Discrimination That Matters: Replication with Extensions of "Perceived Discrimination and Political Behaviour" (2020)

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Abstract

This paper replicates Oskooii (2020), "Perceived Discrimination and Political Behavior" (*British Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 867–892), and introduces two extensions. Oskooii (2020) provides strong evidence that exposure to societal discrimination discourages minorities from mainstream political participation, while political discrimination facilitates it; both forms of discrimination, however, strengthen in-group attachment. This study adds two robustness checks and two extensions. The robustness checks re-estimate the original models by modifying the control matrix and by introducing new outcome variables. The extensions apply matching methods to the original data and re-estimate the models using a survey of newly arrived immigrants. The results suggest that Oskooii's theoretical mechanism does not readily extend to other forms of political behaviour and is only partially applicable to other populations, such as immigrants. This replication finds consistent evidence that political and societal discrimination both foster ethnic-based engagement and that exposure to societal discrimination can lead to some forms of political participation.

Keywords: discrimination, minorities, immigrants, ethnicity, replication

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Introduction

In the light of an intense immigration debate and increasing support for the anti-immigrant agenda, widespread discrimination against minorities and immigrants has received more attention in political psychology (Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Lajevardi 2020; Valentim 2021). Moreover, the focus has also shifted to the political consequences of discrimination (Pérez 2015; Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Lajevardi 2021; Matthes and Schmuck 2017). This paper presents a replication (two robustness checks and two extensions) of "Perceived Discrimination and Political Behaviour" by Kassra A. R. Oskooii (2020) published in the *British Journal of Political Science*. The original paper builds on the author's previous work (Oskooii 2016), providing solid evidence that exposure to societal discrimination demotivates people from participating in mainstream politics, while exposure to political discrimination enhances it. This contribution was recognised as valuable among scholars in migration studies and political psychology.[1]

The overall aim of this study is to improve understanding of the effects of political and societal discrimination on political behaviour. To accomplish this, the study sets out three further aims. The first aim is to extend the analysis from the original paper using causal inference methods (matching). This should provide a stronger basis for interpreting exposure to political or societal discrimination as a cause of political behaviour. The second aim is to examine whether political and societal discrimination affect other forms

[1]By December 2025, the original paper had received 192 citations on Google Scholar. It is also noteworthy that numerous papers on minority and ethnic politics published in the top three journals in political science, as well as leading journals in migration studies and political psychology, also cite this paper.

of political behaviour in the same way that they affect voting, ethnic-based engagement and identity choice. The third and final aim is to assess whether the same effects of discrimination appear in other populations similar to minorities, such as recently arrived immigrants. The paper is organised into four sections. The first section provides an overview of the original paper, while the second presents the design and steps of each study. Section three reports the analysis and results, followed by the discussion and conclusion in the fourth section.

Understanding Discrimination: An Overview of the Original Paper

Oskooii conceptualises discrimination as an outcome of prejudice – a derogatory belief or attitude about individuals generalised on the basis of their group memberships (Oskooii 2016, 2020), which entails making a distinction between individuals or social groups by favouring or disadvantaging them on the basis of their group membership or other group-related traits (Oskooii 2020, 869). The major theoretical contribution of Oskooii (2020) is the conceptual development of a mechanism through which political and societal discrimination exert their divergent effects on political behaviour. Political discrimination exists through "laws, policies, practices, symbols, or political campaigns and discourse that aim to deprive some citizens of resources or rights based on group membership" (Oskooii 2020, 868). Societal discrimination occurs in day-to-day interactions between individuals and is less systematic in character (Oskooii 2020). The

difference between these two types of discrimination lies in their source, and in both types the targets of discrimination can be either individuals or groups.

Existing research indicates that perceived discrimination has numerous and sometimes divergent consequences. Among the most prominent consequences of perceived discrimination are increased levels of anxiety and decreased self-esteem (Schmitt et al. 2014; Bourguignon et al. 2006). The political consequences of perceived discrimination are usually studied among minority populations, since they are exposed to higher levels of discrimination (Lajevardi 2020; Lajevardi et al. 2020; Pérez 2015; Ward 2019). The literature maps divergent consequences of perceived discrimination on mainstream political participation. Schildkraut (2005) finds that discriminated individuals usually retreat from mainstream politics and turn to their in-group (Schildkraut 2005). More recent research (Tyrberg 2020) demonstrates the opposite: exposure to discrimination can lead to an increase in electoral participation.

Following social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 2010, 2004; Huddy 2013), Oskooii (2020) proposes that societal and political discrimination produce diverging effects on political behaviour. Revising existing research, Oskooii (2020, 2016) claims that societal discrimination causes withdrawal from mainstream politics because individuals feel powerless, isolated and anxious, due to exposure to individual targeting. On the other hand, political discrimination, because it is more systematic, equips targeted individuals with the sense of shared fate with other group members, which inspires engagement in mainstream politics (Oskooii 2020, 2016). Yet, in the case of in-group engagement,

Oskooii (2020) proposes that both types push individuals to engage more with their in-group. Societal discrimination would make individuals seek comfort and solace within their in-group, while political discrimination would make them seek protection in numbers and possibility of action against discrimination (Oskooii 2020, 2016).

Oskooii (2020) utilises the comprehensive British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES), conducted in 2010 (Fisher et al. 2012). This survey was conducted on a representative sample of British ethnic minorities and collected a total of 2,787 interviews using the computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) technique. Oskooii (2020, 873-874) provided and tested four hypotheses:

1. On average, exposure to political discrimination increases the likelihood[2] of political participation.

2. On average, exposure to societal discrimination decreases the likelihood of (mainstream) political participation.

3. Exposure to societal discrimination, on average, enhances in-group attachment and engagement.

4. Exposure to political discrimination, on average, enhances in-group attachment and engagement.

Oskooii (2020) tests these hypotheses through four outcomes; mainstream political participation is operationalised as voting in local and general elections (binary indicator),

[2] A reviewer noted that the terms likelihood and probability are conflated here. I retain the original hypotheses in wording faithful to the original paper, but I use the term probability in newly formulated hypotheses.

while in-group engagement is operationalised through participation in ethnic-based organisations and clubs (binary indicator). Attachment is operationalised through a preferred identity scale, ranging from (0) for identifying more with in-group identity, through (1) for identifying equally with in-group and out-group identities, to (2) for identifying more with out-group identity. Societal and political discrimination were operationalised through a 12-point index where 0 represents no discrimination whatsoever, while 12 represents the highest possible score of discrimination. The index represents a complex measure that provides information about experiences of specific types of discrimination (e.g. experiencing discrimination during the job application process or in a restaurant) and the frequency of their occurrence, both measured at the individual level.[3]

In the original study, Oskooii (2020) uses an extensive set of control variables. This set includes socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, education, income level, ethnicity, use of English and country of birth; political variables including political interest, political knowledge, party identification, attitude towards voting as a duty, political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament; remaining variables include worship attendance and identification with British, ethnic or both identities. Up-to-date literature (Sanders et al. 2014; Baysu and Swyngedouw 2020; Moutselos 2020) indicates that Oskooii (2020) indeed uses a suitable set of control variables in the models assessing the impact of societal and political discrimination

[3]Oskooii's way of measuring discrimination is more refined than the usual scope of large representative surveys that capture experiences of discrimination through binary measures (e.g. the European Social Survey) or do not ask questions about the frequency of discrimination.

on voting in local and general elections. The literature about democratic engagement of minorities (e.g. Heath 2015) also indicates that Oskooii (2020) mostly uses relevant controls. Verkuyten and Martinovic (2012) show that political variables also have a considerable impact on identification among immigrants (which could, in the broadest sense, include minorities), suggesting that Oskooii's (2020) controls were not misplaced in this case. In spite of following established practices in large-N research about minorities, there is a potential problem of over-controlling,[4] which remains beyond the scope of this replication study.

Oskooii (2020) uses logit and multinomial models to test his hypotheses. His analysis provides evidence in support of all four hypotheses. The coefficients (Oskooii 2020) are in the expected direction and reach statistical significance at the 0.1 level. To validate the results, each model is accompanied by an analysis of changes in predicted probabilities (using first-difference methods). This analysis also confirms the initial results. Oskooii (2020) provided two other robustness checks. One was to estimate so-called simplified models from which attitudes about voting and political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in parliament were omitted. These models also provided support for Oskooii's hypotheses. Another robustness check simplified the indicators of societal and political discrimination to street-level discrimination and discrimination in government services (Tables 5 and 6 in the Online Appendix of the original paper), which also confirmed the initial results.

[4] I thank the reviewer for this remark.

Replication Design

This replication paper is organised into four separate studies. Studies 1 and 2 rely on the same sample and apply the same methods as the original study (Freese and Peterson 2017, 152). Study 1 re-estimates the original models with different sets of control variables, while Study 2 re-estimates them with new outcome variables. Study 3 applies matching as a different methodology to the original dataset (Clemens 2017). Study 4 applies an approximate analytical procedure of the original study to a different dataset, which situates it in the realm of conceptual replications (Clemens 2017; Freese and Peterson 2017; Irvine 2021; Stroebe and Strack 2014). The overall aim of Studies 1 and 2 is to check the robustness of the original results with respect to different control and outcome variables. Study 3 intends to extend the original conclusions by testing for causal effects of different types of discrimination on political behaviour. Study 4 aims to extend the original analysis to a different population of recently arrived immigrants (in the UK and the Netherlands).

Differences in methodologies and samples incur differences in theoretical estimands between studies in this replication (Lundberg, Johnson, and Stewart 2021). Studies 1 and 2 relate to the same population as the original paper (Oskooii 2020) – ethnic minorities in the UK. Considering the scope of the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (Fisher et al. 2012), these are more precisely racial minorities from former British colonies. In the original study, theoretical estimands represent the difference in respondent i's probability of casting a ballot in general or local elections, engaging in ethnic-based organisations, or embracing British or both British and ethnic identity compared to just

ethnic identity, conditional on their reported levels of societal or political discrimination. Exactly the same set of estimands is used in Study 1. In Study 2, the theoretical estimands are changed to differences in the probability of support for violent protests and differences in the probability of non-electoral political participation for a respondent *i*, with respect to the respondent's reported levels of societal and political discrimination.

Studies 3 and 4 introduce different theoretical estimands and change the target populations. Estimands in Study 3 are differences in the probability of casting a ballot in general or local elections and engaging in ethnic-based organisations for respondent *i* if they reported exposure to either societal or political discrimination. In Study 3, the population in focus consists of ethnic minority individuals in the UK, but the estimated effect is focused on the population of discriminated individuals. In Study 4, the theoretical estimand represents the difference in the probability of ethnic-based engagement and the difference in the probability of supporting the attitude about irreconcilability between host-country and immigrant cultures for individual *i* with respect to exposure to societal and political discrimination. The population in Study 4 comprises immigrants who arrived in the period of three years prior to fielding a survey in the UK or the Netherlands.

Study 1 presents a set of robustness checks for the original models. These robustness checks introduce an alternative matrix of control variables compared to the original paper. Two approaches to an alternative control matrix are used in Study 1. The first approach relies on using more informative controls where Oskooii (2020) used binary

indicators. Hence, I use a continuous measure of party identification instead of a binary one and, instead of the country of birth, I introduce indicators for UK citizenship and duration of stay in the UK.[5] The second approach is to expand the simplified model based on the current literature about mainstream political participation (Wysocki, Lawson, and Rhemtulla 2022). Variables that measure attitudes about voting and political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament are replaced with evaluations of individual and national finances in the past and future (Healy, Persson, and Snowberg 2017; Hansford and Gomez 2015; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997), involvement in local community affairs and perceptions of increasing prejudice among out-group individuals (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Teorell 2003; Giugni, Michel, and Gianni 2014; Teorell 2003; Giugni, Michel, and Gianni 2014). Social identity theory would also suggest that minority individuals with stronger community involvement[6] and greater perceptions of prejudice might be more inclined to vote, while the literature on economic voting suggests that both individual and sociotropic evaluations push people to cast a ballot (Schmitt et al. 2014; Healy, Persson, and Snowberg 2017; Hansford and Gomez 2015). Yet, this literature does not provide an account of the impact of economic evaluations on in-group attachment and engagement; therefore, economic evaluations are not used in re-testing hypotheses 3 and 4.

Study 1 tests exactly the same set of hypotheses as the original paper. Study 1 contains checks for the linearity assumption, heterogeneity and significant outliers (Pregibon

[5] More details are available in Section 2 of the Appendix.

[6] A reviewer suggested that community involvement might also moderate the effects of societal and political discrimination. I retested each model containing this variable for three different moderation effects, but not a single effect is statistically significant. Results are available in Section 4 of the Appendix.

1981).[7] Replicated and original models are compared in terms of the directionality of effects (which are directly comparable, Wooldridge 2010) and statistical significance, which requires additional caution because of differences in sample sizes (Anderson and Maxwell 2016).[8] Following the original paper, results are reported as regression coefficients and as predicted probabilities (obtained with the first-difference method). Due to the fixed variance of the error term in logit models, the effect of the key treatment variable also contains a degree of unobserved heterogeneity (Mood 2010; Wooldridge 2010). For that reason the comparability of effect sizes across different logit models is not as straightforward as in OLS models (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018), but it is possible to compare them through the average marginal effects of societal and political discrimination (Kuha and Mills 2020; Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018).

Study 2 presents the estimation of the original models using different outcome variables: non-electoral participation[9] and support for violent protests. Non-electoral participation is yet another form of participating in mainstream politics, which entails higher costs of engagement than voting. Recent research indicated that broadly defined discrimination increases non-electoral participation of minorities (Bilodeau 2017; Tran, Baluran, and Hassan 2024; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Bilodeau et al. (2023) finds that exposure to discrimination fosters protest participation. Schmuck and Tribastone (2020) report narrower effects of harmful speech on support for only non-violent protests.

[7] These tests were kindly suggested by a reviewer.

[8] For that reason I report confidence intervals alongside *p-values*.

[9] Non-electoral participation includes forms of political engagement that are neither voting, nor ethnic-based, but are close to civic engagement with intention to influencing politics by means such as protesting, signing petitions, volunteering in civil society or trying to reach one's political representatives. Additional details are provided in Section 5, Appendix.

However, exposure to discrimination can lead to higher support for violence (Grewal and Hamid 2024). On the other hand, Besco et al. (2022) demonstrate that exposure to harmful political speech (closer to political discrimination) does not have a causal effect on political engagement or protesting. Support for violent demonstrations is the least mainstream form of political participation, but very relevant, especially for minorities exposed to discrimination (Schmuck and Tribastone 2020; Schmuck, Matthes, and Paul 2017; Grewal and Hamid 2024). Therefore, I propose and test four hypotheses in Study 2:

1. On average, exposure to political discrimination increases the probability of non-electoral political participation.
2. On average, exposure to societal discrimination increases the probability of non-electoral political participation.
3. On average, exposure to political discrimination increases the probability of support for violent protests.
4. On average, exposure to societal discrimination increases the probability of support for violent protests.

Study 3 re-estimates the original models using matching (Ho et al. 2007; Iacus, King, and Porro 2019). The original paper does not offer any causal claims, therefore this study attempts to extend the original research towards establishing causal effects of societal or political discrimination on political behaviour. The chosen matching procedure is only possible with a binary treatment. Therefore, only the effects of a single type

of discrimination could be estimated with matching. The entire control matrix from the original models (complete and simplified) was used to match on, as well as the type of discrimination that did not serve as a treatment. Matching on the entire set of controls imitates experimental conditions as pairs of observations are paired that match in all aspects except exposure to either political or societal discrimination that serves as the treatment. For simplicity of the analysis, matching was applied on binary outcome variables (mainstream political engagement and ethnic-based engagement), while identity choice was left out. Additionally, Figure 1 indicates the distribution of political and societal discrimination in the original data is skewed towards absence of discrimination and lower levels of exposure, leaving high levels of exposure relatively rare. Matching helps to overcome this lack of balance in the data, but also relies on a less informative treatment (leaving out the information about intensity of discrimination and retaining just the information about reported exposure to it). This study tests several hypotheses:

1. Societal discrimination causes a decrease in the probability of voting in general elections.

2. Political discrimination causes an increase in the probability of voting in general elections.

3. Societal discrimination causes a decrease in the probability of voting in local elections.

4. Political discrimination causes an increase in the probability of voting in local

elections.

5. Societal discrimination causes an increase in in-group attachment and engagement.

6. Political discrimination causes an increase in in-group attachment and engagement.

Figure 1: Distribution of Frequencies for Specific Types of Discrimination



(a) Societal Discrimination **(b)** Political Discrimination

Models in Study 3 are re-estimated using propensity score matching (Guo, Fraser, and Chen 2020; Ho et al. 2007; Stuart 2010). Following the advice of King and Nielsen (2019), I checked that in every instance, propensity score matching indeed improves the balance in the data (see Appendix, Graphs 10 to 21 and Tables 31 to 42).[10] The inspection of different measures, such as standardised mean difference and cumulative distribution function measures (CDFmax), indicated that different methods and links achieve varying,

[10]The initial idea was to use coerced exact matching. Unfortunately, this method failed to improve the overall balance of the dataset, even though it improved balance in every particular variable. As Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) indicated, the aim of the method is to improve the overall balance of the dataset for matching to be applied successfully. With the multivariate imbalance measure equal to 1 in all iterations, coerced exact matching was replaced with propensity score matching. Complete results are available in Section 8, Appendix.

although similar, levels of balance on individual variables, but varying levels of total balance in the dataset. For that reason, matching was performed using combinations of different methods (optimal full matching, nearest neighbour matching and optimal pair matching) and links (probit and logit) (Ho et al. 2011), which are reported together. This logic of reporting is used as a robustness check and demonstrates that results are not a relict of a chosen matching procedure or sensitive to a specific level of balance achieved.[11] After the matching procedure was applied, models were re-estimated using weights from matching. The causal effect – estimated as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)[12] – was computed by means of G-computation and is reported in the form of risk ratios and odds ratios respectively (presented in Tables 49 to 60 in the Appendix).

In Study 4, I examine the effects of perceived discrimination among recently arrived immigrants. The original paper finds the effects of perceived discrimination in a sample of minorities that have been living in the UK for longer periods of time (Oskooii 2020). Newly arrived immigrants are the population from which established minorities originate, but recently arrived immigrants lack the experience of living in the host country and their contact with host country nationals is more limited. Study 4 utilises the first wave of *Causes and Consequences of Socio-Cultural Integration Processes among*

[11] Complete explanations of differences between matching methods are available in (Greifer 2023). As suggested in the vignette, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as the desired estimand could be estimated using any procedure. The logic of analysis and reporting in the vignette is justified with the explanation that, in the case of estimating the ATT, "no method can be recommended above all others" (Greifer 2023).

[12] MatchIt allows for estimation of the average treatment effect (ATE) as well, but it was more pertinent to estimate the effect of discrimination inside the group of individuals who reported it, instead of the entire sample (Ho et al. 2011).

New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) dataset which was collected in 2010 and 2011 in the UK, Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands (Diehl et al. 2016). The main advantage of this dataset is the period of data collection which, for the most part, comes close to that of the EMBES data (Fisher et al. 2012). A similar time frame is important because it implies fewer impactful contextual differences that could render the data incomparable, despite the similar set of variables (Van Bavel et al. 2016). The SCIP data cover only two groups of immigrants in the UK, Polish and Pakistani, which is significantly less than the coverage of EMBES. For that reason, this study includes estimates from the first wave of SCIP in the Netherlands, which has a more diverse sample. An additional problem is that only a small fraction of the sampled immigrants reported discrimination (see Figures 27 and 28 in the Appendix). Due to a very low number[13] of discriminated respondents, the analysis should be taken with caution. Descriptive statistics for the key treatment and control variables are provided in the Appendix (Tables 72 to 76).

The SCIP dataset (Diehl et al. 2016) provides a set of variables only partially comparable to EMBES, where the key treatment was measured through instances of discrimination and their frequency. The key limitation to comparability is that the instances of discrimination were measured on the individual level, while the frequency of discrimination was measured on the group level. Because the instances of discrimination still allowed for differentiation between societal and political discrimination, I created two different treatments: (1) a three-point scale summing up the instances of discrimination and (2) a six-point index that combines individual instances with opinion of the frequency

[13] This situation is equivalent to the lack of statistical power in experimental studies due to a small sample or a small number of treated participants in the overall sample.

of group discrimination. Only the measures of ethnic-based engagement are directly comparable to the measures in the EMBES, which makes them focal outcomes in this study. Because the SCIP dataset does not have a direct measure of identification, I used the opinion about irreconcilability of cultural values as a proxy for identification (see Tables 82 to 84 in the Appendix). The SCIP data measure only voting in the elections in the country of origin, since the surveyed population most commonly does not have the voting rights in their respective host country. The SCIP dataset does not contain measures of political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy and opinion about the duty to vote; therefore, the equivalents of simplified models from the original research were estimated in this study.[14] The survey also did not cover the country of birth in a comparable manner (since no respondent was born in the UK or in the Netherlands) and party identification with parties in the UK (or the Netherlands). These variables also had to be omitted from this study. Hypotheses 1 and 2 emulate hypotheses 3 and 4 from the original research, while hypotheses 3 and 4 are created to fit the proxy variables for identification:

1. On average, exposure to societal discrimination enhances in-group attachment and engagement.

2. On average, exposure to political discrimination increases in-group attachment and engagement.

[14]Due to differences in the available variables, I estimated the adapted models for ethnic-based engagement and identity choice using EMBES data, but only with variables that have their equivalent in the SCIP dataset. Adapted models are further reduced compared to Oskooii's simplified models. The adapted models retain directionality and statistical significance of Oskooii's simplified models (Tables 70 and 71, Appendix).

3. On average, exposure to societal discrimination increases the probability of thinking that in-group and host-country values are irreconcilable.

4. On average, exposure to political discrimination increases the probability of thinking that in-group and host-country values are irreconcilable.

Analysis

The results of the original paper, including all graphs and tables presented in the paper, can be reproduced using the code available from the Harvard Dataverse page of the paper.[15] Additional statistical tests are conducted to check the reliability of the original models. Main checks tackle linearity of the relationship between the main predictors (societal and political discrimination) and the outcome variables and the impact of significant outliers in each model. Plots of partial residuals for the original models indicate a linear relationship between the main predictors and all outcomes (Graph 8 in the Appendix). Difference in fits plots indicate that significant outliers only exist when estimating models for identity choice as British (Graph 9 in the Appendix). Breusch-Pagan tests indicate heteroscedasticity in almost all estimated models (Table 8 in the Appendix). The replication models do not address, nor correct for this feature of the original models. Additional checks include the correlation test for two main predictors - societal and political discrimination - which indicate that two variables are not significantly correlated (=.42, Graph 7 in the Appendix). I assume the lack of stronger correlation stems from different originating points of two types of discrimination, in

[15]The replication material with code is available at the following link.

day-to-day social interactions for societal and in policies and behaviour of the state officials for political discrimination (Oskooii 2020).

Study 1

In the case of mainstream political engagement, results suggest that the estimated effect of exposure to societal discrimination demonstrates robustness when modelled with a different set of controls, retaining both the directionality and statistical significance for voting in general elections (Table 11, Appendix). By contrast, the estimated effects of political discrimination lack statistical significance, but retain the hypothesised directionality. Results are presented as plotted predicted probabilities (first-difference method), as in the original paper (Figure 2). Comparisons of the average marginal effects indicate that only Models 1, 2 and 5 estimate 0.030 to 0.040 larger effects of societal discrimination compared to the original paper, whereas Models 3 and 4 (with economic controls) estimate around a 0.010 smaller effect (Table 12, Appendix). This suggests that the more informative control matrix in Models 1 and 2, as well as controlling for the belief in the spread of prejudice and community involvement, might inflate the effects of societal discrimination. The effects of societal and political discrimination on voting in local elections are not robust to changes of the control matrix (Table 13, Appendix).

In the case of in-group attachment, measured as ethnic-based engagement, only three models were estimated, leaving out models with evaluations of personal and national economic circumstances. The literature does not suggest that these variables are important controls of in-group attachment (Healy, Persson, and Snowberg 2017;

Figure 2: Mainstream Political Engagement: Predicted Probabilities for Specific Measures



(a) Vote in General Elections



(b) Vote in Local Elections

Hansford and Gomez 2015; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997). The effects of societal discrimination are robust to new specifications, and both their statistical significance and positive direction are replicated (Figure 3a). In terms of effect magnitude, replicated Models 1 and 2 estimate effects that are around 0.06 larger than in the original models (compare Tables 16 and 9, Appendix). On the other hand, Model 3 estimates an effect that is 0.015 smaller compared to the original paper. Based on this evidence, a more informative set of controls in Models 1 and 2 contributes to minor inflation of the effects of societal discrimination. The effects of political discrimination are not statistically significant, although they remain positive.

The effect of societal discrimination on choosing both in-group and British identity is replicated as negative and statistically significant (see Figure 3b below and Table 17, Appendix). The effect of political discrimination is statistically significant only in Model 3 for preferring Black/Asian identity over British (lower panel, Figure 3b), while all other coefficients are not significant. This suggests that the effects of political discrimination on identity choice cannot be consistently replicated. Average marginal effects[16] are larger than the effects estimated for the original models for category *both* for political and societal discrimination alike; on the other hand, the magnitude of the effects of political and societal discrimination for category *British* is closer to that of the original

[16] A word of caution is necessary here. The estimation of average marginal effects for multinomial models is carried out by estimating two logit models for two categories of the multinomial model. To estimate average marginal effects, the multinomial model was split into two binary logit models. For the *both* category, the logit model compares *both* against a baseline combining *British* and *ethnic* (by setting both to 0). For the *British* category, the logit model compares *British* against a baseline combining *ethnic* and *both* (by setting both to 0). The same procedure was applied when estimating the average marginal effects of the models from the original paper.

Figure 3: In-group Attachment: Predicted Probabilities for Specific Measures



(a) Ethnic-Based Engagement



(b) Identity Choice

models (Tables 10 and 18). The results suggest that the new control matrix inflates the effect of both political and societal discrimination. These results should be treated with caution, considering that the estimation of average marginal effects is based on logit models, which diverge from the original multinomial models.

None of the hypotheses from the original paper can be consistently supported with models from Study 1. Hypothesis 1 completely lacks support, while Hypothesis 2 has only partial support, with societal discrimination demonstrating a robust negative association with voting in general elections. In the same manner, Hypothesis 4 cannot be supported, while there is some support for Hypothesis 3, given a statistically significant, positive association of exposure to societal discrimination with ethnic-based engagement and a consistent negative association with the acceptance of both British and in-group identity.

Study 2

Study 2 tests the association of political and societal discrimination with outcomes other than mainstream political participation and in-group attachment. Instead, the focus is put on non-electoral political participation as an example of a more costly form of participation, and support for violent demonstrations as a somewhat less mainstream, but still relevant, form of political participation. In modelling the effects of political and societal discrimination, I used both fully specified and simplified modelling strategies from the original paper. Because not all controls from the original models seemed relevant, I estimated additional models that excluded worship attendance and attitudes about voting as a duty from a fully specified model and introduced measures for participation in social networks, attitudes about the national economic future and the use of the Internet. Complete models are presented in the Appendix (Tables 27 and 29), while plots with predicted probabilities are presented below.

Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities for Alternative Outcomes



(a) Support for Violent Demonstrations: Political and Societal Discrimination



(b) Non-electoral Political Participation: Political and Societal Discrimination

Models in Study 2 indicate that only Hypothesis 4 can be consistently supported throughout different specifications of the model. The results indicate only societal discrimination is a positive and statistically significant predictor of support for violent protests. Average marginal effects indicate that additional controlling inflates the effect of societal discrimination (Table 28, Appendix). On the other hand, the effects of political discrimination are statistically insignificant and smaller compared to the effects of societal discrimination. This rendered Hypothesis 3 completely unsupported. Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 cannot be consistently supported, because model 3 (Table 29, Appendix) has an insignificant coefficient for societal discrimination, also visible in Figure 4b, where the confidence interval includes 0. Because the coefficients for political discrimination are not statistically significant, Hypothesis 1 also does not have a sufficient level of support (Figure 4a). Comparing average marginal effects for non-electoral participation, societal discrimination on average produces stronger effects than political discrimination. Comparing between models, average marginal effects of societal discrimination on support for violent demonstrations are larger than in the case of non-electoral participation (Tables 28 and 30, Appendix).

Study 3

Study 3 introduces a different theoretical estimand and narrows down the target population to discriminated, minority individuals. For that matter, the results will not be directly comparable to the original research. Nevertheless, the aim of these models is to test for the causal effects of exposure to societal and political discrimination as

stand-alone treatments (not taking into account the intensity of discrimination). Balance checks, simplified models and results presented as odds-ratios, as well as results for coerced exact matching, are available in the Appendix.

The average treatment effect on the treated for societal and political discrimination on voting in general elections is provided in Table 1 and Table 2. Based on combined results, political discrimination demonstrates a consistently positive and statistically significant impact on voting in general elections. This renders strong support for Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, societal discrimination demonstrated no statistically significant impact on the outcome, rendering Hypothesis 1 unsupported. The direction of the effect of political discrimination in Table 2 matches what the theoretical mechanism in the original paper predicts.

Table 1: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.964	0.420	0.882	1.054
Full Logit	0.944	0.208	0.863	1.033
Nearest Probit	1.002	0.973	0.909	1.104
Nearest Logit	0.977	0.625	0.890	1.072
Optimal Probit	0.985	0.764	0.893	1.087
Optimal Pobit	0.954	0.304	0.871	1.044

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Voting in local elections follows the same pattern as voting in general elections (see Table 3 and Table 4). Results in Table 4 indicate that political discrimination is a consistently positive and statistically significant predictor of voting in local elections. This renders strong support for Hypothesis 4, whereas, Hypothesis 3 remains unsupported. Results in Table 2 demonstrate positive directionality, as the original paper

Table 2: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.098	0.047	1.001	1.204
Full Logit	1.109	0.039	1.005	1.223
Nearest Probit	1.165	0.002	1.058	1.284
Nearest Logit	1.148	0.008	1.037	1.272
Optimal Probit	1.176	0.002	1.060	1.305
Optimal Pobit	1.164	0.003	1.052	1.287

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

suggests. This result is somewhat surprising (considering all the differences between models), because the original effect is not robust to the introduction of a different control matrix.

Because matching imitates experimental logic with survey data (Ho et al. 2007; Stuart 2010), these results suggest that exposure to political discrimination has a causal impact on mainstream political participation. The results therefore suggest that exposure to state-incurred discrimination pushes minority individuals to cast a ballot. On the other hand, the average treatment effect on the treated indicates that among those who experienced societal discrimination, there is a critical number of those who voted despite their exposure to discrimination. Therefore, exposure to societal discrimination on its own does not cause retraction from mainstream political participation.

Table 3: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.864	0.001	0.792	0.943
Full Logit	0.873	0.004	0.796	0.958
Nearest Probit	0.922	0.159	0.823	1.032
Nearest Logit	0.989	0.855	0.873	1.119
Optimal Probit	0.988	0.848	0.875	1.116
Optimal Pobit	0.952	0.362	0.855	1.059

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 4: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.116	0.033	1.009	1.235
Full Logit	1.121	0.021	1.018	1.235
Nearest Probit	1.204	0.001	1.078	1.344
Nearest Logit	1.154	0.009	1.036	1.286
Optimal Probit	1.200	0.001	1.076	1.338
Optimal Pobit	1.222	0.001	1.089	1.372

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Results presented in Table 5 and Table 6 lend support for hypotheses 5 and 6. Both types of discrimination are positive and statistically significant predictors of the ethnic-based engagement[17]. Risk ratios suggest that exposure to societal or political discrimination increases the probability of getting involved in ethnic organisations by a factor of 1.2-1.3, compared to non-discriminated individuals. As suggested in the original paper and supported by the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 2010, 2004; Oskooii 2020), matching analysis confirms that exposure to either societal or political discrimination can be regarded as cause of ethnic-based engagement. Considering differences between Studies 3 and 1, and the original paper, the impact of societal discrimination on ethnic-based engagement remains robust through all these different models.

Table 5: Ethnic-based engagement (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.295	0.003	1.094	1.531
Full Logit	1.352	0.002	1.119	1.633
Nearest Probit	1.244	0.024	1.029	1.503
Nearest Logit	1.203	0.061	0.992	1.458
Optimal Probit	1.247	0.015	1.043	1.490
Optimal Pobit	1.219	0.032	1.018	1.461

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

[17] Results were not significant only for the nearest logit procedure.

Table 6: Ethnic-based engagement (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.217	0.036	1.013	1.462
Full Logit	1.200	0.048	1.002	1.438
Nearest Probit	1.226	0.048	1.002	1.500
Nearest Logit	1.169	0.107	0.967	1.412
Optimal Probit	1.244	0.037	1.013	1.528
Optimal Pobit	1.209	0.057	0.994	1.470

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Study 4

In Study 4, a set of 4 adapted hypotheses is tested on the population of recently arrived immigrants. Societal discrimination variables in the UK and the Netherlands do not render statistically significant associations (Figure 5).[18] Therefore, Hypothesis 1 lacks sufficient support. On the other hand, Hypothesis 2 has partial support, considering that coefficients for political discrimination from the Dutch data are positive and statistically significant. Contrary to expectations from Hypothesis 2, coefficients for political discrimination from the UK data are statistically insignificant, but also negative (Table 80, Appendix). Such difference in results might stem from the differences between datasets. The UK dataset has only 2 ethnic groups, while the Dutch sample has in total 6 surveyed groups. The Dutch sample is also larger than the UK sample by about 1,000 respondents. It is noteworthy that the coefficients of predicted probabilities for the UK sample are positive, which is in accordance with Hypothesis 2.

The last set of models provides only partial support for Hypothesis 3, but not for Hypothesis 4. Again, the coefficients obtained from the UK sample lack any statistical

[18]The societal discrimination variables in both the UK and Dutch samples do not show statistically significant associations with the outcome variables.

Figure 5: Ethnic-based Engagement (Specific Measures)



(a) UK **(b)** NL

significance and will not be interpreted (Figure 6 below and Table 82, Appendix), while the coefficients obtained from the Dutch sample are statistically significant (Table 84, Appendix). Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported with coefficients for societal discrimination statistically significant and positive.[19] On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 lacks support, with coefficients being statistically significant, but negative (Figure 6[20] and Table 84, Appendix). Such coefficients indicate that contrary to Hypothesis 4, increase in exposure to political discrimination is associated with decreasing agreement with irreconcilability of values. Within the Dutch sample, the overview of the average marginal effects indicates that the effect of societal discrimination is about twice as large as the effect of political discrimination.

[19]It is noteworthy that the coefficients for the impact of societal discrimination on the agreement with the statement is also positive in directionality in the UK data, but not statistically significant (Table 82, Appendix).

[20]Even though it seems that the upper bound of the confidence interval for Political Discrimination 2 for the agreement relative to disagreement with irreconcilability of values touches 0, it does not, because the upper bound of the confidence interval lies at −0.003041571 obtained using the `mnl_fd2_ova` function in `MNLpred` in R.

Figure 6: Irreconcilable values (Specific Measures)



(a) UK



(b) NL

Discussion and Conclusion

This replication study is intended to expand tests of the theoretical mechanism of divergent impact of societal and political discrimination on political behaviour of minorities, proposed in Oskooii (2020, 2016) through robustness checks and extensions of the original study. Due to differences in the theoretical and empirical estimands, as well as the differences in the data used, studies in this replication are comparable to the original research to a limited extent.

Study 1 finds that only societal discrimination remains a robust, negative predictor of voting in general elections and identifying both as British and Black/Asian, and a robust positive predictor of ethnic-based engagement. Such results indicate limited support for Oskooii's theoretical mechanism overall (2020). Oskooii's mechanism proposes that political discrimination facilitates mainstream political participation while societal discrimination discourages it, and both types strengthen in-group attachment. The results from Study 1 do not fully support this mechanism, as societal discrimination

shows negative effects on voting and identity choice, but political discrimination lacks consistent effects. Results suggest the two types of discrimination might not be of the same significance to minorities. By magnitude and consistency of the effect, societal discrimination emerges as the more significant form of discrimination. As a potential explanation, I would propose that the importance of legalisation of anti-discrimination plays a certain role (see i.e. Hemker and Rink 2017) in decreasing the significance of political discrimination. Namely, political institutions are equipped with anti-discrimination mechanisms that can identify and punish perpetrators of discrimination. Societal discrimination is by nature more dispersed and harder to pinpoint, even though the mechanisms for reporting and investigating exist. Punishing the perpetrators seems more elusive than in the case of political discrimination.

Study 2 finds that only societal, but not political, discrimination consistently predicts support for violent protests. This finding goes along with some key conclusions of the recent literature about support for protests among immigrants and support for violence (Grewal and Hamid 2024; Bilodeau et al. 2023). Oskooii's (2020) theory suggests that the unsystematic nature of societal discrimination makes individuals feel isolated and solitary in their coping with discrimination. The support for violent protests could act as a way to reclaim agency through support or participation in the protests and through approval of violence (possibly directed towards the perpetrators of discrimination). Supporting the violence in this case becomes a channel for expression of grievances and a way to recognise and connect with other people who're experiencing discrimination or expressing their grievances. Forming such a sort of bond could diminish the sense of

isolation that societal discrimination triggers.

Study 3 finds that exposure to political discrimination consistently and positively impacts voting in general and local elections, and participation in ethnic-based engagement, while societal discrimination positively impacts ethnic-based engagement. The treatment in Study 3 is mere exposure to societal and political discrimination and the effect narrows down to just (societally or politically) discriminated individuals. The findings support Oskooii's (2020) theoretical mechanism that exposure to political discrimination inspires mainstream political engagement, while both types of discrimination inspire participation in ethnic organisations. Mere exposure to societal discrimination does not cause abstinence from voting. An explanation for such a result might lie in the fact that voting is a relatively anonymous and low-cost form of political participation (societally discriminated individuals do not necessarily have to enter the public space to vote, for example if they vote by post). Secondly, voting as an act can bring internal satisfaction and demonstrate abidance to the norms of the local community. Both of these can be interpreted as ways of strengthening one's self-esteem and neutralising the harmful effects of societal discrimination. Additionally, the literature also suggests that withdrawal is related to the avoidance of situations in which the loss of self-esteem might emerge (Armenta and Hunt 2009; Greene, Way, and Pahl 2006; Schmitt et al. 2014), which is not necessarily the case in a situation of voting.

Study 4 brings only a partial support for a positive association of political discrimination with ethnic-based engagement and a positive association of societal discrimination with

irreconcilable values between the host country citizens and immigrants. Study 4 suggests a narrow similarity between minorities and recently arrived immigrants. Differences between the Dutch and the UK samples point out that the quality of comparison might be dependent more on the diversity and size of the sample and less on the same temporal and political context of the data collection. The findings suggest that both types of discrimination have significance for immigrants. Political discrimination as suggested pushes immigrants to search for the protection of their ethnic in-group, while societal discrimination alienates them from the host country nationals through an increased perception of cultural distance. Both of these findings lend limited support to Oskooii's (2020) theoretical mechanism.

Studies presented in this paper demonstrate that testing Oskooii's theoretical mechanism is not an easy task. Differences in estimands, populations and methodology prevent direct comparisons between the studies. Nevertheless, they all address the same theoretical mechanism, which provides a common ground for their mutual evaluation. Study 2 suggests that the mechanism described in Oskooii (2020), cannot be directly applied to all other forms of political behaviour. I suggest voting as a low-cost form of political participation is not easily exchangeable for other forms of mainstream political participation. Studies 1 and 3 indicate the relationship between voting and different types of discrimination is not as strong and straightforward as proposed in the initial argument (Oskooii 2020). Study 3 provides solid evidence about the robust positive impact of political and societal discrimination on ethnic-based engagement, further supporting Oskooii's (2020) theoretical mechanism. Finally, Study 4 underlines

additional limitations to Oskooii's (2020) mechanism, which is not directly applicable to populations other than minorities with a history of living in their host country.

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Data Availability: The data and code to reproduce the graphs and tables are available at: https://github.com/AndrejCvetic/Replication_Material.

Competing Interests: The author declares no competing interests.

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Appendix

1 Original Study Checks

Table 7: Summary Statistics for Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political Discrimination	2,658	0.548	1.414	0	12
Societal Discrimination	2,658	0.553	1.366	0	9

Table 8: Breusch-Pagan Test Results for Relevant Original Models

Outcome	Model Type	Estimate	P-value
Voting on General Elections	Complete	105.239	0
Voting on Local Elections	Complete	39.945	0.016
Voting on General Elections	Simplified	89.473	0
Voting on Local Elections	Simplified	36.465	0.009
Ethnic-Based Engagement	Complete	62.303	0
Ethnic-Based Engagement	Simplified	80.656	0
Identity Choice (Both)	Complete	2.143	1
Identity Choice (British)	Complete	224.857	0
Identity Choice (Both)	Simplified	1.187	1
Identity Choice (British)	Simplified	270.025	0

Table 9: Average Marginal Effects of Logit Models from the Original Paper

Outcome	Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
Vote in General Elections	Complete	Political Discrimination	0.112	0.048	2.350	0.019
		Societal Discrimination	-0.090	0.046	-1.941	0.052
Vote in Local Elections	Complete	Political Discrimination	0.125	0.046	2.705	0.007
		Societal Discrimination	-0.092	0.046	-1.999	0.046
Vote in General Elections	Simplified	Political Discrimination	0.073	0.043	1.684	0.092
		Societal Discrimination	-0.098	0.042	-2.309	0.021
Vote in Local Elections	Simplified	Political Discrimination	0.072	0.042	1.694	0.090
		Societal Discrimination	-0.080	0.042	-1.889	0.059
Ethnic-Based Engagement	Complete	Political Discrimination	0.070	0.039	1.804	0.071
		Societal Discrimination	0.099	0.040	2.502	0.012
	Simplified	Political Discrimination	0.071	0.037	1.903	0.057
		Societal Discrimination	0.101	0.038	2.667	0.008

Figure 7: Correlations of Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination)



Table 10: Average Marginal Effects of Multinomial Models from the Original Paper

Model	Variable	Category	AME	SE	z	p
Complete	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.028	0.009	-2.923	0.003
		British	-0.0003	0.007	-0.046	0.963
Simplified		Both	-0.026	0.009	-2.914	0.004
		British	-0.001	0.007	-0.143	0.886
Complete	Political Discrimination	Both	-0.001	0.010	-0.123	0.902
		British	-0.018	0.008	-2.176	0.030
Simplified		Both	-0.003	0.009	-0.282	0.778
		British	-0.020	0.008	-2.565	0.010

Figure 8: Partial Residuals Plots of Original Models



Figure 9: Difference in Fits Plots of Original Models



2 Study 1: Variable Manipulation Strategy and Explanations

Strength of party identification is a 3-point scale (1-3) of self-identified attachment to previously disclosed close party. Time spent in the UK measures years respondent spent in the UK since the time of arrival. Citizenship is a binary indicator of holding a UK passport.

In case of evaluations of economic past, original questions asked respondents how does the financial situation of their household compare to what it was 12 months ago and how has the situation in the country changed over the last 12 months. Answers were ordered in 5-point scale ranging from 1 (got a lot worse) to 5 (got a lot better). I transformed this into a 3-point scale ranging from 1 (worse) over 2 (stay the same) to 3 (better). For the future evaluations, respondents were asked how the situation of their household is going to change in the next 12 months and general economic situation in the country is going to develop in the next 12 months. Answers were ordered in 5-point scale ranging from 1 (got a lot worse) to 5 (got a lot better). I transformed this into a 3-point scale ranging from 1 (worse) over 2 (stay the same) to 3 (better).

Involvement in community affairs was assessed through the following question: "Over the past few years, how active have you been in a voluntary organisation, like a local community association, a charity, or a sports club?" Answers were ordered in 4-point scale ranging from 1 (very active) to 4 (not at all active). I recoded the scale so that 0 represents complete lack of involvement and that 3 represents highest level of involvement. Participation in social networks was measured through questions asking how many people in respondent's circle of friends, neighbourhood or church were from the same ethnic background. Answers were ordered in 5-point scale ranging from 1 (all of them) to 5 (none of them). For all three variables, scales were reversed so that 0 represents complete absence of people from the same ethnic background, to 4 which would represent complete absence of people who do not share respondent's ethnic background. Three variables were then summed into an index that could take values from 0 (complete absence of people from the same ethnic background) to 12 (complete

absence of people who are not of the same ethnic background). Perception of prejudice was measured through assessment if there is more or less prejudice against respondent's ethnic group compared to other Black and Asian groups in the UK today. Answers were ordered in 3-point scale, which was recoded so that 1 means less prejudice, 2 means the same and 3 means more prejudice.

3 Study 1: Alternative Specifications of Original Models

Table 11: Vote in General Elections (Specific Measures) - Alternative Specifications

	Vote in General Election				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Societal Discrimination	−0.132*	−0.135*	−0.080*	−0.079*	−0.096**
	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Political Discrimination	0.124	0.100	0.056	0.049	0.057
	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Worship Attendance	0.142***	0.115**	0.120***	0.116***	0.093***
	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Political Interest	0.251***	0.381***	0.389***	0.414***	0.371***
	(0.093)	(0.081)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Political Knowledge	0.195**	0.152**	0.210***	0.224***	0.183***
	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Strength of Party ID	0.367***	0.393***			
	(0.126)	(0.112)			
Close to British ID	0.390***	0.318***			
	(0.121)	(0.110)			
Party ID (Yes=1)			1.230***	1.158***	1.186***
			(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.128)
English (Main Lang)	0.114	0.044	0.278**	0.261**	0.193
	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Citizen	0.673***	0.736***			
	(0.216)	(0.197)			
Duration of Stay	0.001	−0.0002			
	(0.011)	(0.010)			
Native Born			0.106	0.154	0.058
			(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.130)
Female	0.145	0.276*	0.389***	0.441***	0.415***
	(0.176)	(0.162)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Age	0.031***	0.029***	0.036***	0.038***	0.036***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Education	−0.066	−0.051	−0.023	0.002	0.002
	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
High Income	0.286	0.189	0.294	0.206	0.422**
	(0.333)	(0.313)	(0.214)	(0.217)	(0.215)
Med Income	0.556**	0.416*	0.161	0.091	0.294*
	(0.267)	(0.251)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.159)
Missing Income	0.154	0.051	0.128	0.140	0.195
	(0.199)	(0.180)	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.120)
Black Caribbean	−0.011	−0.063	0.063	0.013	0.122
	(0.308)	(0.279)	(0.169)	(0.173)	(0.172)
Indian	0.336	0.478**	0.710***	0.715***	0.642***
	(0.248)	(0.226)	(0.166)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Pakistani	0.988***	0.976***	0.870***	0.840***	0.951***
	(0.260)	(0.237)	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.164)
Bangladeshi	1.432***	1.581***	1.618***	1.559***	1.467***
	(0.358)	(0.331)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.223)
Vote Duty	0.686***				
	(0.121)				
Political Efficacy	0.045				
	(0.030)				
Democratic Satisfaction	0.013				
	(0.126)				
Trust Parliament	−0.026				
	(0.039)				
Personal finance past			0.032		
			(0.077)		
Personal finance future			−0.076		
			(0.067)		
National economic past				0.052	
				(0.077)	
National economic future				−0.053	
				(0.063)	
Community affairs					0.085
					(0.054)
More prejudice					−0.030
					(0.077)
Constant	−7.287***	−4.172***	−4.138***	−4.397***	−4.078***
	(0.857)	(0.573)	(0.386)	(0.389)	(0.366)
N	982	1,107	2,251	2,148	2,183
Log Likelihood	−440.485	−517.400	−1,158.282	−1,106.169	−1,133.819
AIC	930.969	1,076.800	2,358.565	2,254.338	2,309.638

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 12: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Vote in General Elections

Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0.124	0.079	1.556	0.120
	Societal Discrimination	-0.132	0.080	-1.655	0.098
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0.100	0.073	1.371	0.170
	Societal Discrimination	-0.135	0.075	-1.801	0.072
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0.056	0.044	1.270	0.204
	Societal Discrimination	-0.080	0.044	-1.833	0.067
Model 4	Political Discrimination	0.049	0.044	1.118	0.264
	Societal Discrimination	-0.079	0.044	-1.790	0.074
Model 5	Political Discrimination	0.057	0.042	1.332	0.183
	Societal Discrimination	-0.096	0.042	-2.282	0.022

Table 13: Vote in Local Elections (Specific Measures) - Alternative Specifications

	Vote in Local Election				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Societal Discrimination	−0.113	−0.106	−0.053	−0.064	−0.075*
	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Political Discrimination	0.092	0.079	0.055	0.043	0.052
	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Worship Attendance	0.105**	0.082*	0.116***	0.110***	0.083***
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Political Interest	0.259***	0.367***	0.347***	0.373***	0.315***
	(0.092)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Political Knowledge	0.151**	0.111	0.168***	0.182***	0.159***
	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Strength of Party ID	0.210*	0.244**			
	(0.123)	(0.109)			
Close to British ID	0.426***	0.341***			
	(0.119)	(0.107)			
Party ID (Yes=1)			1.216***	1.104***	1.161***
			(0.130)	(0.134)	(0.131)
English (Main Lang)	0.195	0.065	0.233*	0.208	0.123
	(0.200)	(0.182)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Citizen	0.703***	0.711***			
	(0.214)	(0.194)			
Duration of Stay	−0.001	−0.001			
	(0.010)	(0.009)			
Native Born			0.087	0.177	0.098
			(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.127)
Female	−0.077	0.070	0.256**	0.274***	0.267**
	(0.172)	(0.157)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.105)
Age	0.034***	0.029***	0.039***	0.042***	0.037***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Education	−0.083	−0.055	−0.024	−0.004	0.002
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
High Income	0.287	0.193	0.283	0.241	0.310
	(0.324)	(0.303)	(0.205)	(0.209)	(0.205)
Med Income	0.413	0.282	0.087	0.027	0.128
	(0.258)	(0.241)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Missing Income	0.026	−0.112	0.028	0.034	0.031
	(0.196)	(0.176)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Black Caribbean	−0.093	−0.042	0.064	−0.016	0.117
	(0.299)	(0.271)	(0.166)	(0.170)	(0.169)
Indian	0.195	0.333	0.467***	0.430***	0.458***
	(0.247)	(0.222)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.167)
Pakistani	1.095***	1.069***	0.955***	0.906***	1.039***
	(0.261)	(0.234)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.164)
Bangladeshi	1.281***	1.479***	1.534***	1.461***	1.428***
	(0.345)	(0.314)	(0.222)	(0.224)	(0.219)
Vote Duty	0.661***				
	(0.123)				
Political Efficacy	0.057*				
	(0.030)				
Democratic Satisfaction	−0.031				
	(0.123)				
Trust Parliament	0.003				
	(0.038)				
Personal finance past			0.071		
			(0.076)		
Personal finance future			−0.044		
			(0.067)		
National economic past				0.085	
				(0.076)	
National economic future				−0.080	
				(0.062)	
Community affairs					0.052
					(0.053)
More prejudice					−0.017
					(0.076)
Constant	−7.035***	−3.760***	−4.236***	−4.280***	−3.906***
	(0.847)	(0.549)	(0.383)	(0.384)	(0.361)
N	914	1,030	2,123	2,020	2,052
Log Likelihood	−449.226	−534.959	−1,170.113	−1,118.630	−1,144.844
AIC	948.452	1,110.918	2,382.226	2,279.261	2,331.689

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 14: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Vote in Local Elections

Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0.092	0.078	1.176	0.240
	Societal Discrimination	-0.113	0.079	-1.432	0.152
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0.079	0.072	1.100	0.271
	Societal Discrimination	-0.106	0.074	-1.424	0.154
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0.055	0.043	1.280	0.201
	Societal Discrimination	-0.053	0.044	-1.207	0.228
Model 4	Political Discrimination	0.043	0.043	0.998	0.318
	Societal Discrimination	-0.064	0.044	-1.448	0.148
Model 5	Political Discrimination	0.052	0.042	1.246	0.213
	Societal Discrimination	-0.075	0.042	-1.780	0.075

Table 15: Ethnic Based Engagement (Specific Measures) - Alternative Specifications

	Ethnic-Based Participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Societal Discrimination	0.167**	0.159**	0.085**
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.039)
Political Discrimination	0.080	0.088	0.065*
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.038)
Worship Attendance	0.264***	0.254***	0.213***
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.032)
Political Interest	0.212***	0.217***	0.059
	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.051)
Political Knowledge	0.070	0.107*	0.173***
	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.047)
Strength of Party ID	0.098	0.138	
	(0.110)	(0.100)	
Close to British ID	0.039	0.081	
	(0.108)	(0.101)	
Party ID (Yes=1)			0.485***
			(0.147)
English (Main Lang)	−0.372**	−0.272	−0.262**
	(0.179)	(0.166)	(0.125)
Citizen	−0.065	0.001	
	(0.206)	(0.190)	
Duration of Stay	0.005	0.005	
	(0.009)	(0.008)	
Native Born			0.227*
			(0.128)
Female	0.318**	0.394***	0.110
	(0.155)	(0.145)	(0.102)
Age	0.009	0.006	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Education	0.107**	0.122***	0.062*
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.036)
High Income	0.043	0.001	0.150
	(0.291)	(0.270)	(0.188)
Med Income	−0.021	0.103	0.031
	(0.221)	(0.207)	(0.149)
Missing Income	−0.006	0.001	−0.043
	(0.177)	(0.164)	(0.119)
Black Caribbean	−0.525*	−0.405	0.050
	(0.281)	(0.261)	(0.171)
Indian	0.483**	0.511**	0.627***
	(0.218)	(0.200)	(0.162)
Pakistani	−0.722***	−0.698***	−0.291*
	(0.242)	(0.222)	(0.163)
Bangladeshi	0.075	0.114	0.236
	(0.290)	(0.263)	(0.203)
Vote Duty	0.208*		
	(0.114)		
Political Efficacy	0.089***		
	(0.025)		
Democratic Satisfaction	−0.215**		
	(0.108)		
Trust Parliament	−0.076**		
	(0.034)		
Community affairs			0.493***
			(0.048)
More prejudice			0.096
			(0.074)
Constant	−3.616***	−3.644***	−3.717***
	(0.704)	(0.508)	(0.362)
N	990	1,116	2,205
Log Likelihood	−546.151	−627.950	−1,205.781
AIC	1,142.301	1,297.900	2,453.562

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 16: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Ethnic Based Engagement

Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0.080	0.064	1.252	0.211
	Societal Discrimination	0.167	0.069	2.431	0.015
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0.088	0.061	1.443	0.149
	Societal Discrimination	0.159	0.066	2.422	0.015
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0.065	0.038	1.695	0.090
	Societal Discrimination	0.085	0.039	2.176	0.030

Table 17: Identity Choice (Specific Measures) - Alternative Specifications

	Both (1)	British (1)	Both (2)	British (2)	Both (3)	British (3)
Societal Discrimination	−0.237***	−0.199*	−0.150***	−0.110*	−0.144***	−0.083
	(0.077)	(0.107)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.060)
Political Discrimination	−0.064	−0.027	−0.091**	−0.218***	−0.083**	−0.223***
	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.040)	(0.067)
Worship Attendance	−0.012	−0.181***	−0.078***	−0.177***	−0.086***	−0.209***
	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.043)
Political Interest	0.052	0.204*	0.117**	0.271***	0.130**	0.255***
	(0.081)	(0.114)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.071)
Political Knowledge	0.001	−0.039	−0.049	0.090	−0.054	0.097
	(0.070)	(0.100)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.066)
Strength of Party ID	0.006	−0.123				
	(0.111)	(0.157)				
Party ID (Yes=1)			0.100	0.004	0.159	−0.009
			(0.126)	(0.175)	(0.139)	(0.190)
English (Main Lang)	0.355*	0.471*	0.538***	0.840***	0.515***	0.756***
	(0.185)	(0.257)	(0.121)	(0.162)	(0.132)	(0.174)
Citizen	0.941***	1.654***				
	(0.205)	(0.354)				
Duration of Stay	0.009	0.022*				
	(0.009)	(0.013)				
Native Born			0.819***	1.305***	0.784***	1.186***
			(0.128)	(0.169)	(0.138)	(0.180)
Female	−0.255	−0.448**	−0.023	−0.203	−0.068	−0.256*
	(0.157)	(0.225)	(0.098)	(0.134)	(0.106)	(0.144)
Age	0.002	0.007	0.018***	0.033***	0.015***	0.025***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Education	0.010	0.066	−0.022	−0.041	−0.029	−0.045
	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.050)
High Income	−0.558*	−0.521	−0.379**	−0.458*	−0.241	−0.529**
	(0.310)	(0.407)	(0.188)	(0.252)	(0.199)	(0.267)
Med Income	−0.012	−0.308	0.084	−0.126	0.197	−0.095
	(0.229)	(0.328)	(0.147)	(0.201)	(0.158)	(0.213)
Missing Income	0.099	−0.378	0.228**	−0.019	0.336***	−0.020
	(0.178)	(0.254)	(0.112)	(0.153)	(0.122)	(0.165)
Black Caribbean	−0.089	−0.286	−0.235	−0.560**	−0.263	−0.702**
	(0.272)	(0.424)	(0.160)	(0.255)	(0.173)	(0.273)
Indian	0.729***	1.222***	0.594***	1.261***	0.555***	1.235***
	(0.234)	(0.349)	(0.154)	(0.230)	(0.173)	(0.247)
Pakistani	1.005***	1.612***	0.984***	1.902***	1.028***	1.952***
	(0.239)	(0.353)	(0.153)	(0.227)	(0.168)	(0.245)
Bangladeshi	0.387	0.705	0.723***	1.650***	0.665***	1.332***
	(0.292)	(0.443)	(0.191)	(0.274)	(0.207)	(0.298)
Vote Duty	0.021	−0.066				
	(0.111)	(0.155)				
Political Efficacy	0.032	0.056				
	(0.026)	(0.037)				
Democratic Satisfaction	0.062	0.113				
	(0.111)	(0.161)				
Trust Parliament	0.057*	0.090*				
	(0.034)	(0.050)				
Community affairs					0.030	0.135*
					(0.053)	(0.070)
More prejudice					−0.157**	−0.349***
					(0.078)	(0.106)
Constant	−1.802***	−3.879***	−1.058***	−3.786***	−0.683*	−2.593***
	(0.688)	(0.998)	(0.285)	(0.433)	(0.349)	(0.508)
AIC	1,857.281	1,857.281	4,580.944	4,580.944	3,975.335	3,975.335

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 18: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Identity Choice

Model	Variable	Category	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.040	0.017	-2.374	0.018
		British	-0.005	0.012	-0.429	0.668
	Political Discrimination	Both	-0.013	0.015	-0.848	0.397
		British	0.002	0.011	0.155	0.877
Model 2	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.033	0.016	-2.052	0.040
		British	-0.007	0.012	-0.632	0.527
	Political Discrimination	Both	-0.016	0.015	-1.059	0.290
		British	-0.001	0.011	-0.065	0.948
Model 3	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.027	0.009	-2.911	0.004
		British	0.002	0.007	0.259	0.796
	Political Discrimination	Both	-0.006	0.009	-0.016	0.987
		British	-0.022	0.008	-2.632	0.008

4 Study 1: Interaction Models

Table 19: Vote in General Elections (Interaction Models)

	Voting in General Elections		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Societal Discrimination	−0.121**	−0.116**	−0.097**
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.042)
Community Affairs	0.073	0.071	0.082
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Political Discrimination	0.064	0.054	0.052
	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.053)
Worship Attendance	0.093***	0.093***	0.093***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Political Interest	0.372***	0.372***	0.371***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Political Knowledge	0.183***	0.183***	0.183***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Party ID (Yes=1)	1.188***	1.188***	1.187***
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)
English (Main Lang)	0.194	0.194	0.193
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Native Born	0.060	0.060	0.058
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Female	0.416***	0.415***	0.415***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Age	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
High Income	0.417*	0.417*	0.422*
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.215)
Med Income	0.291*	0.290*	0.293*
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Missing Income	0.193	0.193	0.195
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Black Caribbean	0.118	0.120	0.123
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.172)
Indian	0.641***	0.641***	0.642***
	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Pakistani	0.945***	0.947***	0.951***
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Bangladeshi	1.462***	1.463***	1.467***
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)
More prejudice	−0.027	−0.028	−0.030
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Societal Discrimination*Community affairs	0.024	0.018	
	(0.039)	(0.031)	
Political Discrimination*Community affairs	−0.011		0.004
	(0.039)		(0.031)
Constant	−4.076***	−4.073***	−4.076***
	(0.366)	(0.366)	(0.366)
N	2,183	2,183	2,183
Log Likelihood	−1,133.616	−1,133.653	−1,133.809
AIC	2,313.233	2,311.306	2,311.618

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 20: Average Marginal Effects (Interaction Models): Vote in General Elections

Model	Variable	Moderator	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0	0.011	0.010	1.128	0.259
		1	0.009	0.007	1.254	0.210
		2	0.007	0.010	0.734	0.463
		3	0.005	0.015	0.361	0.718
	Societal Discrimination	0	-0.021	0.010	-2.108	0.035
		1	-0.017	0.007	-2.284	0.022
		2	-0.012	0.010	-1.247	0.212
		3	-0.008	0.015	-0.533	0.594
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0	0.009	0.007	1.265	0.206
		1	0.009	0.007	1.265	0.206
		2	0.009	0.007	1.264	0.206
		3	0.009	0.007	1.262	0.207
	Societal Discrimination	0	-0.020	0.009	-2.150	0.032
		1	-0.017	0.007	-2.324	0.020
		2	-0.013	0.008	-1.588	0.112
		3	-0.010	0.012	-0.860	0.390
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0	0.009	0.009	0.976	0.329
		1	0.010	0.007	1.328	0.184
		2	0.010	0.009	1.176	0.240
		3	0.011	0.012	0.882	0.378
	Societal Discrimination	0	-0.017	0.007	-2.288	0.022
		1	-0.017	0.007	-2.293	0.022
		2	-0.016	0.007	-2.294	0.022
		3	-0.016	0.007	-2.291	0.022

Table 21: Vote in Local Elections (Interaction Models)

	Voting in Local Elections		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Societal Discrimination	−0.062	−0.079	−0.079*
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.042)
Community Affairs	0.043	0.050	0.037
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Political Discrimination	0.020	0.051	0.028
	(0.056)	(0.042)	(0.053)
Worship Attendance	0.083***	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Political Interest	0.317***	0.315***	0.317***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Political Knowledge	0.159***	0.159***	0.159***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Party ID (Yes=1)	1.162***	1.161***	1.163***
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)
English (Main Lang)	0.125	0.123	0.125
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Native Born	0.097	0.098	0.099
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Female	0.264**	0.267**	0.265**
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Age	0.036***	0.037***	0.036***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
High Income	0.311	0.309	0.308
	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.205)
Med Income	0.124	0.127	0.123
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Missing Income	0.032	0.030	0.031
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Black Caribbean	0.125	0.117	0.122
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)
Indian	0.460***	0.458***	0.459***
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.167)
Pakistani	1.044***	1.039***	1.040***
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Bangladeshi	1.430***	1.427***	1.428***
	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.219)
More prejudice	−0.019	−0.016	−0.017
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Societal Discrimination*Community affairs	−0.017	0.003	
	(0.039)	(0.031)	
Political Discrimination*Community affairs	0.032		0.022
	(0.039)		(0.030)
Constant	−3.899***	−3.906***	−3.899***
	(0.361)	(0.361)	(0.361)
N	2,052	2,052	2,052
Log Likelihood	−1,144.490	−1,144.839	−1,144.582
AIC	2,334.980	2,333.678	2,333.165

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 22: Average Marginal Effects (Interaction Models): Vote in Local Elections

Model	Variable	Moderator	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0	0.004	0.011	0.353	0.724
		1	0.010	0.008	1.237	0.216
		2	0.016	0.011	1.454	0.146
		3	0.021	0.016	1.308	0.191
	Societal Discrimination	0	-0.012	0.011	-1.062	0.288
		1	-0.015	0.008	-1.855	0.064
		2	-0.018	0.011	-1.667	0.096
		3	-0.021	0.016	-1.272	0.203
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0	0.010	0.008	1.228	0.219
		1	0.010	0.008	1.228	0.219
		2	0.010	0.008	1.227	0.220
		3	0.009	0.008	1.226	0.220
	Societal Discrimination	0	-0.015	0.010	-1.445	0.149
		1	-0.014	0.008	-1.787	0.074
		2	-0.013	0.009	-1.442	0.149
		3	-0.013	0.013	-0.962	0.336
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0	0.005	0.010	0.533	0.594
		1	0.009	0.008	1.201	0.230
		2	0.013	0.009	1.426	0.154
		3	0.017	0.013	1.299	0.194
	Societal Discrimination	0	-0.015	0.008	-1.859	0.063
		1	-0.015	0.008	-1.861	0.063
		2	-0.015	0.008	-1.862	0.063
		3	-0.014	0.008	-1.863	0.063

Table 23: Ethnic-Based Engagement (Interaction Models)

	Ethnic-Based Engagement		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Societal Discrimination	0.101*	0.090*	0.084**
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.040)
Community Affairs	0.492***	0.496***	0.486***
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Political Discrimination	0.045	0.065*	0.053
	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.051)
Worship Attendance	0.213***	0.213***	0.213***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Political Interest	0.060	0.059	0.060
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Political Knowledge	0.172***	0.172***	0.173***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Party ID (Yes=1)	0.486***	0.485***	0.486***
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)
English (Main Lang)	−0.262**	−0.263**	−0.261**
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Native Born	0.228*	0.227*	0.228*
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Female	0.108	0.110	0.109
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.062*	0.062*	0.062*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
High Income	0.151	0.151	0.149
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Med Income	0.031	0.032	0.030
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Missing Income	−0.042	−0.043	−0.043
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Black Caribbean	0.053	0.050	0.050
	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Indian	0.628***	0.627***	0.627***
	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.162)
Pakistani	−0.288*	−0.291*	−0.290*
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)
Bangladeshi	0.238	0.236	0.235
	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)
More prejudice	0.094	0.096	0.095
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Societal Discrimination*Community affairs	−0.016	−0.004	
	(0.037)	(0.030)	
Political Discrimination*Community affairs	0.019		0.011
	(0.036)		(0.030)
Constant	−3.712***	−3.718***	−3.711***
	(0.362)	(0.362)	(0.362)
N	2,205	2,205	2,205
Log Likelihood	−1,205.628	−1,205.771	−1,205.717
AIC	2,457.256	2,455.543	2,455.433

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 24: Average Marginal Effects (Interaction Models): Ethnic-Based Engagement

Model	Variable	Moderator	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0	0.007	0.009	0.835	0.403
		1	0.013	0.008	1.670	0.095
		2	0.019	0.012	1.617	0.106
		3	0.023	0.018	1.280	0.200
	Societal Discrimination	0	0.017	0.009	1.805	0.071
		1	0.017	0.008	2.173	0.030
		2	0.016	0.012	1.351	0.177
		3	0.012	0.018	0.673	0.501
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0	0.011	0.006	1.703	0.088
		1	0.013	0.008	1.707	0.088
		2	0.015	0.009	1.707	0.088
		3	0.015	0.009	1.706	0.088
	Societal Discrimination	0	0.015	0.009	1.724	0.085
		1	0.017	0.008	2.190	0.029
		2	0.018	0.010	1.765	0.078
		3	0.018	0.015	1.149	0.251
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0	0.009	0.008	1.052	0.293
		1	0.013	0.008	1.654	0.098
		2	0.017	0.010	1.594	0.111
		3	0.019	0.015	1.250	0.211
	Societal Discrimination	0	0.014	0.007	2.126	0.034
		1	0.017	0.008	2.136	0.033
		2	0.019	0.009	2.137	0.033
		3	0.019	0.009	2.133	0.033

Table 25: Identity Choice (Interaction Models)

	Identity Choice	British	Both	British	Both	British
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Societal Discrimination	−0.192***	−0.162*	−0.177***	−0.144*	−0.144***	−0.083
	(0.058)	(0.084)	(0.055)	(0.080)	(0.042)	(0.060)
Community Affairs	0.015	0.107	0.007	0.098	0.032	0.133*
	(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.075)
Political Discrimination	−0.059	−0.191**	−0.087**	−0.229***	−0.081	−0.229***
	(0.054)	(0.092)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.088)
Worship Attendance	−0.087***	−0.210***	−0.086***	−0.210***	−0.086***	−0.209***
	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.043)
Political Interest	0.132**	0.258***	0.133**	0.260***	0.130**	0.255***
	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.071)
Political Knowledge	−0.054	0.099	−0.054	0.099	−0.054	0.097
	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.048)	(0.066)
Party ID (Yes=1)	0.159	−0.008	0.162	−0.005	0.159	−0.009
	(0.139)	(0.190)	(0.139)	(0.190)	(0.139)	(0.190)
English (Main Lang)	0.517***	0.761***	0.518***	0.762***	0.514***	0.756***
	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.132)	(0.174)
Native Born	0.786***	1.189***	0.787***	1.189***	0.784***	1.186***
	(0.138)	(0.180)	(0.138)	(0.180)	(0.138)	(0.180)
Female	−0.065	−0.253*	−0.068	−0.256*	−0.067	−0.256*
	(0.106)	(0.144)	(0.106)	(0.144)	(0.106)	(0.144)
Age	0.015***	0.025***	0.015***	0.025***	0.015***	0.025***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Education	−0.028	−0.043	−0.028	−0.043	−0.029	−0.044
	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.050)
High Income	−0.248	−0.543**	−0.248	−0.542**	−0.241	−0.529**
	(0.199)	(0.268)	(0.199)	(0.267)	(0.199)	(0.267)
Med Income	0.196	−0.100	0.192	−0.104	0.198	−0.095
	(0.158)	(0.213)	(0.158)	(0.213)	(0.158)	(0.213)
Missing Income	0.333***	−0.026	0.333***	−0.025	0.336***	−0.020
	(0.122)	(0.165)	(0.122)	(0.165)	(0.122)	(0.165)
Black Caribbean	−0.271	−0.720***	−0.268	−0.716***	−0.263	−0.702**
	(0.173)	(0.273)	(0.173)	(0.273)	(0.173)	(0.273)
Indian	0.553***	1.231***	0.553***	1.231***	0.555***	1.235***
	(0.173)	(0.247)	(0.173)	(0.246)	(0.173)	(0.247)
Pakistani	1.022***	1.942***	1.025***	1.945***	1.028***	1.952***
	(0.168)	(0.245)	(0.168)	(0.245)	(0.168)	(0.245)
Bangladeshi	0.660***	1.322***	0.659***	1.322***	0.665***	1.332***
	(0.207)	(0.298)	(0.207)	(0.298)	(0.207)	(0.298)
More prejudice	−0.151*	−0.341***	−0.154**	−0.345***	−0.156**	−0.349***
	(0.078)	(0.107)	(0.078)	(0.107)	(0.078)	(0.106)
Societal Discrimination*Community affairs	0.047	0.074	0.029	0.055		
	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.046)		
Political Discrimination*Community affairs	−0.028	−0.037			−0.002	0.006
	(0.037)	(0.060)			(0.030)	(0.051)
Constant	−0.689**	−2.597***	−0.677*	−2.584***	−0.684*	−2.592***
	(0.350)	(0.508)	(0.349)	(0.508)	(0.350)	(0.508)
AIC	3,980.940	3,980.940	3,977.659	3,977.659	3,979.310	3,979.310

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 26: Average Marginal Effects (Interaction Models): Identity Choice

Model	Variable	Category	AME	SE	z	p
	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.028	0.010	-2.927	0.003
		British	0.001	0.008	0.074	0.941
	Political Discrimination	Both	0	0.010	0.012	0.990
		British	-0.022	0.009	-2.578	0.010
Model 2	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.028	0.010	-2.918	0.004
		British	0.001	0.007	0.091	0.927
	Political Discrimination	Both	0	0.009	-0.045	0.964
		British	-0.023	0.008	-2.686	0.007
Model 3	Societal Discrimination	Both	-0.027	0.009	-2.895	0.004
		British	0.002	0.007	0.253	0.800
	Political Discrimination	Both	0	0.010	0.010	0.992
		British	-0.022	0.009	-2.609	0.009

5 Study 2: Variable Manipulation Strategy and Explanations

Support for violent demonstrations was measured through three questions asking people if they would support violent demonstrations in situations such as the British government starting a war they did not agree with; the British government passed a tax increase they thought was unfair; or to protest against job cuts. All questions have yes or no answer. Index of support for violent demonstrations was computed by summing up these three variables, where the range of answers could go from 0 (complete lack of support for violent demonstrations) to 1 (highest level of support for violent demonstrations). Non-electoral political participation was measured through 4 questions asking respondents if they, in the last 12 months, participated in a protest, rally or demonstrations; signed a petition; participated in a boycott of a particular product or service; or donated money to a political cause or advocacy organisations (excluding political parties). Answers were recorded using binary indicators. The index of non-electoral political participation was created by summing up 4 variables in scale where 0 indicates complete lack of non-electoral participation and 4 indicated highest level.

An additional control for the use of Internet was added in these models. The question asks respondents to indicate if they use the internet regularly through a binary indicator. Variable was recoded so that 0 indicates no and 1 indicates yes.

6 Study 2: Alternative Outcome Variables

Table 27: Alternative outcomes (Specific Measures) - Support for Violent Demonstrations

	Support for violent demonstrations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Societal Discrimination	0.127**	0.117**	0.148**
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.074)
Political Discrimination	−0.059	−0.046	0.026
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.070)
Worship Attendance	−0.046	−0.008	
	(0.043)	(0.041)	
Participation in Social Networks			0.007
			(0.042)
Political Interest	0.050	0.095	−0.039
	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.090)
Political Knowledge	0.010	0.045	−0.028
	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.077)
Party ID (Yes=1)	0.488**	0.433**	0.371
	(0.220)	(0.198)	(0.265)
Close to British ID	0.200*	0.171*	0.234*
	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.127)
English (Main Lang)	−0.232	−0.114	−0.220
	(0.171)	(0.160)	(0.196)
Native Born	0.082	0.115	−0.142
	(0.186)	(0.169)	(0.223)
Female	−0.404***	−0.411***	−0.365**
	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.175)
Age	−0.030***	−0.032***	−0.033***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Education	−0.052	−0.073	−0.116*
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.061)
High Income	0.266	0.313	0.437
	(0.249)	(0.240)	(0.296)
Med Income	−0.326	−0.198	−0.267
	(0.215)	(0.204)	(0.255)
Missing Income	−0.322*	−0.251	−0.400*
	(0.168)	(0.157)	(0.208)
Black Caribbean	−0.447*	−0.323	−0.635*
	(0.258)	(0.241)	(0.350)
Indian	0.104	0.070	0.324
	(0.228)	(0.213)	(0.272)
Pakistani	−0.210	−0.249	−0.279
	(0.226)	(0.210)	(0.275)
Bangladeshi	0.366	0.299	0.406
	(0.262)	(0.243)	(0.310)
Vote Duty	−0.070		
	(0.086)		
Political Efficacy	0.096***		0.099***
	(0.024)		(0.029)
Democratic Satisfaction	0.100		0.175
	(0.099)		(0.125)
Trust Parliament	−0.095***		−0.090**
	(0.032)		(0.039)
National economic future			−0.068
			(0.100)
Use of Internet			0.432*
			(0.254)
Constant	−0.272	−0.889**	−0.433
	(0.553)	(0.416)	(0.695)
N	1,689	1,921	1,152
Log Likelihood	−673.136	−758.835	−461.122
AIC	1,394.272	1,557.669	972.244

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 28: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Support for Violent Demonstrations

Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	-0.059	0.059	-1	0.317
	Societal Discrimination	0.127	0.059	2.166	0.030
Model 2	Political Discrimination	-0.046	0.056	-0.827	0.408
	Societal Discrimination	0.117	0.056	2.098	0.036
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0.026	0.070	0.369	0.712
	Societal Discrimination	0.148	0.074	2.003	0.045

Table 29: Alternative outcomes (Specific Measures) - Non-electoral Political Participation

	Non-electoral political participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Societal Discrimination	0.104**	0.107***	0.083
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.051)
Political Discrimination	0.021	0.034	0.033
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.049)
Worship Attendance	0.115***	0.114***	
	(0.033)	(0.031)	
Participation in Social Networks			0.008
			(0.031)
Political Interest	0.278***	0.315***	0.257***
	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.066)
Political Knowledge	0.138***	0.176***	0.123**
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.059)
Party ID (Yes=1)	0.191	0.188	0.265
	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.188)
Close to British ID	0.317***	0.257***	0.344***
	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.095)
English (Main Lang)	0.048	0.134	0.067
	(0.133)	(0.126)	(0.152)
Native Born	0.475***	0.571***	0.430***
	(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.162)
Female	0.046	0.071	−0.046
	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.129)
Age	−0.002	−0.002	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Education	0.223***	0.203***	0.213***
	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.047)
High Income	0.739***	0.613***	0.488**
	(0.189)	(0.181)	(0.228)
Med Income	0.089	0.090	0.078
	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.180)
Missing Income	−0.151	−0.092	−0.170
	(0.128)	(0.120)	(0.152)
Black Caribbean	0.183	0.282	0.189
	(0.186)	(0.176)	(0.227)
Indian	0.284	0.289*	0.266
	(0.177)	(0.169)	(0.210)
Pakistani	0.507***	0.506***	0.455**
	(0.174)	(0.164)	(0.209)
Bangladeshi	0.647***	0.669***	0.543**
	(0.224)	(0.209)	(0.262)
Vote Duty	0.073		
	(0.067)		
Political Efficacy	0.060***		0.070***
	(0.019)		(0.022)
Democratic Satisfaction	−0.146**		−0.084
	(0.074)		(0.090)
Trust Parliament	−0.068***		−0.072**
	(0.024)		(0.029)
National economic future			−0.129*
			(0.074)
Use of Internet			0.069
			(0.183)
Constant	−3.939***	−4.313***	−3.187***
	(0.438)	(0.343)	(0.532)
N	2,101	2,385	1,423
Log Likelihood	−1,100.851	−1,222.997	−778.348
AIC	2,249.703	2,485.995	1,606.697

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 30: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Non-electoral Political Participation

Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Political Discrimination	0.021	0.041	0.515	0.606
	Societal Discrimination	0.104	0.042	2.513	0.012
Model 2	Political Discrimination	0.034	0.039	0.863	0.388
	Societal Discrimination	0.107	0.040	2.675	0.007
Model 3	Political Discrimination	0.033	0.049	0.675	0.500
	Societal Discrimination	0.083	0.051	1.635	0.102

7 Study 3: Propensity Score Matching Results

Balance Checks

Table 31: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Complete Model)

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Logit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
Political Discrimination	0.020	0.019	0.062	0.063	0.065	0.064
Worship Attendance	0.023	0.034	0.018	0.021	0.010	0.041
Political Interest	0.021	0.024	0.016	0.019	0.016	0.022
Political Knowledge	0.022	0.023	0.025	0.023	0.023	0.023
Party ID	0.027	0.038	0.017	0.040	0.011	0.032
Identity	0.028	0.033	0.032	0.045	0.033	0.047
English (Main Lang)	0.001	0.017	0.023	0.032	0.014	0.003
Native Born	0.054	0.036	0.032	0.055	0.032	0.043
Female	0.048	0.036	0.040	0.040	0.020	0.029
Age	0.011	0.012	0.010	0.009	0.011	0.010
Education	0.035	0.023	0.023	0.014	0.029	0.019
High Income	0.0002	0.008	0.023	0.006	0.011	0.020
Med Income	0.022	0.022	0.003	0.034	0.014	0.023
Missing Income	0.020	0.026	0.011	0.011	0.014	0.003
Black Caribbean	0.036	0.038	0.017	0.034	0.014	0.023
Indian	0.024	0.001	0.032	0.029	0.043	0.034
Pakistani	0.021	0.032	0.037	0.032	0.043	0.034
Bangladeshi	0.003	0.015	0.009	0.024	0.011	0.023
Vote Duty	0.022	0.017	0.018	0.011	0.022	0.034
Political Efficacy	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.020	0.007	0.034
Democratic Satisfaction	0.015	0.012	0.011	0.020	0.014	0.034
Trust Parliament	0.042	0.041	0.022	0.020	0.016	0.013

Table 32: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Complete Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.028	0.029	0.029	0.029
Societal Discrimination	0.020	0.027	0.101	0.105	0.105	0.106
Worship Attendance	0.009	0.010	0.014	0.013	0.011	0.013
Political Interest	0.010	0.026	0.016	0.012	0.008	0.007
Political Knowledge	0.015	0.015	0.018	0.015	0.018	0.016
Party ID	0.039	0.020	0.025	0.033	0.028	0.019
Identity	0.018	0.011	0.010	0.019	0.006	0.008
English (Main Lang)	0.019	0.001	0.008	0.003	0.008	0.014
Native Born	0.017	0.006	0.025	0.031	0.039	0.036
Female	0.056	0.062	0.008	0.022	0.022	0.011
Age	0.014	0.024	0.018	0.014	0.019	0.017
Education	0.018	0.025	0.011	0.018	0.007	0.014
High Income	0.005	0.004	0.008	0.003	0.003	0.003
Med Income	0.038	0.043	0.003	0.003	0.017	0.008
Missing Income	0.020	0.009	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.017
Black Caribbean	0.022	0.010	0.006	0.019	0.025	0.022
Indian	0.024	0.010	0.036	0.042	0.011	0.006
Pakistani	0.025	0.009	0.019	0.014	0.019	0.028
Bangladeshi	0.019	0.017	0.030	0.019	0.021	0.015
Vote Duty	0.016	0.014	0.016	0.016	0.021	0.027
Political Efficacy	0.026	0.018	0.013	0.010	0.019	0.015
Democratic Satisfaction	0.015	0.020	0.011	0.008	0.021	0.016
Trust Parliament	0.042	0.014	0.016	0.019	0.020	0.013

Figure 10: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): Balance Plots - Complete Model



Table 33: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Simplified Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.016
Political Discrimination	0.015	0.020	0.060	0.061	0.059	0.062
Worship Attendance	0.022	0.021	0.012	0.017	0.017	0.022
Political Interest	0.028	0.020	0.016	0.026	0.018	0.019
Political Knowledge	0.024	0.025	0.024	0.028	0.022	0.028
Party ID	0.013	0.010	0.013	0.008	0.008	0.011
Identity	0.039	0.030	0.037	0.037	0.036	0.030
English (Main Lang)	0.019	0.033	0.035	0.040	0.024	0.005
Native Born	0.027	0.051	0.029	0.032	0.016	0.013
Female	0.051	0.042	0.008	0.064	0.048	0.024
Age	0.021	0.017	0.013	0.018	0.013	0.019
Education	0.033	0.046	0.025	0.028	0.031	0.029
High Income	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.019	0.024
Med Income	0.008	0.028	0.037	0.003	0.013	0.027
Missing Income	0.037	0.037	0.021	0.021	0.019	0.032
Black Caribbean	0.025	0.032	0.003	0.013	0.027	0.003
Indian	0.015	0.018	0.067	0.035	0.056	0.040
Pakistani	0.019	0.018	0.053	0.029	0.056	0.053
Bangladeshi	0.022	0.009	0.005	0.016	0.011	0.035

Figure 11: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): Balance Plots - Complete Model



Table 34: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Simplified Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.001	0.001	0.024	0.024	0.025	0.025
Societal Discrimination	0.017	0.017	0.097	0.103	0.098	0.101
Worship Attendance	0.026	0.007	0.010	0.009	0.004	0.014
Political Interest	0.018	0.007	0.017	0.023	0.011	0.021
Political Knowledge	0.025	0.015	0.015	0.021	0.016	0.020
Party ID	0.007	0.002	0.003	0.018	0.008	0.026
Identity	0.012	0.010	0.011	0.003	0.023	0.005
English (Main Lang)	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.016	0.023	0.005
Native Born	0.007	0.002	0.013	0.010	0.003	0.005
Female	0.031	0.024	0	0.021	0.003	0.018
Age	0.018	0.023	0.019	0.020	0.017	0.017
Education	0.018	0.013	0.015	0.020	0.027	0.025
High Income	0.005	0.034	0.016	0.021	0.018	0.036
Med Income	0.001	0.014	0.010	0.005	0.003	0.005
Missing Income	0.004	0.022	0.010	0.005	0.023	0.029
Black Caribbean	0.019	0.017	0.034	0.029	0.036	0.034
Indian	0.049	0.008	0.005	0.013	0.005	0.010
Pakistani	0.025	0.0002	0.016	0.021	0.013	0.047
Bangladeshi	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.036

Figure 12: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): Balance Plots - Simplified Model



Table 35: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Complete Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.019
Political Discrimination	0.014	0.020	0.063	0.066	0.063	0.066
Worship Attendance	0.012	0.022	0.012	0.022	0.026	0.024
Political Interest	0.035	0.027	0.018	0.026	0.020	0.022
Political Knowledge	0.025	0.026	0.024	0.028	0.023	0.018
Party ID	0.019	0.021	0.012	0.034	0.018	0.003
Identity	0.042	0.040	0.039	0.026	0.039	0.041
English (Main Lang)	0.026	0.016	0.012	0.015	0.015	0.018
Native Born	0.044	0.028	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.006
Female	0.069	0.048	0.031	0.049	0.034	0.009
Age	0.015	0.009	0.009	0.016	0.017	0.013
Education	0.015	0.011	0.030	0.024	0.010	0.016
High Income	0.007	0.005	0.003	0.025	0.009	0.003
Med Income	0.061	0.015	0.025	0.043	0.012	0.009
Missing Income	0.071	0.030	0.003	0.034	0.006	0.006
Black Caribbean	0.028	0.017	0.012	0.006	0.034	0.022
Indian	0.021	0.026	0.040	0.040	0.052	0.018
Pakistani	0.043	0.034	0.037	0.046	0.058	0.034
Bangladeshi	0.001	0.002	0.034	0	0.022	0.025
Vote Duty	0.023	0.024	0.022	0.017	0.025	0.023
Political Efficacy	0.015	0.010	0.013	0.016	0.013	0.020
Democratic Satisfaction	0.014	0.017	0.021	0.018	0.022	0.021
Trust Parliament	0.029	0.025	0.017	0.029	0.015	0.028

Figure 13: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): Balance Plots - Simplified Modell



Table 36: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Complete Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.030
Societal Discrimination	0.026	0.021	0.102	0.106	0.104	0.106
Worship Attendance	0.021	0.015	0.010	0.010	0.017	0.012
Political Interest	0.021	0.013	0.014	0.010	0.009	0.012
Political Knowledge	0.017	0.020	0.012	0.016	0.019	0.013
Party ID	0.032	0.027	0.021	0.018	0.032	0.015
Identity	0.006	0.018	0.020	0.006	0.021	0.016
English (Main Lang)	0.017	0.001	0.012	0.018	0.012	0.012
Native Born	0.014	0.030	0.044	0.065	0.032	0.053
Female	0.062	0.031	0.003	0.032	0.012	0.032
Age	0.019	0.017	0.017	0.021	0.025	0.022
Education	0.013	0.022	0.014	0.013	0.010	0.019
High Income	0.005	0.012	0.006	0.012	0.003	0.012
Med Income	0.010	0.034	0.003	0.024	0.006	0.015
Missing Income	0.028	0.011	0.012	0.009	0.006	0.003
Black Caribbean	0.047	0.010	0.047	0.050	0.026	0.038
Indian	0.0005	0.007	0.006	0.003	0.021	0
Pakistani	0.020	0.036	0.018	0.035	0.029	0.029
Bangladeshi	0.014	0.015	0.003	0.021	0.029	0.029
Vote Duty	0.019	0.017	0.011	0.008	0.009	0.009
Political Efficacy	0.019	0.021	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.009
Democratic Satisfaction	0.024	0.030	0.030	0.021	0.023	0.018
Trust Parliament	0.018	0.017	0.014	0.016	0.016	0.013

Figure 14: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): Balance Plots - Complete Model



Table 37: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Simplified Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.016
Political Discrimination	0.017	0.018	0.061	0.062	0.062	0.060
Worship Attendance	0.026	0.032	0.018	0.020	0.017	0.009
Political Interest	0.032	0.027	0.022	0.016	0.016	0.013
Political Knowledge	0.021	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.028	0.022
Party ID	0.011	0.005	0.029	0.020	0.017	0.003
Identity	0.033	0.040	0.042	0.038	0.029	0.029
English (Main Lang)	0.028	0.035	0.014	0.035	0.012	0.003
Native Born	0.058	0.075	0.017	0.029	0.017	0.023
Female	0.042	0.048	0.017	0.043	0.017	0.014
Age	0.017	0.012	0.018	0.013	0.015	0.015
Education	0.022	0.024	0.026	0.022	0.023	0.035
High Income	0.027	0.002	0.014	0.026	0.026	0.032
Med Income	0.035	0.026	0.046	0.032	0.058	0.046
Missing Income	0.077	0.049	0.029	0.020	0.046	0.035
Black Caribbean	0.061	0.075	0.003	0.012	0	0.043
Indian	0.002	0.011	0.043	0.043	0.012	0.066
Pakistani	0.020	0.038	0.040	0.046	0.035	0.049
Bangladeshi	0.002	0.001	0.014	0.023	0.026	0.012

Figure 15: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): Balance Plots - Complete Model



Table 38: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Simplified Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.025
Societal Discrimination	0.022	0.024	0.098	0.095	0.097	0.098
Worship Attendance	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.018	0.009
Political Interest	0.022	0.013	0.015	0.014	0.022	0.017
Political Knowledge	0.019	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.017	0.015
Party ID	0.017	0.011	0.033	0.014	0.022	0.003
Identity	0.027	0.014	0.013	0.017	0.012	0.012
English (Main Lang)	0.016	0.002	0	0.008	0.008	0.028
Native Born	0.039	0.014	0	0.036	0.030	0.041
Female	0.028	0.003	0.036	0.017	0.006	0.011
Age	0.019	0.021	0.019	0.021	0.021	0.017
Education	0.026	0.015	0.014	0.013	0.023	0.021
High Income	0.007	0.040	0.014	0.025	0.014	0.047
Med Income	0.020	0.010	0.006	0	0	0.011
Missing Income	0.008	0.044	0.003	0.008	0.014	0
Black Caribbean	0.006	0.033	0.022	0.008	0.036	0.019
Indian	0.059	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.017	0.014
Pakistani	0.027	0.010	0.025	0.014	0.033	0.030
Bangladeshi	0.009	0.009	0	0.003	0.019	0.008

Figure 16: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): Balance Plots - Simplified Model



Table 39: Ethnic-based Engagement (Societal Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Complete Models

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
Political Discrimination	0.018	0.020	0.062	0.065	0.066	0.066
Worship Attendance	0.026	0.024	0.011	0.023	0.034	0.027
Political Interest	0.029	0.022	0.015	0.014	0.020	0.021
Political Knowledge	0.022	0.025	0.024	0.017	0.025	0.019
Party ID	0.031	0.028	0.017	0.023	0.017	0.011
Identity	0.025	0.033	0.027	0.031	0.041	0.036
English (Main Lang)	0.033	0.026	0.023	0.009	0.020	0.009
Native Born	0.044	0.066	0.011	0.020	0.011	0.026
Female	0.071	0.045	0.003	0.034	0.020	0.031
Age	0.018	0.010	0.011	0.007	0.011	0.008
Education	0.036	0.018	0.024	0.027	0.022	0.018
High Income	0.038	0.003	0.031	0.014	0.023	0.009
Med Income	0.007	0.011	0.003	0.006	0.017	0.023
Missing Income	0.052	0.036	0.011	0.006	0.011	0.017
Black Caribbean	0.034	0.051	0.006	0.003	0.009	0
Indian	0.010	0.009	0.026	0.017	0.026	0.051
Pakistani	0.030	0.033	0.045	0.043	0.060	0.077
Bangladeshi	0.015	0.001	0.009	0	0.034	0.023
Vote Duty	0.021	0.027	0.018	0.024	0.013	0.025
Political Efficacy	0.009	0.011	0.009	0.020	0.012	0.010
Democratic Satisfaction	0.017	0.013	0.010	0.013	0.013	0.013
Trust Parliament	0.031	0.033	0.017	0.022	0.020	0.020

Figure 17: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): Balance Plots - Simplified Model



Table 40: Ethnic-based Engagement (Political Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Complete Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.029
Societal Discrimination	0.030	0.027	0.098	0.103	0.096	0.102
Worship Attendance	0.033	0.018	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.013
Political Interest	0.018	0.024	0.009	0.012	0.010	0.012
Political Knowledge	0.009	0.012	0.010	0.009	0.016	0.012
Party ID	0.045	0.005	0.011	0.019	0.022	0.006
Identity	0.014	0.013	0.008	0.008	0.012	0.010
English (Main Lang)	0.017	0.003	0.014	0.017	0.011	0.011
Native Born	0.032	0.004	0.036	0.044	0.022	0.050
Female	0.074	0.052	0.041	0.036	0.044	0.041
Age	0.016	0.018	0.021	0.020	0.017	0.022
Education	0.029	0.020	0.007	0.008	0.014	0.012
High Income	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.011	0.003	0.006
Med Income	0.038	0.022	0.006	0.003	0.008	0.017
Missing Income	0.022	0.020	0.006	0.014	0.003	0.008
Black Caribbean	0.044	0.024	0.014	0.033	0.041	0.033
Indian	0.005	0.017	0	0.030	0.008	0.003
Pakistani	0.029	0.008	0.022	0.033	0.014	0.033
Bangladeshi	0.015	0.002	0.008	0.014	0.011	0.003
Vote Duty	0.011	0.007	0.009	0.006	0.004	0.010
Political Efficacy	0.017	0.008	0.009	0.015	0.009	0.009
Democratic Satisfaction	0.018	0.020	0.023	0.019	0.019	0.025
Trust Parliament	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.014	0.014

Figure 18: Ethnic-based Engagement (Societal Discrimination): Balance Plots - Complete Model



Table 41: Ethnic-based Engagement (Societal Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Simplified Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.002	0.002	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Political Discrimination	0.014	0.015	0.061	0.065	0.063	0.063
Worship Attendance	0.019	0.020	0.009	0.022	0.019	0.016
Political Interest	0.025	0.030	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.017
Political Knowledge	0.032	0.030	0.026	0.023	0.023	0.028
Party ID	0.025	0.007	0.026	0.024	0.003	0.005
Identity	0.035	0.037	0.042	0.037	0.033	0.038
English (Main Lang)	0.019	0.017	0.011	0.029	0.005	0.019
Native Born	0.052	0.057	0.048	0.019	0.016	0.045
Female	0.080	0.051	0.029	0.056	0.016	0.029
Age	0.013	0.015	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.012
Education	0.034	0.034	0.020	0.025	0.030	0.034
High Income	0.016	0.012	0.032	0.011	0.024	0.024
Med Income	0.036	0.035	0.042	0.050	0.042	0.037
Missing Income	0.059	0.041	0	0.019	0.021	0.019
Black Caribbean	0.036	0.044	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.005
Indian	0.030	0.007	0.008	0.026	0.021	0.034
Pakistani	0.026	0.025	0.003	0.021	0.029	0.042
Bangladeshi	0.013	0.003	0.008	0.013	0.026	0.024

Figure 19: Ethnic-based Engagement (Political Discrimination): Balance Plots - Complete Model



Table 42: Ethnic-based Engagement (Political Discrimination): CDF Comparison - Simplified Model

	Full Probit	Full Logit	Nearest Probit	Nearest Logit	Optimal Probit	Optimal Pobit
Distance	0.001	0.002	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
Societal Discrimination	0.017	0.021	0.097	0.099	0.097	0.098
Worship Attendance	0.014	0.011	0.006	0.005	0.009	0.019
Political Interest	0.011	0.013	0.016	0.017	0.015	0.010
Political Knowledge	0.019	0.024	0.014	0.019	0.014	0.021
Party ID	0.019	0.017	0.021	0.039	0.013	0.016
Identity	0.017	0.011	0.016	0.016	0.009	0.011
English (Main Lang)	0.045	0.004	0.018	0.003	0.026	0.031
Native Born	0.020	0.001	0.023	0.013	0.021	0.018
Female	0.023	0.038	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.031
Age	0.019	0.026	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.016
Education	0.015	0.011	0.022	0.025	0.021	0.024
High Income	0.044	0.042	0.023	0.023	0.008	0.028
Med Income	0.002	0.025	0.016	0.013	0.005	0.013
Missing Income	0.022	0.021	0.008	0.023	0.003	0.003
Black Caribbean	0.008	0.023	0.039	0.036	0.047	0.018
Indian	0.007	0.011	0.003	0.026	0.021	0.005
Pakistani	0.020	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.047	0.026
Bangladeshi	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.016	0.028

Figure 20: Ethnic-based Engagement (Societal Discrimination): Balance Plots - Simplified Model



Figure 21: Ethnic-based Engagement (Political Discrimination): Balance Plots - Simplified Model



Results Presented as Risk Ratios for Simplified Models

Table 43: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.962	0.393	0.880	1.051
Full Logit	0.987	0.766	0.903	1.078
Nearest Probit	0.975	0.590	0.888	1.070
Nearest Logit	0.973	0.579	0.882	1.073
Optimal Probit	0.953	0.291	0.872	1.042
Optimal Pobit	0.958	0.396	0.869	1.057

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 44: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.067	0.229	0.960	1.186
Full Logit	1.114	0.040	1.005	1.236
Nearest Probit	1.179	0.003	1.057	1.314
Nearest Logit	1.145	0.008	1.036	1.266
Optimal Probit	1.135	0.015	1.025	1.258
Optimal Pobit	1.137	0.009	1.032	1.251

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 45: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.938	0.215	0.847	1.038
Full Logit	0.939	0.211	0.852	1.036
Nearest Probit	0.983	0.766	0.876	1.103
Nearest Logit	0.969	0.591	0.864	1.087
Optimal Probit	0.986	0.796	0.884	1.099
Optimal Pobit	0.987	0.817	0.880	1.106

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 46: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.112	0.055	0.998	1.239
Full Logit	1.095	0.082	0.989	1.212
Nearest Probit	1.156	0.009	1.037	1.288
Nearest Logit	1.156	0.008	1.039	1.287
Optimal Probit	1.144	0.023	1.019	1.285
Optimal Pobit	1.164	0.008	1.040	1.302

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 47: Ethnic-based engagement (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.345	0.001	1.122	1.613
Full Logit	1.360	0.001	1.131	1.634
Nearest Probit	1.310	0.005	1.086	1.581
Nearest Logit	1.261	0.012	1.052	1.511
Optimal Probit	1.195	0.065	0.989	1.443
Optimal Pobit	1.283	0.007	1.071	1.537

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 48: Ethnic-based engagement (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Risk Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.213	0.053	0.998	1.475
Full Logit	1.260	0.015	1.045	1.520
Nearest Probit	1.201	0.057	0.994	1.450
Nearest Logit	1.176	0.088	0.976	1.417
Optimal Probit	1.202	0.055	0.996	1.450
Optimal Pobit	1.196	0.066	0.988	1.448

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Results Presented as Odds Ratios for All Models

Table 49: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.891	0.423	0.673	1.181
Full Logit	0.830	0.215	0.619	1.114
Nearest Probit	1.005	0.973	0.749	1.349
Nearest Logit	0.930	0.627	0.696	1.244
Optimal Probit	0.955	0.764	0.705	1.293
Optimal Pobit	0.860	0.309	0.642	1.150

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 50: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.345	0.044	1.008	1.795
Full Logit	1.384	0.034	1.024	1.871
Nearest Probit	1.583	0.001	1.193	2.099
Nearest Logit	1.524	0.007	1.125	2.064
Optimal Probit	1.623	0.002	1.203	2.188
Optimal Pobit	1.578	0.002	1.174	2.120

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 51: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.887	0.396	0.673	1.170
Full Logit	0.960	0.766	0.734	1.255
Nearest Probit	0.925	0.592	0.695	1.231
Nearest Logit	0.919	0.580	0.681	1.240
Optimal Probit	0.861	0.294	0.651	1.139
Optimal Pobit	0.876	0.399	0.645	1.191

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 52: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.227	0.225	0.882	1.708
Full Logit	1.388	0.038	1.019	1.892
Nearest Probit	1.607	0.002	1.182	2.184
Nearest Logit	1.494	0.007	1.117	1.997
Optimal Probit	1.460	0.014	1.081	1.971
Optimal Pobit	1.464	0.008	1.105	1.939

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 53: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.646	0.001	0.501	0.835
Full Logit	0.671	0.004	0.511	0.881
Nearest Probit	0.797	0.166	0.578	1.099
Nearest Logit	0.970	0.856	0.700	1.344
Optimal Probit	0.969	0.848	0.704	1.334
Optimal Pobit	0.874	0.366	0.652	1.171

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 54: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.353	0.030	1.030	1.778
Full Logit	1.368	0.019	1.054	1.775
Nearest Probit	1.619	0.001	1.222	2.144
Nearest Logit	1.468	0.008	1.104	1.954
Optimal Probit	1.608	0.001	1.219	2.122
Optimal Pobit	1.675	0.0005	1.253	2.239

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 55: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	0.838	0.220	0.631	1.112
Full Logit	0.842	0.217	0.641	1.106
Nearest Probit	0.955	0.766	0.703	1.296
Nearest Logit	0.919	0.592	0.676	1.250
Optimal Probit	0.963	0.796	0.721	1.285
Optimal Pobit	0.965	0.817	0.714	1.305

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 56: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.329	0.051	0.999	1.768
Full Logit	1.278	0.076	0.975	1.676
Nearest Probit	1.458	0.008	1.105	1.923
Nearest Logit	1.460	0.007	1.108	1.923
Optimal Probit	1.424	0.021	1.055	1.924
Optimal Pobit	1.482	0.007	1.114	1.971

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 57: Ethnic-based engagement (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.506	0.002	1.156	1.960
Full Logit	1.604	0.001	1.201	2.142
Nearest Probit	1.418	0.023	1.050	1.916
Nearest Logit	1.348	0.058	0.990	1.836
Optimal Probit	1.424	0.014	1.073	1.889
Optimal Pobit	1.377	0.030	1.032	1.837

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 58: Ethnic-based engagement (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Complete Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.372	0.032	1.028	1.832
Full Logit	1.344	0.043	1.009	1.790
Nearest Probit	1.387	0.045	1.008	1.910
Nearest Logit	1.289	0.103	0.950	1.749
Optimal Probit	1.419	0.034	1.027	1.961
Optimal Pobit	1.358	0.054	0.995	1.854

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 59: Ethnic-based engagement (Societal Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.588	0.001	1.205	2.093
Full Logit	1.612	0.001	1.216	2.138
Nearest Probit	1.528	0.004	1.143	2.042
Nearest Logit	1.444	0.011	1.088	1.917
Optimal Probit	1.331	0.063	0.984	1.801
Optimal Pobit	1.482	0.006	1.119	1.961

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

Table 60: Ethnic-based engagement (Political Discrimination): ATT Estimates as Odds Ratios - Simplified Model

Model	Estimate	P-value	CI Lower	CI Upper
Full Probit	1.361	0.049	1.001	1.850
Full Logit	1.260	0.015	1.045	1.520
Nearest Probit	1.201	0.057	0.994	1.450
Nearest Logit	1.176	0.088	0.976	1.417
Optimal Probit	1.202	0.055	0.996	1.450
Optimal Pobit	1.196	0.066	0.988	1.448

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported

8 Study 3 - Supplement: Coerced Exact Matching Results

Table 61: Vote in General Elections (Societal Discrimination) - Coerced Exact Imbalance before Matching

Variables	Diff. in mean	L1
Political Disc.	-1.374	0.396
Worship Attendance	0.359	0.099
Political Interest	-0.150	0.088
Political Knowledge	-0.307	0.088
Party ID (Yes=1)	-0.012	0.012
Identity (Brit=2)	0.150	0.146
English (Main Lang)	-0.174	0.174
Native Born	-0.156	0.156
Female	0.041	0.041
Age	3.384	0.0005
Education	-0.356	0.109
High Income	0.008	0.008
Med Income	-0.030	0.030
Missing Income	0.061	0.061
Black Caribbean	-0.158	0.158
Indian	0.027	0.027
Pakistani	0.088	0.088
Bangladeshi	0.028	0.028
Vote Duty	0.119	0.047
Political Efficacy	0.204	0.070
Democratic Satisfaction	0.322	0.075
Trust Parliament	0.915	0.148

Table 62: Vote in General Elections (Political Discrimination) - Imbalance before Coerced Exact Matching

Variables	Diff. in mean	L1
Societal Disc	-1.436	0.391
Worship Attendance	0.263	0.069
Political Interest	-0.326	0.149
Political Knowledge	-0.336	0.092
Party ID (Yes=1)	-0.009	0.009
Identity (Brit=2)	0.198	0.151
English (Main Lang)	-0.188	0.188
Native Born	-0.122	0.122
Female	0.043	0.043
Age	3.106	0.002
Education	-0.592	0.170
High Income	-0.033	0.033
Med Income	-0.043	0.043
Missing Income	0.097	0.097
Black Caribbean	-0.173	0.173
Indian	0.074	0.074
Pakistani	0.110	0.110
Bangladeshi	0.059	0.059
Vote Duty	0.172	0.039
Political Efficacy	0.338	0.090
Democratic Satisfaction	0.418	0.081
Trust Parliament	1.133	0.195

Table 63: Vote in Local Elections (Societal Discrimination) - Imbalance before Coerced Exact Matching

Variables	Diff. in mean	L1
Political Disc.	-1.363	0.389
Worship Attendance	0.355	0.098
Political Interest	-0.175	0.092
Political Knowledge	-0.305	0.090
Party ID (Yes=1)	-0.010	0.010
Identity (Brit=2)	0.148	0.144
English (Main Lang)	-0.176	0.176
Native Born	-0.160	0.160
Female	0.039	0.039
Age	3.015	0.001
Education	-0.344	0.108
High Income	0.008	0.008
Med Income	-0.039	0.039
Missing Income	0.072	0.072
Black Caribbean	-0.164	0.164
Indian	0.028	0.028
Pakistani	0.085	0.085
Bangladeshi	0.024	0.024
Vote Duty	0.097	0.040
Political Efficacy	0.048	0.056
Democratic Satisfaction	0.334	0.077
Trust Parliament	0.878	0.143

Table 64: Vote in Local Elections (Political Discrimination) - Imbalance before Coerced Exact Matching

Variables	Diff. in mean	L1
Societal Disc	-1.407	0.383
Worship Attendance	0.251	0.064
Political Interest	-0.330	0.148
Political Knowledge	-0.347	0.098
Party ID (Yes=1)	-0.014	0.014
Identity (Brit=2)	0.195	0.151
English (Main Lang)	-0.210	0.210
Native Born	-0.135	0.135
Female	0.036	0.036
Age	3.029	0.003
Education	-0.610	0.173
High Income	-0.035	0.035
Med Income	-0.046	0.046
Missing Income	0.095	0.095
Black Caribbean	-0.185	0.185
Indian	0.070	0.070
Pakistani	0.115	0.115
Bangladeshi	0.060	0.060
Vote Duty	0.163	0.035
Political Efficacy	0.273	0.079
Democratic Satisfaction	0.443	0.082
Trust Parliament	1.178	0.213

Table 65: Ethnic-based Engagement (Societal Discrimination) - Imbalance before Coerced Exact Matching

Variables	Diff. in mean	L1
Political Disc.	-1.378	0.396
Worship Attendance	0.366	0.101
Political Interest	-0.154	0.089
Political Knowledge	-0.290	0.083
Party ID (Yes=1)	-0.013	0.013
Identity (Brit=2)	0.150	0.143
English (Main Lang)	-0.174	0.174
Native Born	-0.159	0.159
Female	0.040	0.040
Age	3.340	0.0005
Education	-0.362	0.112
High Income	0.009	0.009
Med Income	-0.030	0.030
Missing Income	0.063	0.063
Black Caribbean	-0.156	0.156
Indian	0.028	0.028
Pakistani	0.085	0.085
Bangladeshi	0.028	0.028
Political Efficacy	0.165	0.064
Democratic Satisfaction	0.320	0.075
Trust Parliament	0.920	0.147

Table 66: Ethnic Based Engagement (Political Discrimination) - Imbalance before Coerced Exact Matching

Variables	Diff. in mean	L1
Societal Disc	-1.426	0.391
Worship Attendance	0.266	0.069
Political Interest	-0.330	0.151
Political Knowledge	-0.337	0.092
Party ID (Yes=1)	-0.013	0.013
Identity (Brit=2)	0.193	0.146
English (Main Lang)	-0.193	0.193
Native Born	-0.122	0.122
Female	0.046	0.046
Age	3.064	0.002
Education	-0.594	0.170
High Income	-0.032	0.032
Med Income	-0.043	0.043
Missing Income	0.098	0.098
Black Caribbean	-0.172	0.172
Indian	0.075	0.075
Pakistani	0.112	0.112
Bangladeshi	0.060	0.060
Political Efficacy	0.339	0.088
Democratic Satisfaction	0.419	0.080
Trust Parliament	1.140	0.201

Table 67: Vote in General Elections (Specific Measures): Coerced Exact Matching

	Vote in General Election							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Societal Disc. Binary	0.142	0.129			−0.419***	−0.414***		
	(0.318)	(0.308)			(0.149)	(0.148)		
Political Disc.	−0.011	−0.008			0.033	0.032		
	(0.126)	(0.123)			(0.044)	(0.044)		
Political Disc. Binary			0.127	0.112			0.092	0.088
			(0.343)	(0.330)			(0.156)	(0.156)
Societal Disc.			−0.196	−0.179			−0.019	−0.019
			(0.164)	(0.158)			(0.056)	(0.056)
Worship Attendance	0.254**	0.228**	0.011	0.014	0.077*	0.075*	−0.026	−0.025
	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Political Interest	0.022	0.023	0.284	0.242	0.586***	0.576***	0.241***	0.236***
	(0.188)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.175)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Political Knowledge	0.232	0.212	0.453***	0.408**	0.088	0.087	0.219***	0.215***
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.172)	(0.165)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Party ID (Yes=1)	1.415***	1.274***	0.821*	0.741*	0.968***	0.952***	1.384***	1.358***
	(0.466)	(0.447)	(0.465)	(0.449)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.173)	(0.172)
Identity (Brit=2)	0.276	0.254	0.785**	0.700**	0.142	0.139	0.187*	0.183
	(0.273)	(0.264)	(0.312)	(0.297)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.113)
English (Main Lang)	0.001	−0.001	−0.556	−0.490	0.347**	0.341**	−0.035	−0.033
	(0.401)	(0.388)	(0.450)	(0.431)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.183)	(0.182)
Native Born	1.264***	1.136***	0.026	0.024	0.182	0.180	0.054	0.052
	(0.397)	(0.382)	(0.403)	(0.389)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.168)	(0.167)
Female	0.682**	0.611*	1.169***	1.034***	0.394***	0.387***	0.953***	0.936***
	(0.324)	(0.313)	(0.340)	(0.324)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.142)
Age	0.052***	0.047***	0.065***	0.057***	0.045***	0.044***	0.039***	0.039***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education	−0.208	−0.190	0.255*	0.232	−0.114**	−0.111*	−0.116**	−0.114**
	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
High Income	0.394	0.427	0.791	0.620	0.566	0.538	1.297***	1.254***
	(1.075)	(1.038)	(1.062)	(0.996)	(0.370)	(0.366)	(0.350)	(0.346)
Med Income	0.448	0.409	1.191**	1.050**	0.918***	0.902***	1.044***	1.024***
	(0.417)	(0.404)	(0.490)	(0.469)	(0.198)	(0.197)	(0.201)	(0.200)
Missing Income	0.484	0.437	1.324***	1.172***	0.297*	0.290*	0.402***	0.394**
	(0.352)	(0.341)	(0.385)	(0.368)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.156)	(0.155)
Black Caribbean	−0.914	−0.837	−0.652	−0.559	−0.457**	−0.448**	−0.073	−0.070
	(0.611)	(0.592)	(0.532)	(0.513)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.214)	(0.213)
Indian	0.039	0.045	−0.318	−0.274	0.376*	0.368*	0.367*	0.359
	(0.517)	(0.503)	(0.546)	(0.528)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.220)	(0.219)
Pakistani	0.673	0.617	0.879	0.772	0.626***	0.616***	0.872***	0.856***
	(0.486)	(0.473)	(0.541)	(0.519)	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.224)	(0.222)
Bangladeshi	1.724***	1.545**	1.336*	1.181*	1.231***	1.202***	1.235***	1.203***
	(0.665)	(0.638)	(0.718)	(0.684)	(0.318)	(0.316)	(0.334)	(0.331)
Vote Duty	1.001***	0.901***	0.377*	0.333*				
	(0.211)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.197)				
Political Efficacy	0.084	0.076	0.090	0.080				
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.071)				
Democratic Satisfaction	−0.096	−0.087	−0.422	−0.378				
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.285)	(0.273)				
Trust Parliament	−0.159**	−0.144*	0.007	0.007				
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.076)				
Constant	−8.360***	−7.528***	−7.614***	−6.768***	−4.050***	−3.976***	−3.824***	−3.752***
	(1.415)	(1.345)	(1.373)	(1.301)	(0.471)	(0.468)	(0.485)	(0.481)
N	2,102	2,102	2,102	2,102	2,387	2,387	2,387	2,387
Log Likelihood	−138.683	−139.332	−137.163	−137.736	−660.321	−660.429	−638.669	−638.768
AIC	325.365	326.664	322.325	323.473	1,360.642	1,360.858	1,317.338	1,317.535

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 were estimated using conventional logit modeling, while models 2, 4, 6 and 8 were estimated using Penalized Maximum Likelihood estimator suggested by Rainey and McCaskey (2021).

Table 68: Vote in Local Elections (Specific Measures) - Coerced Exact Matching

	Vote in Local Election							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Societal Disc. Binary	−0.066	−0.058			−0.409***	−0.403***		
	(0.331)	(0.320)			(0.153)	(0.152)		
Political Disc.	−0.130	−0.113			0.021	0.021		
	(0.137)	(0.132)			(0.045)	(0.044)		
Political Disc. Binary			−0.316	−0.280			−0.073	−0.073
			(0.349)	(0.336)			(0.156)	(0.155)
Societal Disc.			−0.046	−0.045			−0.022	−0.022
			(0.192)	(0.185)			(0.057)	(0.057)
Worship Attendance	0.234*	0.207*	−0.007	−0.003	0.142***	0.139***	0.042	0.041
	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Political Interest	0.269	0.241	0.513***	0.443**	0.536***	0.527***	0.208***	0.203***
	(0.204)	(0.197)	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Political Knowledge	0.086	0.079	0.375**	0.334*	0.148**	0.146**	0.145**	0.143**
	(0.162)	(0.157)	(0.179)	(0.171)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Party ID (Yes=1)	1.371***	1.225***	0.543	0.489	0.822***	0.808***	1.557***	1.524***
	(0.487)	(0.465)	(0.458)	(0.444)	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.185)	(0.184)
Identity (Brit=2)	0.301	0.271	0.579*	0.518*	0.302***	0.297***	0.096	0.094
	(0.295)	(0.285)	(0.314)	(0.301)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.115)
English (Main Lang)	0.209	0.189	−0.280	−0.245	0.616***	0.606***	0.235	0.231
	(0.419)	(0.404)	(0.446)	(0.431)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.184)	(0.183)
Native Born	1.164***	1.036***	−0.285	−0.249	−0.074	−0.073	0.114	0.111
	(0.403)	(0.389)	(0.391)	(0.379)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.166)	(0.165)
Female	0.363	0.322	0.913***	0.804**	0.357***	0.350**	0.526***	0.516***
	(0.332)	(0.321)	(0.339)	(0.325)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.141)
Age	0.069***	0.061***	0.057***	0.050***	0.044***	0.043***	0.053***	0.052***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education	−0.255*	−0.228	0.006	0.011	−0.087	−0.085	−0.060	−0.058
	(0.151)	(0.146)	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.057)
High Income	0.034	0.091	0.201	0.144	0.462	0.442	1.279***	1.241***
	(1.057)	(1.028)	(1.054)	(0.995)	(0.357)	(0.354)	(0.337)	(0.333)
Med Income	−0.002	0.006	0.869*	0.763*	0.615***	0.605***	0.992***	0.974***
	(0.433)	(0.419)	(0.481)	(0.464)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.201)	(0.200)
Missing Income	0.044	0.034	0.600	0.532	0.125	0.122	0.222	0.217
	(0.370)	(0.359)	(0.384)	(0.370)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.160)	(0.159)
Black Caribbean	0.043	0.025	−0.470	−0.403	0.113	0.112	−0.356	−0.350
	(0.669)	(0.643)	(0.543)	(0.524)	(0.211)	(0.210)	(0.217)	(0.216)
Indian	0.205	0.189	−0.024	−0.007	0.319	0.313	−0.021	−0.021
	(0.541)	(0.523)	(0.541)	(0.526)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.225)	(0.224)
Pakistani	1.241**	1.122**	1.673***	1.469***	0.926***	0.909***	1.004***	0.985***
	(0.530)	(0.512)	(0.570)	(0.543)	(0.227)	(0.226)	(0.230)	(0.228)
Bangladeshi	1.704***	1.525**	1.493**	1.322**	1.592***	1.556***	1.483***	1.445***
	(0.661)	(0.635)	(0.681)	(0.651)	(0.320)	(0.318)	(0.337)	(0.334)
Vote Duty	0.710***	0.634***	0.173	0.151				
	(0.214)	(0.206)	(0.209)	(0.202)				
Political Efficacy	0.073	0.064	0.152*	0.135*				
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.074)				
Democratic Satisfaction	0.082	0.071	−0.319	−0.286				
	(0.237)	(0.229)	(0.288)	(0.277)				
Trust Parliament	−0.065	−0.058	0.084	0.074				
	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.077)				
Constant	−8.327***	−7.430***	−6.322***	−5.594***	−4.806***	−4.716***	−4.473***	−4.385***
	(1.456)	(1.378)	(1.359)	(1.294)	(0.482)	(0.478)	(0.494)	(0.491)
N	1,979	1,979	1,979	1,979	2,246	2,246	2,246	2,246
Log Likelihood	−133.105	−133.437	−131.737	−132.463	−665.215	−665.246	−625.130	−625.259
AIC	314.211	314.875	311.474	312.927	1,370.431	1,370.492	1,290.260	1,290.517

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 were estimated using conventional logit modeling, while models 2, 4, 6 and 8 were estimated using Penalized Maximum Likelihood estimator suggested by Rainey and McCaskey (2021).

Table 69: Ethnic-based Engagement (Specific Measures) - Coerced Exact Matching

	Ethnic-based Participation							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Societal Disc. Binary	0.140	0.134			0.097	0.097		
	(0.233)	(0.231)			(0.140)	(0.140)		
Political Disc.	0.249***	0.234**			0.155***	0.153***		
	(0.093)	(0.093)			(0.042)	(0.042)		
Political Disc. Binary			0.545**	0.518**			0.130	0.130
			(0.250)	(0.246)			(0.146)	(0.145)
Societal Disc.			0.149	0.143			0.285***	0.280***
			(0.120)	(0.118)			(0.053)	(0.052)
Worship Attendance	0.109	0.103	0.094	0.088	0.192***	0.189***	0.325***	0.320***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Political Interest	0.005	0.004	0.372***	0.349***	0.270***	0.265***	0.260***	0.255***
	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Political Knowledge	0.324***	0.304***	0.252*	0.235*	0.191***	0.188***	0.224***	0.219***
	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Party ID (Yes=1)	0.379	0.348	0.870**	0.794**	0.489***	0.478***	0.471**	0.459**
	(0.338)	(0.332)	(0.402)	(0.388)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.191)	(0.190)
Identity (Brit=2)	0.069	0.067	−0.213	−0.199	−0.229**	−0.225**	−0.348***	−0.341***
	(0.198)	(0.196)	(0.210)	(0.206)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.107)
English (Main Lang)	−0.050	−0.050	−0.747**	−0.701**	−0.317**	−0.312**	−0.053	−0.053
	(0.296)	(0.292)	(0.323)	(0.317)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.173)	(0.172)
Native Born	0.465	0.437	0.249	0.232	0.835***	0.822***	0.748***	0.736***
	(0.291)	(0.287)	(0.309)	(0.304)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.160)
Female	−0.095	−0.089	0.228	0.216	−0.365***	−0.360***	0.120	0.117
	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.247)	(0.243)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Age	0.011	0.010	−0.003	−0.003	0.025***	0.025***	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	0.036	0.032	0.054	0.048	0.071	0.070	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.055)
High Income	−0.175	−0.106	−0.713	−0.540	−0.036	−0.026	0.438	0.434
	(0.774)	(0.763)	(0.834)	(0.785)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.273)	(0.272)
Med Income	−0.060	−0.054	0.268	0.254	0.015	0.016	0.040	0.040
	(0.307)	(0.305)	(0.319)	(0.315)	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.172)	(0.172)
Missing Income	−0.216	−0.204	−0.317	−0.298	−0.267*	−0.263*	−0.460***	−0.452***
	(0.261)	(0.258)	(0.283)	(0.277)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.157)	(0.156)
Black Caribbean	0.026	0.018	0.081	0.065	−0.132	−0.132	−0.061	−0.062
	(0.403)	(0.399)	(0.402)	(0.396)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.202)
Indian	−0.194	−0.188	0.742*	0.696*	0.312	0.307	0.391*	0.384*
	(0.389)	(0.385)	(0.389)	(0.383)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.202)
Pakistani	−0.484	−0.463	−0.705*	−0.654	−0.108	−0.106	−0.621***	−0.610***
	(0.369)	(0.365)	(0.413)	(0.403)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.215)	(0.214)
Bangladeshi	−0.723	−0.671	−0.461	−0.400	−0.201	−0.191	−0.338	−0.325
	(0.504)	(0.495)	(0.568)	(0.550)	(0.292)	(0.291)	(0.302)	(0.300)
Political Efficacy	0.057	0.054	0.075	0.071				
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.049)				
Democratic Satisfaction	−0.123	−0.118	0.336*	0.313*				
	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.189)	(0.186)				
Trust Parliament	0.119**	0.112**	−0.082	−0.077				
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)				
Constant	−3.385***	−3.171***	−3.875***	−3.617***	−3.830***	−3.765***	−3.258***	−3.197***
	(0.874)	(0.859)	(0.931)	(0.907)	(0.446)	(0.444)	(0.456)	(0.454)
N	2,133	2,133	2,133	2,133	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415
Log Likelihood	−244.427	−244.536	−214.066	−214.479	−783.708	−783.706	−721.568	−721.730
AIC	534.855	535.072	474.132	474.958	1,607.416	1,607.413	1,483.136	1,483.459

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 were estimated using conventional logit modeling, while models 2, 4, 6 and 8 were estimated using Penalized Maximum Likelihood estimator suggested by Rainey and McCaskey (2021).



Figure 22: Vote in General Elections: Predicted Probabilities for Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) after Coerced Exact Matching



Figure 23: Vote in Local Elections: Predicted Probabilities for Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) after Coerced Exact Matching



Figure 24: Ethnic-based Engagement: Predicted Probabilities for Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) after Coerced Exact Matching

9 Study 4: Variable Manipulation Strategy and Explanations SCIP Dataset

In total four variables measuring discrimination were used in the models. Two variables for societal discrimination and two variables for political discrimination. Following the original research, only instances of ethnic and racial discrimination were taken into account when constructing all variables (other measured forms, such as gender or language discrimination were not included). As it was indicated in the paper, variables political discrimination 1 and societal discrimination 1 measure only in instances of political or racial discrimination. Both variables were created by combining binary indicators. In case of political discrimination, instances of institutional and labour discrimination were combined, while in societal, instances of racial harassment and discrimination in the access to housing were combined. Both variables take values from 0 (no discrimination) to 2 (experiencing both measured forms of discrimination). Indeed this measure is less complex and sensitive compared to the measures in the original paper.

To try making the measures as close as possible to variables in the original paper, I combined binary indicators with measures of frequency of group discrimination (recoded to range from 0 to 3) to get political discrimination 2 and societal discrimination 2. For each binary indicator (institutional, labour, housing discrimination and racial harassment) I developed a new variable ranging from 0 (no discrimination at all) to 3 (highest level of perceived discrimination). Point 0 designates that respondent reported no instances of discrimination and they don't think their group is discriminated whatsoever. Values from 1 to 3 were appointed if respondent reported specific form of discrimination (value 1 for a binary indicator) and frequency of group discrimination (ranging from 1 to 3). Higher values of frequency of group discrimination mean also higher values of the new variables. To get measures of political discrimination, I summed indicators for institutional and labour discrimination, while for societal discrimination, I summed indicators for housing discrimination and racial harassment. Scales for both variables go from 0 (no discrimination) to 6 (highest level of perceived discrimination).

Additional measures of broad discrimination were made in the same principle. The first measure of broad discrimination is binary, where value 1 designates an instance of any of the following binary indicators (institutional, labour, housing discrimination and racial harassment). The second measure of broad discrimination was made using the principle described in the previous paragraph. Binary indicator for broad discrimination was combined with the measure of frequency of group discrimination. The second measure of broad discrimination takes values from 0 to 3.

The key outcome variable was created by combining four binary indicators for engagement in sports, political, religious or other organisations. Each binary indicator would get a value of 1 if the respondent reported participating in the organisation and if the respondent reported that at least half or more participants came from their country of origin. The initial strategy was to sum up all binary indicators, but the measure of ethnic based engagement would only range from 0 to 2 (instead of 4 as a potential highest value). Due to small number of observations for value 2, I recoded the measure of ethnic based engagement into a binary indicator.

The second outcome is a variable that asks if the value of the residence country people and the people from the country of origin are irreconcilable/totally different. The original scale ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). I reversed the scale so that smaller numbers indicate less agreement. I also recoded the reversed scale so it ranges from 1 (disagreement) over 2 (neutral) to 3 (agreement with the statement).
Worship attendance, a 6-point scale, recoded so that smaller numbers indicate less attendance. Political interest, a 4-point scale, recoded so that smaller numbers indicate less interest. Political knowledge, a 15-point scale (UK) or an 11-point scale, rendered by summing up binary indicators that measure if a respondent has heard of a particular political party in the UK or the Netherlands, respectively. The use of English was measured with a 3-point scale ranging from 0 to 2. The scale was computed using binary indicators for the use of English with children and partners in the house. Gender was measured through a binary indicator (1 for females, 0 for males). Age and education were measured in years (of age or years spend in formal education). Indicators of

income were developed in a way that low income encompass all individuals with income bellow ¢25.000; middle income category ranges between ¢25.000 and ¢50.000; high income category includes all respondents with incomes higher than ¢50.000. In the UK sample, ethnicity coincides with the country of origin with indicators for Pakistani and Polish respondents. In the Dutch sample, there are indicators for Antillean, Bulgarian, Moroccan, Polish, Surinamese and Turkish respondents.

10 Study 4: Original Models Adapted to Match the Available Variables in SCIP Dataset for Comparison

Figure 25: Ethnic-based Engagement (Specific Measures) - Adapted Model



Table 70: Ethnic-based Engagement (Specific Measures) - Adapted Model

	Ethnic-Based Participation
Societal Discrimination	0.108***
	(0.038)
Political Discrimination	0.069*
	(0.037)
Worship Attendance	0.230***
	(0.029)
Political Interest	0.174***
	(0.046)
Political Knowledge	0.211***
	(0.042)
Close to British ID	−0.111
	(0.070)
English (Main Lang)	−0.037
	(0.111)
Female	0.132
	(0.094)
Age	−0.0002
	(0.003)
Education	0.056*
	(0.032)
High Income	0.171
	(0.174)
Med Income	0.056
	(0.137)
Missing Income	−0.122
	(0.108)
Black Caribbean	0.145
	(0.151)
Indian	0.688***
	(0.143)
Pakistani	−0.238
	(0.148)
Bangladeshi	0.061
	(0.188)
Constant	−2.839***
	(0.281)
N	2,444
Log Likelihood	−1,405.493
AIC	2,846.986

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 26: Identity Choice (Specific Measures) - Adapted Model



Table 71: Identity Choice (Specific Measures) - Adapted Model

Identity Choice	Equally both	British
	(1)	(2)
Societal Discrimination	-0.129^{***}	-0.095^{*}
	(0.040)	(0.057)
Political Discrimination	-0.088^{**}	-0.203^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.064)
Worship Attendance	-0.106^{***}	-0.195^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.038)
Political Interest	0.113^{**}	0.234^{***}
	(0.047)	(0.063)
Political Knowledge	-0.032	0.119^{**}
	(0.042)	(0.058)
English (Main Lang)	0.683^{***}	1.111^{***}
	(0.117)	(0.155)
Female	0.010	-0.154
	(0.097)	(0.131)
Age	0.010^{***}	0.017^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.005)
Education	-0.018	-0.042
	(0.033)	(0.045)
High Income	-0.300	-0.370
	(0.183)	(0.246)
Med Income	0.095	-0.054
	(0.144)	(0.195)
Missing Income	0.229^{**}	0.011
	(0.110)	(0.149)
Black Caribbean	0.068	0.034
	(0.148)	(0.240)
Indian	0.737^{***}	1.519^{***}
	(0.149)	(0.224)
Pakistani	1.172^{***}	2.199^{***}
	(0.149)	(0.222)
Bangladeshi	0.830^{***}	1.845^{***}
	(0.188)	(0.268)
Constant	-0.656^{**}	-3.158^{***}
	(0.269)	(0.400)
AIC	4,715.533	4,715.533

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

11 Study 4: Descriptive Statistics for SCIP Dataset

Table 72: Summary Statistics for Specific Measures (Political Discrimination) for UK

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political Discrimination 1	1,529	0.061	0.268	0	2
Political Discrimination 2	1,529	0.147	0.699	0	6

Table 73: Summary Statistics for Specific Measures (Societal Discrimination) for UK

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Societal Discrimination 1	1,529	0.061	0.244	0	2
Societal Discrimination 2	1,529	0.119	0.529	0	4

Table 74: Summary Statistrics for Specific Measures (Political Discrimination) for NL

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political Discrimination 1	3,355	0.060	0.274	0	2
Political Discrimination 2	3,355	0.148	0.727	0	6

Table 75: Summary Statistrics for Specific Measures (Societal Discrimination) for NL

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Societal Discrimination 1	3,355	0.040	0.215	0	2
Societal Discrimination 2	3,355	0.100	0.561	0	6

Figure 27: Distribution of Frequencies for Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) for UK



(a) Societal Discrimination 1



(b) Political Discrimination 1



(c) Societal Discrimination 2



(d) Political Discrimination 2

Figure 28: Distribution of Frequencies for Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) for NL



(a) Societal Discrimination 1



(b) Political Discrimination 1



(c) Societal Discrimination 2



(d) Political Discrimination 2

Table 76: Summary Statistics for Control Variables (UK)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Worship Attendance	1,371	3.516	1.990	0	6
Political Interest	1,511	0.621	0.825	0	3
Political Knowledge	1,513	0.801	1.071	0	3
Irreconcilable values	1,452	2.547	0.716	1	3
Language at home	1,529	0.149	0.413	0	2
Female	1,529	0.308	0.462	0	1
Age	1,529	29.706	9.284	18	60
Education	1,479	13.644	2.457	1	27
High Income	1,529	0.019	0.136	0	1
Med Income	1,529	0.089	0.285	0	1
Missing Income	1,529	0.451	0.498	0	1
Pakistani	1,529	0.491	0.500	0	1

Table 77: Summary Statistics for Control Variables (NL)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Worship Attendance	2,921	2.231	2.036	0	6
Political Interest	3,216	0.642	0.861	0	3
Political Knowledge	3,208	0.957	1.292	0	3
Irreconcilable values	3,208	2.217	0.866	1	3
Language at home	3,350	0.371	0.598	0	2
Female	3,355	0.506	0.500	0	1
Age	3,355	31.525	9.479	18	67
Education	2,953	11.788	4.096	0	42
High Income	3,355	0.022	0.147	0	1
Med Income	3,355	0.136	0.342	0	1
Missing Income	3,355	0.349	0.477	0	1
Bulgarian	3,355	0.136	0.343	0	1
Morrocan	3,355	0.128	0.334	0	1
Polish	3,355	0.261	0.439	0	1
Surinamese	3,355	0.115	0.319	0	1
Turkish	3,355	0.247	0.432	0	1

12 Study 4: Estimates for Broad Discrimination Measures in SCIP Dataset

Table 78: Ethnic-based Engagement (Broad Discrimination): UK

	Ethnic-based Engagement	
	(1)	(2)
Broad Discrimination 1	−0.445	
	(0.778)	
Broad Discrimination 2		0.187
		(0.209)
Worship Attendance	0.140	0.126
	(0.129)	(0.130)
Political Interest	−0.357	−0.424
	(0.299)	(0.302)
Political Knowledge	0.663***	0.662***
	(0.203)	(0.203)
Irreconcilable values	0.500	0.481
	(0.379)	(0.377)
Language at home	0.234	0.271
	(0.502)	(0.503)
Female	−0.531	−0.500
	(0.576)	(0.577)
Age	−0.027	−0.025
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Education	0.144*	0.147*
	(0.081)	(0.081)
High Income	0.181	0.269
	(1.135)	(1.133)
Med Income	−1.184	−1.178
	(1.080)	(1.078)
Missing Income	−0.196	−0.166
	(0.483)	(0.485)
Pakistani	−1.531***	−1.476***
	(0.563)	(0.559)
Constant	−6.647***	−7.029***
	(1.733)	(1.768)
N	1,238	1,238
Log Likelihood	−98.060	−97.831
AIC	224.121	223.663

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 29: Ethnic-based Engagement (Broad Discrimination)



(a) UK



(b) NL

Table 79: Ethnic-based Engagement (Broad discrimination): NL

	Ethnic-based Engagement	
	(1)	(2)
Broad Discrimination 1	1.012***	
	(0.367)	
Broad Discrimination 2		0.163
		(0.124)
Worship Attendance	0.215***	0.216***
	(0.060)	(0.060)
Political Interest	0.434***	0.428***
	(0.135)	(0.135)
Political Knowledge	0.190*	0.196**
	(0.099)	(0.099)
Irreconcilable values	0.066	0.058
	(0.147)	(0.146)
Language at home	−0.032	−0.010
	(0.208)	(0.209)
Female	−0.281	−0.276
	(0.244)	(0.244)
Age	−0.029*	−0.030**
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	0.019	0.019
	(0.029)	(0.029)
High Income	0.086	−0.008
	(0.770)	(0.772)
Med Income	−0.074	−0.047
	(0.361)	(0.359)
Missing Income	−0.038	−0.007
	(0.268)	(0.267)
Bulgarian	−1.169*	−0.906
	(0.701)	(0.686)
Morrocan	0.902**	0.953**
	(0.449)	(0.451)
Polish	−0.340	−0.240
	(0.458)	(0.454)
Surinamese	−1.017*	−0.985*
	(0.555)	(0.555)
Turkish	0.043	−0.036
	(0.389)	(0.389)
Constant	−3.865***	−4.019***
	(0.780)	(0.806)
N	2,479	2,479
Log Likelihood	−322.045	−324.508
AIC	680.089	685.017

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

13 Study 4: Models

Table 80: Ethnic-based Engagement: Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) for UK and NL

	Ethnic-based Engagement			
	UK		NL	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Societal Discrimination 1	0.086		0.281	
	(0.766)		(0.479)	
Political Discrimination 1	−0.528		0.672**	
	(0.968)		(0.327)	
Societal Discrimination 2		0.078		0.057
		(0.364)		(0.186)
Political Discrimination 2		−0.277		0.245**
		(0.426)		(0.124)
Worship Attendance	0.138	0.138	0.211***	0.213***
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Political Interest	−0.350	−0.346	0.418***	0.419***
	(0.299)	(0.298)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Political Knowledge	0.656***	0.654***	0.196**	0.198**
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Irreconcilable Values	0.499	0.502	0.074	0.076
	(0.378)	(0.378)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Language at Home	0.240	0.239	−0.025	−0.028
	(0.503)	(0.503)	(0.209)	(0.209)
Female	−0.506	−0.501	−0.279	−0.272
	(0.577)	(0.576)	(0.244)	(0.244)
Age	−0.025	−0.025	−0.029*	−0.029*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	0.146*	0.146*	0.020	0.019
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.029)	(0.029)
High Income	0.184	0.182	0.075	0.060
	(1.134)	(1.134)	(0.771)	(0.771)
Med Income	−1.172	−1.173	−0.074	−0.078
	(1.079)	(1.080)	(0.361)	(0.361)
Missing Income	−0.205	−0.209	−0.039	−0.033
	(0.485)	(0.485)	(0.267)	(0.267)
Pakistani	−1.492***	−1.484***		
	(0.565)	(0.564)		
Bulgarian			−1.205*	−1.155
			(0.712)	(0.710)
Morrocan			0.923**	0.929**
			(0.450)	(0.450)
Polish			−0.264	−0.228
			(0.457)	(0.455)
Surinamese			−1.000*	−0.994*
			(0.555)	(0.555)
Turkish			0.038	0.036
			(0.390)	(0.390)
Constant	−6.760***	−6.791***	−3.875***	−3.881***
	(1.734)	(1.732)	(0.782)	(0.782)
N	1,238	1,238	2,479	2,479
Log Likelihood	−98.058	−97.945	−322.538	−322.919
AIC	226.116	225.890	683.076	683.839

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 81: Average Marginal Effects for Ethnic-based Engagement Models (Specific Measures) for UK and NL

Country	Model	Variable	AME	SE	z	p
UK	Model 1	Political Discrimination 1	-0.528	0.968	-0.546	0.585
		Societal Discrimination 1	0.086	0.766	0.113	0.910
	Model 2	Political Discrimination 2	-0.277	0.426	-0.649	0.516
		Societal Discrimination 2	0.078	0.364	0.213	0.831
NL	Model 1	Political Discrimination 1	0.672	0.327	2.053	0.040
		Societal Discrimination 1	0.281	0.479	0.587	0.557
	Model 2	Political Discrimination 2	0.245	0.124	1.966	0.049
		Societal Discrimination 2	0.057	0.186	0.307	0.759

Table 82: Irreconcilable values: Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) for UK

Irreconcilable values	Neutral (1)	Agree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)
Societal Discrimination 1	−0.087	0.015		
	(0.441)	(0.355)		
Political Discrimination 1	−0.331	0.136		
	(0.435)	(0.341)		
Societal Discrimination 2			0.059	0.041
			(0.211)	(0.177)
Political Discrimination 2			−0.059	0.112
			(0.176)	(0.142)
Worship Attendance	−0.026	0.125***	−0.028	0.123**
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.048)
Political Interest	0.303**	0.064	0.294**	0.057
	(0.146)	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.128)
Political Knowledge	−0.292***	−0.184**	−0.297***	−0.186**
	(0.111)	(0.093)	(0.111)	(0.093)
Language at home	−0.003	−0.048	−0.005	−0.049
	(0.272)	(0.226)	(0.272)	(0.226)
Female	−0.278	−0.145	−0.272	−0.144
	(0.249)	(0.210)	(0.249)	(0.210)
Age	0.003	−0.018*	0.003	−0.018*
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Education	0.013	−0.043	0.013	−0.044
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.037)
High Income	0.017	0.466	0.030	0.477
	(0.853)	(0.668)	(0.854)	(0.669)
Med Income	0.493	1.107***	0.502	1.116***
	(0.467)	(0.391)	(0.468)	(0.391)
Missing Income	0.320	0.263	0.328	0.267
	(0.239)	(0.202)	(0.239)	(0.202)
Pakistani	1.215***	1.243***	1.232***	1.249***
	(0.281)	(0.239)	(0.280)	(0.239)
Constant	−0.313	1.881***	−0.320	1.890***
	(0.710)	(0.594)	(0.711)	(0.596)
AIC	1,970.319	1,970.319	1,970.334	1,970.334

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 83: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Irreconcilable Values (UK)

Model	Variable	Category	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Societal Discrimination 1	Agree	0.013	0.053	0.251	0.802
		Neutral	-0.014	0.048	-0.298	0.766
	Political Discrimination 1	Agree	0.067	0.051	1.308	0.191
		Neutral	-0.064	0.047	-1.365	0.172
Model 2	Societal Discrimination 2	Agree	0.001	0.025	0.042	0.966
		Neutral	0.004	0.022	0.161	0.872
	Political Discrimination 2	Agree	0.029	0.020	1.470	0.141
		Neutral	-0.022	0.018	-1.229	0.219

Table 84: Irreconcilable values: Specific Measures (Political and Societal Discrimination) for NL

Irreconcilable values	Neutral (1)	Agree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)
Societal Discrimination 1	0.671**	0.876***		
	(0.279)	(0.246)		
Political Discrimination 1	−0.424*	−0.513***		
	(0.228)	(0.198)		
Societal Discrimination 2			0.286**	0.378***
			(0.115)	(0.100)
Political Discrimination 2			−0.234**	−0.192**
			(0.096)	(0.077)
Worship Attendance	0.117***	0.104***	0.116***	0.102***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)
Political Interest	−0.049	−0.099	−0.044	−0.097
	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.070)
Political Knowledge	0.022	−0.023	0.021	−0.026
	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.049)
Language at home	−0.186*	−0.213**	−0.189*	−0.216***
	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.083)
Female	−0.060	0.096	−0.059	0.097
	(0.120)	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.102)
Age	−0.007	−0.200*	−0.010	−0.201*
	(0.123)	(0.105)	(0.123)	(0.105)
Education	0.0003	−0.002	0.0002	−0.002
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
High Income	−0.013	−0.019	−0.013	−0.019
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Med Income	−0.111	−0.304	−0.122	−0.305
	(0.360)	(0.340)	(0.359)	(0.340)
Missing Income	−0.437**	−0.234	−0.433**	−0.227
	(0.183)	(0.150)	(0.183)	(0.150)
Bulgarian	0.304**	0.360***	0.303**	0.356***
	(0.144)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.125)
Morrocan	1.160***	1.964***	1.168***	1.946***
	(0.324)	(0.274)	(0.324)	(0.274)
Polish	1.090***	0.849***	1.085***	0.845***
	(0.318)	(0.285)	(0.318)	(0.285)
Surinamese	−0.683***	−1.310***	−0.673***	−1.324***
	(0.231)	(0.200)	(0.231)	(0.200)
Turkish	0.057	0.158	0.054	0.155
	(0.237)	(0.199)	(0.237)	(0.199)
turkish	0.140	0.416**	0.135	0.414**
	(0.217)	(0.181)	(0.217)	(0.181)
Constant	−0.078	1.056***	−0.058	1.063***
	(0.411)	(0.351)	(0.411)	(0.351)
AIC	4,665.965	4,665.965	4,663.401	4,663.401

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 85: Average Marginal Effects (Specific Measures): Irreconcilable Values (NL)

Model	Variable	Category	AME	SE	z	p
Model 1	Socital Discrimination	Agree	0.123	0.045	2.731	0.006
		Neutral	0.020	0.037	0.544	0.587
	Political Discrimination	Agree	-0.069	0.038	-1.796	0.072
		Neutral	-0.017	0.032	-0.518	0.605
Model 2	Socital Discrimination	Agree	0.053	0.018	2.951	0.003
		Neutral	0.008	0.015	0.534	0.593
	Political Discrimination	Agree	-0.019	0.015	-1.207	0.227
		Neutral	-0.018	0.014	-1.296	0.195