Report 2: Final results of regression models

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1 Presentation

This report examines how housing wealth relates to a broad set of social-cohesion attitudes. We conceptualize housing wealth as the market value of the residential asset environment and proxy it using land prices (price per square meter) in the respondent's area. The objective is to document the magnitude and direction of these associations across 15 cohesion outcomes and to assess how they change as we sequentially account for core socioeconomic correlates (education, social class, and equivalised household income).

Given the panel structure of the data and relatively modest within-wave sample sizes (2,191 person-wave observations from 823 individuals across four waves: 2016 = 472; 2017 = 414; 2018 = 647; 2019 = 658), we estimate pooled OLS models with wave fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level. This "pooled with time effects" specification is a standard population-average approach: it estimates the regression on the stacked person-wave dataset, while wave indicators absorb common period shocks and aggregate changes over time (Angrist & Pischke, 2015). Because repeated observations on the same individuals are typically serially correlated, conventional i.i.d. OLS standard errors can overstate precision; clustering at the individual level allows for arbitrary within-person dependence in the error process, yielding valid inference under weak conditions commonly used in applied work (Angrist & Pischke, 2015). This approach is also well suited to an unbalanced panel (i.e., individuals not observed in every wave), which is common in survey panel data (Wooldridge, 2009).

The document is organized into four sequential blocks. First, we present descriptive statistics for all variables and examine how homeownership status is associated with the control variables. Second, using the pooled sample restricted to homeowners (paid-off or mortgaged; 1,391 person-wave observations from 548 individuals), we estimate a first set of pooled OLS models for each of the 15 social-cohesion outcomes, relating housing wealth—proxied by the log land price per square meter in the respondent's residential zone—to each cohesion outcome. Third, using the same homeowner sample, we replace the continuous land-price measure with an indicator for residing in a top-decile land-price zone (decile 10 vs. all others) to capture distributional extremes. Fourth, we estimate analogous regression models on the full sample, adding an interaction between homeownership status and land price per square meter to assess whether associations between residential land values and cohesion outcomes differ between homeowners and non-homeowners. Across all three modelling blocks, specifications are estimated sequentially: beginning with the focal housing-wealth measure plus wave fixed effects and age, then adding education, then social class, and finally equivalised household income.

2 Descriptive statistics

First, we begin by showing the descriptive statistics for the main variables per wave in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics by wave

Variable	Value	2016	2017	2018	2019
Age		43.33 (14.41)	43.38 (14.67)	44.44 (14.91)	45.89 (14.89)
Educational level		12.46 (3.76)	12.39 (3.63)	12.14 (3.67)	12.14 (3.91)
Equivalised household income (square-root scale)		7192447.22 (140667271.91)	654112.12 (647149.14)	517115.13 (563092.80)	516813.85 (552486.71)
Housing tenure	Owned and fully paid-off home	217 (46.0%)	183 (44.2%)	306 (47.3%)	325 (49.4%)
	Owned home with mortgage payments	91 (19.3%)	89 (21.5%)	87 (13.4%)	93 (14.1%)
	Rented housing	110 (23.3%)	91 (22.0%)	154 (23.8%)	141 (21.4%)
	Other regime	54 (11.4%)	51 (12.3%)	100 (15.5%)	99 (15.0%)
Housing wealth (UF, 2018)		22.85 (12.61)	22.64 (12.56)	21.86 (13.01)	22.12 (13.06)
Housing wealth (log UF, 2018)		3.01 (0.49)	3.00 (0.49)	2.95 (0.51)	2.96 (0.51)
Housing wealth (top decile)	Other deciles	447 (94.7%)	392 (94.7%)	612 (94.6%)	621 (94.4%)
	Decile 10	25 (5.3%)	22 (5.3%)	35 (5.4%)	37 (5.6%)
ISEI		43.00 (16.33)	43.26 (16.11)	38.50 (15.53)	38.87 (15.74)
Income decile (equivalised)	1	21 (4.4%)	24 (5.8%)	40 (6.2%)	39 (5.9%)
	2	33 (7.0%)	23 (5.6%)	44 (6.8%)	43 (6.5%)
	3	38 (8.1%)	33 (8.0%)	52 (8.0%)	72 (10.9%)
Social cohesion	4	52 (11.0%)	28 (6.8%)	66 (10.2%)	55 (8.4%)
	5	45 (9.5%)	45 (10.9%)	63 (9.7%)	69 (10.5%)
	6	44 (9.3%)	44 (10.6%)	66 (10.2%)	66 (10.0%)
	7	53 (11.2%)	51 (12.3%)	84 (13.0%)	85 (12.9%)
	8	56 (11.9%)	56 (13.5%)	85 (13.1%)	71 (10.8%)
	9	52 (11.0%)	50 (12.1%)	72 (11.1%)	70 (10.6%)
	10	78 (16.5%)	60 (14.5%)	75 (11.6%)	88 (13.4%)
	Altruistic dispositions	4.04 (0.52)	4.18 (0.65)	4.21 (0.61)	4.32 (0.61)
	Conventional political participation	1.19 (0.32)	1.18 (0.29)	1.20 (0.31)	1.20 (0.28)
	Cultural identification	4.05 (0.77)	4.28 (0.81)	4.16 (0.82)	4.05 (0.83)
	Egalitarianism	4.07 (0.66)	4.16 (0.82)	4.09 (0.84)	4.17 (0.76)
	Generalized trust in fellow citizens	1.35 (0.70)	1.34 (0.71)	1.32 (0.69)	1.26 (0.64)
	Generalized trust in minorities	3.06 (0.97)	3.08 (0.96)	2.94 (1.01)	2.89 (0.94)
	Justification of violence	3.98 (0.89)	3.99 (0.84)	3.83 (0.94)	3.98 (0.89)
	Nearby network size	3.44 (1.40)	3.49 (1.40)	3.28 (1.47)	3.07 (1.54)
	Number of friends	2.78 (1.17)	2.86 (1.14)	2.79 (1.18)	2.77 (1.21)
	Political engagement	1.83 (1.14)	2.22 (1.25)	2.01 (1.19)	2.36 (1.33)
	Prosocial behavior	1.69 (0.59)	1.81 (0.67)	1.75 (0.65)	1.72 (0.61)
	Satisfaction with democracy	2.02 (1.12)	2.19 (1.12)	2.28 (1.07)	1.64 (0.86)
	Support for democracy	2.40 (0.71)	2.38 (0.74)	2.38 (0.73)	2.57 (0.63)
	Trust in major institutions	1.70 (0.68)	1.79 (0.71)	1.90 (0.72)	1.51 (0.61)
	Unconventional political participation	1.46 (0.64)	1.41 (0.62)	1.31 (0.56)	1.51 (0.76)

Continuous variables report mean (SD). Categorical variables report n (%).

3 Inspection of homeownership

Now, we examine the homeownership variable to see its distribution across waves and its association (cross-tabulation) with the control variables entered into the models (age, education, social class, and equivalized household income).



Figure 1: Changes in homeownership status 2016-2019



Figure 2: Comparation of homeownership status between 2016 and 2019

Table 2: Age by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	40.78	12.55	40.0	18-66	0.15	-1.10	30-51
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	47.51	15.04	51.0	18-75	-0.39	-0.89	35-58
Rented housing		110	38.27	11.81	37.5	18-71	0.53	-0.08	30-45
Other regime		54	41.11	15.06	37.0	19-73	0.38	-1.05	28-52.75
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	40.88	12.45	40.0	19-67	0.24	-0.99	30-49
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	47.67	15.88	52.0	19-77	-0.28	-1.10	33-59
Rented housing		91	38.33	12.21	37.0	18-71	0.55	-0.26	29-47
Other regime		51	41.37	13.74	39.0	20-74	0.31	-0.91	30-52.5
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	42.45	12.86	41.0	22-70	0.32	-0.90	33-52
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	49.01	15.60	53.0	19-77	-0.27	-1.02	36-61
Rented housing		154	38.96	12.23	37.0	18-72	0.47	-0.38	30.25-46.75
Other regime		100	40.60	14.01	38.0	19-78	0.32	-0.93	29-51.75
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	43.24	12.30	41.0	23-71	0.37	-0.80	34-52
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	50.23	15.61	54.0	20-79	-0.31	-1.02	37-61
Rented housing		141	40.01	11.81	39.0	20-69	0.33	-0.63	31-47
Other regime		99	42.52	14.47	41.0	20-79	0.15	-1.14	30-57
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	41.84	12.53	40.0	18-71	0.27	-0.87	32-52
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	48.84	15.56	52.0	18-79	-0.30	-0.99	36-60
Rented housing		496	38.99	12.00	38.0	18-72	0.46	-0.35	30-47
Other regime		304	41.44	14.26	39.0	19-79	0.28	-0.99	29-54

Table 3: Years of education by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	13.77	3.37	14.80	0-19.07	-1.47	2.94	12.02-15.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	11.83	4.04	12.02	0-19.07	-0.54	-0.19	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		110	13.04	3.38	13.90	4.3-19.07	-0.69	0.09	12.02-14.9
Other regime		54	11.66	3.20	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.59	0.23	9.8-14.575
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	13.80	3.33	14.80	0-19.07	-1.34	2.84	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	11.90	3.87	12.02	0-19.07	-0.59	-0.21	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		91	12.48	3.19	12.02	0-16.9	-0.79	1.24	9.8-14.8
Other regime		51	11.55	3.37	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.57	0.07	9.8-14.8
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	13.72	3.07	13.90	4.3-19.07	-0.51	0.36	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	11.55	3.92	12.02	0-19.07	-0.51	-0.41	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		154	12.72	3.36	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.53	0.25	12.02-14.9
Other regime		100	11.64	3.31	12.02	4.3-16.9	-0.75	-0.13	9.8-14.8
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	13.83	3.42	13.90	4.3-19.07	-0.54	0.12	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	11.43	4.20	12.02	0-19.07	-0.52	-0.47	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		141	12.89	3.25	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.59	0.27	12.02-14.9
Other regime		99	11.83	3.56	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.58	-0.33	9.8-14.8
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	13.78	3.29	14.80	0-19.07	-0.99	1.72	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	11.63	4.03	12.02	0-19.07	-0.54	-0.32	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		496	12.80	3.30	12.02	0-19.07	-0.63	0.42	12.02-14.9
Other regime		304	11.69	3.37	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.63	-0.05	9.8-14.8

Table 4: Equivalised household income (square-root scale) by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	855025	760136	540185	81028-3742514	1.87	3.79	317994-1080371
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	14949611	207448816	324111	22053-3055749875	14.51	209.74	235967-540185
Rented housing		110	484273	338388	381969	59420-1871257	1.71	3.14	241955-620602
Other regime		54	364672	227322	293498	93563-935628	1.06	0.06	200223-479321
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	927880	874508	571448	14940-4753821	2.17	5.20	448195-1133853
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	609703	617215	422562	56693-4481946	3.08	12.06	269282-718960
Rented housing		91	596854	481728	448195	105640-2852293	2.37	6.20	312960-653067
Other regime		51	437878	338597	336146	14940-1584607	1.78	2.89	243966-538563
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	850622	778746	594633	130278-3604774	1.81	3.02	318015-1159670
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	461920	475881	356780	38928-4369646	4.27	24.03	231735-509792
Rented housing		154	566629	643366	411974	35678-6554469	5.97	48.44	273462-651783
Other regime		100	319611	233267	258011	29732-1544903	2.94	11.93	189664-391375
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	891499	883957	571548	77782-5000000	2.14	5.33	300000-1150000
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	462292	468288	326599	40825-4500000	3.82	21.81	212132-500000
Rented housing		141	517371	451773	385373	15000-3500000	2.89	12.99	250000-601041
Other regime		99	343030	350215	250000	60000-3000000	4.92	32.00	180693-402492
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	881395	823895	571448	14940-5000000	2.08	4.92	342202-1138950
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	3537569	95182859	352848	22053-3055749875	31.98	1022.57	230301-540185
Rented housing		496	539907	504700	404145	15000-6554469	4.99	44.63	264502-635413
Other regime		304	355083	295023	271294	14940-3000000	3.76	23.44	195414-406102

Table 5: Income decile (equivalised, square-root scale) by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	2 (2.2%)	1 (1.1%)	4 (4.4%)	5 (5.5%)	8 (8.8%)	5 (5.5%)	8 (8.8%)	14 (15.4%)	12 (13.2%)	32 (35.2%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		14 (6.5%)	16 (7.4%)	19 (8.8%)	26 (12.0%)	23 (10.6%)	23 (10.6%)	27 (12.4%)	21 (9.7%)	19 (8.8%)	29 (13.4%)
Rented housing		2 (1.8%)	6 (5.5%)	12 (10.9%)	13 (11.8%)	8 (7.3%)	10 (9.1%)	16 (14.5%)	14 (12.7%)	15 (13.6%)	14 (12.7%)
Other regime		3 (5.6%)	10 (18.5%)	3 (5.6%)	8 (14.8%)	6 (11.1%)	6 (11.1%)	2 (3.7%)	7 (13.0%)	6 (11.1%)	3 (5.6%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	2 (2.2%)	3 (3.4%)	5 (5.6%)	2 (2.2%)	5 (5.6%)	4 (4.5%)	19 (21.3%)	12 (13.5%)	14 (15.7%)	23 (25.8%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		15 (8.2%)	13 (7.1%)	12 (6.6%)	13 (7.1%)	18 (9.8%)	26 (14.2%)	20 (10.9%)	20 (10.9%)	23 (12.6%)	23 (12.6%)
Rented housing		2 (2.2%)	4 (4.4%)	7 (7.7%)	9 (9.9%)	12 (13.2%)	12 (13.2%)	8 (8.8%)	16 (17.6%)	11 (12.1%)	10 (11.0%)
Other regime		5 (9.8%)	3 (5.9%)	9 (17.6%)	4 (7.8%)	10 (19.6%)	2 (3.9%)	4 (7.8%)	8 (15.7%)	2 (3.9%)	4 (7.8%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	2 (2.3%)	2 (2.3%)	4 (4.6%)	7 (8.0%)	6 (6.9%)	7 (8.0%)	5 (5.7%)	11 (12.6%)	16 (18.4%)	27 (31.0%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		21 (6.9%)	21 (6.9%)	25 (8.2%)	34 (11.1%)	30 (9.8%)	31 (10.1%)	50 (16.3%)	43 (14.1%)	29 (9.5%)	22 (7.2%)
Rented housing		5 (3.2%)	10 (6.5%)	10 (6.5%)	11 (7.1%)	16 (10.4%)	17 (11.0%)	18 (11.7%)	20 (13.0%)	24 (15.6%)	23 (14.9%)
Other regime		12 (12.0%)	11 (11.0%)	13 (13.0%)	14 (14.0%)	11 (11.0%)	11 (11.0%)	11 (11.0%)	11 (11.0%)	3 (3.0%)	3 (3.0%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	2 (2.2%)	4 (4.3%)	6 (6.5%)	3 (3.2%)	9 (9.7%)	3 (3.2%)	11 (11.8%)	10 (10.8%)	16 (17.2%)	29 (31.2%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		22 (6.8%)	23 (7.1%)	32 (9.8%)	32 (9.8%)	40 (12.3%)	35 (10.8%)	40 (12.3%)	33 (10.2%)	33 (10.2%)	35 (10.8%)
Rented housing		6 (4.3%)	6 (4.3%)	15 (10.6%)	9 (6.4%)	12 (8.5%)	15 (10.6%)	21 (14.9%)	21 (14.9%)	15 (10.6%)	21 (14.9%)
Other regime		9 (9.1%)	10 (10.1%)	19 (19.2%)	11 (11.1%)	8 (8.1%)	13 (13.1%)	13 (13.1%)	7 (7.1%)	6 (6.1%)	3 (3.0%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	8 (2.2%)	10 (2.8%)	19 (5.3%)	17 (4.7%)	28 (7.8%)	19 (5.3%)	43 (11.9%)	47 (13.1%)	58 (16.1%)	111 (30.8%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		72 (7.0%)	73 (7.1%)	88 (8.5%)	105 (10.2%)	111 (10.8%)	115 (11.2%)	137 (13.3%)	117 (11.3%)	104 (10.1%)	109 (10.6%)
Rented housing		15 (3.0%)	26 (5.2%)	44 (8.9%)	42 (8.5%)	48 (9.7%)	54 (10.9%)	63 (12.7%)	71 (14.3%)	65 (13.1%)	68 (13.7%)
Other regime		29 (9.5%)	34 (11.2%)	44 (14.5%)	37 (12.2%)	35 (11.5%)	32 (10.5%)	30 (9.9%)	33 (10.9%)	17 (5.6%)	13 (4.3%)

% = row proportion

4 First set: Social cohesion and housing wealth

We next examine whether housing wealth—proxied by the log land price per square meter in the respondent's residential zone—relates to multiple social-cohesion outcomes. To align this measure with the notion of housing wealth as an owned asset, these models are estimated on the restricted panel of respondents who report owning their dwelling, either **owned and fully paid-off** or **owned with mortgage payments** (based on the homeownership item).

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Log price}_{it} + \beta 2 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta 3 \text{Class}_{it} + \beta 4 \text{Income}_{it} + \lambda_t + \delta_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association between log land price m^2 and Y_{it}, conditional on the covariates; β_2, β_3, and β_4 capture the associations of years of education, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), and the log equivalised household income respectively; λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, δ_{it} denotes individual's age, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

4.1 Cultural identification

Table 6: Cultural identification by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.52***	4.07***	4.12***	4.10***	4.22***
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.50)
Log land price m^2	−0.14*	−0.14*	−0.12	−0.09	−0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.02	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	−0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.01
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.2 Number of friends

Table 7: Number of friends by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.50***	2.23***	1.56***	1.59***	0.44
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.70)
Log land price m^2	0.43***	0.43***	0.20*	0.15	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.01	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.08***	0.07***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01*	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.11
					(0.06)
R^2	0.03	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.13	0.14
RMSE	1.18	1.15	1.11	1.11	1.11
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.3 Network size

Table 8: Network size by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.89***	2.11***	1.52***	1.60***	2.47**
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.81)
Log land price m^2	0.51***	0.52***	0.31*	0.21	0.23
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.06	−0.05	−0.05	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.30**	−0.28**	−0.28**	−0.24*	−0.25*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.05**	0.06**
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.08
					(0.07)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.44	1.43	1.41	1.40	1.40
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.4 Generalized trust

Table 9: Generalized trust by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.93***	1.06***	0.85***	0.87***	0.46
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.39)
Log land price m^2	0.14**	0.14**	0.07	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.09	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.02**	0.02*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.5 Trust in minorities

Table 10: Trust in minorities by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.95***	2.49***	1.97***	1.97***	1.50**
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.53)
Log land price m^2	0.35***	0.35***	0.18*	0.17*	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.08	−0.05	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.05
					(0.04)
R^2	0.04	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.12
RMSE	0.95	0.94	0.91	0.91	0.91
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 11: Political trust by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.09***	1.15***	0.87***	0.87***	0.80*
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.40)
Log land price m^2	0.21***	0.21***	0.11*	0.10*	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.09
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.7 Political engagement

Table 12: Political engagement by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.26	0.85**	−0.09	−0.03	−0.83
	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.66)
Log land price m^2	0.54***	0.55***	0.22*	0.14	0.12
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.37***	0.37***	0.35***	0.36***	0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2018	0.22**	0.25***	0.25***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	0.52***	0.57***	0.57***	0.60***	0.60***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.12***	0.10***	0.09***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01**
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.08
					(0.05)
R^2	0.07	0.09	0.19	0.20	0.21
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.09	0.19	0.20	0.20
RMSE	1.22	1.21	1.14	1.13	1.13
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 13: Satisfaction with democracy by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.44***	1.27***	1.09***	1.10***	1.00
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.61)
Log land price m^2	0.19**	0.19**	0.13	0.11	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Wave 2018	0.33***	0.32***	0.32***	0.33***	0.33***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.36***	−0.37***	−0.37***	−0.36***	−0.36***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.02*	0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.05)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.07
RMSE	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.9 Conventional political participation

Table 14: Conventional political participation by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.11***	1.05***	0.90***	0.91***	0.53**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)
Log land price m^2	0.03	0.03	−0.02	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2018	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wave 2019	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 15: Unconventional political participation by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.10***	1.62***	1.23***	1.24***	1.30***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.34)
Log land price m^2	0.12*	0.12*	−0.02	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.16***	−0.14***	−0.14***	−0.13***	−0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.17
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.10	0.16	0.17	0.17
RMSE	0.64	0.61	0.59	0.59	0.59
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.11 Egalitarianism

Table 16: Egalitarianism by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.66***	4.78***	4.86***	4.86***	5.79***
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.42)
Log land price m^2	−0.22***	−0.22***	−0.19**	−0.18**	−0.16**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.09*
					(0.04)
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
RMSE	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 17: Altruistic dispositions by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.93***	4.10***	4.02***	4.02***	4.57***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.28)
Log land price m^2	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.20***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.30***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01*
			(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.05*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 18: Prosocial behavior by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.42***	1.51***	1.26***	1.27***	0.33
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.31)
Log land price m^2	0.10*	0.10*	0.01	−0.00	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.09**
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
RMSE	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.14 Support for democracy

Table 19: Support for democracy by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.08***	2.18***	1.87***	1.89***	1.69***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.32)
Log land price m^2	0.11*	0.11*	0.00	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.02
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

4.15 Justification of violence

Table 20: Justification of violence by housing wealth, educational level, social class, income and age

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.70***	3.71***	3.62***	3.63***	3.92***
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.46)
Log land price m^2	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.17**	−0.17*	−0.17*	−0.16*	−0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.03
					(0.04)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5 Second set: Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decile land-price exposure)

We then focus on the upper tail of the local housing-wealth distribution by replacing the continuous land-price proxy with an indicator for extreme housing-wealth contexts. Specifically, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent resides in a zone whose **land price per square meter falls in the top decile (decile 10)**, and 0 otherwise. This specification is intended to capture discontinuous differences between living in the most expensive residential contexts versus the rest of the distribution—i.e., an "extremes" contrast that may be obscured by a linear specification in log prices. As in the second set, models are estimated on the restricted panel of homeowners (fully paid-off or paying a mortgage), using pooled OLS with wave fixed effects and CR2 individual-clustered standard errors, and adding education, social class, equivalised household income and age sequentially.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{TopDecilePrice}_{it} + \beta 2\text{Education}_{it} + \beta 3\text{Class}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Income}_{it} + \lambda_t + \delta_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association between residing in a top-decile land-price zone (decile 10 vs. all others) and Y_{it}, conditional on the covariates; β_2, β_3, and β_4 capture the associations of years of education, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), and the log equivalised household income respectively; λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, δ_{it} denotes individual's age, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

5.1 Cultural identification

Table 21: Cultural identification by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.13***	3.66***	3.78***	3.84***	3.95***
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.49)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.28	−0.31	−0.27	−0.22	−0.22
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.02	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	−0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.01
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.2 Number of friends

Table 22: Number of friends by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.76***	3.51***	2.05***	1.93***	0.56
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.71)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.60***	0.66***	0.20	0.08	0.01
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.05	−0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.03	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.09***	0.08***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01*	0.01
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.12*
					(0.06)
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.14	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.14
RMSE	1.19	1.16	1.12	1.11	1.11
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.3 Network size

Table 23: Network size by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.38***	3.64***	2.39***	2.18***	3.11***
	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.83)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	1.03***	1.05***	0.66**	0.44*	0.49*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.09	−0.08	−0.06	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.32**	−0.30**	−0.29**	−0.25*	−0.26*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age (in years)		−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.08***	0.05**	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.08
					(0.07)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.44	1.44	1.41	1.40	1.40
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.4 Generalized trust

Table 24: Generalized trust by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.33***	1.48***	1.03***	0.98***	0.55
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.41)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.27	0.28*	0.14	0.09	0.07
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.09*	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.02**	0.02*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04
RMSE	0.68	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.5 Trust in minorities

Table 25: Trust in minorities by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.97***	3.53***	2.46***	2.45***	1.96***
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.55)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.69***	0.73***	0.40*	0.38*	0.36
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.03	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.10	−0.06	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04
					(0.04)
R^2	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.06	0.12	0.12	0.12
RMSE	0.96	0.94	0.91	0.91	0.91
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 26: Political trust by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.70***	1.77***	1.18***	1.17***	1.12*
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.43)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.45***	0.45***	0.27*	0.26*	0.25*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.17***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.10
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.7 Political engagement

Table 27: Political engagement by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.84***	2.47***	0.55*	0.40	−0.39
	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.67)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	1.11***	1.16***	0.56*	0.42	0.38
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.37***	0.37***	0.35***	0.36***	0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2018	0.19**	0.22**	0.24***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	0.50***	0.54***	0.56***	0.59***	0.59***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.12***	0.10***	0.09***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01*
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.07
					(0.05)
R^2	0.06	0.09	0.20	0.21	0.21
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.09	0.19	0.20	0.20
RMSE	1.23	1.21	1.13	1.13	1.13
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 28: Satisfaction with democracy by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.99***	1.84***	1.49***	1.46***	1.45*
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.61)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.55***	0.54**	0.44*	0.40*	0.40*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave 2018	0.32***	0.31***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.37***	−0.38***	−0.38***	−0.37***	−0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.02*	0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.05)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.9 Conventional political participation

Table 29: Conventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.21***	1.15***	0.84***	0.82***	0.39
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.21)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.02	0.01	−0.08	−0.11	−0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2018	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wave 2019	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00***	0.00**	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.06
RMSE	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 30: Unconventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.45***	1.98***	1.16***	1.11***	1.14**
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.36)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.12	0.16	−0.10	−0.15	−0.14
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.17***	−0.15***	−0.14***	−0.13***	−0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.09	0.17	0.17	0.17
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.09	0.17	0.17	0.17
RMSE	0.64	0.61	0.59	0.59	0.59
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.11 Egalitarianism

Table 31: Egalitarianism by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.03***	4.13***	4.36***	4.37***	5.42***
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.46)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.39**	−0.39**	−0.32*	−0.30*	−0.25
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.09*
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
RMSE	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 32: Altruistic dispositions by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.02***	4.20***	4.06***	4.06***	4.70***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.27)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.20***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.29***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***	0.30***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01*
			(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.06*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 33: Prosocial behavior by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.71***	1.81***	1.31***	1.28***	0.30
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.33)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.23*	0.23*	0.08	0.05	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.09**
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
RMSE	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.14 Support for democracy

Table 34: Support for democracy by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.38***	2.50***	1.93***	1.89***	1.78***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.33)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.35***	0.36***	0.18	0.15	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

5.15 Justification of violence

Table 35: Justification of violence by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.99***	4.00***	3.80***	3.77***	4.06***
	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.48)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.09	0.11
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.17**	−0.17**	−0.17**	−0.16*	−0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.03
					(0.04)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6 Third set: Social cohesion and housing-wealth by homeownership

Finally, we examine whether the association between housing wealth—proxied by the log land price per square meter in the respondent's residential zone—and social-cohesion outcomes varies by homeownership status. These models use the full unbalanced panel, leveraging all available person-wave observations across waves.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Log price}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Class}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Income}_{it} + \beta_6 (\text{Log price} \times \text{Homeownership})_{it} + \lambda_t + \delta_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association between log land price per m^2 and Y_{it}, conditional on the covariates; β_2, β_3, and β_4 capture the associations of years of education, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), and the log equivalised household income respectively; and β_6 captures the interaction between log land price per m^2 and homeownership status, indicating whether the land-price gradient differs across ownership groups. λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, δ_{it} denotes individual's age, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

6.1 Cultural identification

Table 36: Cultural identification by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.97***	4.60***	4.71***	4.71***	4.63***
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.52)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.77	−0.87*	−0.88*	−0.88*	−0.88*
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Rented housing	−0.88	−0.96*	−0.96*	−0.96*	−0.96*
	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Other regime	−0.97	−0.93*	−0.89	−0.89	−0.89
	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Log land price m^2	−0.31*	−0.33**	−0.30*	−0.30*	−0.30*
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.11**	0.10*	0.10*	0.10*	0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.00	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	0.29*	0.30*	0.30*	0.30*	0.30*
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	0.34	0.33*	0.31	0.31	0.31
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Education (in years)			−0.01*	−0.01	−0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	−0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.2 Number of friends

Table 37: Number of friends by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.60**	2.17***	1.37**	1.38**	−0.05
	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.71)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.12	0.04	0.13	0.16	0.10
	(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Rented housing	−0.12	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.73)	(0.70)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.60)
Other regime	0.15	0.09	−0.19	−0.25	−0.27
	(0.71)	(0.66)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.60)
Log land price m^2	0.41*	0.44*	0.21	0.17	0.12
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.08*	0.08**	0.09**	0.09**	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.05	−0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.12	−0.10	0.05	0.07	0.10
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Education (in years)			0.09***	0.08***	0.07***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01*	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.14**
					(0.05)
R^2	0.04	0.08	0.14	0.14	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.14
RMSE	1.16	1.14	1.10	1.09	1.09
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.3 Network size

Table 38: Network size by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.82*	2.05**	1.44*	1.45*	1.75*
	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.66)	(0.87)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.19	0.25	0.33	0.37	0.39
	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.74)
Rented housing	0.07	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.13
	(0.90)	(0.89)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.85)
Other regime	0.96	0.93	0.71	0.59	0.60
	(0.98)	(0.98)	(0.95)	(0.94)	(0.94)
Log land price m^2	0.56*	0.57*	0.39	0.30	0.31
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.14*	−0.13*	−0.13*	−0.09	−0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.35***	−0.33***	−0.34***	−0.30***	−0.30***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.01*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	−0.07	−0.09	−0.07	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.36	−0.35	−0.24	−0.18	−0.18
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.05**	0.05**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01***	0.01***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.03
					(0.06)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07
RMSE	1.44	1.44	1.42	1.42	1.42
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.4 Generalized trust

Table 39: Generalized trust by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.40	0.49	0.19	0.20	−0.31
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.40)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.82*	0.84*	0.88**	0.89**	0.87**
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Rented housing	−0.07	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)
Other regime	0.50	0.49	0.38	0.35	0.34
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Log land price m^2	0.33**	0.33**	0.25*	0.22*	0.20*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.09*	−0.08*	−0.08*	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00*	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.29**	−0.29**	−0.30**	−0.30**	−0.29*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.19	−0.19	−0.14	−0.12	−0.11
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00*	0.00*
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.05
					(0.03)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.5 Trust in minorities

Table 40: Trust in minorities by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.20*	1.58**	0.91*	0.91	0.20
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.61)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	1.16*	1.26*	1.34**	1.36**	1.33**
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.49)
Rented housing	0.62	0.70	0.71	0.71	0.72
	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Other regime	0.62	0.58	0.34	0.30	0.29
	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.62)
Log land price m^2	0.61***	0.63***	0.44**	0.41**	0.38**
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.10*	−0.09	−0.09	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.15**	−0.13**	−0.13**	−0.12*	−0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.38*	−0.39*	−0.40*	−0.40*	−0.38*
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	−0.19	−0.22	−0.20	−0.19	−0.19
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.21	−0.20	−0.08	−0.06	−0.05
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.07***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.07
					(0.04)
R^2	0.05	0.08	0.14	0.14	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.14
RMSE	0.95	0.94	0.91	0.90	0.90
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 41: Political trust by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.69**	0.75**	0.50*	0.50*	0.17
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.39)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.55*	0.56*	0.59*	0.60*	0.59*
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Rented housing	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Other regime	0.52	0.52	0.43	0.41	0.41
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Log land price m^2	0.33***	0.34***	0.27***	0.26***	0.24**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	0.22***	0.22***	0.22***	0.23***	0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.17***	−0.17***	−0.17***	−0.17***	−0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.19*	−0.19*	−0.19*	−0.19*	−0.19*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.18	−0.18	−0.14	−0.13	−0.13
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.03
					(0.03)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.7 Political engagement

Table 42: Political engagement by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	−0.33	0.04	−0.95	−0.94	−1.76*
	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.72)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	1.05	1.15	1.27*	1.31*	1.27*
	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.54)
Rented housing	0.30	0.38	0.40	0.40	0.41
	(0.72)	(0.70)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.62)
Other regime	0.95	0.91	0.56	0.47	0.46
	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Log land price m^2	0.80***	0.82***	0.53**	0.47**	0.44**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.39***	0.39***	0.40***	0.39***	0.38***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	0.22***	0.24***	0.24***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.57***	0.59***	0.59***	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.44*	−0.45*	−0.45*	−0.45*	−0.44*
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	−0.20	−0.24	−0.21	−0.20	−0.19
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.44	−0.42	−0.25	−0.20	−0.19
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Education (in years)			0.11***	0.09***	0.09***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01**
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.08
					(0.04)
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.18	0.19	0.19
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.10	0.18	0.19	0.19
RMSE	1.20	1.19	1.13	1.13	1.13
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 43: Satisfaction with democracy by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.02**	0.91*	0.80*	0.80*	0.65
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.58)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.59	0.56	0.58	0.59	0.59
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Rented housing	−0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)
Other regime	0.70	0.71	0.67	0.63	0.63
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)
Log land price m^2	0.32**	0.32**	0.28*	0.26*	0.25*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.18**	0.18**	0.18**	0.18**	0.18*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2018	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.37***	−0.37***	−0.37***	−0.36***	−0.36***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.18	−0.18	−0.18	−0.18	−0.18
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.25	−0.25	−0.23	−0.21	−0.21
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.04)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
RMSE	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.9 Conventional political participation

Table 44: Conventional political participation by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.17***	1.11***	0.95***	0.95***	0.60**
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.07	−0.09	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Rented housing	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Other regime	−0.27	−0.27	−0.33	−0.34*	−0.34*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Log land price m^2	0.02	0.02	−0.03	−0.04	−0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2018	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wave 2019	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (in years)		0.00*	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	−0.04	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.11
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (in years)			0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.03*
					(0.01)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.29
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 45: Unconventional political participation by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.12***	1.50***	1.03***	1.03***	1.01*
	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.41)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.04	0.14	0.20	0.21	0.21
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Rented housing	−0.34	−0.26	−0.25	−0.25	−0.25
	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Other regime	−0.46	−0.50	−0.67	−0.70	−0.71
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Log land price m^2	0.14	0.16	0.02	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.13***	−0.12***	−0.12***	−0.11***	−0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2019	0.07*	0.09**	0.09**	0.10**	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.06	−0.06	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.10	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	0.13	0.15	0.23	0.25	0.25
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Education (in years)			0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00**	0.00**
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.02)
R^2	0.04	0.09	0.16	0.16	0.16
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.09	0.15	0.16	0.16
RMSE	0.65	0.63	0.61	0.60	0.60
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.11 Egalitarianism

Table 46: Egalitarianism by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.51***	4.55***	4.63***	4.63***	5.59***
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.43)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.28
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Rented housing	−0.11	−0.10	−0.10	−0.10	−0.11
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.35)
Other regime	−0.43	−0.44	−0.41	−0.40	−0.39
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Log land price m^2	−0.16	−0.16	−0.14	−0.13	−0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.09*	0.09*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.09
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.16
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.09**
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
RMSE	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 47: Altruistic dispositions by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.90***	3.99***	3.88***	3.88***	4.34***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.31)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Rented housing	−0.18	−0.16	−0.16	−0.16	−0.16
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Other regime	−0.40	−0.41	−0.45	−0.46	−0.45
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Log land price m^2	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2019	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (in years)		−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	0.15	0.15	0.17*	0.17*	0.17
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education (in years)			0.01**	0.01*	0.01**
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.04*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
RMSE	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 48: Prosocial behavior by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.39***	1.41***	1.11***	1.11***	0.38
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.39)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.09
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Rented housing	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Other regime	0.14	0.14	0.03	0.00	−0.01
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Log land price m^2	0.12	0.12	0.03	0.01	−0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.08*	0.08*	0.08*	0.09**	0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2019	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	−0.06	−0.07	−0.06	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.11	−0.11	−0.05	−0.04	−0.03
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.07**
					(0.02)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
RMSE	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.61
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.14 Support for democracy

Table 49: Support for democracy by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.40***	2.45***	2.11***	2.11***	2.01***
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.36)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.35	−0.34	−0.29	−0.28	−0.29
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Rented housing	−0.76*	−0.75	−0.74*	−0.74*	−0.74*
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Other regime	−0.74*	−0.75*	−0.87**	−0.89**	−0.90**
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Log land price m^2	0.04	0.04	−0.06	−0.08	−0.08
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.22
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	0.21	0.21	0.27*	0.28*	0.28**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00*	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.68
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

6.15 Justification of violence

Table 50: Justification of violence by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.93***	3.92***	3.85***	3.86***	4.20***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.50)
Homeownership (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.31	−0.31	−0.30	−0.29	−0.28
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Rented housing	−0.44	−0.44	−0.44	−0.44	−0.44
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Other regime	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.08	0.09
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)
Log land price m^2	0.04	0.04	0.02	−0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.15**	−0.15**	−0.15**	−0.14**	−0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Homeownership x Log land price m^2 (Ref. = Owned home with mortgage payments)					
Owned and fully paid-off home x Log land price m^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Rented housing x Log land price m^2	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Other regime x Log land price m^2	−0.03	−0.03	−0.01	0.00	−0.00
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.00	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.03
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Num. obs.	2191	2191	2191	2191	2191
Num. clusters	823	823	823	823	823

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

7 Summary of findings

The two main specifications are summarized below. Marked cells indicate cases in which the housing-wealth coefficient—either the land-price measure or the top-decile (decile 10) dummy—is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. All models include wave fixed effects, and standard errors are computed using CR2 corrections clustered at the individual level. Let Y denote a measure of social cohesion; W housing wealth; A the respondent's age; E years of education; C social class; and I household income. These specifications correspond to Models 1 through 5 in the preceding tables (reported separately for each dependent variable).

7.1 Social cohesion and housing wealth

Y	W	W+A	W+A+E	W+A+E+C	W+A+E+C+I
Cultural identification	x	x			
Number of friends	x	x	x		
Nearby network size	x	x	x		
Generalized trust in fellow citizens	x	x			
Generalized trust in minorities	x	x	x	x	
Trust in major institutions	x	x	x	x	
Political engagement	x	x	x		
Satisfaction with democracy	x	x			
Conventional political participation					
Unconventional political participation	x	x			
Egalitarianism	x	x	x	x	x
Altruistic dispositions					
Prosocial behavior	x	x			
Support for democracy	x	x			
Justification of violence					

7.2 Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decileland-price exposure)

Y	W	W+A	W+A+E	W+A+E+C	W+A+E+C+I
Cultural identification					
Number of friends	x	x			
Nearby network size	x	x	x	x	x
Generalized trust in fellow citizens		x			
Generalized trust in minorities	x	x	x	x	
Trust in major institutions	x	x	x	x	x
Political engagement	x	x	x		
Satisfaction with democracy	x	x	x	x	x
Conventional political participation					x
Unconventional political participation					
Egalitarianism	x	x	x	x	
Altruistic dispositions					
Prosocial behavior	x	x			
Support for democracy	x	x			
Justification of violence					

8 References

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