

# Andreas Born

## Stockholm School of Economics

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### PLACEMENT OFFICERS

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### REFERENCES

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Tore Ellingsen Stockholm School of Economics <a href="mailto:Tore.Ellingsen@hhs.se">Tore.Ellingsen@hhs.se</a> +46-8-736 9260	Magnus Johannesson Stockholm School of Economics <a href="mailto:Magnus.Johannesson@hhs.se">Magnus.Johannesson@hhs.se</a> +46-8-736 9443
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### PERSONAL INFORMATION

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**Citizenship:** German  
**Date of Birth:** December 25<sup>th</sup>, 1988

### EDUCATION

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<b>PhD Candidate in Economics</b> , Stockholm School of Economics Advisor: Tore Ellingsen	2014 – 2019
Visiting scholar, Rady School of Management, UCSD Sponsor: Uri Gneezy	2017 – 2018
<b>MSc. in Economics</b> , Stockholm School of Economics Thesis: Magnus Johannesson	2012 – 2014
Visiting grad student, Bocconi University	2014
<b>BSc. in Economics</b> , University of Bonn Thesis: Philipp Wichardt	2008 – 2012
Visiting student, University of Toronto	2011 – 2012

### RESEARCH INTERESTS

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**Primary:** Behavioral Economics, Microeconomics  
**Secondary:** Applied Microeconomics, Experimental Economics  
**Methods:** Experiments, Theory, Causal Inference, Machine Learning/Textual Analysis

### EMPLOYMENT

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<b>Research Assistant:</b>	
<i>Anna Dreber Almenberg</i> , Stockholm School of Economics	2015 – 2016
<i>Giancarlo Spagnolo</i> , Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics	2015 – 2016
<i>Magnus Johannesson</i> , Stockholm School of Economics	2015
<i>Department of Macroeconomics and Econometrics</i> , University of Bonn	2010 – 2011, 2012
<i>Chair for Economic Theory III</i> , University of Bonn	2009 – 2010

**Teaching Assistant:***Stockholm School of Economics:*

Economics of Organization 2016

Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis 2016

Microeconomics 2013, 2015

*University of Bonn:*

Math-introductory Class 2010, 2010/11, 2011

Principles of Business Administration A (Theory of the Firm) 2010/11

Corporate Finance 2010, 2011

**SCHOLARSHIPS, AWARDS:**


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Hedelius Scholarship	2017 – 2019
Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Grant	2016 – present
Stipend for PhD Studies, Stockholm School of Economics	2014 – 2016
Erasmus Scholarship (for Bocconi University)	2014
Master Thesis Project-Funding, UniCredit & Universities Foundation	2013
Masterscholarship, UniCredit & Universities Foundation	2012-14
Exchange scholarship (for University of Toronto)	2011-12
Outstanding Teaching Assistant award (Corporate Finance),	2011
Promos Scholarship, German Academic Exchange Service	2011

**RESEARCH**

Job Market Paper:

**Promise Competition**

*This paper studies competition when sellers cannot perfectly commit to the quality of their offers. I propose a model in which two sellers compete by promising service-quality to a one-time-only customer and test its predictions in a laboratory experiment. Sellers have private information about the individual cost of supplying quality and of breaking promises. In equilibrium, sellers pool their promises and competition induces them to promise higher quality than they would provide absent promises. Honest sellers keep their high promise, therefore promise competition raises average service-quality despite non-binding contracts and private information. However, pooling prevents positive selection of better sellers. The experiment confirms these predictions. Promise competition increases the amount participants give and – while participants distinguish themselves by their promises initially – they learn to pool their promises and selecting better seller-types becomes impossible eventually. The results suggest an explanation for the prevalence of promises in market interactions even though promises are non-binding and uninformative.*

Published Research:

**An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises** with Pieter van Eck and Magnus Johannesson,  
*Political Psychology*, 2017

*We analyze the effect of election promises on electoral behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, politicians can make nonbinding election promises about how to split an endowment between themselves and the group. We find that promises affect both voting and voter beliefs about how much the politician will contribute to the public fund. The relationship is inverted U-shaped with decreasing credibility of higher promises. Contributions of politicians are correlated with their promises in a similar pattern. The election promises are generally credible unless particularly high. Politicians keep promises more often if a reelection is possible and if the politician came into power by vote rather than by random*

*draw. Voters reward high contributions in the previous period and punish promise breaking even after controlling for the contribution in the previous period or voters' beliefs about future contributions. By controlling for voters' beliefs, we distinguish retrospective from prospective voting. Our results suggest that voters both use promises for prospective voting and retrospectively punish broken promises.*

Work in progress:

**A Man's World? The Impact of a Male Dominated Environment on Female Leadership** with Anna Sandberg and Eva Ranehill

*Despite the significant growth in female labor force participation and educational attainment over the past decades, labor markets remain vertically and horizontally segregated. In this study, we explore whether male dominated environments, in and of themselves, adversely affect women's willingness to lead a team. We find that women randomly assigned to male majority teams are less willing to become team leaders than women assigned to female majority teams are. Analyses of potential mechanisms show that women in male majority teams are less confident in their relative performance, less influential and more swayed by others in the team discussions. They also (accurately) believe that they will receive less support from team members in the leadership election. Taken together, our results indicate that the absence of women in male dominated contexts may be a self-reinforcing process.*

**Do district elected MPs favor their district or their party? A textual analysis of parliamentary speeches using machine learning** with Aljoscha Janssen

*This paper takes advantage of the mixed member proportional system in the German parliament by employing a regression discontinuity design to quantify the causal effect of a district election on the conformity to the party line. First, we show that the election by a district does not affect the roll call voting behavior of a politician causally. Second, we use information retrieval methods to analyze parliamentary speeches. We demonstrate that speeches of district-elected members of parliament do not differ, in terms of cosines-distance, from those of their party-peers who have been elected through closed party lists. To build a measure of closeness of a speech to a party, we train a classifier on the party manifestos and use it to predict probabilities of a parliamentary speech belonging to a certain manifesto. We use the predicted probability of an MP's own party manifesto as a measure of closeness of the wording to the party's manifesto. We show that district elected candidates do not use a wording closer or further away from the party's manifesto. We can negate that district elected MPs have a faster within party career progression.*

## SKILLS

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*Software:* Python (Pandas, NumPy, scikit-learn), R, Stata, SQLite, oTree, z-Tree, Matlab, Javascript, LaTeX

*Languages:* German (native), English (fluent), Swedish (advanced)