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Lesson 11

4.1 Authenticated encryption (Age of Ultron)

Last time we proved CPA-security of Π . Today we will explore the *auth* property. Consider Π as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Enc} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda * \mathcal{M} &\rightarrow \mathcal{C} \\ \text{Tag} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda * \mathcal{C} &\rightarrow \Phi \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 1. *If $\text{Tag}(\cdot, \cdot)$ is **EUF-CMA**, then Π has *auth-property*.* \diamond

What is **EUFCMA** ?

It's a property similar to **uf-cma**, but now I want that the challenge message (m^*, ϕ^*) is made by a fresh m^* and a valid **fresh** ϕ^* .

The difference is that in **ufcma** we didn't care about the freshness of ϕ^* .

Proof. Suppose Π has not the *auth* property.

So we have an \mathcal{A}' which can win the **auth** challenge of Π .


On the other hand, we have a Π_2 schema which uses an **eu-f-cma** $\text{Tag}(\cdot, \cdot)$ function.

So, by reduction, we show that ...

\square

Exercise 3 - point a

We define a *Game*, supposing y is correctly chosen among the G codomain (and this happens with probability equal to $\frac{1}{2}$):



Now D can check if $y = y'$, and can win against C . Since D and D' work in $\text{poly}\lambda$, we can state that D can distinguish in $\text{poly}\lambda$ this PRG from $\mathcal{U}_{n+1} \Rightarrow G$ is not a PRG, but this is a contradiction with initial statement.

Exercise 4 - point a

From the security of ONE-TIME pad, if you have some arbitrary distribution D over a group G , and the uniform distribution U over the same group G . If D and U are independent, we have that $y \leftarrow \mathcal{U}$ and $x \leftarrow D$, and computing $z = x \oplus y$ we have that z is distributed uniformly over G . Thus, in the end I build

$$G^*(x, x') = G_1(x) \oplus G_2(x')$$

for $x \neq x'$.

Now, we want to show that, given a PRG G_1 and a non-PRG G_2 , $G(x) = G_1(x) \oplus G_2(x)$ is a PRG.

We want to show, by contradiction, that G is always a PRG. Now suppose that we have the following game, where the PRG function is G_1 :


, with $x' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and G_2 such that its output is always equal to identity string. Then $G^* = z \oplus G_2(x') = z$ always. Now D wins over C^{prg} , but this is a contradiction since PRG cannot be distinguished from random extraction. Furthermore, since the same reduction can be built for the case when G_2 is the PRG one, we can state that G is always a PRG.

Exercise 4 - point b¹

We can demonstrate that optimal seed length is 2λ because in the following case:

$$G^*\{0, 1\}^\lambda$$

¹da rivedere bene



we obtain

$$G^*(x) = G_1(x) \oplus G_2(x)$$

And in this case G^* is not perfect

