Report 3: Statistical analysis

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1 Presentation

This report examines how housing wealth relates to a broad set of social-cohesion attitudes. We conceptualize housing wealth as the market value of the residential asset environment and proxy it using land prices (price per square meter) in the respondent's area. The objective is to document the magnitude and direction of these associations across 15 cohesion outcomes and to assess how they change as we sequentially account for core socioeconomic correlates (education, social class, and equivalised household income).

Given the panel structure of the data and relatively modest within-wave sample sizes (2,191 person-wave observations from 823 individuals across four waves: 2016 = 472; 2017 = 414; 2018 = 647; 2019 = 658), we estimate pooled OLS models with wave fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level. This "pooled with time effects" specification is a standard population-average approach: it estimates the regression on the stacked person-wave dataset, while wave indicators absorb common period shocks and aggregate changes over time (Angrist & Pischke, 2015). Because repeated observations on the same individuals are typically serially correlated, conventional i.i.d. OLS standard errors can overstate precision; clustering at the individual level allows for arbitrary within-person dependence in the error process, yielding valid inference under weak conditions commonly used in applied work (Angrist & Pischke, 2015). This approach is also well suited to an unbalanced panel (i.e., individuals not observed in every wave), which is common in survey panel data (Wooldridge, 2009).

The document is organized into four sequential blocks. First, we present descriptive statistics for all variables and examine how homeownership status is associated with the control variables. Second, using the pooled sample restricted to homeowners (paid-off or mortgaged; 1,391 person-wave observations from 548 individuals), we estimate a first set of pooled OLS models for each of the 15 social-cohesion outcomes, relating housing wealth—proxied by the log land price per square meter in the respondent's residential zone—to each cohesion outcome. Third, using the same homeowner sample, we replace the continuous land-price measure with an indicator for residing in a top-decile land-price zone (decile 10 vs. all others) to capture distributional extremes. Fourth, we estimate analogous regression models on the full sample, adding an interaction between homeownership status and land price per square meter to assess whether associations between residential land values and cohesion outcomes differ between homeowners and non-homeowners. Across all three modelling blocks, specifications are estimated sequentially: beginning with the focal housing-wealth measure plus wave fixed effects and age, then adding education, then social class, and finally equivalised household income.

2 Descriptive statistics

First, we begin by showing the descriptive statistics for the main variables per wave in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics by wave

Variable	Value	2016	2017	2018	2019
Age		43.33 (14.41)	43.38 (14.67)	44.44 (14.91)	45.89 (14.89)
Educational level		12.46 (3.76)	12.39 (3.63)	12.14 (3.67)	12.14 (3.91)
Equivalised household income (square-root scale)		572541.33 (665629.21)	654112.12 (647149.14)	517115.13 (563092.80)	516813.85 (552486.71)
Housing tenure	Owned and fully paid-off home	217 (46.0%)	183 (44.2%)	306 (47.3%)	325 (49.4%)
	Owned home with mortgage payments	91 (19.3%)	89 (21.5%)	87 (13.4%)	93 (14.1%)
	Rented housing	110 (23.3%)	91 (22.0%)	154 (23.8%)	141 (21.4%)
	Other regime	54 (11.4%)	51 (12.3%)	100 (15.5%)	99 (15.0%)
Housing wealth (UF, 2018)		22.85 (12.61)	22.64 (12.56)	21.86 (13.01)	22.12 (13.06)
Housing wealth (log UF, 2018)		3.01 (0.49)	3.00 (0.49)	2.95 (0.51)	2.96 (0.51)
Housing wealth (top decile)	Other deciles	447 (94.7%)	392 (94.7%)	612 (94.6%)	621 (94.4%)
	Decile 10	25 (5.3%)	22 (5.3%)	35 (5.4%)	37 (5.6%)
ISEI		43.00 (16.33)	43.26 (16.11)	38.50 (15.53)	38.87 (15.74)
Income decile (equivalised)	1	21 (4.4%)	24 (5.8%)	40 (6.2%)	39 (5.9%)
	2	33 (7.0%)	23 (5.6%)	44 (6.8%)	43 (6.5%)
	3	38 (8.1%)	33 (8.0%)	52 (8.0%)	72 (10.9%)
Social cohesion	4	52 (11.0%)	28 (6.8%)	66 (10.2%)	55 (8.4%)
	5	45 (9.5%)	45 (10.9%)	63 (9.7%)	69 (10.5%)
	6	44 (9.3%)	44 (10.6%)	66 (10.2%)	66 (10.0%)
	7	53 (11.2%)	51 (12.3%)	84 (13.0%)	85 (12.9%)
	8	56 (11.9%)	56 (13.5%)	85 (13.1%)	71 (10.8%)
	9	52 (11.0%)	50 (12.1%)	72 (11.1%)	70 (10.6%)
	10	78 (16.5%)	60 (14.5%)	75 (11.6%)	88 (13.4%)
	Altruistic dispositions	4.04 (0.52)	4.18 (0.65)	4.21 (0.61)	4.32 (0.61)
	Conventional political participation	1.19 (0.32)	1.18 (0.29)	1.20 (0.31)	1.20 (0.28)
	Cultural identification	4.05 (0.77)	4.28 (0.81)	4.16 (0.82)	4.05 (0.83)
	Egalitarianism	4.07 (0.66)	4.16 (0.82)	4.09 (0.84)	4.17 (0.76)
	Generalized trust in fellow citizens	1.35 (0.70)	1.34 (0.71)	1.32 (0.69)	1.26 (0.64)
	Generalized trust in minorities	3.06 (0.97)	3.08 (0.96)	2.94 (1.01)	2.89 (0.94)
	Justification of violence	3.98 (0.89)	3.99 (0.84)	3.83 (0.94)	3.98 (0.89)
	Nearby network size	3.44 (1.40)	3.49 (1.40)	3.28 (1.47)	3.07 (1.54)
	Number of friends	2.78 (1.17)	2.86 (1.14)	2.79 (1.18)	2.77 (1.21)
	Political engagement	1.83 (1.14)	2.22 (1.25)	2.01 (1.19)	2.36 (1.33)
	Prosocial behavior	1.69 (0.59)	1.81 (0.67)	1.75 (0.65)	1.72 (0.61)
	Satisfaction with democracy	2.02 (1.12)	2.19 (1.12)	2.28 (1.07)	1.64 (0.86)
	Support for democracy	2.40 (0.71)	2.38 (0.74)	2.38 (0.73)	2.57 (0.63)
	Trust in major institutions	1.70 (0.68)	1.79 (0.71)	1.90 (0.72)	1.51 (0.61)
	Unconventional political participation	1.46 (0.64)	1.41 (0.62)	1.31 (0.56)	1.51 (0.76)

Continuous variables report mean (SD). Categorical variables report n (%).

3 Inspection of homeownership

Now, we examine the homeownership variable to see its distribution across waves and its association (cross-tabulation) with the control variables entered into the models (age, education, social class, and equivalized household income).



Figure 1: Changes in homeownership status 2016-2019



Figure 2: Comparation of homeownership status between 2016 and 2019

Table 2: Age by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	40.78	12.55	40.0	18-66	0.15	-1.10	30-51
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	47.51	15.04	51.0	18-75	-0.39	-0.89	35-58
Rented housing		110	38.27	11.81	37.5	18-71	0.53	-0.08	30-45
Other regime		54	41.11	15.06	37.0	19-73	0.38	-1.05	28-52.75
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	40.88	12.45	40.0	19-67	0.24	-0.99	30-49
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	47.67	15.88	52.0	19-77	-0.28	-1.10	33-59
Rented housing		91	38.33	12.21	37.0	18-71	0.55	-0.26	29-47
Other regime		51	41.37	13.74	39.0	20-74	0.31	-0.91	30-52.5
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	42.45	12.86	41.0	22-70	0.32	-0.90	33-52
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	49.01	15.60	53.0	19-77	-0.27	-1.02	36-61
Rented housing		154	38.96	12.23	37.0	18-72	0.47	-0.38	30.25-46.75
Other regime		100	40.60	14.01	38.0	19-78	0.32	-0.93	29-51.75
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	43.24	12.30	41.0	23-71	0.37	-0.80	34-52
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	50.23	15.61	54.0	20-79	-0.31	-1.02	37-61
Rented housing		141	40.01	11.81	39.0	20-69	0.33	-0.63	31-47
Other regime		99	42.52	14.47	41.0	20-79	0.15	-1.14	30-57
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	41.84	12.53	40.0	18-71	0.27	-0.87	32-52
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	48.84	15.56	52.0	18-79	-0.30	-0.99	36-60
Rented housing		496	38.99	12.00	38.0	18-72	0.46	-0.35	30-47
Other regime		304	41.44	14.26	39.0	19-79	0.28	-0.99	29-54

Table 3: Years of education by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	13.77	3.37	14.80	0-19.07	-1.47	2.94	12.02-15.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	11.83	4.04	12.02	0-19.07	-0.54	-0.19	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		110	13.04	3.38	13.90	4.3-19.07	-0.69	0.09	12.02-14.9
Other regime		54	11.66	3.20	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.59	0.23	9.8-14.575
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	13.80	3.33	14.80	0-19.07	-1.34	2.84	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	11.90	3.87	12.02	0-19.07	-0.59	-0.21	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		91	12.48	3.19	12.02	0-16.9	-0.79	1.24	9.8-14.8
Other regime		51	11.55	3.37	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.57	0.07	9.8-14.8
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	13.72	3.07	13.90	4.3-19.07	-0.51	0.36	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	11.55	3.92	12.02	0-19.07	-0.51	-0.41	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		154	12.72	3.36	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.53	0.25	12.02-14.9
Other regime		100	11.64	3.31	12.02	4.3-16.9	-0.75	-0.13	9.8-14.8
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	13.83	3.42	13.90	4.3-19.07	-0.54	0.12	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	11.43	4.20	12.02	0-19.07	-0.52	-0.47	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		141	12.89	3.25	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.59	0.27	12.02-14.9
Other regime		99	11.83	3.56	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.58	-0.33	9.8-14.8
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	13.78	3.29	14.80	0-19.07	-0.99	1.72	12.02-16.9
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	11.63	4.03	12.02	0-19.07	-0.54	-0.32	9.8-14.8
Rented housing		496	12.80	3.30	12.02	0-19.07	-0.63	0.42	12.02-14.9
Other regime		304	11.69	3.37	12.02	4.3-19.07	-0.63	-0.05	9.8-14.8

Table 4: Social class (ISEI) by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	50.4	15.9	56.0	17-86	-0.02	-0.86	37.5-60.5
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	41.2	16.6	38.0	16-86	0.32	-0.80	28-56
Rented housing		110	41.9	15.8	40.0	16-76	0.13	-1.00	29.5-57
Other regime		54	40.1	13.9	38.0	16-72	0.28	-0.57	32-47
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	49.9	15.9	53.0	17-86	0.09	-0.91	37-61
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	41.1	16.1	38.0	16-89	0.37	-0.53	29.5-56
Rented housing		91	42.3	15.9	40.0	16-76	0.19	-0.90	29-57
Other regime		51	41.0	14.2	38.0	16-72	0.08	-0.65	33-53
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	45.8	17.1	45.0	16-89	0.32	-0.55	34-58
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	37.9	15.2	35.0	10-89	0.76	0.27	27-46
Rented housing		154	38.2	14.8	36.0	10-85	0.69	0.07	29-47
Other regime		100	34.7	14.3	33.5	10-72	0.68	0.00	24-40
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	47.8	16.8	45.0	16-89	0.18	-0.62	36-59
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	37.7	15.3	35.0	10-89	0.89	0.47	27-45
Rented housing		141	38.1	14.9	36.0	16-85	0.71	0.00	29-47
Other regime		99	35.3	14.4	34.0	10-76	0.66	-0.02	24-44
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	48.5	16.4	49.0	16-89	0.13	-0.71	36-59
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	39.1	15.8	36.0	10-89	0.63	-0.15	27.5-49
Rented housing		496	39.7	15.3	37.0	10-85	0.47	-0.48	29-51
Other regime		304	36.9	14.4	36.0	10-76	0.48	-0.32	26-46

Table 5: Equivalised household income (square-root scale) by homeownership and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Q1-Q3
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	91	855025	760136	540185	81028-3742514	1.87	3.79	317994-1080371
Owned and fully paid-off home		217	550553	778481	324111	22053-5301895	4.42	21.76	235967-540185
Rented housing		110	484273	338388	381969	59420-1871257	1.71	3.14	241955-620602
Other regime		54	364672	227322	293498	93563-935628	1.06	0.06	200223-479321
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	89	927880	874508	571448	14940-4753821	2.17	5.20	448195-1133853
Owned and fully paid-off home		183	609703	617215	422562	56693-4481946	3.08	12.06	269282-718960
Rented housing		91	596854	481728	448195	105640-2852293	2.37	6.20	312960-653067
Other regime		51	437878	338597	336146	14940-1584607	1.78	2.89	243966-538563
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	87	850622	778746	594633	130278-3604774	1.81	3.02	318015-1159670
Owned and fully paid-off home		306	461920	475881	356780	38928-4369646	4.27	24.03	231735-509792
Rented housing		154	566629	643366	411974	35678-6554469	5.97	48.44	273462-651783
Other regime		100	319611	233267	258011	29732-1544903	2.94	11.93	189664-391375
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	93	891499	883957	571548	77782-5000000	2.14	5.33	300000-1150000
Owned and fully paid-off home		325	462292	468288	326599	40825-4500000	3.82	21.81	212132-500000
Rented housing		141	517371	451773	385373	15000-3500000	2.89	12.99	250000-601041
Other regime		99	343030	350215	250000	60000-3000000	4.92	32.00	180693-402492
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	360	881395	823895	571448	14940-5000000	2.08	4.92	342202-1138950
Owned and fully paid-off home		1031	506923	577887	352848	22053-5301895	4.38	25.51	230301-540185
Rented housing		496	539907	504700	404145	15000-6554469	4.99	44.63	264502-635413
Other regime		304	355083	295023	271294	14940-3000000	3.76	23.44	195414-406102

Table 6: Age by decile housing wealth and wave

Decile housing wealth	2016	2017	2018	2019	All
D1	42.8 (17.2)	44.5 (16.4)	41.9 (15.2)	43.9 (15.3)	43.1 (15.7)
D2	42.1 (16.9)	43.3 (17.3)	43.5 (16.7)	45.4 (16.8)	43.8 (16.8)
D3	43.7 (14)	44.4 (13.8)	46.2 (14.3)	46.5 (13.8)	45.4 (14)
D4	45.3 (14.1)	44.5 (14.7)	45.3 (14.7)	47 (14.7)	45.7 (14.5)
D5	42.2 (14)	41.5 (14.1)	44.5 (14.9)	46 (15.1)	43.8 (14.6)
D6	44.3 (13.6)	41.6 (14.1)	43.3 (14.7)	44.4 (15.3)	43.5 (14.5)
D7	42.8 (14.4)	44.7 (14.7)	44.2 (14.9)	46.2 (14.3)	44.4 (14.5)
D8	44.9 (14.7)	45.3 (16.1)	44.9 (14.3)	47 (14.8)	45.6 (14.8)
D9	40 (12.2)	39.1 (10.6)	43.8 (14.2)	44.9 (14.1)	42.3 (13.2)
D10	45 (13.9)	44.9 (15)	45.1 (17)	46.6 (16)	45.5 (15.5)

Table 7: Years of education by decile housing wealth and wave

Decile housing wealth	2016	2017	2018	2019	All
D1	11.3 (3.6)	11.1 (3.8)	11 (3.4)	11.1 (3.5)	11.1 (3.5)
D2	11.1 (4.2)	11.4 (3.3)	12 (3.3)	11.4 (3.6)	11.5 (3.6)
D3	11.6 (3.8)	11.1 (3.7)	11.3 (3.7)	11.7 (3.9)	11.4 (3.8)
D4	10.9 (4.2)	10.7 (3.9)	10.7 (4.1)	10.8 (4.1)	10.8 (4.1)
D5	11.8 (3.2)	12.3 (2.5)	11.9 (3.1)	11.5 (3.5)	11.9 (3.1)
D6	12.3 (3.6)	12.6 (3.3)	12.4 (3.1)	11.6 (4)	12.2 (3.5)
D7	13 (3)	12.9 (3.7)	12.5 (3.3)	13.1 (2.8)	12.9 (3.2)
D8	13.8 (3.1)	13.7 (2.9)	13.3 (3.3)	12.6 (3.8)	13.3 (3.4)
D9	14.7 (2.9)	15 (2.9)	13.9 (3.4)	14.7 (3.3)	14.5 (3.2)
D10	16.4 (2.2)	15.6 (3.1)	16.2 (2)	16.4 (2.2)	16.2 (2.3)

4 Inspection of decile housing wealth

Another important element to examine is how the wealth deciles of housing are distributed across the waves and according to the covariates included in the models (age, education, social class, equivalent household income, and homeownership). Here we present the means and standard deviations of these covariates by wave and for all waves.

Table 8: Social class (ISEI) by decile housing wealth and wave

Decile housing wealth	2016	2017	2018	2019	All
D1	37.4 (13.3)	38.6 (13.1)	32.9 (11.4)	32.1 (11.1)	34.5 (12.2)
D2	38 (13.4)	37.6 (13.1)	37.8 (12.9)	36.8 (14.1)	37.5 (13.3)
D3	38.2 (14.6)	39.5 (13.9)	35.6 (13.5)	37.3 (14)	37.3 (13.9)
D4	37.9 (15.3)	39.1 (15.7)	35.3 (14.5)	35.5 (13.9)	36.5 (14.7)
D5	40.5 (16.6)	40.7 (16.3)	35.3 (13.4)	34.4 (13.4)	37.4 (15)
D6	43.6 (16.2)	43 (15.7)	37.2 (14.6)	36 (14.2)	39.3 (15.3)
D7	44 (12.7)	43.5 (13.2)	39.9 (15.1)	40 (13.5)	41.9 (13.7)
D8	44.4 (16.8)	44.6 (17)	38.5 (16.4)	38.9 (15.7)	41.1 (16.5)
D9	54.9 (13.6)	56.4 (14)	48.7 (16.4)	52.2 (16.4)	52.7 (15.5)
D10	63.6 (15.4)	62.3 (15.7)	59.7 (15.8)	59.8 (16.3)	61.1 (15.7)

Table 9: Equivalised household income (square-root scale) by decile housing wealth and wave

Decile housing wealth	2016	2017	2018	2019	All
D1	$ 342,847 ($ 205,006)	$ 403,240 ($257,148)	$ 339,069 ($ 233,608)	$ 341,355 ($209,182)	$ 351,091 ($ 224,476)
D2	$ 367,214 ($ 338,123)	$ 487,320 ($441,127)	$ 379,663 ($ 243,609)	$ 415,099 ($553,424)	$ 408,968 ($ 417,531)
D3	$ 419,333 ($ 655,482)	$ 460,623 ($291,629)	$ 363,205 ($ 275,536)	$ 393,943 ($338,574)	$ 401,073 ($ 402,118)
D4	$ 401,246 ($ 429,210)	$ 620,118 ($723,299)	$ 430,353 ($ 478,288)	$ 388,086 ($313,333)	$ 442,181 ($ 479,402)
D5	$ 573,224 ($ 844,508)	$ 604,829 ($546,590)	$ 416,561 ($ 278,260)	$ 381,223 ($263,574)	$ 482,197 ($ 521,939)
D6	$ 443,226 ($ 303,674)	$ 531,817 ($383,420)	$ 454,652 ($ 366,975)	$ 452,237 ($464,892)	$ 465,500 ($ 388,981)
D7	$ 501,678 ($ 251,320)	$ 533,449 ($328,083)	$ 441,047 ($ 271,977)	$ 429,088 ($290,248)	$ 477,554 ($ 288,005)
D8	$ 613,698 ($ 497,024)	$ 740,731 ($816,730)	$ 534,696 ($ 453,548)	$ 551,117 ($562,315)	$ 595,555 ($ 577,033)
D9	$1,056,645 ($ 887,992)	$1,141,088 ($901,393)	$ 900,419 ($ 689,344)	$1,066,345 ($946,552)	$1,032,657 ($ 856,622)
D10	$1,501,986 ($1,135,291)	$1,556,817 ($984,898)	$1,607,207 ($1,322,081)	$1,279,691 ($806,441)	$1,473,954 ($1,074,880)

Table 10: Homeownership by decile housing wealth and wave

Homeownership status	Wave	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10
Owned home with mortgage payments	2016	3 (3.3%)	6 (6.6%)	7 (7.7%)	7 (7.7%)	8 (8.8%)	17 (18.7%)	13 (14.3%)	10 (11.0%)	17 (18.7%)	3 (3.3%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		20 (9.2%)	22 (10.1%)	36 (16.6%)	26 (12.0%)	31 (14.3%)	18 (8.3%)	14 (6.5%)	25 (11.5%)	12 (5.5%)	13 (6.0%)
Rented housing		4 (3.6%)	7 (6.4%)	17 (15.5%)	14 (12.7%)	13 (11.8%)	8 (7.3%)	16 (14.5%)	15 (13.6%)	9 (8.2%)	7 (6.4%)
Other regime		9 (16.7%)	5 (9.3%)	6 (11.1%)	11 (20.4%)	8 (14.8%)	2 (3.7%)	5 (9.3%)	2 (3.7%)	4 (7.4%)	2 (3.7%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	2017	3 (3.4%)	7 (7.9%)	6 (6.7%)	7 (7.9%)	8 (9.0%)	15 (16.9%)	14 (15.7%)	8 (9.0%)	16 (18.0%)	5 (5.6%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		18 (9.8%)	19 (10.4%)	31 (16.9%)	22 (12.0%)	24 (13.1%)	16 (8.7%)	12 (6.6%)	23 (12.6%)	9 (4.9%)	9 (4.9%)
Rented housing		2 (2.2%)	6 (6.6%)	15 (16.5%)	12 (13.2%)	15 (16.5%)	4 (4.4%)	17 (18.7%)	8 (8.8%)	6 (6.6%)	6 (6.6%)
Other regime		8 (15.7%)	6 (11.8%)	4 (7.8%)	10 (19.6%)	9 (17.6%)	2 (3.9%)	6 (11.8%)	1 (2.0%)	3 (5.9%)	2 (3.9%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	2018	7 (8.0%)	5 (5.7%)	6 (6.9%)	10 (11.5%)	6 (6.9%)	14 (16.1%)	7 (8.0%)	10 (11.5%)	12 (13.8%)	10 (11.5%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		27 (8.8%)	26 (8.5%)	58 (19.0%)	56 (18.3%)	44 (14.4%)	21 (6.9%)	17 (5.6%)	27 (8.8%)	20 (6.5%)	10 (3.3%)
Rented housing		11 (7.1%)	12 (7.8%)	21 (13.6%)	18 (11.7%)	15 (9.7%)	15 (9.7%)	14 (9.1%)	21 (13.6%)	14 (9.1%)	13 (8.4%)
Other regime		17 (17.0%)	15 (15.0%)	17 (17.0%)	16 (16.0%)	9 (9.0%)	8 (8.0%)	9 (9.0%)	4 (4.0%)	3 (3.0%)	2 (2.0%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	2019	6 (6.5%)	5 (5.4%)	9 (9.7%)	11 (11.8%)	6 (6.5%)	12 (12.9%)	9 (9.7%)	9 (9.7%)	15 (16.1%)	11 (11.8%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		27 (8.3%)	35 (10.8%)	54 (16.6%)	57 (17.5%)	44 (13.5%)	24 (7.4%)	16 (4.9%)	37 (11.4%)	19 (5.8%)	12 (3.7%)
Rented housing		12 (8.5%)	10 (7.1%)	16 (11.3%)	18 (12.8%)	14 (9.9%)	17 (12.1%)	12 (8.5%)	16 (11.3%)	14 (9.9%)	12 (8.5%)
Other regime		14 (14.1%)	14 (14.1%)	16 (16.2%)	16 (16.2%)	10 (10.1%)	9 (9.1%)	8 (8.1%)	5 (5.1%)	5 (5.1%)	2 (2.0%)
Owned home with mortgage payments	All	19 (5.3%)	23 (6.4%)	28 (7.8%)	35 (9.7%)	28 (7.8%)	58 (16.1%)	43 (11.9%)	37 (10.3%)	60 (16.7%)	29 (8.1%)
Owned and fully paid-off home		92 (8.9%)	102 (9.9%)	179 (17.4%)	161 (15.6%)	143 (13.9%)	79 (7.7%)	59 (5.7%)	112 (10.9%)	60 (5.8%)	44 (4.3%)
Rented housing		29 (5.8%)	35 (7.1%)	69 (13.9%)	62 (12.5%)	57 (11.5%)	44 (8.9%)	59 (11.9%)	60 (12.1%)	43 (8.7%)	38 (7.7%)
Other regime		48 (15.8%)	40 (13.2%)	43 (14.1%)	53 (17.4%)	36 (11.8%)	21 (6.9%)	28 (9.2%)	12 (3.9%)	15 (4.9%)	8 (2.6%)

5 Primary set: Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decile land-price exposure)

We then focus on the upper tail of the local housing-wealth distribution by replacing the continuous land-price proxy with an indicator for extreme housing-wealth contexts. Specifically, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent resides in a zone whose **land price per square meter falls in the top decile (decile 10)**, and 0 otherwise. This specification is intended to capture discontinuous differences between living in the most expensive residential contexts versus the rest of the distribution—i.e., an "extremes" contrast that may be obscured by a linear specification in log prices. To align this measure with the notion of housing wealth as an owned asset, these models are estimated on the restricted panel of respondents who report owning their dwelling, either **owned and fully paid-off** or **owned with mortgage payments** (based on the homeownership item). Models are estimated using pooled OLS with wave fixed effects, age and CR2 individual-clustered standard errors, and adding education, social class, and equivalised household income sequentially.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{TopDecilePrice}_{it} + \beta 2\text{Education}_{it} + \beta 3\text{Class}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Income}_{it} + \lambda_t + \delta_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{it} is the social-cohesion outcome for individual i in wave t; α is the intercept; β_1 captures the association between residing in a top-decile land-price zone (decile 10 vs. all others) and Y_{it}, conditional on the covariates; β_2, β_3, and β_4 capture the associations of years of education, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), and the log equivalised household income respectively; λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, δ_{it} denotes individual's age, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

Below, we present the results of the estimates using coefficient plots grouped by indicators belonging to the cultural, relational, political, and normative dimensions of social cohesion (Otero et al., 2022). Complete tables can be found in Supplementary Material.

5.1 Cultural dimension



Figure 3: Cultural identification by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income"

5.2 Relational dimension



Source: authors... elaboration using pooled ELSOC data (2016...2019; N = 1,391 person−waves; 548 respondents)
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
Estimates highlighted in red are statistically significant (p < .05)
ɜ fixed effects and age; M2 additionally adjusts for education; M3 adds social class; and M4 further adds equivalized household income

Figure 4: Relational dimension of social cohesion by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income"

5.3 Political dimension



Source: authors... elaboration using pooled ELSOC data (2016...2019; N = 1,391 person−waves; 548 respondents)
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
Estimates highlighted in red are statistically significant (p < .05)
ɜ fixed effects and age; M2 additionally adjusts for education; M3 adds social class; and M4 further adds equivalized household income

Figure 5: Political dimension of social cohesion by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income"

5.4 Normative dimension



Figure 6: Normative dimension of social cohesion by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income"

6 Interactions 1: Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-top 10 decileland-price exposure) by homeownership

We next examine whether the association between residing in the top housing-wealth decile (decile 10) of the respondent's residential zone and social-cohesion outcomes varies by homeownership status. To do so, we estimate models on a restricted panel that includes only respondents who are homeowners, distinguishing between those who own their dwelling outright and those who are still making mortgage payments.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{g=1}^{4} \alpha_g \, H_{git} \; + \; \sum_{g=1}^{4} \beta_g \Big(\text{Top top 10 decile Price}_{it} \times H_{git} \Big) \; + \; \gamma_1 \, \text{Education}_{it} \; + \; \gamma_2 \, \text{Class}_{it} \; + \; \gamma_3 \, \text{Income}_{it} \\ + \, \delta \, \text{Age}_{it} \; + \; \lambda_t \; + \; \varepsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

where H_{git} is a dummy indicating whether individual i in wave t belongs to homeownership category $g \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. The coefficients β_g represent the top-top 10 decile housing wealth (top 10 decile 10 vs. all others) gradient within each homeownership category (i.e., group-specific slopes), and there is no global β_1 term for Top top 10 decile Price_{it} outside these interactions; β_2, β_3, and β_4 capture the associations of years of education, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), and the log equivalised household income respectively; and β_6 captures the interaction between top-top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership status, indicating whether the top-top 10 decile housing wealth effect differs across ownership groups. λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, δ_{it} denotes individual's age, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

Below, we present the results of the estimates using plots of predicted values grouped by indicators belonging to the cultural, relational, political, and normative dimensions of social cohesion. Complete tables can be found in Supplementary Material.

6.1 Cultural dimension



Figure 7: Cultural identification by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

6.2 Relational dimension



Figure 8: Number of friends by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 9: Network size by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

Figure 10: Generalized trust by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 11: Trust in minorities by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 12: Trust in major institutions by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

6.3 Political dimension



Figure 13: Political engagement by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 14: Satisfaction with democracy by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 15: Conventional political participation by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 16: Unconventional political participation by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

Figure 17: Egalitarianism by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 18: Altruistic dispositions by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

Figure 19: Prosocial behavior by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

6.4 Normative dimension



Figure 20: Democracy support by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 21: Justification of violence by top 10 decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

7 Interactions 2: Social cohesion and housing-wealth by homeownership

We also examine whether the association between housing wealth—proxied by the log land price per square meter in the respondent's residential zone—and social-cohesion outcomes varies by homeownership status. As in the previous set of interaction models, the analysis is conducted on a restricted panel that includes only homeowners, distinguishing between outright owners and those with mortgage payments.

Formally, the model is:

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{g=1}^{4} \alpha_g \, H_{git} \; + \; \sum_{g=1}^{4} \beta_g \Big(\text{Log price}_{it} \times H_{git} \Big) \; + \; \gamma_1 \, \text{Education}_{it} \; + \; \gamma_2 \, \text{Class}_{it} \; + \; \gamma_3 \, \text{Income}_{it} \\ + \, \delta \, \text{Age}_{it} \; + \; \lambda_t \; + \; \varepsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

where H_{git} is a dummy indicating whether individual i in wave t belongs to homeownership category $g \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. The coefficients β_g represent the land-price gradient within each homeownership category (i.e., group-specific slopes), and there is no global β_1 term for Log price$_{it}$ outside these interactions; β_2, β_3, and β_4 capture the associations of years of education, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), and the log equivalised household income respectively; and β_6 captures the interaction between log land price per m^2 and homeownership status, indicating whether the land-price gradient differs across ownership groups. λ_t denotes wave fixed effects, δ_{it} denotes individual's age, and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (`idencuesta`) using the CR2 correction.

Below, we present the results of the estimates using plots of predicted values grouped by indicators belonging to the cultural, relational, political, and normative dimensions of social cohesion. Complete tables can be found in Supplementary Material.

7.1 Cultural dimension



Figure 22: Cultural identification by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

7.2 Relational dimension



Figure 23: Number of friends by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 24: Network size by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 25: Generalized trust by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 26: Trust in minorities by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 27: Trust in major institutions by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

7.3 Political dimension



Figure 28: Political engagement by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 29: Satisfaction with democracy by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 30: Conventional political participation by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 31: Unconventional political participation by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 32: Egalitarianism by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 33: Altruistic dispositions by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 34: Prosocial behavior by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

7.4 Normative dimension



Figure 35: Democracy support by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)



Figure 36: Justification of violence by housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

8 Summary of findings

The main specification is summarized below. Marked cells indicate cases in which the housing-wealth coefficient—the top-decile (decile 10) dummy—is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. All models include wave fixed effects, and standard errors are computed using CR2 corrections clustered at the individual level. Let Y denote a measure of social cohesion; W housing wealth; A the respondent's age; E years of education; C social class; and I household income. These specifications correspond to Models 1 through 5 in the preceding tables (reported separately for each dependent variable).

8.1 Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decileland-price exposure)

Y	W+A	W+A+E	W+A+E+C	W+A+E+C+I
Cultural identification				
Number of friends	x			
Nearby network size	x	x	x	x
Generalized trust in fellow citizens	x			
Generalized trust in minorities	x	x	x	
Trust in major institutions	x	x	x	x
Political engagement	x	x		
Satisfaction with democracy	x	x	x	x
Conventional political participation				x
Unconventional political participation				
Egalitarianism	x	x	x	
Altruistic dispositions				
Prosocial behavior	x			
Support for democracy	x			
Justification of violence				

9 References

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10 Supplementary material

10.1 Primary set: Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decile land-price exposure)

10.1.1 Cultural identification

Table 11: Cultural identification by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.13***	3.66***	3.78***	3.84***	3.95***
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.49)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.28	−0.31	−0.27	−0.22	−0.22
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.02	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	−0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.01
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.2 Number of friends

Table 12: Number of friends by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.76***	3.51***	2.05***	1.93***	0.56
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.71)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.60***	0.66***	0.20	0.08	0.01
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.05	−0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.03	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.09***	0.08***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01*	0.01
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.12*
					(0.06)
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.14	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.14
RMSE	1.19	1.16	1.12	1.11	1.11
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.3 Network size

Table 13: Network size by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.38***	3.64***	2.39***	2.18***	3.11***
	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.83)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	1.03***	1.05***	0.66**	0.44*	0.49*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.09	−0.08	−0.06	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.32**	−0.30**	−0.29**	−0.25*	−0.26*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age (in years)		−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.08***	0.05**	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.08
					(0.07)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.44	1.44	1.41	1.40	1.40
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.4 Generalized trust

Table 14: Generalized trust by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.33***	1.48***	1.03***	0.98***	0.55
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.41)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.27	0.28*	0.14	0.09	0.07
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.09*	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.02**	0.02*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04
RMSE	0.68	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.5 Trust in minorities

Table 15: Trust in minorities by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.97***	3.53***	2.46***	2.45***	1.96***
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.55)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.69***	0.73***	0.40*	0.38*	0.36
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.03	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.10	−0.06	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04
					(0.04)
R^2	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.06	0.12	0.12	0.12
RMSE	0.96	0.94	0.91	0.91	0.91
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 16: Political trust by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.70***	1.77***	1.18***	1.17***	1.12*
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.43)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.45***	0.45***	0.27*	0.26*	0.25*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.17***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.10
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.7 Political engagement

Table 17: Political engagement by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.84***	2.47***	0.55*	0.40	−0.39
	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.67)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	1.11***	1.16***	0.56*	0.42	0.38
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.37***	0.37***	0.35***	0.36***	0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2018	0.19**	0.22**	0.24***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	0.50***	0.54***	0.56***	0.59***	0.59***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.12***	0.10***	0.09***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01*
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.07
					(0.05)
R^2	0.06	0.09	0.20	0.21	0.21
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.09	0.19	0.20	0.20
RMSE	1.23	1.21	1.13	1.13	1.13
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 18: Satisfaction with democracy by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.99***	1.84***	1.49***	1.46***	1.45*
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.61)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.55***	0.54**	0.44*	0.40*	0.40*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave 2018	0.32***	0.31***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.37***	−0.38***	−0.38***	−0.37***	−0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.02*	0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.05)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.9 Conventional political participation

Table 19: Conventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.21***	1.15***	0.84***	0.82***	0.39
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.21)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.02	0.01	−0.08	−0.11	−0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2018	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wave 2019	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00***	0.00**	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.06
RMSE	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 20: Unconventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.45***	1.98***	1.16***	1.11***	1.14**
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.36)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.12	0.16	−0.10	−0.15	−0.14
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.17***	−0.15***	−0.14***	−0.13***	−0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.09	0.17	0.17	0.17
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.09	0.17	0.17	0.17
RMSE	0.64	0.61	0.59	0.59	0.59
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.11 Egalitarianism

Table 21: Egalitarianism by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.03***	4.13***	4.36***	4.37***	5.42***
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.46)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.39**	−0.39**	−0.32*	−0.30*	−0.25
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.09*
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
RMSE	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 22: Altruistic dispositions by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	4.02***	4.20***	4.06***	4.06***	4.70***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.27)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.20***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.29***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***	0.30***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01*
			(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.06*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 23: Prosocial behavior by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.71***	1.81***	1.31***	1.28***	0.30
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.33)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.23*	0.23*	0.08	0.05	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.09**
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
RMSE	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.14 Support for democracy

Table 24: Support for democracy by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.38***	2.50***	1.93***	1.89***	1.78***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.33)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.35***	0.36***	0.18	0.15	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.1.15 Justification of violence

Table 25: Justification of violence by top-decile housing wealth, educational level, social class and income

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.99***	4.00***	3.80***	3.77***	4.06***
	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.48)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.09	0.11
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Wave (Ref. = 2016)					
Wave 2017	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.17**	−0.17**	−0.17**	−0.16*	−0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.03
					(0.04)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2 Interactions 1: Social cohesion and housing-wealth extremes (top-decile land-price exposure) by homeownership

10.2.1 Cultural identification

Table 26: Cultural identification by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.13*	−0.07	−0.06	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.20	−0.26	−0.23	−0.17	−0.16
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Wave 2017	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.02	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.14	−0.10	−0.11	−0.13	−0.14
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	−0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.01
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.2 Number of friends

Table 27: Number of friends by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.18	0.07	−0.07	−0.11	−0.15
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.67**	0.77***	0.27	0.12	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Wave 2017	0.09*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.03	−0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.01	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.24	−0.31	−0.17	−0.10	−0.06
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Education (in years)			0.09***	0.08***	0.07***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01*	0.01*
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.14*
					(0.06)
R^2	0.02	0.06	0.13	0.14	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.05	0.13	0.13	0.14
RMSE	1.19	1.16	1.12	1.11	1.11
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.3 Network size

Table 28: Network size by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.11	0.08	−0.03	−0.10	−0.08
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	1.15***	1.18***	0.75*	0.49	0.54
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.28)
Wave 2017	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.31**	−0.29**	−0.29**	−0.25*	−0.26*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age (in years)		−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.34	−0.36	−0.24	−0.12	−0.14
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Education (in years)			0.08***	0.05**	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.08
					(0.07)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.44	1.44	1.41	1.40	1.40
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.4 Generalized trust

Table 29: Generalized trust by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.27	0.29	0.14	0.09	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.09	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.05	−0.06	−0.02	0.00	0.01
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.02**	0.02*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.5 Trust in minorities

Table 30: Trust in minorities by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.06	−0.03	−0.13	−0.14	−0.15
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.54*	0.61*	0.24	0.20	0.17
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.03	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.10	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.36	0.31	0.41	0.43	0.45
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.06
					(0.04)
R^2	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.13	0.13
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.06	0.12	0.12	0.12
RMSE	0.96	0.94	0.91	0.91	0.91
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 31: Political trust by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.06	0.05	−0.00	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.41*	0.42**	0.22	0.20	0.20
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.19***	−0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.14
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.09
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.7 Political engagement

Table 32: Political engagement by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.32**	0.24*	0.07	0.02	0.00
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.78*	0.86*	0.22	0.04	−0.00
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Wave 2017	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***	0.34***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2018	0.20**	0.22**	0.23**	0.26***	0.26***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	0.51***	0.54***	0.55***	0.57***	0.58***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.71	0.66	0.85*	0.93*	0.94*
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Education (in years)			0.12***	0.10***	0.09***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01**
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.07
					(0.05)
R^2	0.08	0.10	0.20	0.21	0.21
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.10	0.20	0.21	0.21
RMSE	1.21	1.20	1.13	1.12	1.12
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 33: Satisfaction with democracy by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.05	−0.03	−0.06	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.35	0.33	0.21	0.16	0.15
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Wave 2017	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Wave 2018	0.31***	0.30***	0.30***	0.31***	0.31***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.38***	−0.39***	−0.39***	−0.38***	−0.38***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.52	0.54	0.57	0.60	0.60
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Education (in years)			0.02*	0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.05)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.9 Conventional political participation

Table 34: Conventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.05	0.06*	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.06	0.05	−0.05	−0.07	−0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2018	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wave 2019	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (in years)		0.00*	0.00***	0.00***	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.13	−0.12	−0.10	−0.09	−0.08
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education (in years)			0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.04*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.06
RMSE	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 35: Unconventional political participation by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.16*	0.09	0.01	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.18	0.25*	−0.02	−0.08	−0.08
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Wave 2017	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.15***	−0.13***	−0.13***	−0.12**	−0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.05	0.08	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.22	−0.27	−0.19	−0.16	−0.17
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Education (in years)			0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.17
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.09	0.17	0.17	0.17
RMSE	0.64	0.61	0.59	0.59	0.59
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.11 Egalitarianism

Table 36: Egalitarianism by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.06	−0.08	−0.06	−0.06	−0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.39*	−0.37*	−0.30	−0.29	−0.23
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Wave 2017	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.11*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.01	−0.00	−0.02	−0.03	−0.05
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.09*
					(0.04)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
RMSE	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 37: Altruistic dispositions by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.01	−0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.18*	0.21*	0.16	0.16	0.20*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave 2017	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.30***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.17	−0.18	−0.17	−0.17	−0.19
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.06*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 38: Prosocial behavior by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.01	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.29	0.30*	0.14	0.11	0.05
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Wave 2017	0.09*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.20	−0.20	−0.16	−0.14	−0.12
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.09**
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.14 Support for democracy

Table 39: Support for democracy by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.14**	0.13*	0.08	0.07	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.40***	0.41***	0.23*	0.19	0.19
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.17	−0.18	−0.13	−0.11	−0.11
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.69
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.2.15 Justification of violence

Table 40: Justification of violence by top-decile housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Top 10 decile housing wealth	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.09	0.11
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Wave 2017	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.16*	−0.17*	−0.16*	−0.16*	−0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Top 10 decile housing wealth	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.04
					(0.04)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3 Interactions 2: Social cohesion and housing-wealth by homeownership

10.3.1 Cultural identification

Table 41: Cultural identification by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.76	0.85*	0.86*	0.87*	0.87*
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Log land price m^2	−0.03	−0.04	−0.02	0.00	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2017	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.03	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	−0.29*	−0.30*	−0.30*	−0.30*	−0.30*
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	−0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.00
					(0.04)
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.78	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.2 Number of friends

Table 42: Number of friends by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.11	−0.05	−0.14	−0.17	−0.12
	(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Log land price m^2	0.42***	0.43***	0.21	0.16	0.13
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wave 2017	0.09*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	−0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.00	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.01
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Education (in years)			0.09***	0.07***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01*	0.01
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.12*
					(0.06)
R^2	0.03	0.08	0.14	0.14	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.14
RMSE	1.18	1.15	1.11	1.11	1.11
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.3 Network size

Table 43: Network size by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.17	−0.22	−0.30	−0.36	−0.39
	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.76)	(0.74)	(0.73)
Log land price m^2	0.49***	0.50***	0.30*	0.20	0.21
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Wave 2017	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.06	−0.05	−0.06	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.30**	−0.28**	−0.28**	−0.25*	−0.25*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age (in years)		−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.05**	0.06**
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ISEI				0.01***	0.01***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.07
					(0.07)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.44	1.44	1.41	1.40	1.40
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.4 Generalized trust

Table 44: Generalized trust by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.82*	−0.84*	−0.87**	−0.88**	−0.87**
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Log land price m^2	0.04	0.04	−0.03	−0.05	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2017	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.09	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.29**	0.29**	0.30**	0.30**	0.29**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.02**	0.02*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.03
					(0.03)
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.5 Trust in minorities

Table 45: Trust in minorities by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−1.14*	−1.26*	−1.33**	−1.33**	−1.32**
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Log land price m^2	0.23*	0.24**	0.07	0.06	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2019	−0.09	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.38*	0.39*	0.39*	0.39*	0.38*
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Education (in years)			0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.05
					(0.04)
R^2	0.04	0.08	0.13	0.13	0.13
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.13	0.13
RMSE	0.95	0.93	0.90	0.91	0.90
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.6 Trust in major institutions

Table 46: Political trust by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.55*	−0.56*	−0.60*	−0.60*	−0.60*
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Log land price m^2	0.14*	0.15*	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2018	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.00
					(0.03)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
RMSE	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.7 Political engagement

Table 47: Political engagement by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−1.05	−1.16	−1.29*	−1.33*	−1.30*
	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.54)
Log land price m^2	0.36**	0.37***	0.07	−0.00	−0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Wave 2017	0.36***	0.36***	0.35***	0.35***	0.34***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2018	0.23**	0.25***	0.25***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	0.54***	0.57***	0.57***	0.59***	0.59***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.44*	0.45*	0.45*	0.45*	0.44*
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Education (in years)			0.12***	0.10***	0.09***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.01**	0.01*
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.06
					(0.05)
R^2	0.08	0.10	0.20	0.21	0.21
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.10	0.20	0.21	0.21
RMSE	1.21	1.20	1.13	1.13	1.13
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.8 Satisfaction with democracy

Table 48: Satisfaction with democracy by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.59	−0.55	−0.58	−0.59	−0.58
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Log land price m^2	0.14	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wave 2017	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Wave 2018	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.33***	0.33***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wave 2019	−0.36***	−0.37***	−0.37***	−0.37***	−0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Education (in years)			0.02*	0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.01
					(0.05)
R^2	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08
RMSE	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.9 Conventional political participation

Table 49: Conventional political participation by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.08
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Log land price m^2	0.03	0.03	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave 2018	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wave 2019	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (in years)			0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.03*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05
RMSE	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.10 Unconventional political participation

Table 50: Unconventional political participation by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.04	−0.15	−0.20	−0.22	−0.22
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Log land price m^2	0.08	0.09	−0.04	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2017	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wave 2018	−0.15***	−0.14***	−0.14***	−0.13***	−0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Education (in years)			0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.01
					(0.03)
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.17
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.10	0.16	0.17	0.17
RMSE	0.63	0.61	0.59	0.59	0.59
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.11 Egalitarianism

Table 51: Egalitarianism by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.25	−0.28	−0.27	−0.27	−0.30
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Log land price m^2	−0.23**	−0.23**	−0.21**	−0.20**	−0.19*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2017	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.10	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education (in years)			−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				−0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.09*
					(0.04)
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03
RMSE	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.12 Altruistic dispositions

Table 52: Altruistic dispositions by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.07	−0.11	−0.12	−0.12	−0.14
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Log land price m^2	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2017	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.20***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.30***	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***	0.30***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education (in years)			0.01*	0.01	0.01*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.05*
					(0.02)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.13 Prosocial behavior

Table 53: Prosocial behavior by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	−0.07	−0.08	−0.12	−0.13	−0.09
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Log land price m^2	0.08	0.08	−0.00	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Wave 2017	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wave 2019	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education (in years)			0.03***	0.03***	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.09**
					(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04
RMSE	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.14 Support for democracy

Table 54: Support for democracy by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.35	0.34	0.30	0.28	0.29
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Log land price m^2	0.11	0.11	0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2017	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2018	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wave 2019	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (in years)		−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Education (in years)			0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					0.02
					(0.03)
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06
RMSE	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.

10.3.15 Justification of violence

Table 55: Justification of violence by land price housing wealth and homeownership (controls: education, social class, equivalised income, age)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Owned home with mortgage payments	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.28
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Log land price m^2	0.11	0.11	0.08	0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Wave 2017	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wave 2018	−0.16*	−0.16*	−0.16*	−0.16*	−0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wave 2019	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age (in years)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Owned home with mortgage payments x Log land price m^2	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Education (in years)			0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ISEI				0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Log equivalised household income (square-root scale)					−0.03
					(0.04)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
RMSE	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Num. obs.	1391	1391	1391	1391	1391
Num. clusters	548	548	548	548	548

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.