

ROCSC 2022

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minipwn: Pwn

Description

Desi pare o aplicatie simpla suspectam ca autorul a introdus un backdoor. Trebuie sa aflam daca acesta exista si daca il putem exploata pentru a obtine acces la steag (/flag.txt).

Flag format: ROCSC{sha256}

Flag proof


```
ROCSC{220c86cab87f8016f63660d369001d908b94df19ab406f01394e5c5c7eee88ac}
```

Summary


I went to <http://34.141.25.94:31837> and then I followed the instructions in the challenge description, and so I went to <http://34.141.25.94:31837/flag.txt> where I found the flag.

Details

Step 1:



Step 2:



weird-noise: Forensics

Description

We have received this message, but unfortunately, we can't understand anything. The only thing we know is that the message has the following tag: ROBOT 36 Slow Something.

Flag proof

```
FL4g147#?!23
```

Summary

I used <https://github.com/xdsopl/robot36> to decode the given .wav into a .ppm


Details

I googled the tag provided in the challenge description, and then googled robot 36 wav because the given file was in .wav format. Then I cloned and compiled <https://github.com/xdsopl/robot36>, using the included README. For my linux distro, I also needed to install libasound2-dev and libSDL2-dev libSDL1.2-dev.

```
git clone https://github.com/xdsopl/robot36.git
cd robot36
sudo make
sudo apt-get install libasound2-dev
sudo apt install libSDL2-dev libSDL1.2-dev
```

Then I used the following to extract the image, which contained the flag:

```
./decode ../weird-noise.wav out.ppm
```



malicious-internet-traffic: Network, Forensics

Description

During a cybersecurity incident, some malicious network traffic was captured. We need to find answers related to the following questions.

NOTE! The present challenge contains documents infected with real malware. Be cautious and solve this challenge in a virtual environment only.

Flag proof

1. From which site the malicious Office document was downloaded?

`http://danielbrink.dk`

2. Which is the IP of the machine where the malicious document was downloaded?

`10.12.5.102`

3. Which is the name of the malicious document downloaded?

`eForm-869337384710242.doc`

4. With which malware family was the compromised machine infected?

`emotet`

Summary

For questions 1-3 I used [NetworkMiner](#) to analyze the packet capture. To answer question 4 I uploaded the malicious document to VirusTotal, which identified the malware family.

Details

For question 1, after loading the packet capture in NetworkMiner, I looked at the Files tab:

NetworkMiner 2.7.3

FileToolsHelp

-- Select a network adapter in the list --

Hosts (12)Files (18)ImagesMessagesCredentialsSessions (22)DNS (38)Parameters (398)KeywordsAnomalies


Filter keyword:

Frame nr.	Filename	Extension	Size	Source host	S. port	Destination host	D. port
6	2018-12.html	html	256 B	94.231.108.253 [danielbrink.dk] (Other)	TCP 80	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49178
10	eForm-869337384710242.doc	doc	155 776 B	94.231.108.253 [danielbrink.dk] (Other)	TCP 80	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49178
195	lsvlxHU.html	html	233 B	112.78.117.10 [twilm.com] (Other)	TCP 80	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49182
198	Jh2U0a145k.exe	exe	528 384 B	112.78.117.10 [twilm.com] (Other)	TCP 80	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49182
1221	Wang's.info.cer	cer	685 B	178.21.8.42 [foxpartsearch.com] [Wang's.info] [labadegmc....	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49188
1495	Wang's.info[1].cer	cer	685 B	178.21.8.42 [foxpartsearch.com] [Wang's.info] [labadegmc....	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49193
1815	capture.com.cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49197
1836	Wang's.info[2].cer	cer	685 B	178.21.8.42 [foxpartsearch.com] [Wang's.info] [labadegmc....	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49199
1952	Wang's.info[3].cer	cer	685 B	178.21.8.42 [foxpartsearch.com] [Wang's.info] [labadegmc....	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49198
1982	capture.com[1].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49204
2026	capture.com[2].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49205
2249	capture.com[3].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49211
2393	capture.com[4].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49213
3351	capture.com[5].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49216
3406	capture.com[6].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49217
3446	capture.com[7].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49218
3499	capture.com[8].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49220
3551	capture.com[9].cer	cer	681 B	185.174.173.140 [janther.org] [capture.com] [freshwallet.at...	TCP 443	10.12.5.102 (Windows)	TCP 49221

Since questions 1-3 mentioned that the file was a “document”, I focused on eForm-869337384710242.doc, and after some trial and error while submitting the flag, figured out it was <http://danielbrink.dk>.

Question 2 and 3 were answered using the Destination host and respectively Filename columns in the screenshot above.

For question 4 I uploaded the file to [VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com), and found the malware family in the Details tab, after expanding the Names section:



i-am-root: Forensics

Description

We need the following information ASAP, a Linux workstation within our organization is manifesting weird behavior.

_NOTE! The present challenge contains documents infected with real malware.
Be cautious and solve this challenge in a virtual environment only.

Flag proof

1. Which CPU models used the compromised machine?

i9-10885H

2. Which rootkit managed the attacker to launch on the compromised workstation?

```
diamorphine
```

3. Who developed the rootkit?

```
Victor-Ramos-Mello
```

4. Which is the MAC address of the compromised computer?

```
08:00:27:C6:76:FC
```

5. From which path location on the compromised workstation, the rootkit was launched?

```
/home/ubuntu/Diamorphine
```

Summary

For question 2 and 3 I used Autopsy, while for 1,4,5 I used grep on the provided image.

Details

For question 1, I first looked at the output of lscpu on my machine, and inspired by it, I searched for "processor" using the following command (-n for line number, -a to get output from binary files, -e for pattern):

```
grep -na -e "processor" i-am-root.bin > grepoutproc.txt
```

Then, I searched for the two mainstream manufacturers, using:


```
grep -ia "intel" grepoutproc.txt
```

```
grep -ia "amd" grepoutproc.txt
```

Somewhere in the output for intel, I found:

```
LSM: Security Framework initializing9&('Yama: becoming
mindful.vb0'AppArmor: AppArmor initialized'TD'Mount-cache hash table
entries: 8192 (order: 4, 65536 bytes, linear)n'\I'Mountpoint-cache hash
table entries: 8192 (order: 4, 65536 bytes, linear)('*** VALIDATE tmpfs
***tz('*** VALIDATE proc ***'('*** VALIDATE cgroup1 ***'('***
VALIDATE cgroup2 ***04$'process: using mwait in idle threadsã@-'Last
level iTLB entries: 4KB 64, 2MB 8, 4MB 8'D4'Last level dTLB entries:
4KB 64, 2MB 0, 4MB 0, 1GB 4'dQ'Spectre V1 : Mitigation: usercopy/swaps
barriers and __user pointer sanitizationM'@/'Spectre V2 : Mitigation:
Full generic retpoline`N'Spectre V2 : Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB
mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch''4$'Speculative Store Bypass:
Vulnerable''4''MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers''4$'Freeing SMP
alternatives memory: 40K''
18709653:tb'smpboot: CPU0: Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-10885H CPU @ 2.40GHz
(family: 0x6, model: 0xa5, stepping: 0x2)'0
    hU'Performance Events: unsupported p6 CPU model 165 no PMU driver,
software events only.4'
```

To answer question 2, I loaded the file in Autopsy as as a disk image:



Add Data Source


Steps

1. Select Host
2. **Select Data Source Type**
3. Select Data Source
4. Configure Ingest
5. Add Data Source

Select Data Source Type

- ☒ Disk Image or VM File
- ☐ Local Disk
- ☐ Logical Files
- ☐ Unallocated Space Image File
- ☐ Autopsy Logical Imager Results
- ☐ XRY Text Export

< Back Next > Finish Cancel Help



Add Data Source

Steps

1. Select Host
2. Select Data Source Type
3. **Select Data Source**
4. Configure Ingest
5. Add Data Source

Select Data Source

Path:

☐ Ignore orphan files in FAT file systems

Time zone:

Sector size:

Hash Values (optional):


MD5:

SHA-1:


SHA-256:

NOTE: These values will not be validated when the data source is added.

Then, I searched for the substring “rootkit” in the extracted files:



I looked at the results and found the following, and I submitted “diamorphine”:



For question 3, I googled the github repo found in the screenshot above, and identified the author’s name:




For question 4, I used bulk_extractor like so:

```
bulk_extractor i-am-root.bin -o bulkextoutp
cd bulkextoutp
cat ether.txt
```


In ether.txt, I found 2 different mac addresses:


```
# BANNER FILE NOT PROVIDED (-b option)
# BULK_EXTRACTOR-Version: 2.0.0
# Feature-Recorder: ether
# Filename: i-am-root.bin
# Feature-File-Version: 1.1
48726208    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
48726208    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
48730048    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
48730048    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
48731968    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
48731968    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
48733888    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
48733888    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
58144064    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
58144064    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
58145984    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
58145984    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
58147904    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
58147904    52:54:00:12:35:02    (ether_shost)
58149824    08:00:27:C6:76:FC    (ether_dhost)
```

I also used NetworkMiner to inspect the extracted packet capture:



Because it was mentioned in the challenge description the workstation was running Linux, I submitted "08:00:27:C6:76:FC", as for the other MAC address found in ether.txt an OS couldn't be identified.

For question 5, I looked at the Install section in the README on the rootkit's github. The instructions of the mentioned using "insmod diamorphine.ko" to load the module:



```
https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
cs Kali Forums Kali NetHunter Exploit-DB Google Hacking DB OffSec

:≡ README.md

Install

Verify if the kernel is 2.6.x/3.x/4.x/5.x

uname -r

Clone the repository

git clone https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine

Enter the folder

cd Diamorphine

Compile

make

Load the module(as root)

insmod diamorphine.ko
```

As such, I used the following command:

```
grep -na -e "insmod diamorphine.ko" i-am-root.bin
```

In its output, I found highlighted by zsh the user and machine name, as well as the path where the load command was run:

```
timeRemaining1X
~/.Diamorphineubuntu@ubuntu:~/Diamorphine$ sudo insmod diamorphine.ko
epublapklipa|do[ct][xm]|p[op]t[mx]|xl[st][xm]|pyz)1*5**U***U*.*U|ors)"01*-U
U@9.U=***!/etc/inputrc !A*U !alert!*3**U***U !la*U !8.U !2**U+C**U ≡*U !sudo apt install make!#1657721
629!*.*U**:*U!ls -Ato!*2**U+j**U !l-*Uubuntu@ubuntu:~/Diamorphine$ !**<*U*;*U @0%:*U**:*U$ '!*.*>*U06@*Ure/
```

With this information, I assembled the path (~=/home/ubuntu): **/home/ubuntu/Diamorphine**