Andreas Born
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PERSONAL INFORMATION

Citizenship: German
Date of Birth: December 25th, 1988

EDUCATION

PhD Candidate in Economics, Stockholm School of Economics	2014 – 2019
Advisor: Tore Ellingsen	
Visiting scholar, Rady School of Management, UCSD	2017 – 2018
Sponsor: Uri Gneezy	
MSc. in Economics, Stockholm School of Economics	2012 – 2014
Thesis: Magnus Johannesson	
Visiting grad student, Bocconi University	2014
BSc. in Economics, University of Bonn	2008 – 2012
Thesis: Philipp Wichardt	
Visiting student, University of Toronto	2011 – 2012

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary: Behavioral Economics, Microeconomics

Secondary: Industrial Organization, Institutional Economics

Methods: Experimental Method, Theory, Causal Inference, Machine Learning/Textual Analysis

EMPLOYMENT

Research Assistant:

Anna Dreber Almenberg, Stockholm School of Economics	2015 – 2016
Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics	2015 – 2016
Magnus Johannesson, Stockholm School of Economics	2015
Department of Macroeconomics and Econometrics, University of Bonn	2010 – 2011, 2012
Chair for Economic Theory III, University of Bonn	2009 – 2010

Teaching Assistant:

Stockholm School of Economics:	
Economics of Organization	2016
Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis	2016
Microeconomics	2013, 2015
University of Bonn:	
Math-introductory Class	2010, 2010/11, 2011
Principles of Business Administration A (Theory of the Firm)	2010/11
Corporate Finance	2010, 2011

SCHOLARSHIPS, AWARDS:

Hedelius Scholarship	2017 – 2019
Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Grant	2016 – present

Stipend for PhD Studies, Stockholm School of Economics	2014 – 2016
Erasmus Scholarship (for Bocconi University)	2014
Master Thesis Project-Funding, UniCredit & Universities Foundation	2013
Masterscholarship, UniCredit & Universities Foundation	2012-14
Exchange scholarship (for University of Toronto)	2011-12
Outstanding Teaching Assistant award (Corporate Finance),	2011
Promos Scholarship, German Academic Exchange Service	2011

RESEARCH

Job Market Paper:

Promise Competition

This paper studies competition when sellers cannot perfectly commit to the quality of their offers. I propose a model in which two sellers compete by promising service-quality to a one-time-only customer and test its predictions in a laboratory experiment. Sellers have private information about the individual cost of supplying quality and of breaking promises. In any refined Bayesian Equilibrium, sellers pool their promises. Competition induces sellers to promise higher quality than they would provide absent promises. Some sellers keep their high promises, therefore promise competition raises average service-quality despite non-binding contracts and private information. However, pooling prevents positive selection of better sellers. The experiment confirms these predictions. While participants distinguish themselves by their promises initially, they learn to pool their promises and selecting better seller-types becomes impossible eventually. Promise competition increases quality at the outset, yet no clean comparison is possible for later repetitions.

Published Research:

"An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises" with Pieter van Eck and Magnus Johannesson,

Political Psychology, 2017

We analyze the effect of election promises on electoral behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, politicians can make nonbinding election promises about how to split an endowment between themselves and the group. We find that promises affect both voting and voter beliefs about how much the politician will contribute to the public fund. The relationship is inverted U-shaped with decreasing credibility of higher promises. Contributions of politicians are correlated with their promises in a similar pattern. The election promises are generally credible unless particularly high. Politicians keep promises more often if a reelection is possible and if the politician came into power by vote rather than by random draw. Voters reward high contributions in the previous period and punish promise breaking even after controlling for the contribution in the previous period or voters' beliefs about future contributions. By controlling for voters' beliefs, we distinguish retrospective from prospective voting. Our results suggest that voters both use promises for prospective voting and retrospectively punish broken promises.

Work in progress:

"A Man's World? The Impact of a Male Dominated Environment on Female Leadership" with Anna Sandberg and Eva Ranehill

Despite the significant growth in female labor force participation and educational attainment over the past decades, labor markets remain vertically and horizontally segregated. In this study, we explore whether male dominated environments, in and of themselves, adversely affect women's willingness to lead a team. We find that women randomly assigned to male majority teams are less willing to become team leaders than women assigned to female majority teams are. Analyses of potential mechanisms show that women in male majority teams are less confident in their relative performance, less influential and more swayed by others in the team discussions. They also (accurately) believe that they will receive less support from team members in the leadership election. Taken together, our results indicate that the absence of women in male dominated contexts may be a self-reinforcing process.

"Do district elected MPs favor their district or their party? A textual analysis of parliamentary speeches using machine learning" with Aljoscha Janssen

This paper takes advantage of the mixed member proportional system in the German parliament by employing a regression discontinuity design to quantify the causal effect of a district election on the conformity to the party line. First, we show that the election by a district does not affect the roll call voting behavior of a politician causally. Second, we use information retrieval methods to analyze parliamentary speeches. We demonstrate that speeches of district-elected members of parliament do not differ, in terms of cosines-distance, from those of their party-peers who have been elected through closed party lists. To build a measure of closeness of a speech to a party, we train a classifier on the party manifestos and use it to predict probabilities of a parliamentary speech belonging to a certain manifesto. We use the predicted probability of an MP's own party manifesto as a measure of closeness of the wording to the party's manifesto. We show that district elected candidates do not use a wording closer or further away from the party's manifesto. We can negate that district elected MPs have a faster within party career progression.

SKILLS

Software: Python (Pandas, NumPy, scikit-learn), R, Stata, SQLite, oTree, z-Tree, Matlab, Javascript

Languages: German (native), English (fluent), Swedish (advanced)