

Report 1: Initial results of regression models

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1 Presentation

This report examines how housing wealth relates to a broad set of social-cohesion attitudes. We treat housing wealth as a construct captured through two complementary proxies: (i) homeownership status (owning vs. not owning), and (ii) the market value of the residential asset environment, proxied by land prices (price per square meter) in the respondent’s area. The objective is to document the magnitude and direction of these associations across 15 cohesion outcomes, and to assess how they evolve as we sequentially account for core socioeconomic correlates (education, social class, and equivalised household income).

Given the panel structure of the data and relatively small within-wave sample sizes (2,393 person-wave observations drawn from 905 individuals across four waves: 2016 = 537; 2017 = 448; 2018 = 706; 2019 = 702), we estimate pooled OLS models with wave fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the individual level. This “pooled with time effects” specification is a standard population-average approach: it estimates the regression on the stacked person-wave dataset, while wave indicators absorb common period shocks and overall changes across waves (Angrist & Pischke, 2015). Because repeated outcomes for the same unit are typically serially correlated, conventional i.i.d. OLS standard errors can overstate precision; clustering on the individual explicitly allows arbitrary within-person dependence in the error process, yielding valid inference under weak conditions commonly used in applied work (Angrist & Pischke, 2015). This approach is also compatible with the unbalanced nature of the panel (some individuals are not observed in every wave), which is common in survey panels (Wooldridge, 2009).

The document is structured in four sequential blocks. First, descriptive statistics are presented. Second, using the full pooled sample, we estimate a first set of pooled OLS models for each of the 15 social-cohesion outcomes with homeownership as the main predictor. Third, we restrict the dataset to homeowners (paid-off or paying; 1,572 person-wave observations from 624 individuals) and estimate the association between housing wealth—proxied by the (log) land price per square meter in the respondent’s residential zone—and each cohesion outcome. Four, using the same homeowner sample, we replace the continuous land-price measure with an indicator for living in a top-decile land-price zone (decil 10 vs. all others) to capture distributional extremes. Across all three blocks, models are estimated sequentially: starting with the focal housing variable plus wave fixed effects, then adding education, then social class, and finally equivalised household income decile.

2 Descriptive statistics

First, we begin by showing the descriptive statistics for the main variables per wave in Table 1.

3 First set: Social cohesion and homeownership

We next examine the association between homeownership and multiple social cohesion outcomes. These models use the full unbalanced panel (all available observations across waves).

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Homeownership}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Class}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{IncomeDecile}_{it} + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t ; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association

Table 1: Descriptive statistics by wave

Variable	Value	2016	2017	2018	2019
Age group	18-29	100 (18.6%)	97 (21.7%)	127 (18.0%)	111 (15.8%)
	30-49	206 (38.4%)	167 (37.3%)	264 (37.4%)	254 (36.2%)
	50-64	157 (29.2%)	131 (29.2%)	204 (28.9%)	220 (31.3%)
	65 or more	74 (13.8%)	53 (11.8%)	111 (15.7%)	117 (16.7%)
Educational level	Primary or less	85 (15.8%)	67 (15.0%)	126 (17.8%)	129 (18.4%)
	Secondary	215 (40.0%)	187 (41.7%)	299 (42.4%)	278 (39.6%)
	Technical	105 (19.6%)	81 (18.1%)	127 (18.0%)	135 (19.2%)
	University or more	132 (24.6%)	113 (25.2%)	154 (21.8%)	160 (22.8%)
Housing tenure	Owned and fully paid-off home	274 (51.0%)	217 (48.4%)	356 (50.4%)	367 (52.3%)
	Owned home with mortgage payments	92 (17.1%)	87 (19.4%)	88 (12.5%)	91 (13.0%)
	Rented housing	113 (21.0%)	92 (20.5%)	156 (22.1%)	140 (19.9%)
	Other regime	58 (10.8%)	52 (11.6%)	106 (15.0%)	104 (14.8%)
Housing wealth (UF, 2018)		23.25 (13.04)	22.97 (12.87)	21.95 (13.16)	22.32 (13.54)
Housing wealth (log UF, 2018)		3.02 (0.50)	3.01 (0.49)	2.95 (0.52)	2.96 (0.52)
Housing wealth (top decile)	Other deciles	505 (94.0%)	422 (94.2%)	667 (94.5%)	659 (93.9%)
	Decile 10	32 (6.0%)	26 (5.8%)	39 (5.5%)	43 (6.1%)
Income decile (equivalised)	1	31 (5.8%)	28 (6.2%)	55 (7.8%)	49 (7.0%)
	2	46 (8.6%)	28 (6.2%)	53 (7.5%)	47 (6.7%)
	3	43 (8.0%)	38 (8.5%)	61 (8.6%)	83 (11.8%)
	4	58 (10.8%)	32 (7.1%)	71 (10.1%)	65 (9.3%)
	5	53 (9.9%)	47 (10.5%)	68 (9.6%)	74 (10.5%)
	6	50 (9.3%)	49 (10.9%)	74 (10.5%)	72 (10.3%)
	7	61 (11.4%)	54 (12.1%)	86 (12.2%)	84 (12.0%)
	8	60 (11.2%)	56 (12.5%)	85 (12.0%)	71 (10.1%)
	9	54 (10.1%)	53 (11.8%)	74 (10.5%)	68 (9.7%)
	10	81 (15.1%)	63 (14.1%)	79 (11.2%)	89 (12.7%)
Sex	Male	203 (37.8%)	168 (37.5%)	267 (37.8%)	261 (37.2%)
	Female	334 (62.2%)	280 (62.5%)	439 (62.2%)	441 (62.8%)
Social class	Higher-grade service class	53 (9.9%)	47 (10.5%)	59 (8.4%)	69 (9.8%)
	Lower-grade service class	46 (8.6%)	47 (10.5%)	69 (9.8%)	59 (8.4%)
	Small business owners	77 (14.3%)	78 (17.4%)	119 (16.9%)	116 (16.5%)
	Skilled workers	138 (25.7%)	120 (26.8%)	159 (22.5%)	166 (23.6%)
	Unskilled workers	64 (11.9%)	51 (11.4%)	133 (18.8%)	127 (18.1%)
	Retired	57 (10.6%)	34 (7.6%)	58 (8.2%)	64 (9.1%)
	Unemployed	24 (4.5%)	7 (1.6%)	14 (2.0%)	17 (2.4%)
	Other (NILF)	78 (14.5%)	64 (14.3%)	95 (13.5%)	84 (12.0%)
Social cohesion	Altruistic dispositions	4.04 (0.51)	4.18 (0.67)	4.20 (0.62)	4.30 (0.61)
	Conventional political participation	1.19 (0.31)	1.18 (0.29)	1.20 (0.31)	1.20 (0.28)
	Cultural identification	4.09 (0.75)	4.28 (0.80)	4.18 (0.81)	4.07 (0.82)
	Egalitarianism	4.05 (0.70)	4.16 (0.81)	4.08 (0.84)	4.16 (0.77)
	Generalized trust in fellow citizens	1.33 (0.68)	1.32 (0.70)	1.31 (0.68)	1.27 (0.66)
	Generalized trust in minorities	3.03 (0.96)	3.07 (0.94)	2.89 (1.02)	2.87 (0.94)
	Justification of violence	3.97 (0.90)	3.99 (0.83)	3.84 (0.94)	4.01 (0.87)
	Nearby network size	3.43 (1.41)	3.48 (1.40)	3.25 (1.48)	3.07 (1.55)
	Number of friends	2.74 (1.17)	2.81 (1.15)	2.77 (1.18)	2.77 (1.21)
	Political engagement	1.82 (1.13)	2.25 (1.27)	2.00 (1.19)	2.35 (1.34)
	Prosocial behavior	1.70 (0.60)	1.81 (0.67)	1.74 (0.64)	1.73 (0.61)
	Satisfaction with democracy	2.04 (1.13)	2.20 (1.13)	2.28 (1.06)	1.66 (0.87)
	Support for democracy	2.39 (0.72)	2.39 (0.74)	2.39 (0.73)	2.58 (0.63)
	Trust in major institutions	1.70 (0.69)	1.79 (0.72)	1.91 (0.72)	1.52 (0.62)
	Unconventional political participation	1.45 (0.63)	1.40 (0.62)	1.31 (0.56)	1.49 (0.75)

Continuous variables report mean (SD). Categorical variables report n (%).

between homeownership and Y_{it} conditional on the covariates; β_2 , β_3 , and β_4 capture the associations of educational attainment, social class, and equivalised household income decile with Y_{it} , respectively; λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

3.1 Cultural identification

Table 2: Cultural identification by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.10*** (0.06)	4.22*** (0.07)	4.19*** (0.11)	4.13*** (0.13)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.08 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Owned home with mortgage payments	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
Rented housing	-0.17* (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)
Wave 2019	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.08 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)
Technical		-0.15* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.16** (0.06)
University or more		-0.38*** (0.07)	-0.36*** (0.07)	-0.41*** (0.08)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)
Small business owners			0.06 (0.10)	0.07 (0.11)
Skilled workers			-0.05 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)
Unskilled workers			-0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)
Retired			0.17 (0.11)	0.20 (0.11)
Unemployed			0.03 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)
Other (NILF)			0.07 (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.00 (0.09)
D3				0.02 (0.08)
D4				0.06 (0.08)
D5				0.16 (0.08)
D6				0.11 (0.08)
D7				0.08 (0.08)
D8				0.12 (0.09)
D9				0.17 (0.09)
D10				0.12 (0.10)
R ²	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.78
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.2 Number of friends

Table 3: Number of friends by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.56*** (0.09)	2.06*** (0.11)	2.45*** (0.16)	2.15*** (0.19)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.11 (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.31* (0.13)	0.07 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	−0.06 (0.12)
Rented housing	0.32** (0.11)	0.19 (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Wave 2018	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.35*** (0.10)	0.35*** (0.10)	0.27** (0.10)
Technical		0.90*** (0.11)	0.86*** (0.11)	0.74*** (0.11)
University or more		1.08*** (0.11)	0.93*** (0.12)	0.75*** (0.12)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.25 (0.14)	−0.22 (0.14)
Small business owners			−0.36* (0.15)	−0.27 (0.15)
Skilled workers			−0.38** (0.12)	−0.32* (0.13)
Unskilled workers			−0.41** (0.13)	−0.32* (0.14)
Retired			−0.37* (0.15)	−0.24 (0.16)
Unemployed			−0.21 (0.20)	−0.06 (0.20)
Other (NILF)			−0.49*** (0.14)	−0.37* (0.15)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.07 (0.12)
D3				0.28* (0.13)
D4				0.31* (0.13)
D5				0.36** (0.14)
D6				0.38** (0.13)
D7				0.39** (0.13)
D8				0.40** (0.14)
D9				0.50*** (0.14)
D10				0.61*** (0.15)
R ²	0.01	0.12	0.13	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.11	0.12	0.13
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	1.18	1.11	1.11	1.10
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.3 Network size

Table 4: Network size by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.28*** (0.13)	2.86*** (0.15)	3.14*** (0.22)	2.91*** (0.24)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.15 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.13 (0.12)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.25 (0.16)	0.05 (0.15)	−0.00 (0.15)	−0.02 (0.15)
Rented housing	0.12 (0.15)	0.01 (0.14)	−0.00 (0.15)	−0.01 (0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.17** (0.05)	−0.15** (0.05)	−0.14** (0.05)	−0.13* (0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.35*** (0.08)	−0.34*** (0.08)	−0.33*** (0.08)	−0.32*** (0.08)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.36** (0.12)	0.34** (0.12)	0.32** (0.12)
Technical		0.60*** (0.13)	0.54*** (0.14)	0.51*** (0.14)
University or more		0.96*** (0.13)	0.83*** (0.15)	0.78*** (0.16)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.07 (0.18)	−0.06 (0.19)
Small business owners			−0.28 (0.18)	−0.25 (0.19)
Skilled workers			−0.12 (0.16)	−0.09 (0.17)
Unskilled workers			−0.50** (0.19)	−0.47* (0.19)
Retired			−0.42* (0.20)	−0.38 (0.20)
Unemployed			−0.32 (0.29)	−0.26 (0.29)
Other (NILF)			−0.15 (0.19)	−0.11 (0.20)
Equalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.34* (0.15)
D3				0.17 (0.15)
D4				0.20 (0.15)
D5				0.25 (0.15)
D6				0.21 (0.15)
D7				0.22 (0.14)
D8				0.18 (0.16)
D9				0.26 (0.16)
D10				0.32 (0.18)
R ²	0.01	0.06	0.07	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.06
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	1.47	1.44	1.43	1.43
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.4 Generalized trust

Table 5: Generalized trust by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.27*** (0.04)	1.17*** (0.04)	1.31*** (0.10)	1.30*** (0.10)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.02 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.04)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.15* (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
Rented housing	0.11 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Technical		0.08 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
University or more		0.46*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.16 (0.10)	−0.14 (0.10)
Small business owners			−0.11 (0.09)	−0.09 (0.09)
Skilled workers			−0.15 (0.09)	−0.13 (0.09)
Unskilled workers			−0.12 (0.09)	−0.10 (0.09)
Retired			−0.09 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.10)
Unemployed			−0.27** (0.10)	−0.24* (0.10)
Other (NILF)			−0.17* (0.09)	−0.15 (0.09)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.01 (0.06)
D3				0.03 (0.06)
D4				−0.08 (0.06)
D5				−0.04 (0.05)
D6				−0.08 (0.05)
D7				0.12 (0.06)
D8				0.02 (0.06)
D9				−0.01 (0.06)
D10				0.07 (0.08)
R ²	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.09
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.07	0.08	0.08
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.68	0.65	0.65	0.65
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.5 Trust in minorities

Table 6: Trust in minorities by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.93*** (0.09)	2.54*** (0.10)	2.74*** (0.15)	2.56*** (0.17)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	−0.00 (0.08)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.20 (0.12)	−0.04 (0.11)	−0.07 (0.11)	−0.10 (0.12)
Rented housing	0.18 (0.10)	0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11* (0.04)	−0.10* (0.04)	−0.09* (0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.15*** (0.04)	−0.14** (0.04)	−0.14** (0.04)	−0.13** (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.29*** (0.08)	0.28*** (0.08)	0.26*** (0.08)
Technical		0.51*** (0.09)	0.48*** (0.09)	0.44*** (0.09)
University or more		1.06*** (0.09)	0.98*** (0.10)	0.92*** (0.10)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.17 (0.13)	−0.13 (0.13)
Small business owners			−0.24 (0.12)	−0.18 (0.13)
Skilled workers			−0.12 (0.12)	−0.06 (0.12)
Unskilled workers			−0.20 (0.13)	−0.14 (0.13)
Retired			−0.30* (0.14)	−0.23 (0.14)
Unemployed			−0.02 (0.16)	0.08 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			−0.19 (0.13)	−0.13 (0.14)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.18 (0.09)
D3				0.09 (0.10)
D4				0.18 (0.10)
D5				0.13 (0.10)
D6				0.21* (0.10)
D7				0.26** (0.10)
D8				0.05 (0.11)
D9				0.13 (0.11)
D10				0.36** (0.12)
R ²	0.01	0.15	0.15	0.16
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.14	0.15	0.15
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.96	0.90	0.90	0.89
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 7: Political trust by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.63*** (0.05)	1.53*** (0.06)	1.62*** (0.10)	1.65*** (0.12)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.11 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)
Rented housing	0.11 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.09** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
Wave 2018	0.21*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.18*** (0.03)	−0.17*** (0.03)	−0.17*** (0.03)	−0.17*** (0.03)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Technical		0.18** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)
University or more		0.35*** (0.06)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.13 (0.09)	−0.09 (0.09)
Small business owners			−0.12 (0.09)	−0.08 (0.09)
Skilled workers			−0.18* (0.09)	−0.13 (0.09)
Unskilled workers			−0.12 (0.09)	−0.07 (0.09)
Retired			0.05 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)
Unemployed			0.02 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)
Other (NILF)			−0.09 (0.09)	−0.03 (0.10)
Equivalent income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.16* (0.08)
D3				−0.06 (0.08)
D4				−0.05 (0.07)
D5				−0.05 (0.08)
D6				−0.09 (0.08)
D7				−0.07 (0.08)
D8				−0.06 (0.08)
D9				−0.00 (0.08)
D10				0.09 (0.09)
R ²	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.10
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.09
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.69	0.67	0.67	0.67
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.7 Political engagement

Table 8: Political engagement by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.63*** (0.09)	1.15*** (0.09)	1.49*** (0.18)	1.39*** (0.20)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.14 (0.10)	0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.51*** (0.13)	0.18 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)
Rented housing	0.16 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.42*** (0.06)	0.42*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.06)
Wave 2018	0.20*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Wave 2019	0.55*** (0.06)	0.57*** (0.06)	0.57*** (0.06)	0.57*** (0.06)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.27*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.24*** (0.07)
Technical		0.74*** (0.09)	0.74*** (0.09)	0.69*** (0.10)
University or more		1.41*** (0.10)	1.30*** (0.11)	1.23*** (0.11)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.37* (0.16)	-0.36* (0.16)
Small business owners			-0.40* (0.16)	-0.36* (0.17)
Skilled workers			-0.37* (0.15)	-0.34* (0.16)
Unskilled workers			-0.28 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.17)
Retired			-0.24 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.19)
Unemployed			-0.15 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.22)
Other (NILF)			-0.36* (0.16)	-0.31 (0.17)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.00 (0.11)
D3				0.03 (0.12)
D4				0.14 (0.11)
D5				0.17 (0.12)
D6				0.08 (0.11)
D7				0.03 (0.11)
D8				0.08 (0.12)
D9				0.22 (0.13)
D10				0.21 (0.14)
R ²	0.04	0.20	0.21	0.21
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.20	0.20	0.20
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	1.23	1.13	1.12	1.12
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 9: Satisfaction with democracy by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.94*** (0.08)	1.96*** (0.10)	1.98*** (0.14)	1.99*** (0.17)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.12 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.12 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
Rented housing	0.08 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.16* (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)
Wave 2018	0.25*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)
Wave 2019	-0.37*** (0.06)	-0.37*** (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.06)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.07 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Technical		-0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)
University or more		0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.00 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Small business owners			-0.03 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)
Skilled workers			-0.12 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.12)
Unskilled workers			-0.21 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)
Retired			0.28* (0.14)	0.34* (0.14)
Unemployed			-0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)
Other (NILF)			0.08 (0.13)	0.15 (0.13)
Equivalentised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.13 (0.12)
D3				-0.08 (0.11)
D4				-0.09 (0.11)
D5				0.00 (0.11)
D6				-0.21 (0.11)
D7				0.02 (0.12)
D8				-0.07 (0.11)
D9				0.04 (0.12)
D10				0.14 (0.13)
R ²	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	1.04	1.04	1.03	1.03
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.9 Conventional political participation

Table 10: Conventional political participation by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.16*** (0.02)	1.14*** (0.03)	1.23*** (0.05)	1.21*** (0.06)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.07* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Rented housing	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Wave 2018	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Wave 2019	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Technical		0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
University or more		0.12*** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Small business owners			-0.12** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
Skilled workers			-0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Unskilled workers			-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Retired			-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Unemployed			-0.09 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)
Other (NILF)			-0.12** (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.02 (0.02)
D3				-0.01 (0.03)
D4				0.02 (0.03)
D5				0.05 (0.03)
D6				0.02 (0.03)
D7				0.01 (0.03)
D8				0.02 (0.03)
D9				0.04 (0.03)
D10				0.07 (0.04)
R ²	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.05
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.29
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 11: Unconventional political participation by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.43*** (0.06)	1.20*** (0.05)	1.42*** (0.11)	1.43*** (0.12)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.11 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.07)
Rented housing	0.08 (0.07)	−0.00 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.14*** (0.03)	−0.12*** (0.03)	−0.13*** (0.03)	−0.13*** (0.03)
Wave 2019	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.15*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)
Technical		0.35*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.31*** (0.05)
University or more		0.66*** (0.05)	0.56*** (0.05)	0.58*** (0.06)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.06 (0.11)	−0.07 (0.11)
Small business owners			−0.27** (0.09)	−0.28** (0.10)
Skilled workers			−0.15 (0.10)	−0.16 (0.10)
Unskilled workers			−0.16 (0.10)	−0.18 (0.10)
Retired			−0.30** (0.10)	−0.31** (0.10)
Unemployed			−0.24* (0.11)	−0.25* (0.12)
Other (NILF)			−0.25** (0.10)	−0.27** (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.03 (0.04)
D3				0.03 (0.05)
D4				0.06 (0.05)
D5				0.02 (0.05)
D6				−0.02 (0.05)
D7				0.01 (0.05)
D8				−0.06 (0.06)
D9				−0.02 (0.06)
D10				−0.05 (0.07)
R ²	0.02	0.15	0.16	0.16
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.14	0.16	0.16
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.64	0.60	0.60	0.60
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.11 Egalitarianism

Table 12: Egalitarianism by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.17*** (0.05)	4.20*** (0.07)	4.16*** (0.10)	4.24*** (0.12)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	-0.14* (0.05)	-0.14* (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)
Owned home with mortgage payments	-0.19** (0.07)	-0.17* (0.07)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)
Rented housing	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.12* (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.11* (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.11** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Technical		-0.14* (0.06)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)
University or more		-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.09 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
Small business owners			0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
Skilled workers			0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)
Unskilled workers			0.10 (0.08)	0.00 (0.09)
Retired			-0.09 (0.10)	-0.20 (0.10)
Unemployed			-0.08 (0.14)	-0.20 (0.14)
Other (NILF)			0.05 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.06 (0.08)
D3				0.02 (0.08)
D4				0.07 (0.09)
D5				0.02 (0.09)
D6				-0.02 (0.09)
D7				-0.15 (0.09)
D8				-0.17 (0.09)
D9				-0.15 (0.09)
D10				-0.34*** (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.77
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 13: Altruistic dispositions by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.05*** (0.04)	3.97*** (0.05)	4.10*** (0.07)	4.08*** (0.09)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.00 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)
Rented housing	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.06 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Wave 2019	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)
Technical		0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
University or more		0.23*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.09 (0.06)	−0.11 (0.06)
Small business owners			−0.08 (0.06)	−0.11 (0.06)
Skilled workers			−0.12* (0.06)	−0.15* (0.06)
Unskilled workers			−0.14* (0.06)	−0.17** (0.06)
Retired			−0.23*** (0.06)	−0.26*** (0.07)
Unemployed			−0.07 (0.09)	−0.10 (0.09)
Other (NILF)			−0.11 (0.06)	−0.13* (0.06)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.11 (0.07)
D3				0.00 (0.07)
D4				0.08 (0.07)
D5				0.02 (0.07)
D6				0.08 (0.07)
D7				0.03 (0.06)
D8				0.01 (0.07)
D9				0.03 (0.07)
D10				−0.05 (0.07)
R ²	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 14: Prosocial behavior by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.59*** (0.05)	1.48*** (0.06)	1.56*** (0.09)	1.50*** (0.10)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.12* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.17** (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Rented housing	0.11* (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.11** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Wave 2019	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Technical		0.19*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)
University or more		0.32*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Small business owners			-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)
Skilled workers			-0.12 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)
Unskilled workers			-0.11 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)
Retired			-0.07 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)
Unemployed			-0.21* (0.09)	-0.17 (0.09)
Other (NILF)			-0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.00 (0.07)
D3				0.03 (0.07)
D4				0.09 (0.07)
D5				0.05 (0.07)
D6				0.05 (0.07)
D7				0.18** (0.07)
D8				0.08 (0.07)
D9				0.16* (0.08)
D10				0.15 (0.08)
R ²	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.63	0.62	0.61	0.61
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.14 Support for democracy

Table 15: Support for democracy by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.32*** (0.05)	2.19*** (0.06)	2.35*** (0.08)	2.33*** (0.10)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.19** (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
Rented housing	0.07 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Technical		0.17** (0.05)	0.17** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)
University or more		0.41*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.06)	0.35*** (0.06)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.17* (0.08)	−0.19* (0.08)
Small business owners			−0.22** (0.07)	−0.23** (0.07)
Skilled workers			−0.16** (0.06)	−0.19** (0.07)
Unskilled workers			−0.15* (0.07)	−0.17* (0.07)
Retired			−0.03 (0.09)	−0.04 (0.09)
Unemployed			−0.29** (0.10)	−0.30** (0.11)
Other (NILF)			−0.15* (0.08)	−0.16* (0.08)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.01 (0.07)
D3				0.02 (0.07)
D4				0.09 (0.07)
D5				0.02 (0.07)
D6				0.01 (0.07)
D7				0.11 (0.07)
D8				0.11 (0.07)
D9				0.05 (0.08)
D10				−0.00 (0.09)
R ²	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.68
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

3.15 Justification of violence

Table 16: Justification of violence by homeownership, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.06*** (0.07)	4.14*** (0.08)	4.28*** (0.12)	4.34*** (0.14)
Homeownership (Ref. = Other regime)				
Owned and fully paid-off home	−0.13 (0.07)	−0.15* (0.07)	−0.16* (0.07)	−0.15* (0.07)
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.03 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.08)	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.06 (0.08)
Rented housing	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.13 (0.08)	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.11 (0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)
Wave 2019	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		−0.14* (0.06)	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.09 (0.06)
Technical		−0.12 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.08)
University or more		0.09 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.20 (0.11)	−0.19 (0.11)
Small business owners			−0.03 (0.10)	−0.04 (0.10)
Skilled workers			−0.28** (0.09)	−0.28** (0.09)
Unskilled workers			−0.22* (0.10)	−0.23* (0.11)
Retired			−0.07 (0.11)	−0.10 (0.11)
Unemployed			−0.25 (0.14)	−0.27 (0.14)
Other (NILF)			−0.14 (0.10)	−0.16 (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.02 (0.09)
D3				−0.06 (0.11)
D4				−0.03 (0.10)
D5				−0.12 (0.10)
D6				−0.20 (0.11)
D7				−0.06 (0.10)
D8				−0.08 (0.10)
D9				−0.10 (0.11)
D10				−0.13 (0.11)
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
Num. obs.	2393	2393	2393	2393
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.88	0.88
Num. clusters	905	905	905	905

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4 Second set: Social cohesion and housing wealth

We next examine whether housing wealth—proxied by the log land price per square meter in the respondent’s residential zone—relates to multiple social-cohesion outcomes. To align this measure with the notion of housing wealth as an owned asset, these models are estimated on the restricted panel of respondents who report owning their dwelling, either **owned and fully paid-off** or **owned with mortgage payments** (based on the homeownership item). The estimation strategy mirrors the first set: we use pooled OLS with wave fixed effects and individual-clustered CR2 standard errors, and we build specifications sequentially by adding education, social class, and equivalised household income decile.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \log \text{price}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Class}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{IncomeDecile}_{it} + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t ; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association between log land price m^2 and Y_{it} , conditional on the covariates; β_2 , β_3 , and β_4 capture the associations of educational attainment, social class, and equivalised household income decile with Y_{it} , respectively; λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

4.1 Cultural identification

Table 17: Cultural identification by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.49*** (0.16)	4.35*** (0.15)	4.20*** (0.17)	4.15*** (0.18)
Log land price m ²	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.16** (0.05)	0.16** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave 2019	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)
Technical		-0.16* (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.15* (0.08)
University or more		-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.25** (0.08)	-0.29** (0.09)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.13 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)
Small business owners			0.20 (0.12)	0.21 (0.13)
Skilled workers			0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Unskilled workers			0.13 (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)
Retired			0.34** (0.12)	0.36** (0.12)
Unemployed			0.15 (0.16)	0.17 (0.17)
Other (NILF)			0.11 (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.01 (0.11)
D3				0.04 (0.10)
D4				0.12 (0.10)
D5				0.16 (0.10)
D6				0.12 (0.11)
D7				0.09 (0.10)
D8				0.11 (0.11)
D9				0.12 (0.11)
D10				0.11 (0.13)
R ²	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.75
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.2 Number of friends

Table 18: Number of friends by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.47*** (0.26)	1.71*** (0.27)	2.00*** (0.32)	1.82*** (0.34)
Log land price m ²	0.42*** (0.08)	0.16 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.11* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Wave 2019	0.05 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.32** (0.12)	0.32** (0.12)	0.23 (0.12)
Technical		0.84*** (0.14)	0.80*** (0.14)	0.68*** (0.14)
University or more		1.00*** (0.13)	0.87*** (0.14)	0.71*** (0.14)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.01 (0.16)	0.01 (0.16)
Small business owners			−0.19 (0.18)	−0.12 (0.18)
Skilled workers			−0.28 (0.14)	−0.25 (0.15)
Unskilled workers			−0.25 (0.16)	−0.21 (0.17)
Retired			−0.30 (0.16)	−0.18 (0.17)
Unemployed			−0.23 (0.25)	−0.13 (0.24)
Other (NILF)			−0.35* (0.16)	−0.27 (0.17)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.08 (0.14)
D3				0.42** (0.16)
D4				0.30 (0.15)
D5				0.32* (0.16)
D6				0.53*** (0.16)
D7				0.46** (0.15)
D8				0.39* (0.16)
D9				0.54** (0.16)
D10				0.59*** (0.17)
R ²	0.03	0.12	0.13	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.11	0.12	0.13
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.18	1.13	1.12	1.12
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.3 Network size

Table 19: Network size by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.85*** (0.32)	1.92*** (0.33)	2.15*** (0.39)	1.96*** (0.40)
Log land price m ²	0.52*** (0.10)	0.33** (0.11)	0.33** (0.11)	0.35** (0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave 2018	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Wave 2019	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.27** (0.10)	-0.26** (0.10)	-0.27** (0.10)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.45*** (0.13)	0.43** (0.13)	0.42** (0.14)
Technical		0.57*** (0.16)	0.50** (0.16)	0.49** (0.17)
University or more		0.87*** (0.16)	0.75*** (0.18)	0.78*** (0.19)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.14 (0.22)	-0.19 (0.22)
Small business owners			-0.27 (0.21)	-0.32 (0.22)
Skilled workers			0.06 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.19)
Unskilled workers			-0.48* (0.22)	-0.55* (0.23)
Retired			-0.40 (0.22)	-0.45 (0.23)
Unemployed			-0.18 (0.35)	-0.23 (0.35)
Other (NILF)			-0.21 (0.22)	-0.27 (0.22)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.28 (0.18)
D3				0.23 (0.19)
D4				0.22 (0.19)
D5				0.29 (0.19)
D6				0.28 (0.19)
D7				0.20 (0.17)
D8				0.17 (0.20)
D9				0.20 (0.19)
D10				0.04 (0.22)
R ²	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.09
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.45	1.43	1.42	1.42
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.4 Generalized trust

Table 20: Generalized trust by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	0.93*** (0.14)	1.13*** (0.14)	1.19*** (0.18)	1.24*** (0.18)
Log land price m ²	0.13** (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.00 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Technical		0.09 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)
University or more		0.39*** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.08)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.07 (0.12)	−0.05 (0.12)
Small business owners			0.01 (0.10)	0.03 (0.11)
Skilled workers			−0.08 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.10)
Unskilled workers			−0.03 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.11)
Retired			−0.03 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.11)
Unemployed			−0.20 (0.11)	−0.18 (0.11)
Other (NILF)			−0.07 (0.10)	−0.05 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.11 (0.07)
D3				−0.00 (0.07)
D4				−0.14 (0.07)
D5				−0.06 (0.07)
D6				−0.11 (0.07)
D7				0.02 (0.07)
D8				0.02 (0.08)
D9				−0.09 (0.08)
D10				0.01 (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.65
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.5 Trust in minorities

Table 21: Trust in minorities by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.00*** (0.22)	2.23*** (0.21)	2.25*** (0.27)	2.22*** (0.28)
Log land price m ²	0.32*** (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.07* (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Wave 2018	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
Wave 2019	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.34*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)
Technical		0.51*** (0.11)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.47*** (0.11)
University or more		0.96*** (0.11)	0.92*** (0.12)	0.91*** (0.12)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.03 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.15)
Small business owners			-0.11 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)
Skilled workers			0.01 (0.14)	0.03 (0.14)
Unskilled workers			0.03 (0.16)	0.03 (0.16)
Retired			-0.19 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)
Unemployed			0.16 (0.20)	0.19 (0.20)
Other (NILF)			-0.11 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.16)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.08 (0.11)
D3				0.06 (0.12)
D4				0.17 (0.13)
D5				0.06 (0.13)
D6				0.27* (0.13)
D7				0.16 (0.12)
D8				-0.07 (0.14)
D9				-0.03 (0.13)
D10				0.20 (0.14)
R ²	0.03	0.13	0.14	0.15
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.13	0.13	0.14
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.95	0.90	0.90	0.90
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 22: Political trust by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.12*** (0.14)	1.25*** (0.14)	1.33*** (0.18)	1.44*** (0.20)
Log land price m ²	0.20*** (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.19*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
Wave 2019	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Technical		0.23*** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.07)
University or more		0.33*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.32*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)
Small business owners			-0.07 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)
Skilled workers			-0.11 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.11)
Unskilled workers			-0.03 (0.11)	0.00 (0.12)
Retired			0.12 (0.12)	0.14 (0.13)
Unemployed			0.09 (0.15)	0.10 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			-0.06 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.20* (0.09)
D3				-0.12 (0.10)
D4				-0.13 (0.09)
D5				-0.11 (0.10)
D6				-0.15 (0.09)
D7				-0.10 (0.10)
D8				-0.14 (0.10)
D9				-0.07 (0.10)
D10				-0.06 (0.11)
R ²	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.10
Adj. R ²	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.09
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.67
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.7 Political engagement

Table 23: Political engagement by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	0.26 (0.27)	0.73** (0.24)	1.26*** (0.31)	1.20*** (0.31)
Log land price m ²	0.53*** (0.09)	0.17* (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.42*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)
Wave 2018	0.23*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)
Wave 2019	0.52*** (0.07)	0.55*** (0.07)	0.55*** (0.07)	0.54*** (0.07)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.28*** (0.08)	0.28*** (0.08)	0.26** (0.08)
Technical		0.88*** (0.12)	0.88*** (0.12)	0.85*** (0.12)
University or more		1.33*** (0.12)	1.21*** (0.13)	1.18*** (0.13)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.49** (0.18)	-0.50** (0.19)
Small business owners			-0.46* (0.19)	-0.44* (0.20)
Skilled workers			-0.47** (0.18)	-0.45* (0.19)
Unskilled workers			-0.37 (0.19)	-0.34 (0.20)
Retired			-0.36 (0.20)	-0.32 (0.21)
Unemployed			-0.25 (0.25)	-0.23 (0.26)
Other (NILF)			-0.42* (0.19)	-0.39* (0.20)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.05 (0.14)
D3				0.04 (0.13)
D4				0.18 (0.13)
D5				0.23 (0.15)
D6				0.19 (0.14)
D7				-0.07 (0.13)
D8				0.08 (0.14)
D9				0.20 (0.15)
D10				0.16 (0.18)
R ²	0.07	0.20	0.21	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.07	0.20	0.21	0.21
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.22	1.13	1.12	1.12
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 24: Satisfaction with democracy by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.52*** (0.20)	1.62*** (0.20)	1.62*** (0.26)	1.67*** (0.27)
Log land price m ²	0.18** (0.06)	0.15* (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
Wave 2018	0.29*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.07)
Wave 2019	-0.37*** (0.07)	-0.37*** (0.07)	-0.36*** (0.07)	-0.36*** (0.07)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
Technical		0.01 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)
University or more		0.07 (0.10)	0.12 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.08 (0.16)	0.09 (0.16)
Small business owners			0.03 (0.14)	0.04 (0.15)
Skilled workers			0.01 (0.15)	0.03 (0.15)
Unskilled workers			-0.05 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.16)
Retired			0.34* (0.15)	0.37* (0.16)
Unemployed			-0.11 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.20)
Other (NILF)			0.16 (0.15)	0.20 (0.16)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.15 (0.14)
D3				-0.06 (0.14)
D4				-0.03 (0.13)
D5				0.02 (0.14)
D6				-0.15 (0.14)
D7				0.08 (0.14)
D8				-0.08 (0.14)
D9				0.06 (0.14)
D10				0.04 (0.16)
R ²	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.06	1.06	1.05	1.05
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.9 Conventional political participation

Table 25: Conventional political participation by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.11*** (0.07)	1.17*** (0.07)	1.30*** (0.09)	1.31*** (0.09)
Log land price m ²	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Wave 2018	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Wave 2019	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Technical		0.11** (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
University or more		0.13*** (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.10 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)
Small business owners			-0.16** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.06)
Skilled workers			-0.08 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
Unskilled workers			-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)
Retired			-0.08 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)
Unemployed			-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)
Other (NILF)			-0.15** (0.05)	-0.14* (0.06)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.04 (0.03)
D3				-0.01 (0.03)
D4				0.03 (0.04)
D5				0.01 (0.04)
D6				0.01 (0.04)
D7				0.02 (0.03)
D8				-0.01 (0.04)
D9				0.04 (0.04)
D10				0.05 (0.05)
R ²	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 26: Unconventional political participation by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.16*** (0.14)	1.39*** (0.13)	1.61*** (0.18)	1.60*** (0.18)
Log land price m ²	0.09* (0.04)	−0.08 (0.04)	−0.08 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.04)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.16*** (0.03)	−0.14*** (0.03)	−0.15*** (0.03)	−0.15*** (0.03)
Wave 2019	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.15*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Technical		0.42*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.06)	0.39*** (0.06)
University or more		0.66*** (0.06)	0.55*** (0.07)	0.59*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.03 (0.12)	−0.05 (0.12)
Small business owners			−0.24* (0.10)	−0.27* (0.11)
Skilled workers			−0.15 (0.11)	−0.16 (0.12)
Unskilled workers			−0.14 (0.11)	−0.16 (0.11)
Retired			−0.30** (0.10)	−0.33** (0.11)
Unemployed			−0.22 (0.13)	−0.25 (0.13)
Other (NILF)			−0.20 (0.10)	−0.23* (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.04 (0.05)
D3				0.04 (0.06)
D4				0.04 (0.07)
D5				−0.03 (0.06)
D6				−0.03 (0.06)
D7				−0.04 (0.06)
D8				−0.12 (0.07)
D9				−0.01 (0.07)
D10				−0.10 (0.09)
R ²	0.02	0.15	0.17	0.17
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.15	0.16	0.16
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.62	0.58	0.58	0.58
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.11 Egalitarianism

Table 27: Egalitarianism by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.61*** (0.16)	4.60*** (0.16)	4.57*** (0.20)	4.50*** (0.21)
Log land price m ²	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.13* (0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.22*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Wave 2019	0.10* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.00 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
Technical		-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)
University or more		-0.02 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.12 (0.10)	0.05 (0.11)
Small business owners			0.01 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.10)
Skilled workers			0.03 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)
Unskilled workers			0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)
Retired			-0.12 (0.11)	-0.24* (0.11)
Unemployed			-0.20 (0.16)	-0.31 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			0.05 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.05 (0.10)
D3				0.01 (0.11)
D4				0.14 (0.10)
D5				0.05 (0.10)
D6				0.02 (0.11)
D7				-0.12 (0.10)
D8				-0.12 (0.11)
D9				-0.12 (0.11)
D10				-0.32* (0.13)
R ²	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.79
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 28: Altruistic dispositions by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.00*** (0.10)	4.04*** (0.10)	4.15*** (0.12)	4.15*** (0.12)
Log land price m ²	0.01 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.17*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.11* (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.12** (0.05)
Technical		0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)
University or more		0.25*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.07 (0.08)	−0.10 (0.08)
Small business owners			−0.05 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.07)
Skilled workers			−0.09 (0.06)	−0.12 (0.07)
Unskilled workers			−0.13 (0.08)	−0.16* (0.08)
Retired			−0.19** (0.07)	−0.24** (0.07)
Unemployed			−0.14 (0.10)	−0.19 (0.10)
Other (NILF)			−0.08 (0.07)	−0.12 (0.07)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.05 (0.08)
D3				−0.09 (0.08)
D4				−0.01 (0.08)
D5				−0.05 (0.07)
D6				0.05 (0.07)
D7				−0.04 (0.06)
D8				−0.09 (0.07)
D9				−0.05 (0.07)
D10				−0.13 (0.08)
R ²	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 29: Prosocial behavior by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.50*** (0.13)	1.62*** (0.14)	1.76*** (0.18)	1.72*** (0.18)
Log land price m ²	0.08 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.09* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Technical		0.20** (0.07)	0.22** (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)
University or more		0.32*** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.24** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.13 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)
Small business owners			-0.08 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)
Skilled workers			-0.14 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.09)
Unskilled workers			-0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)
Retired			-0.10 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
Unemployed			-0.22* (0.10)	-0.17 (0.11)
Other (NILF)			-0.02 (0.09)	0.03 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.02 (0.09)
D3				0.10 (0.09)
D4				0.10 (0.09)
D5				0.05 (0.09)
D6				0.08 (0.09)
D7				0.18* (0.08)
D8				0.09 (0.09)
D9				0.20* (0.09)
D10				0.22* (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.14 Support for democracy

Table 30: Support for democracy by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.04*** (0.14)	2.18*** (0.14)	2.41*** (0.16)	2.35*** (0.17)
Log land price m ²	0.12* (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave 2019	0.20*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)
Technical		0.23*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)
University or more		0.39*** (0.06)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.13 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)
Small business owners			-0.19* (0.09)	-0.21* (0.09)
Skilled workers			-0.20* (0.08)	-0.23** (0.08)
Unskilled workers			-0.17 (0.09)	-0.19* (0.09)
Retired			-0.05 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)
Unemployed			-0.30* (0.13)	-0.31* (0.14)
Other (NILF)			-0.17 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.05 (0.09)
D3				0.01 (0.09)
D4				0.15 (0.09)
D5				0.10 (0.09)
D6				0.08 (0.09)
D7				0.12 (0.09)
D8				0.15 (0.09)
D9				0.12 (0.09)
D10				0.04 (0.11)
R ²	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.71	0.69	0.69	0.69
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

4.15 Justification of violence

Table 31: Justification of violence by housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.67*** (0.18)	3.84*** (0.19)	4.03*** (0.24)	4.02*** (0.26)
Log land price m ²	0.10 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.14* (0.06)	−0.14* (0.06)	−0.15* (0.06)	−0.15* (0.06)
Wave 2019	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)	−0.00 (0.06)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		−0.15 (0.08)	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.10 (0.07)
Technical		−0.04 (0.08)	0.00 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
University or more		0.04 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.06 (0.10)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.14 (0.13)	−0.15 (0.13)
Small business owners			0.01 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.12)
Skilled workers			−0.30* (0.11)	−0.32** (0.12)
Unskilled workers			−0.15 (0.13)	−0.17 (0.13)
Retired			−0.08 (0.12)	−0.12 (0.13)
Unemployed			−0.21 (0.16)	−0.23 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			−0.18 (0.12)	−0.20 (0.13)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.09 (0.11)
D3				−0.02 (0.13)
D4				−0.03 (0.12)
D5				−0.11 (0.13)
D6				−0.15 (0.13)
D7				−0.00 (0.12)
D8				−0.01 (0.12)
D9				−0.07 (0.13)
D10				−0.13 (0.14)
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5 Third set: Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decile land-price exposure)

We then focus on the upper tail of the local housing-wealth distribution by replacing the continuous land-price proxy with an indicator for extreme housing-wealth contexts. Specifically, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent resides in a zone whose **land price per square meter falls in the top decile (decile 10)**, and 0 otherwise. This specification is intended to capture discontinuous differences between living in the most expensive residential contexts versus the rest of the distribution—i.e., an “extremes” contrast that may be obscured by a linear specification in log prices. As in the second set, models are estimated on the restricted panel of homeowners (fully paid-off or paying a mortgage), using pooled OLS with wave fixed effects and CR2 individual-clustered standard errors, and adding education, social class, and equivalised household income decile sequentially.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{TopDecilePrice}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Class}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{IncomeDecile}_{it} + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t ; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association between residing in a top-decile land-price zone (decile 10 vs. all others) and Y_{it} , conditional on the covariates; β_2 , β_3 , and β_4 capture the associations of educational attainment, social class, and equivalised household income decile with Y_{it} , respectively; λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

5.1 Cultural identification

Table 32: Cultural identification by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.17*** (0.04)	4.29*** (0.05)	4.12*** (0.12)	4.06*** (0.14)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.14)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.16** (0.05)	0.16** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave 2019	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)
Technical		-0.17* (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.16* (0.08)
University or more		-0.33*** (0.08)	-0.26** (0.09)	-0.30** (0.09)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.14 (0.12)	0.13 (0.13)
Small business owners			0.21 (0.12)	0.21 (0.13)
Skilled workers			0.05 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Unskilled workers			0.13 (0.12)	0.13 (0.13)
Retired			0.34** (0.11)	0.36** (0.12)
Unemployed			0.16 (0.16)	0.17 (0.17)
Other (NILF)			0.11 (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.01 (0.11)
D3				0.04 (0.10)
D4				0.12 (0.10)
D5				0.16 (0.10)
D6				0.12 (0.11)
D7				0.09 (0.10)
D8				0.11 (0.11)
D9				0.12 (0.11)
D10				0.09 (0.12)
R ²	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.75
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.2 Number of friends

Table 33: Number of friends by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.71*** (0.06)	2.16*** (0.11)	2.46*** (0.17)	2.09*** (0.21)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.50** (0.14)	0.07 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	−0.03 (0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.10* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Wave 2019	0.02 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.33** (0.12)	0.33** (0.12)	0.23* (0.12)
Technical		0.88*** (0.13)	0.84*** (0.13)	0.69*** (0.14)
University or more		1.06*** (0.13)	0.93*** (0.14)	0.74*** (0.14)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.04 (0.16)	−0.00 (0.16)
Small business owners			−0.23 (0.18)	−0.13 (0.18)
Skilled workers			−0.31* (0.15)	−0.27 (0.15)
Unskilled workers			−0.30 (0.16)	−0.23 (0.17)
Retired			−0.31 (0.16)	−0.17 (0.17)
Unemployed			−0.26 (0.25)	−0.13 (0.25)
Other (NILF)			−0.36* (0.16)	−0.26 (0.17)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.09 (0.14)
D3				0.43** (0.16)
D4				0.31* (0.15)
D5				0.34* (0.16)
D6				0.54*** (0.16)
D7				0.47** (0.15)
D8				0.41* (0.16)
D9				0.56*** (0.16)
D10				0.65*** (0.17)
R ²	0.01	0.12	0.12	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.11	0.11	0.13
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.19	1.13	1.13	1.12
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.3 Network size

Table 34: Network size by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.37*** (0.08)	2.85*** (0.12)	3.09*** (0.22)	2.89*** (0.25)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.87*** (0.17)	0.54** (0.19)	0.54** (0.19)	0.58** (0.20)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave 2018	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Wave 2019	-0.32** (0.10)	-0.28** (0.10)	-0.28** (0.10)	-0.28** (0.10)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.47*** (0.13)	0.45*** (0.13)	0.43** (0.14)
Technical		0.65*** (0.15)	0.57*** (0.16)	0.55*** (0.17)
University or more		0.93*** (0.16)	0.80*** (0.18)	0.80*** (0.19)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.12 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.22)
Small business owners			-0.29 (0.22)	-0.31 (0.22)
Skilled workers			0.04 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.19)
Unskilled workers			-0.51* (0.22)	-0.56* (0.23)
Retired			-0.38 (0.23)	-0.40 (0.23)
Unemployed			-0.17 (0.36)	-0.18 (0.36)
Other (NILF)			-0.20 (0.22)	-0.24 (0.22)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.32 (0.18)
D3				0.28 (0.19)
D4				0.27 (0.19)
D5				0.35 (0.19)
D6				0.35 (0.19)
D7				0.26 (0.17)
D8				0.23 (0.20)
D9				0.26 (0.19)
D10				0.15 (0.22)
R ²	0.03	0.07	0.09	0.09
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.08
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.46	1.43	1.42	1.42
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.4 Generalized trust

Table 35: Generalized trust by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.30*** (0.04)	1.18*** (0.04)	1.23*** (0.11)	1.26*** (0.12)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.25* (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.13)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.00 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Wave 2019	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Technical		0.10 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)
University or more		0.39*** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.08)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.07 (0.12)	−0.05 (0.12)
Small business owners			0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)
Skilled workers			−0.08 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.10)
Unskilled workers			−0.03 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.11)
Retired			−0.03 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.11)
Unemployed			−0.20 (0.11)	−0.18 (0.11)
Other (NILF)			−0.07 (0.10)	−0.05 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.10 (0.07)
D3				−0.00 (0.07)
D4				−0.14 (0.07)
D5				−0.06 (0.07)
D6				−0.11 (0.07)
D7				0.02 (0.07)
D8				0.02 (0.08)
D9				−0.09 (0.08)
D10				0.01 (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.65
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.5 Trust in minorities

Table 36: Trust in minorities by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.93*** (0.05)	2.47*** (0.09)	2.54*** (0.16)	2.42*** (0.19)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.59** (0.17)	0.18 (0.15)	0.20 (0.16)	0.16 (0.16)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.07* (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Wave 2018	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
Wave 2019	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.34*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)
Technical		0.53*** (0.11)	0.50*** (0.11)	0.49*** (0.11)
University or more		0.97*** (0.11)	0.93*** (0.12)	0.92*** (0.12)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.02 (0.15)	0.00 (0.15)
Small business owners			-0.11 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)
Skilled workers			0.01 (0.14)	0.03 (0.15)
Unskilled workers			0.02 (0.16)	0.03 (0.16)
Retired			-0.18 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.16)
Unemployed			0.17 (0.19)	0.20 (0.20)
Other (NILF)			-0.10 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.16)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.09 (0.11)
D3				0.07 (0.13)
D4				0.18 (0.13)
D5				0.07 (0.13)
D6				0.29* (0.13)
D7				0.18 (0.13)
D8				-0.06 (0.13)
D9				-0.02 (0.13)
D10				0.22 (0.14)
R ²	0.02	0.13	0.14	0.15
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.13	0.13	0.14
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.95	0.90	0.90	0.90
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 37: Political trust by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.70*** (0.04)	1.54*** (0.05)	1.56*** (0.10)	1.64*** (0.13)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.43*** (0.10)	0.28** (0.10)	0.26* (0.10)	0.24* (0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
Wave 2019	-0.19*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Technical		0.26*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)
University or more		0.33*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.32*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.03 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)
Small business owners			-0.06 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)
Skilled workers			-0.09 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.11)
Unskilled workers			-0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)
Retired			0.14 (0.12)	0.16 (0.12)
Unemployed			0.11 (0.15)	0.12 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			-0.04 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.19* (0.09)
D3				-0.10 (0.10)
D4				-0.12 (0.09)
D5				-0.10 (0.10)
D6				-0.13 (0.09)
D7				-0.09 (0.10)
D8				-0.13 (0.10)
D9				-0.06 (0.10)
D10				-0.05 (0.11)
R ²	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.10
Adj. R ²	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.09
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.67
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.7 Political engagement

Table 38: Political engagement by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.82*** (0.06)	1.22*** (0.07)	1.63*** (0.19)	1.50*** (0.22)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.97*** (0.24)	0.36 (0.21)	0.26 (0.21)	0.24 (0.21)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.42*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)
Wave 2018	0.20** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)
Wave 2019	0.49*** (0.07)	0.54*** (0.07)	0.54*** (0.07)	0.54*** (0.07)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.30*** (0.08)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.26** (0.08)
Technical		0.92*** (0.11)	0.92*** (0.12)	0.88*** (0.12)
University or more		1.34*** (0.12)	1.23*** (0.13)	1.18*** (0.13)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.48** (0.18)	-0.49** (0.19)
Small business owners			-0.46* (0.19)	-0.43* (0.20)
Skilled workers			-0.47** (0.18)	-0.45* (0.19)
Unskilled workers			-0.37 (0.19)	-0.34 (0.20)
Retired			-0.35 (0.20)	-0.31 (0.21)
Unemployed			-0.23 (0.25)	-0.21 (0.26)
Other (NILF)			-0.41* (0.19)	-0.38 (0.20)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.06 (0.14)
D3				0.06 (0.13)
D4				0.20 (0.13)
D5				0.25 (0.15)
D6				0.21 (0.14)
D7				-0.05 (0.13)
D8				0.10 (0.14)
D9				0.22 (0.15)
D10				0.19 (0.18)
R ²	0.06	0.20	0.21	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.20	0.21	0.21
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.23	1.13	1.13	1.12
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 39: Satisfaction with democracy by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.03*** (0.06)	2.02*** (0.09)	1.91*** (0.16)	1.92*** (0.19)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.45** (0.14)	0.40** (0.15)	0.37* (0.16)	0.35* (0.16)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
Wave 2018	0.28*** (0.07)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.07)
Wave 2019	-0.38*** (0.07)	-0.37*** (0.07)	-0.36*** (0.07)	-0.36*** (0.07)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.04 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
Technical		0.04 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)
University or more		0.07 (0.10)	0.11 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.11 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)
Small business owners			0.05 (0.14)	0.06 (0.15)
Skilled workers			0.04 (0.15)	0.05 (0.15)
Unskilled workers			-0.03 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.16)
Retired			0.36* (0.16)	0.39* (0.16)
Unemployed			-0.07 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.20)
Other (NILF)			0.19 (0.15)	0.22 (0.16)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				-0.13 (0.14)
D3				-0.04 (0.14)
D4				-0.02 (0.13)
D5				0.03 (0.14)
D6				-0.13 (0.14)
D7				0.09 (0.14)
D8				-0.06 (0.14)
D9				0.08 (0.14)
D10				0.04 (0.15)
R ²	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.9 Conventional political participation

Table 40: Conventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.22*** (0.02)	1.16*** (0.02)	1.28*** (0.06)	1.27*** (0.06)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.08 (0.05)	−0.10 (0.05)	−0.11* (0.05)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02* (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
Wave 2018	−0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Wave 2019	−0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Technical		0.10** (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
University or more		0.14*** (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.12* (0.05)	−0.11 (0.06)
Small business owners			−0.17** (0.05)	−0.16** (0.06)
Skilled workers			−0.09 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)
Unskilled workers			−0.09 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.06)
Retired			−0.09 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.06)
Unemployed			−0.09 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.08)
Other (NILF)			−0.16** (0.05)	−0.14* (0.06)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.04 (0.03)
D3				−0.01 (0.03)
D4				0.02 (0.04)
D5				0.01 (0.04)
D6				0.00 (0.04)
D7				0.01 (0.03)
D8				−0.01 (0.03)
D9				0.04 (0.04)
D10				0.06 (0.05)
R ²	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.06
Adj. R ²	−0.00	0.03	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 41: Unconventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.44*** (0.03)	1.16*** (0.03)	1.38*** (0.11)	1.42*** (0.12)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.08 (0.08)	−0.23* (0.09)	−0.24* (0.10)	−0.22* (0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.17*** (0.03)	−0.14*** (0.03)	−0.15*** (0.03)	−0.15*** (0.03)
Wave 2019	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.14*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Technical		0.40*** (0.06)	0.35*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.06)
University or more		0.66*** (0.06)	0.55*** (0.07)	0.59*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.05 (0.12)	−0.06 (0.12)
Small business owners			−0.25* (0.10)	−0.28* (0.11)
Skilled workers			−0.16 (0.11)	−0.17 (0.12)
Unskilled workers			−0.15 (0.11)	−0.17 (0.11)
Retired			−0.32** (0.10)	−0.34** (0.11)
Unemployed			−0.24 (0.13)	−0.27 (0.14)
Other (NILF)			−0.22* (0.10)	−0.24* (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				−0.05 (0.05)
D3				0.03 (0.06)
D4				0.03 (0.07)
D5				−0.04 (0.06)
D6				−0.05 (0.06)
D7				−0.05 (0.06)
D8				−0.13 (0.07)
D9				−0.02 (0.07)
D10				−0.10 (0.10)
R ²	0.02	0.15	0.17	0.18
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.15	0.16	0.16
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.62	0.58	0.57	0.57
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.11 Egalitarianism

Table 42: Egalitarianism by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.01*** (0.04)	4.05*** (0.06)	4.05*** (0.10)	4.16*** (0.13)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	-0.30* (0.12)	-0.27* (0.12)	-0.25 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.13)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.22*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Wave 2019	0.11* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
Technical		-0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
University or more		-0.07 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			0.12 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)
Small business owners			0.03 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)
Skilled workers			0.05 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)
Unskilled workers			0.08 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)
Retired			-0.13 (0.11)	-0.25* (0.11)
Unemployed			-0.20 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			0.04 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.11)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.03 (0.10)
D3				-0.00 (0.11)
D4				0.12 (0.10)
D5				0.03 (0.10)
D6				-0.00 (0.11)
D7				-0.14 (0.10)
D8				-0.15 (0.11)
D9				-0.15 (0.11)
D10				-0.37** (0.13)
R ²	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 43: Altruistic dispositions by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.02*** (0.03)	3.92*** (0.05)	4.01*** (0.07)	4.07*** (0.08)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.17*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.12** (0.05)
Technical		0.07 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)
University or more		0.23*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.07 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)
Small business owners			-0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)
Skilled workers			-0.08 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)
Unskilled workers			-0.12 (0.08)	-0.16* (0.08)
Retired			-0.19** (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.07)
Unemployed			-0.14 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.10)
Other (NILF)			-0.08 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.04 (0.08)
D3				-0.09 (0.08)
D4				-0.01 (0.08)
D5				-0.06 (0.07)
D6				0.04 (0.07)
D7				-0.04 (0.06)
D8				-0.10 (0.07)
D9				-0.06 (0.07)
D10				-0.15* (0.07)
R ²	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 44: Prosocial behavior by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.73*** (0.03)	1.59*** (0.05)	1.68*** (0.09)	1.58*** (0.11)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.16 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.09* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)
Wave 2018	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Wave 2019	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Technical		0.20** (0.07)	0.21** (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)
University or more		0.32*** (0.06)	0.30*** (0.07)	0.24** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.12 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)
Small business owners			-0.08 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
Skilled workers			-0.14 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)
Unskilled workers			-0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)
Retired			-0.10 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
Unemployed			-0.22* (0.10)	-0.17 (0.11)
Other (NILF)			-0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.01 (0.09)
D3				0.09 (0.09)
D4				0.10 (0.09)
D5				0.04 (0.09)
D6				0.07 (0.09)
D7				0.17* (0.08)
D8				0.08 (0.09)
D9				0.19* (0.09)
D10				0.20* (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.14 Support for democracy

Table 45: Support for democracy by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.37*** (0.04)	2.21*** (0.05)	2.36*** (0.09)	2.32*** (0.11)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.32*** (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.14 (0.09)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Wave 2018	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Wave 2019	0.19*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)
Technical		0.23*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)
University or more		0.36*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.07)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			-0.11 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)
Small business owners			-0.17* (0.09)	-0.19* (0.09)
Skilled workers			-0.18* (0.08)	-0.22** (0.08)
Unskilled workers			-0.15 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.09)
Retired			-0.04 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)
Unemployed			-0.28* (0.13)	-0.29* (0.13)
Other (NILF)			-0.16 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.10)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.05 (0.09)
D3				0.02 (0.09)
D4				0.15 (0.09)
D5				0.09 (0.09)
D6				0.08 (0.09)
D7				0.12 (0.09)
D8				0.14 (0.09)
D9				0.12 (0.09)
D10				0.01 (0.11)
R ²	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

5.15 Justification of violence

Table 46: Justification of violence by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.97*** (0.05)	4.02*** (0.07)	4.16*** (0.13)	4.19*** (0.16)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.17 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.12)	0.05 (0.12)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)				
Wave 2017	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.15* (0.06)	−0.14* (0.06)	−0.15* (0.06)	−0.15* (0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.00 (0.06)	−0.00 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)
Educational level (CINE) (Ref. = Primary or less)				
Secondary		−0.14 (0.08)	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.10 (0.07)
Technical		−0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.09)
University or more		0.06 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.07 (0.10)
Social class (Ref. = High grade service)				
Lower-grade service class			−0.15 (0.13)	−0.15 (0.13)
Small business owners			0.00 (0.12)	−0.02 (0.13)
Skilled workers			−0.31** (0.12)	−0.32** (0.12)
Unskilled workers			−0.16 (0.13)	−0.18 (0.13)
Retired			−0.08 (0.12)	−0.11 (0.13)
Unemployed			−0.21 (0.16)	−0.23 (0.16)
Other (NILF)			−0.18 (0.13)	−0.20 (0.13)
Equivalised income decile (square-root scale)				
D2				0.10 (0.11)
D3				−0.02 (0.13)
D4				−0.02 (0.12)
D5				−0.10 (0.13)
D6				−0.13 (0.13)
D7				0.01 (0.12)
D8				−0.00 (0.12)
D9				−0.05 (0.13)
D10				−0.10 (0.13)
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	1572	1572	1572	1572
RMSE	0.89	0.88	0.88	0.88
Num. clusters	624	624	624	624

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

6 References

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