# Exercises chapter 6

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### Exercise 6.1

In this exercise we are asked to calculate transition rates using an Euler scheme, we have four states, i.e  $S = \{*, \diamond, \times, \dagger\}$ , where  $\times$  represents critically ill. From the text, we have the following transition rate matrix:

```
#required libraries:
library(tidyverse)
library(scales)
```

```
#0: alive, 1: disabeld, 2: critcally ill, 3: dead
lambda <- function(t){</pre>
  #constants given in exercise:
  a1 \leftarrow 4*10**(-4)
  b1 <- 3.4674*10**(-6)
  c1 <- 0.138155
  a2 <- 5*10**(-4)
  b2 <- 7.5858*10**(-5)
  c2 <- 0.08749
  #alive
  m01 \leftarrow a1 + b1*exp(c1*t)
  m02 <- 0.05*m01
  m03 \leftarrow a2 + b2*exp(c2*t)
  m00 \leftarrow -(m01 + m02 + m03)
  #disabeld
  m10 <- 0.1*m01
  m12 <- m02
  m13 <- m03
  m11 \leftarrow -(m10 + m12 + m13)
  #critically ill
  m23 <- 1.2*m13
  m21 < -0
  m20 <- 0
  m22 \leftarrow -(m23 + m21 + m20)
  #deceased
  m30 <- m31 <- m32 <- m33 <- 0
  transition_rates <- c(m00, m01, m02, m03,
                          m10, m11, m12, m13,
                          m20, m21, m22, m23,
                          m30, m31, m32, m33)
```


```
L <- matrix(transition_rates, nrow=4, byrow=TRUE)</pre>
 return(L)
field <- function(t,M){</pre>
 return(M%*%lambda(t))
#field(t0, P0)
Euler <- function(t0,P0,h,tn){</pre>
 if(t0==tn){ return(P0)}
 N \leftarrow (tn-t0)/h
 D <- \dim(P0)[1] #gives dimension of man matrix dim = c(m,n)
  #Initial condition at s
  P \leftarrow array(diag(D*(N+1)), dim=c(D,D,N+1))
  #First iteration
  P[,,1] \leftarrow P0 + h*field(t0,P0)
  for(n in 1:N){
    P[,,n+1] \leftarrow P[,,n]+h*field(t0+n*h,P[,,n])
 return(P) #returns array, array(data, dim=c(3,3,2)), this stores 2 3x3 matricies
}
t0 <- 30
              #start age
PO <- diag(4) #initial start with P(s,s) = I
tn <- 110
              #end age
h <- 1/12
               #step size
N <- (tn-t0)/h #number of steps
sol <- Euler(t0,P0,h,tn) #contains ages transition probs from 30 to 110
#p_surv(30,75):
sol[1,1, ][12*35]
```

## [1] 0.6189569

```
a <- seq(30, 110, length = length(sol[1,1, ]))
b <- sol[1,1, ]

df <- data.frame(a,b)
colnames(df) <- c("age", "survival_prob")

fig <- df %>%
    ggplot(aes(x = age, y = survival_prob)) +
    geom_line() +
    scale_y_continuous() +
    xlab("Age") +
    ylab("Survival_probability")
```



#### Exercise 6.2

We have the following contractual information:

Where our state space is  $S = \{*, \diamond, \dagger\}$ , we have the following policy-functions:

$$a_{\diamond}(t) = \begin{cases} 0, & t < 0 \\ Dt, & t \in [0, T) \\ DT, & t \ge T \end{cases} \quad a_{*\dagger}(t) = \begin{cases} B, & t \in [0, T) \\ 0, & else \end{cases}$$

Since we for now do not care about the premiums in the policy-functions, we get

$$\dot{a}_*(t) = 0$$

and

$$\dot{a}_{\diamond}(t) = D \mathbb{1}_{[0,T)}(t)$$

We can set up thieles differential equations:

$$\frac{d}{dt}V_*^+(t) = r(t)V_*(t) - \mu_{*\diamond}^x(t)[V_\diamond^+(t) - V_*^+(t)] - \mu_{*\uparrow}^x(t)[B\mathbb{1}_{[0,T)}(t) - V_*^+(t)]$$

$$\frac{d}{dt}V_\diamond^+(t) = r(t)V_\diamond(t) - D\mathbb{1}_{[0,T)}(t) - \mu_{*\diamond}^x(t)[V_*^+(t) - V_\diamond^+(t)] + \mu_{\diamond\uparrow}^x(t)V_\diamond^+(t)$$

With finial conditions:  $V_*^+(T) = V_\diamond^+(T) = 0$ 

In order to solve this numerically, we partition up [0,T] in times  $t_i = t_0 + ih$ , with  $0 = t_0 < \cdots < t_n = T$ . We also iterate backwards, giving us:

$$\frac{V_*^+(t_i) - V_*^+(t_{i-1})}{h} = rV_*(t_i) - \mu_{*\diamond}^x(t_i)[V_\diamond^+(t_i) - V_*^+(t_i)] - \mu_{*\dagger}^x(t_i)[B - V_*^+(t_i)]$$

We then solve for  $V_*(t_{i-1})$ , giving us:

$$V_*^+(t_{i-1}) = V_*^+(t_i) - h \left[ r V_*^+(t_i) - \mu_{*\dagger}^x(t_i) [V_{\diamond}^+(t_i) - V_*^+(t_i)] - \mu_{*\dagger}^x(t) [B - V_*(t_i)] \right]$$

We do the same for  $V_{\diamond}^+(t_{i-1})$ :

$$V_{\diamond}^{+}(t_{i-1}) = V_{\diamond}^{+}(t_{i}) - h \left[ rV_{\diamond}^{+}(t_{i}) - D\mathbb{1}_{[0,T)}(t) - \mu_{\diamond*}^{x}(t_{i})[V_{*}^{+}(t_{i}) - V_{\diamond}^{+}(t_{i})] + \mu_{\diamond\dagger}^{x}(t_{i})V_{\diamond}^{+}(t_{i}) \right]$$

```
#states 0:alive, 1:disabled, 2:dead

mu01 <- function(u){
   a1 <- 4*10^{-4}
   b1 <- 3.4674*10^{-6}
   c1 <- 0.138755
   return(a1 + b1*exp(c1*u))
}</pre>
mu02 <- function(u){
```

```
a2 < 5*10^{-4}
  b2 <- 7.5858*10^{-5}
  c2 <- 0.087498
 return(a2 + b2*exp(c2*u))
}
mu12 <- function(u){</pre>
return(mu02(u))
}
mu10 <- function(u){</pre>
  return(0.1*mu01(u))
#a.e. derivative of a_{\lambda}(t)
dis_dot <- function(t){</pre>
  if(t >= 0 && t<T){ return(D) }</pre>
 if(t >= T) \{ return(0) \}
}
#PV of policy VO and V1
h <- 1/12
N <- T/h
PV_act <- PV_dis <- rep(0,N+1)
PV_act[N+1] <- PV_dis[N+1] <- 0 #by construction of contract
for(i in N:1){
  PV_act[i] <- PV_act[i+1] - h*(r*PV_act[i+1]</pre>
                                  - mu01(x+(i+1)*h)*(PV_dis[i+1]-PV_act[i+1])
                                  - mu02(x+(i+1)*h)*(B-PV_act[i+1])
  PV_dis[i] <- PV_dis[i+1] - h*(r*PV_dis[i+1] - dis_dot((i+1)*h)</pre>
                                  - mu10(x+(i+1)*h)*(PV_act[i+1]-PV_dis[i+1])
                                  + mu12(x+(i+1)*h)*PV_dis[i+1]
                                  )
}
```

And from this we can find the one-time premium  $\pi_0 = V_*^+(0)$ :

```
pi0 <- PV_act[1]
pi0
```

#### ## [1] 20608.17

We were asked to find the yearly premium  $\pi$ , we then use the method, where we create an artificial policy, where one pays a premium of NOK 1 during [0, T), i.e this is the only contribution of interest, thus:

$$\begin{split} a_*^{Prem=1}(t) &= \begin{cases} 0, & t < 0 \\ -t, & t \in [0,T) \implies \dot{a}_*^{Prem=1}(t) = -1\mathbbm{1}_{[0,T)}(t) \\ -T, & t \geq T \end{cases} \\ a_\diamond^{Prem=1}(t) &= 0, \ \forall t \implies \dot{a}_\diamond^{Prem=1}0 \\ a_{*\dagger}^{Prem=1}(t) &= 0 \end{split}$$

We can now set up the new thieles equations:

$$\frac{d}{dt}V_*^+(t,A^{Prem=1}) = rV_*^+(t) - \dot{a}_*(t) - \mu_{*\diamond}^x(t)[V_\diamond^+(t) - V_*^+(t)] + \mu_{*\dagger}^x(t)V_*^+(t)$$

$$\frac{d}{dt}V_\diamond^+(t,A^{Prem=1}) = rV_\diamond(t) - \mu_{*\diamond}^x(t)[V_*^+(t) - V_\diamond^+(t)] + \mu_{\diamond\dagger}^x(t)V_\diamond^+(t)$$

And again solve for  $V_*^+(t_{i-1})$  and  $V_{\diamond}^+(t_{i-1})$ :

$$V_*^+(t_{i-1}) = V_*^+(t_i) - h \left[ r V_*^+(t_i) - \dot{a}_*(t_i) - \mu_{*\uparrow}^x(t_i) [V_{\diamond}^+(t_i) - V_*^+(t_i)] + \mu_{*\uparrow}^x(t) V_*(t_i) \right]$$

$$V_{\diamond}^+(t_{i-1}) = V_{\diamond}^+(t_i) - h \left[ r V_{\diamond}^+(t_i) - \mu_{\diamond*}^x(t_i) [V_*^+(t_i) - V_{\diamond}^+(t_i)] + \mu_{\diamond\uparrow}^x(t_i) V_{\diamond}^+(t_i) \right]$$

```
#a.e derivative a_{*}:
a_dot_prem1 <- function(t){</pre>
  if(t >= 0 \&\& t < T) \{ return(-1) \}
  if(t >= T) \{ return(0) \}
}
PV_prem1_act <- PV_prem1_dis <- rep(0,N+1)</pre>
PV_prem1_act[N+1] <- PV_prem1_dis[N+1] <- 0 #follows from contract
for(i in N:1){
  PV\_prem1\_act[i] \leftarrow PV\_prem1\_act[i+1] - h*(r*PV\_prem1\_act[i+1] - a\_dot\_prem1((i+1)*h)
                                   - mu01(x+(i+1)*h)*(PV_prem1_dis[i+1]-PV_prem1_act[i+1])
                                   + mu02(x+(i+1)*h)*(PV_prem1_act[i+1])
  PV_prem1_dis[i] <- PV_prem1_dis[i+1] - h*(r*PV_prem1_dis[i+1]</pre>
                                   - mu10(x+(i+1)*h)*(PV_prem1_act[i+1]-PV_prem1_dis[i+1])
                                   + mu12(x+(i+1)*h)*PV_prem1_dis[i+1]
                                   )
}
PV_prem1_act[1]
```

## [1] -6.453883

We will now use the equivalence principle, which tells us:

$$\pi V_*^+(0, A^{Prem=1}) + V_*^+(0) = 0$$

$$\Downarrow$$

$$\pi = -\frac{V_*(0)}{V_*^+(0, A^{Prem=1})}$$

This gives us:

pi0

```
## [1] 20608.17
```

```
yearly_premium <- (-1)*pi0/PV_prem1_act[1]
yearly_premium</pre>
```

## [1] 3193.142

#### Exercise 6.4

We are dealing with an endownment insurance, meaning that  $S = \{*, \dagger\}$ , we are asked to calculate the second moment of the benefit payments  $V_t^+$  for  $t = 10, \dots, 20$ . The contractual information provided is:

```
x <- 40

T <- 20

E <- 115000

B <- 220000

r <- 0.03
```

We start by writing up the policy functions:

$$a_*^{Pre}(n) = \begin{cases} 0 & , n = 0, \dots, T - 1 \\ E & , else \end{cases} a_{*\dagger}^{Post}(n) = \begin{cases} B & , n = 0, \dots, T - 1 \\ 0 & , else \end{cases}$$

From chapter.5 we are given the following formula:

$$\mathbb{E}[(V_t^+)^p | X_t = i] = (v_t)^p \sum_j p_{ij}^x(t, t+1) \sum_{k=0}^p \binom{p}{k} (a_{ij}^{Post}(t))^{p-k} \mathbb{E}[(V_{t+1}^+)^k | X_{t+1} = j]$$

Where  $v_t$  is the one-step discount factor in [t, t+1] i.e.

$$v(t) = v_0 v_1 \dots v_{t-1}$$

Let's denote  $V_2(t) := \mathbb{E}[(V_t^+)^2 | X_t = *]$ , and then translate the equation above into our situation:

$$V_{2}(t) = (v_{t})^{2} \sum_{j} p_{*j}^{x}(t, t+1) \sum_{k=0}^{2} {2 \choose k} (a_{*j}^{Post}(t))^{2-k} \mathbb{E}[(V_{t+1}^{+})^{k} | X_{t+1} = j]$$

$$= (v_{t})^{2} p_{**}^{x}(t, t+1) \mathbb{E}[(V_{t+1}^{+})^{2} | X_{t+1} = *] + (v_{t})^{2} p_{*\uparrow}^{x}(t, t+1) (a_{*\uparrow}^{Post}(t))^{2}$$

$$= (v_{t})^{2} p_{**}^{x}(t, t+1) V_{2}(t+1) + (v_{t})^{2} p_{*\uparrow}^{x}(t, t+1) (a_{*\uparrow}^{Post}(t))^{2}$$

$$= e^{-2r} [p_{**}^{x}(t, t+1) V_{2}(t+1) + p_{*\uparrow}^{x}(t, t+1) (a_{*\uparrow}^{Post}(t))^{2}]$$

This has now become an difference equation, with final condition:

$$V_2(T) = (\Delta a_*^{Pre}(T))^2 = E^2$$

From the exercise it's also given that:

```
\mu_{*\dagger}^x(t) = 0.0018 + 0.0004t
```

```
#0:alive, 1:dead
mu01_x <- function(t){</pre>
 return(0.0018 + 0.0004*t)
p_surv_x <- function(t,s){</pre>
  f <- mu01_x
  integral <- integrate(f, lower = t, upper = s)$value</pre>
  return(exp((-1)*integral))
V2 \leftarrow rep(0,T+1)
V2[T+1] \leftarrow E^{2}
for(n in (T-1):0){
   V2[n+1] \leftarrow exp(-2*r)*(p\_surv\_x(n,n+1)*V2[n+2] + B^{2}*(1-p\_surv\_x(n,n+1))) 
}
V2
##
   [1] 6167825284 6465436986 6765434135 7068218098 7374219626 7683901471
## [7] 7997761234 8316334482 8640198138 8969974190 9306333731 9650001385
## [13] 10001760131 10362456580 10733006746 11114402361 11507717773 11914117511
## [19] 12334864556 12771329405 13225000000
```

#### Exercise 6.5

We are considering a permanent disability insurance, so  $S = \{*, \diamond, \dagger\}$ , with  $\mu_{\diamond *}(t) = 0$ . Contractual information:

```
x <- 60

T <- 10

D <- 30000

B <- 50000

r <- 0.05

u <- 60000
```

We are asked to find:

$$P_{\diamond}(t, u) := P[V_t^+ < u | X_t = \diamond]$$

for t = 7 and u = \$60k

Before we start, we write up the desired policy functions:

$$a^{Pre}_{\diamond}(n) = \begin{cases} D & , n = 0, \dots, T-1 \\ 0 & , else \end{cases} \quad a^{Post}_{*\dagger}(n) \quad = \begin{cases} B & , n = 0, \dots, T-1 \\ 0 & , else \end{cases} \quad a^{Post}_{\diamond\dagger}(n) = \begin{cases} B & , n = 0, \dots, T-1 \\ 0 & , else \end{cases}$$

We will use Thiele's difference equation for distributions of mathematical reserves:

$$P_i(t, u) = \sum_{k} p_{ik}^x(t, t+1) P_k(t+1, v_t^{-1}[u - a_i^{Pre}(t) - a_{ik}^{Post}(t)])$$

Translating this into our situation:

$$\begin{split} P_{\diamond}(t,u) &= p_{\diamond \diamond}^{x}(t,t+1)P_{\diamond}(t+1,e^{r}[u-a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t)-a_{\diamond \diamond}^{Post}(t)]) \\ &+ p_{\diamond \dagger}^{x}(t,t+1)P_{\dagger}(t+1,e^{r}[u-a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t)-a_{\diamond \dagger}^{Post}(t)]) \\ &= p_{\diamond \diamond}^{x}(t,t+1)P_{\diamond}(t+1,e^{r}[u-a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t)]) \\ &+ p_{\diamond \dagger}^{x}(t,t+1)P_{\dagger}(t+1,e^{r}[u-a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t)-a_{\diamond \dagger}^{Post}(t)]) \end{split}$$

We start by exploring  $P_{\dagger}$ :

$$\begin{split} P_{\dagger}(t+1, e^{r}[u - a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t) - a_{\diamond\dagger}^{Post}(t)]) &= P[V_{t+1}^{+} < e^{r}[u - a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t) - a_{\diamond\dagger}^{Post}(t)]|X_{t+1} = \dagger] \\ &= P[0 < e^{r}[u - a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t) - a_{\diamond\dagger}^{Post}(t)]] \\ &= \begin{cases} 1 & , t > T \\ 0 & , t \leq T \end{cases} \end{split}$$

Since we are interested in  $t \leq T$ , we get:

$$P_{\dagger}(t+1, e^{r}[u - a^{Pre}_{\diamond}(t) - a^{Post}_{\diamond\dagger}(t)] = 0$$

Giving us:

$$P_{\diamond}(t,u) = p_{\diamond\diamond}^x(t,t+1)P_{\diamond}(t+1,e^r[u-a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(t)])$$

We iterate backwards, given that we know  $V_{10}^+ = 0$ , as we do not need to set aside money for someone entering the contract at the end.

$$P_{\diamond}(9,60) = p_{\diamond\diamond}^{x}(9,10)P_{\diamond}(10,e^{r}[60 - a_{\diamond}^{Pre}(9)])$$
$$= p_{\diamond\diamond}^{x}(9,10)P[0 < e^{r}[60 - 30]$$
$$= p_{\diamond\diamond}^{x}(9,10)$$