni sicurezza

Access Control Policies

- **Discretionary access control (DAC)**

- Controlla l'accesso in base all'identità del richiedente e alle regole di accesso (autorizzazioni) che indicano ciò che i richiedenti sono (o non sono) autorizzati a fare

- **Mandatory access control (MAC)**

- Controlla l'accesso in base al confronto delle etichette di sicurezza con le autorizzazioni di sicurezza
- obbligatorio perché un'entità che ha l'autorizzazione ad accedere a una risorsa potrebbe non abilitarne un'altra di sua spontanea volontà entità per accedere a tale risorsa.

- **Role-based access control (RBAC)**

- Controlla l'accesso in base ai ruoli che gli utenti hanno all'interno del sistema e alle regole che stabiliscono quali accessi sono consentiti agli utenti in determinati ruoli


- **Attribute-based access control (ABAC)**

- Controlla l'accesso in base agli attributi dell'utente, alla risorsa a cui accedere e alle condizioni ambientali correnti

Le politiche non sono mutuamente esclusive



Soggetti, oggetti e permessi di accesso



Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

- Schema in cui a un'entità possono essere concessi permessi di accesso che le consentono, a suo giudizio, di concedere a un'altra entità permessi di accesso su determinate risorse
 - Spesso fornito utilizzando una matrice di accesso (Access Matrix)
 - Una dimensione è costituita da soggetti identificati che possono tentare l'accesso ai dati delle risorse
 - L'altra dimensione elenca gli oggetti a cui è possibile accedere
- Ogni voce della matrice indica i diritti di accesso di un particolare soggetto per un particolare oggetto



Access matrix

		OBJECTS			
		File 1	File 2	File 3	File 4
SUBJECTS	User A	Own Read Write		Own Read Write	
	User B	Read	Own Read Write	Write	Read
	User C	Read Write	Read		Own Read Write



(a) Access matrix



Implementazione Access Matrix

- Access Matrix è generalmente sparsa
- Access Control Lists
 - Decomposizione per colonne
- Capability Lists
 - Decomposizione per righe





Vantaggi e Svantaggi

Access Control Lists

- Vantaggiosa per determinare tutti i permessi su di una risorsa
- Svantaggiosa per determinare i permessi associati ad un singolo utente
- Vantaggio: può contenere una voce di default per garantire permessi di accesso agli utenti non elencati
 - Regola del least privilege sempre

Capability Lists

- Vantaggiosa per determinare i permessi associati ad un singolo utente
- Svantaggiosa nel determinare tutti i permessi di una risorsa
- Ogni utente può prestare/cedere un capability ticket (se autorizzato)
- Disseminazione dei capability ticket pone un problema di sicurezza
 - Ticket non falsificabile
 - Mantenuti dal SO
 - token non falsificabile nella CL
 - Adatta nei sistemi distribuit



Authorization Table for Files

Subject	Access Mode	Object
A	Own	File 1
	Read	File 1
	Write	File 1
A	Own	File 3
	Read	File 3
	Write	File 3
B	Read	File 1
B	Own	File 2
B	Read	File 2
B	Write	File 2
B	Write	File 3
B	Read	File 4
C	Read	File 1
C	Write	File 1
C	Read	File 2
C	Own	File 4
C	Read	File 4
C	Write	File 4

- Ordinata/accesso per soggetto = capability list
- Ordinata/accesso per oggetto = ACL

Modello per il controllo degli accessi (Lampson, Graham e Denning)

- Soggetti, oggetti e regole che governano l'accesso dei soggetti agli oggetti
- Protezione del sistema:
 - Insieme di informazioni, in un determinato istante, che specificano i permessi di accesso di ogni soggetto relativamente ad ogni oggetto
- Tre requisiti
 - Rappresentare lo stato di protezione
 - Far rispettare i permessi di accesso
 - Permettere ai soggetti di modificare lo stato di protezione secondo determinate modalità



Modello per il controllo degli accessi (Cont'd)

- Estende l'universo degli oggetti nella Control Matrix (Extended Control Matrix)
 - Processi
 - Cancellare, fermare, riattivare
 - Dispositivi
 - R/W, controllare le operazioni, Blocco/Sblocco
 - Locazione o regione di memoria
 - R/W su regioni per cui di default no access
 - Soggetti
 - Concedere/cancellare i suoi permessi di accesso relativi ad altri utenti




Extended Control Matrix

$$A[S,X]=\alpha$$

Contiene attributi di accesso

		subjects			files		processes		disk drives	
		S ₁	S ₂	S ₃	F ₁	F ₂	P ₁	P ₂	D ₁	D ₂
SUBJECTS	S ₁	control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
	S ₂		control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
	S ₃			control		write	stop			

* - copy flag set



Access Control System

Commands:

Regole che controllano le modifiche alla Access Matrix

Rule	Command (by S_o)	Authorization	Operation
R1	transfer $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{array} \right\}$ to S, X	' α^* ' in $A[S_o, X]$	store $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{array} \right\}$ in $A[S, X]$
R2	grant $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{array} \right\}$ to S, X	'owner' in $A[S_o, X]$	store $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{array} \right\}$ in $A[S, X]$
R3	delete α from S, X	'control' in $A[S_o, S]$ or 'owner' in $A[S_o, X]$	delete α from $A[S, X]$
R4	$w \leftarrow \text{read } S, X$	'control' in $A[S_o, S]$ or 'owner' in $A[S_o, X]$	copy $A[S, X]$ into w
R5	create object X	None	add column for X to A ; store 'owner' in $A[S_o, X]$
R6	destroy object X	'owner' in $A[S_o, X]$	delete column for X from A
R7	create subject S	none	add row for S to A ; execute create object S ; store 'control' in $A[S, S]$
R8	destroy subject S	'owner' in $A[S_o, S]$	delete row for S from A ; execute destroy object S

Trasferimento, concessione e cancellazione di permessi di accesso

Creazione e cancellazione di soggetti e oggetti



Protection Domains (a more general approach)

- Set of objects together with access rights to those objects
- More flexibility when associating capabilities with protection domains
- In terms of the access matrix, a row defines a protection domain
- User can spawn processes with a subset of the access rights of the user
- Association between a process and a domain can be static or dynamic
- Unix protection domains
 - In **user mode** certain areas of memory are protected from use and certain instructions may not be executed
 - In **kernel mode** privileged instructions may be executed and protected areas of memory may be accessed



UNIX File Access Control

UNIX files are administered using inodes (index nodes)


- Control structures with key information needed for a particular file
- Several file names may be associated with a single inode
- An active inode is associated with exactly one file
- File attributes, permissions and control information are sorted in the inode
- On the disk there is an inode table, or inode list, that contains the inodes of all the files in the file system
- When a file is opened its inode is brought into main memory and stored in a memory resident inode table

Directories are structured in a hierarchical tree

- May contain files and/or other directories
- Contains file names plus pointers to associated inodes

UNIX File Access Control

- Unique user identification number (user ID)
- Member of a primary group identified by a group ID
- Belongs to a specific group
- 12 protection bits
 - Specify read, write, and execute permission for the owner of the file, members of the group and all other users
- The owner ID, group ID, and protection bits are part of the file's inode



UNIX File Access Control



Traditional UNIX File Access Control

- Set user ID (SetUID)
- Set group ID (SetGID)
 - System temporarily uses rights of the file owner/group in addition to the real user's rights when making access control decisions
 - Enables privileged programs to access files/resources not generally accessible
- Sticky bit
 - When applied to a directory it specifies that only the owner of any file in the directory can rename, move, or delete that file
- Superuser
 - Is exempt from usual access control restrictions
 - Has system-wide access



Access Control Lists (ACLs) in UNIX

Modern UNIX systems support ACLs

- FreeBSD, OpenBSD, Linux, Solaris


FreeBSD

- Setfacl command assigns a list of UNIX user IDs and groups
- Any number of users and groups can be associated with a file
- Read, write, execute protection bits
- A file does not need to have an ACL
- Includes an additional protection bit that indicates whether the file has an extended ACL

When a process requests access to a file system object two steps are performed:

- Step 1 selects the most appropriate ACL
- Step 2 checks if the matching entry contains sufficient permissions





(b) Extended access control list

Figure 4.5 UNIX File Access Control





Figure 4.6 Users, Roles, and Resources


	R ₁	R ₂	• • •	R _n
U ₁	X			
U ₂	X			
U ₃		X		X
U ₄				X
U ₅				X
U ₆				X
•				
•				
•				
U _m	X			

		OBJECTS								
		R ₁	R ₂	R _n	F ₁	F ₁	P ₁	P ₂	D ₁	D ₂
ROLES	R ₁	control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
	R ₂		control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
	•									
	•									
	•									
	R _n			control		write	stop			

Figure 4.7 Access Control Matrix Representation of RBAC



(a) Relationship among RBAC models



(b) RBAC models

Figure 4.8 A Family of Role-Based Access Control Models.

Table 4.4

Scope RBAC Models

Models	Hierarchies	Constraints
RBAC ₀	No	No
RBAC ₁	Yes	No
RBAC ₂	No	Yes
RBAC ₃	Yes	Yes




Figure 4.9 Example of Role Hierarchy

Constraints - RBAC

- Provide a means of adapting RBAC to the specifics of administrative and security policies of an organization
- A defined relationship among roles or a condition related to roles
- Types:

Mutually exclusive roles

- A user can only be assigned to one role in the set (either during a session or statically)
- Any permission (access right) can be granted to only one role in the set

Cardinality

- Setting a maximum number with respect to roles

Prerequisite roles

- Dictates that a user can only be assigned to a particular role if it is already assigned to some other specified role

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

Can define authorizations that express conditions on properties of both the resource and the subject


Strength is its flexibility and expressive power

Main obstacle to its adoption in real systems has been concern about the performance impact of evaluating predicates on both resource and user properties for each access

Web services have been pioneering technologies through the introduction of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XAMCL)

There is considerable interest in applying the model to cloud services

ABAC Model: Attributes



ABAC

Distinguishable because it controls access to objects by evaluating rules against the attributes of entities, operations, and the environment relevant to a request

Relies upon the evaluation of attributes of the subject, attributes of the object, and a formal relationship or access control rule defining the allowable operations for subject-object attribute combinations in a given environment

Systems are capable of enforcing DAC, RBAC, and MAC concepts

Allows an unlimited number of attributes to be combined to satisfy any access control rule






Figure 4.10 ABAC Scenario



(a) ACL Trust Chain



(b) ABAC Trust Chain

Figure 4.11 ACL and ABAC Trust Relationships

ABAC Policies

A policy is a set of rules and relationships that govern allowable behavior within an organization, based on the privileges of subjects and how resources or objects are to be protected under which environment conditions

Typically written from the perspective of the object that needs protecting and the privileges available to subjects

Privileges represent the authorized behavior of a subject and are defined by an authority and embodied in a policy

Other terms commonly used instead of privileges are: rights, authorizations, and entitlements

S, O, E : Soggetto, oggetto, Ambiente

SA_K, OA_M, EA_N : attributi di S,O,E

$$\text{ATTR}(\mathbf{s} \in S) \subseteq SA_1 \times SA_2 \times SA_3 \times \dots \times SA_K$$

$$\text{ATTR}(\mathbf{o} \in O) \subseteq OA_1 \times \dots \times OA_M$$

$$\text{ATTR}(\mathbf{e} \in E) \subseteq EA_1 \times \dots \times EA_N$$

REGOLA

Rule : $\text{com_access}(s, o, e) \leftarrow f(\text{ATTR}(s), \text{ATTR}(o), \text{ATTR}(e))$

↑
fusione
rulesee

ESEMPPIO

FILM' CLASSES	ADULT USERS
R	≥ 17 anni
PG-13	≥ 13 anni
G	ALL

R1 : Com-Access (v, m, e) \leftarrow ^{Perf. TSLR} \leftarrow ^{seen}

$(Age(v) \geq 17 \wedge Rating(m) \in \{R, PG-13, G\}) \vee$

$(Age(v) \geq 13 \wedge Age(v) < 17 \wedge Rating(m) \in \{PG-13, G\}) \vee$

$(Age(v) < 13 \wedge Rating(m) \in \{G\})$

New & Old

New Isors → New & Old releases

Old Isors → Old releases

RBAC richiede def. useri ruoli.

Il numero dei ruoli è addoppiato.

Implementare ESPONENZIALI con il numero di attributi

ABAC new role

R2: $\text{can-see}(v, m, e) \leftarrow$

(MemberType(v) = Premium) \vee

(MemberType(v) = Regular) \wedge MovieType(m) = OldRel

R3: $\text{can-see}(v, m, e) \leftarrow R1 \wedge R2$

SE VOUS Serez AGGUERIE


UN A VRAI REGOLA TIPO

"Regular Users can scan New Releases
in preview period"


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Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM)

- A comprehensive approach to managing and implementing digital identities, credentials, and access control
- Developed by the U.S. government
- Designed to:
 - Create trusted digital identity representations of individuals and nonperson entities (NPEs)
 - Bind those identities to credentials that may serve as a proxy for the individual or NPE in access transactions
 - A credential is an object or data structure that authoritatively binds an identity to a token possessed and controlled by a subscriber
 - Use the credentials to provide authorized access to an agency's resources



Identity Management



<p>Concerned with assigning attributes to a digital identity and connecting that digital identity to an individual or NPE</p>
<p>Goal is to establish a trustworthy digital identity that is independent of a specific application or context</p>
<p>Most common approach to access control for applications and programs is to create a digital representation of an identity for the specific use of the application or program</p>
<p>Maintenance and protection of the identity itself is treated as secondary to the mission associated with the application</p>
<p>Final element is lifecycle management which includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mechanisms, policies, and procedures for protecting personal identity information• Controlling access to identity data• Techniques for sharing authoritative identity data with applications that need it• Revocation of an enterprise identity

Credential Management

The management of the life cycle of the credential

Examples of credentials are smart cards, private/public cryptographic keys, and digital certificates

Encompasses five logical components:

An authorized individual sponsors an individual or entity for a credential to establish the need for the credential

The sponsored individual enrolls for the credential

- Process typically consists of identity proofing and the capture of biographic and biometric data
- This step may also involve incorporating authoritative attribute data, maintained by the identity management component

A credential is produced

- Depending on the credential type, production may involve encryption, the use of a digital signature, the production of a smart card or other functions

The credential is issued to the individual or NPE

A credential must be maintained over its life cycle

- Might include revocation, reissuance/replacement, reenrollment, expiration, personal identification number (PIN) reset, suspension, or reinstatement

Access Management

Deals with the management and control of the ways entities are granted access to resources

Covers both logical and physical access

May be internal to a system or an external element

Purpose is to ensure that the proper identity verification is made when an individual attempts to access a security sensitive building, computer systems, or data

Three support elements are needed for an enterprise-wide access control facility:

- Resource management
- Privilege management
- Policy management

Three support elements are needed for an enterprise-wide access control facility:

Resource management

- Concerned with defining rules for a resource that requires access control
- Rules would include credential requirements and what user attributes, resource attributes, and environmental conditions are required for access of a given resource for a given function

Privilege management


- Concerned with establishing and maintaining the entitlement or privilege attributes that comprise an individual's access profile
- These attributes represent features of an individual that can be used as the basis for determining access decisions to both physical and logical resources
- Privileges are considered attributes that can be linked to a digital identity

Policy management

- Governs what is allowable and unallowable in an access transaction

Identity Federation

- Term used to describe the technology, standards, policies, and processes that allow an organization to trust digital identities, identity attributes, and credentials created and issued by another organization
- Addresses two questions:
 - How do you trust identities of individuals from external organizations who need access to your systems
 - How do you vouch for identities of individuals in your organization when they need to collaborate with external organizations



(a) Traditional triangle of parties involved in an exchange of identity information

Figure 4.13 Identity Information Exchange Approaches

Open Identity Trust Framework

OpenID

- An open standard that allows users to be authenticated by certain cooperating sites using a third party service

OIDF

- OpenID Foundation is an international nonprofit organization of individuals and companies committed to enabling, promoting, and protecting OpenID technologies

ICF

- Information Card Foundation is a nonprofit community of companies and individuals working together to evolve the Information Card ecosystem

OITF


- Open Identity Trust Framework is a standardized, open specification of a trust framework for identity and attribute exchange, developed jointly by OIDF and ICF

OIX

- Open Identity Exchange Corporation is an independent, neutral, international provider of certification trust frameworks conforming to the OITF model

AXN

- Attribute Exchange Network is an online Internet-scale gateway for identity service providers and relying parties to efficiently access user asserted, permissioned, and verified online identity attributes in high volumes at affordable costs



(B) Identity attribute exchange elements

Figure 4.13 Identity Information Exchange Approaches

Summary

- Access control principles
 - Access control context
 - Access control policies
- Subjects, objects, and access rights
- Discretionary access control
 - Access control model
 - Protection domains
- UNIX file access control
 - Traditional UNIX file access control
 - Access control lists in UNIX
- Role-based access control
 - RBAC reference models
- Attribute-based access control
 - Attributes
 - ABAC logical architecture
 - ABAC policies
- Identity, credential, and access management
 - Identity management
 - Credential management
 - Access management
 - Identity federation
- Trust frameworks
 - Traditional identity exchange approach
 - Open identity trust framework
- Bank RBAC system