MACHINE LEARNING-DRIVEN ACCIDENT PREDICTION TO ENHANCE INHERENT SAFETY DESIGN THROUGHOUT PROCESS DESIGN LIFECYCLE

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CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The incorporation of machine learning (ML) based techniques in inherent safety design across the entire process design lifecycle has emerged as one of the most active fields at present. Whenever safety-related events happen within industrial processes, they are usually followed by severe consequences; therefore, the industry should proactively adopt ways by which they could automate the capability to understand their process safety mechanisms and ultimately avoid causing sound catastrophes. Inherent safety design along with data-derived information from ML could work wonders toward eliminating hazards at source. This chapter reviews the existing literature regarding inherent safety design principles, lifecycle integration, risk management, and ML as applied to accident prediction methods in the process design lifecycle.

2.2 Inherent Safety Design

Plants that are naturally safer start with the initial design, where integrity and reliability may be built at the lowest cost and with the greatest effectiveness. It's critical to choose designs that can avoid or reduce the release of combustible or hazardous components, which could result in a fire, explosion, or damage to the environment. Design is a creative endeavor, and it may be one of the most fulfilling and enjoyable things an engineer can do. The design did not exist at the start of the project. The designer starts with a certain goal or consumer requirement in mind, then develops and evaluates various designs until they find the best approach to achieve that goal or for the chemical engineer to design a new chemical process plant.

2.2.1 Principles of Inherent Safety

Inherently safer design (ISD) was introduced in the 1970s by Kletz, where the philosophy presents the approach to eliminate hazards in the chemical process and to the extent that it will be carried out as early as the research and development phase before proceed to the process development stage. A survey conducted by Gupta and Edwards (2002) as well as a review on inherently safer design shows that the designer is generally familiar with the concept. Inherent safety is one of the four main strategies of the risk reduction measure to eliminate or minimize consequences in chemical process industries. It is a concept of minimizing the source of harm by using fewer hazardous chemicals, smaller inventories, and milder process conditions. Kletz (1999) formalized the inherently safer design principles as strategies to remove or reduce hazards at the source instead of add-on controls to achieve the inherently safer design.



Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of Control (Kletz and Amyotte, 2010)

Hazard reduction in designing a user-friendly plant is of the same importance as hazard reduction in understanding the hazards posed by processes involved. A systematic approach to designing an inherently safer and user-friendly plant is shown by the hierarchy of controls in Figure 2.1 (Kletz and Amyotte, 2010). In the hierarchy of controls, hazard identification and understanding need to be done first before proceeding to hazard avoidance and risk reduction. Understanding hazards can be done through hazards assessments, which also include the causes and effects of the hazards on the process.

It is important to utilize all the available details that may affect the inherent safer design in CPI. Inherent safer characteristics should be evaluated systematically in the early phase of the plant's design. Referring to Figure 2.2, the opportunity to implement the ISD is the highest at the earliest process design stage. However, it is significantly reduced when progressing to the latter engineering stage even though more detailed knowledge or information of the plant has been developed. This implies that the higher freedom of engineering modification due to safer plants implemented by ISD.



Figure 2.2: Inherently safer design from process design until operational phases (Hurme and Rahman, 2005).

Note that the opportunity for installing the add-on safety features is increased along the design stages but it is more focused on hazard management and less effective in hazard reduction or elimination. Furthermore, starting from the detailed engineering stage, the strategy of external control has been finalized through risk assessment (e.g., HAZOP), and less focus will be given to process safety in subsequent project and operational phases and represented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Project phases of inherently safer design plants

No.	Feature	Conceptual Stage	Flowsheet Stage	Line Diagram Stage
1	Minimization	X	X	
2	Substitution	X	X	
3	Moderation	X	X	
4	Simplification			
	by equipment design			X
	by changing reaction conditions	X	X	

Paradoxically, a common reason for new plant designs failing to implement inherently safer designs in CPI is the driving force behind the designs is the reduction of risk to people. Since the introduction of ISD, several inherent analysis methods have been developed by researchers in the past decades to quantify the risk or hazard of IS (Srinivasan and Natarajan, 2012).

2.2.1.1 Minimization

Minimization in ISD is reducing the amount of dangerous materials and energy in a process. For example, if you minimize it, the risk of an accident is much less, and if it does happen, it would be of much less consequence. A typical example of this is replacing a large batch reactor with a small continuous reactor so that material would not be accumulated to any large extent or at any time in the process, thus inherently safer operation. Another example is that by reducing raw material storage or keeping dangerous intermediates, the risk of big spills, leaks, or fires becomes very low. Another thing it deals with is keeping the amount of material "held up" in the process to a minimum, so that failure might only involve small quantities of the hazardous substance. Such operations make it possible to deal with hazards directly at the source.

2.2.1.2 Substitution

Substitution in ISD where more dangerous hazardous materials or process replaces either with less hazardous materials or processes to minimize the risk. For example, using water as a heat transfer fluid, rather than hot oil, avoids the danger of conducting any oil leak or fire, because water is less flammable and poses lesser environmental risks in case of spills. This is also true for welded pipelines, which remove the opportunity of having a flange joint in the system. It generally can be expected that welded connections are leak-proof other than flange connections; the latter may loosen through time or pressure changes. Therefore, these substitutions inherently make the process safer by materials and designs that avoid possible accident scenarios.

2.2.1.3 Simplification

Simplification in ISD focuses on the removal of unnecessary complexity from the simple that would yet make processes easier to use and manage while ensuring their safety. Putting fire and explosion-resistant barricades over an area clearly outlines it so that it surrounds the people and protects them from accidents. The simple design of control panels means operators can quickly identify the situation and have no time wasted in determining what the problem is. The design of the plant makes for simplified and safe maintenance, resulting in fewer possibilities of repair mistakes, which keeps workers safer. Maintaining neat and visible piping systems allows operators to quickly identify potential problems or needs for maintenance. Labeling pipes allows workers to "walk the line" when trying to trace systems back to their sources. Similar logic follows with labeled vessels and controls, which adds to one's understanding of the process and avoids mistakes. Equipment with low maintenance requirements lowers the chance of having failures and downtime, thus ensuring safe operations. Lastly, separating systems and controls in ways that are simple to understand keeps the operator more in control over various parts of the process flow without confusion and accidents. These are all simplifications that render much of a system more friendly to a person, or they render it safer and more efficient.

2.2.1.4 Moderation

Moderation in ISD focuses on the reduction in intensity or impact of hazards by bringing the control of conditions under which processes occur example in bad line noise equipment isolation with poorer acoustics at provides lesser noise pollution and hence keeping away noise in the workplace improves hearing. Protecting workers in control rooms and tanks provides for physical segmentation away from high-risk areas, reducing the risk of exposure to potential hazards. The use of a safe solvent for dissolving hazardous materials would moderate the risk of dangerous reactions by reducing the chemical's reactivity or toxicity. Reactor runaway is avoided by operating at conditions, such as safe temperature and pressure limits, to ensure that processes are stable and have reduced chances for such catastrophic events. For example, control rooms should be located far from operations so that operators will not be subjected to possible hazards while they monitor the system remotely and not exposed to dangerous circumstances. Refrigeration prevents high temperatures of storage containers, which keeps volatile substances within safe limits and minimizes the risk of an explosion or chemical degradation. Low process temperatures and pressures greatly reduce the chances of dangerous reactions or equipment failure, thus making the process safer. Separation of pump rooms from all other rooms can thus be devised so that any mechanical failure or leak in the pumps would not involve other areas of the plant, rendering this broader hazard less likely. Finally, using a vacuum to reduce boiling point would allow such materials to operate at lower temperatures during process, minimizing the probability of an overheating or unwanted reaction. All these moderation strategies aim at making the process safer for hazards such as control of conditions associated with hazardous events concerning the severity of accidents that might occur.

2.2.2 Process Design Lifecycle

A chemical plant design undergoes a series of phases. Usually, the design of the plant starts with research and development, followed by preliminary process design, basic engineering, detailed engineering, construction and start-up, plant operation, retrofit, and decommissioning. Each design phase has specific design objectives, tasks, and decisions as presented in Table 2.2.

2.2.2.1 Research and Development (R&D)

As the project starts, the chemical process route is either acquired or developed during the research and development phase which is based on experimental and modeling data. In this step, the process concept from laboratory to pilot plant is developed. In the preliminary design, the process concept is defined, process alternatives are identified, material and heat balances are calculated, and flow sheet diagrams are generated.

The *research and development (R&D) phase*, is the earliest process design phase for a chemical pathway. The process concepts from the laboratory to the pilot plant are developed and much of the detailed information is still missing because the process is not yet designed. The chemical, reaction chemistry, and physical property data are studied in detail and the process information is compiled for process scale-up. Through extensive experimental and literature studies, a list of potential chemistry pathways can be defined in this stage. Subsequently, the assessment can be performed on those alternative pathways to determine the potential pathways for further assessment in the next design Phases.

Based on the selected chemistry routes, the process block diagram (or initial flow sheet) can be drafted. Traditionally, early safety and health considerations are focused on fire and explosion hazards as well as acute toxic releases. In practice, safety and health assessments at the early phase of design are complex and have a relatively lower impact as compared to technical criteria during the design decision. This is due to the belief that the hazards are unavoidable (Hendershot, 2011) or they can be controlled effectively by add-on safety protection systems (Mannan, 2005). Hence, the designers have to develop and improve the quality of the corresponding technical tools.

Many do not realize that the best time to apply inherent safety and health is during the R&D phase when the process changes are easy and cheap (Kletz and Amyotte, 2010). Several ISD strategies can be employed to avoid or control process hazards at the source. According to Tanabe and Miyake (2012), since inherent safety and health design measures are limited and in many cases are case-specific, it is difficult to decide on the implementation of inherent safety and health design unless the extent of their application to decide is clearly defined. The identification of the appropriate inherent safety and health strategy and the setting of the criteria for its implementation should be done by a combined approach of deterministic/risk-based safety and health design approaches during the early phase of the project. The combined approach can overcome difficulties and restrictions due to the limitation of information available in the early phases of a project.

2.2.2.2 Preliminary Engineering

The second phase of the process design is *preliminary engineering*, where the overall system configuration is defined and alternative processes are generated. Here, the design focuses on creating the general framework to build the project, and the block flow diagrams which are very simplified are represented by a process that begins. In this phase, pre-dimensioning of major unit operation and process flow diagram (PFD) was developed. The basic information at the process unit level (e.g., major unit operations) such as types of unit operation and their process conditions, process materials and utilities, materials of construction, mass, and energy balance is temporarily fixed for process evaluations. Generally, inherent safety and health have great potential at this phase and several inherent safety indices are purposely developed for this phase to evaluate the process routes.

Several assessments in the preliminary engineering stage are presented in the literature. For example, Gómez et al. (2013) assessed the IS performance of two types of reactor systems used in biodiesel production, e.g., plug flow reactor, and reactive distillation column, via flow sheet simulation. From their work, it is also pointed out that the inherent hazards are not easily found during the operation of the process, and hence the assessment during the design phase is essential. Other than that, a variety of software tools such as HYSYS, Aspen, and PRO II are available for accomplishing the task. However, the process flow diagram is not a perfect representation of what the real-life process will look like. The basic information at the process unit level (e.g., major unit operations) such as types of unit operation and its process conditions, process materials and utilities, mass, and energy balance, and materials of construction are temporarily fixed for process evaluations.

2.2.2.3 Basic Engineering

In the *basic engineering phase*, it determined the details of the process package contain detailed information on the process flow sheet, process specification, and process description. Process data for all unit operations and its piping connectivity, as well as the control system and utilities needed for the process, are decided according to the actual plant capacity. Based on the process design information available at this phase, the detailed piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) and plant layout are developed by transforming the information from PFD. P&ID is not only essential for design works but also for later works of detailed simulation, construction, and process operation. This document is usually subject to further review and updates at the basic engineering stage, which is known as the detailed engineering stage, based on the aspects of operability and maintainability. Apart from P&ID, other information e.g., general equipment and piping data sheet, general operating instruction, etc., are developed in this design stage as well. The detailed equipment and instrument specifications are finalized. At this phase, a majority of the future plant safety and health risks are locked in.

2.2.2.4 Detailed Engineering

The *detailed engineering phase* is about meeting the multi-disciplinary engineering requirements for the safer, healthier, and profitable chemical process industry. Based on the process design data from previous design phases, a combination of mechanical, electrical, civil, and other fields of engineering disciplines are used to ensure the intended design can be realized. At this phase, three-dimensional (3D) plant layouts are developed and the written operation manual is finalized which covers the overall processes operation, major equipment, safety, health, and emergency guidelines. The detailed engineering phase has a strong impact on the overall project cost and ensures that the overall design solution satisfies the project's objective.

2.2.2.5 Operation and Maintenance

Essential for the functionality of any industrial system is the operation and maintenance (O&M) phase. Accidents are avoided and the efficiency quotient is increased by incorporating within daily activities the principles of inherent safety during this very phase. A guide for accomplishing a task is contained in a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Inherent Safety Principles simplify these procedures while bringing critical steps to safety to bear and thus easier to follow, resulting in less chance of human errors associated with them. Regular inspections have identified possible hazards at early stages. Systems with inherent safety are easy to inspect since they give priority access to high-risk areas. Modern tools such as sensors are now available to tell failures of equipment even past the dates, they occur to prevent accidents before they happen.

Training teaches the workers about safe operation and emergency is one area where it does not follow general safety principles for training. It concerns the development of practical skills under the auspices of training for safety concepts and readiness in emergencies through on-the-hand drills and simulations. Automation brings safety because it has an add-on to real-time hazard detection or emergency facilities and fail-safe systems that automatically switch to safe modes in case of malfunctions or failures. Thus, human action dependency is reduced. Maintenance usually involves some hazardous activities such as working in hazardous areas.

2.2.2.6 Decommissioning

Decommissioning is the last step in the life cycle of a system or facility, and it involves dismantling, removing, or repurposing equipment. This phase addresses many safety issues since very often, decommissioning incidents require residual hazard management, such as leftover chemicals, contaminated materials, or the remnants of structures that may not be stable. Inherent safety principles ensure that this process will be undertaken as methodically and as reasonably safe as possible for workers, the environment, and most importantly, surrounding communities. All decommissioning activities shall disassemble systems in a way that will minimize exposure to hazards.

Despite ceasing operations, many systems continue to have residual risks such as toxic chemicals, flammable materials, or radioactive materials. Naturally safe principles stipulate the act of removing or neutralizing hazards. Such as toxic chemicals are treatable or safely transported to disposal sites. Contaminated equipment or materials can be cleaned or sealed for safety in the handling of such items. Decommissioning refers to the environmental effects related to dismantling operations. e.g. disposing of hazardous materials as per environmental laws and separation of recyclable components to reduce waste.

2.2.3 Risk Management

Risk management complements inherent safety design by systematically identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks throughout the lifecycle. Hazard is defined as the potential danger or harm to the individuals. At first, it is important to identify the potential hazard. In the past decades, hazard identification (HAZIP) and hazard analysis (HAZAN) on occupational safety, health, and the environment have had increased attention from plant designers. The hazard level is then used to represent the safety performance of the chemical plant, in terms of material, chemistry, unit operation, process flow sheet, storage, etc. According to Heikkilä et al. (1996), the overall safety performance of a chemical plant depends on two categories, i.e. internal and external safety. In principle, both categories have to be greater than the acceptable safety limit. For both internal and external safety approaches, their fundamental concept and techniques of hazard elimination and reduction are different from each other.

For the external safety approach, the conventional way of hazard management system is commonly applied. In specific, this external approach is mainly focused on the system protection of the process hazards that have already existed. This type of protection system can normally be executed by employing external controls, e.g. instrumentation, mechanical system, administrative management, interlocks, redundancy system, special operating procedures, etc. Nonetheless, an external approach can only be applied during the detailed design phase or even the operational stage because it requires detailed information on engineering design, system specification, and setup. In general, there are three major categories under the external safety management, as listed below:

(a) Passive control: Implemented without the need to detect the initiating event followed by activation of action by any person or device, e.g. installation of a firewall to protect from the harm of fire during the emergency event.
(b) Active control: Implemented with the need of detecting the initiating event and the system to activate the mitigation or corrective actions by any person or device, e.g. installation of a fire alarm system to detect the presence of fire and to activate the sprinkler system for extinguishing the fire.

(c) Procedural control: The detection of initiating events is followed by the implementation of procedural action by operation personnel to mitigate or correct the situation, e.g. in the event of a fire, the site's emergency response team coordinates the site evacuation and executes the firefighting work.

2.2.3.1 Hazard Identification

Hazard identification tools, such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), pinpoint potential risks in processes and systems. Apart from hazard identification and assessment, the risk of the process can be assessed. The risk is defined as the mutual consideration of both the severity of the potential danger or harm and the likelihood of occurrence. Referring to Figure 2.3 (Cullen, 2014), the typical process of risk assessment is involved in a cycle with five major steps. The process starts with the identification of hazards that lie within the chemical process, and it is then followed by the risk assessment. This will be followed by defining the corrective actions and implementing the action. Lastly, the associated hazard is reviewed. Later, the overall process is started again to ensure that the hazard is eliminated or reduced throughout the entire operation period of the chemical plant. According to Srinivasan and Natarajan (2012), the probability of occurrence in risk assessment is normally associated with the robustness of the process control, safety instrumented system, human factor, or management system. Therefore, the risk assessment will most likely be conducted during the detailed engineering design phase when that needful information is available.



Figure 2.3: Typical cycle of hazard and risk assessment (Cullen, 2014)

2.2.3.2 Risk Assessment

Quantitative and qualitative risk assessments evaluate the likelihood and consequences of identified hazards to prioritize mitigation efforts. For the risk assessment, it can be categorized into quantitative, semi-quantitative, or qualitative types. Qualitative risk assessment performs a textual evaluation that ranks or segregates the risk into descriptive categories using the facts and process data. In general, the accuracy of qualitative assessment is dependent on expert opinions or discussions from a group of relevant personnel. For safety assessment, there are several common qualitative risk assessments that are applicable during the operational stage, e.g. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies (Lawley, 1974), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis, etc. However, qualitative risk assessment often provides an insufficient understanding of the actual risks due to subjective judgment from the reviewers, and therefore more detailed risk evaluation called Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is performed.

The risk estimation of QRA is performed through mathematical risk calculation. The extent of the risk is judged by jointly considering the consequence and frequency of the hazard. In particular, the product of consequence and frequency indicates the level of risk (Risk = Likelihood X Severity). There are a number of QRA studies on chemical hazards available in the literature, e.g. pipe rupture hazard (Milazzo and Aven, 2012), the risk impact of a new plant (Baesi et al., 2012), hazardous chemical leakage (Si et al., 2012), risk of hydrogen generator unit (Jafari et al., 2012), etc. Besides, there are some QRA, which are specified to fire, explosion, and toxicity hazards, e.g. Dow Fire and Explosion Index (Dow FEI) (Dow, 1964). Apart from qualitative and quantitative risk assessments, both types of assessments can be combined into a single assessment, known as semi-quantitative risk assessment. In other words, both qualitative and quantitative approaches are jointly applied in risk assessment, which enables the assessment to become more comprehensive.

2.3 Machine Learning Techniques

The heavy utilization of machine learning (ML) techniques has become the order of the day because of their potential to identify any patterns and make data-based predictions. The output performance of the models created by using machine learning will very much depend on the quality of input data. This makes preprocessing data one of the critical steps for any model. This section will discuss the fundamental procedures that inform the preparation of data for machine learning applications.

2.3.1 Data Preprocessing

Data prepossessed is raw data that has been an internal data structure that was refined, making it appropriate for analysis purposes. It also includes some very important components, such as cleaning, transforming, and lowering data complexity, in order to improve performance and robustness within ML models.

2.3.1.1 Data Cleaning

Data cleaning removes inconsistencies, errors, and missing values that enhance dataset integrity. It is the early stage of preprocessing that aims at having better data integrity, concerning some of the following problems: inconsistencies, errors, and missing values:

- Inconsistency: sometimes, entries can be conflicted or duplicated; this is usually because of data integration across sources.
- Errors: these are a range of typographical errors, incorrect values, or outliers that artificially skew results.
- Missing Values: incomplete datasets that lead to biased results.

Outlier detection techniques (e.g., Z-score), format standardization, and filling ambiguous gaps with the help of domain knowledge are the techniques used for data cleaning. The literature refers to the fact that systematic cleaning should be avoided in order not to propagate errors during the training of the ML model.

2.3.1.2 Feature Engineering

This is the process of feature engineering identification and transformation of input variables that improve model performance and relevance. It converts raw variables' meanings into meaningful features to increase model accuracy and relevance. This process typically includes:

- Feature Selection: Finding the best predictors and getting rid of redundant or irrelevant variables. Approaches include wrapper methods, filter methods (for example, correlation analysis), and embedded methods (for example, feature importance from decision trees).
- Feature Transformation: Making math transformations (for example, logarithms, scales, and normalizations) for the standard distribution of features and improved compatibility of algorithms.

It interprets raw data into machine-learning relevant input for an optimized set, using which models could extract insights from the data effectively.

2.3.1.3 Data Imputation

Dealing with an incomplete dataset is when the mean replacement or application of k-nearest neighbors or advanced ML algorithms offers input to that data set. This incompleteness brings down ML performance, thus making input compulsory preprocessing. Techniques for this include:

- Mean/Median Substitution: This is an adjustment to retain the consistency of the dataset by replacing the missing value through statistical measures.

- K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN): Neighbor observations are drawn on their proximity to estimate the missing values by collecting local patterns around the data.
- Advanced ML Imputation: This technique applies machine learning models such as regression or neural networks to predict the missing data based on the other features.

The choice of a particular imputing method is context-specific, as it weighs the cost of that method's implementation against achieving relative simplicity to the complexity of the dataset and the intended ML application.

2.3.1.4 Dimensionality Reduction

These approaches include Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and a host of other techniques of dimensionality reduction, which help cut down on the complexity of computation by eliminating redundant features. Moreover, reduction dimensionality solves the problems that high-dimensional datasets pose, like overfitting, higher cost of computation, and difficulty in visualizing data. Apart from the fact that it might emphasize several kinds of methods for dimension reduction, key ones, are:

- Principal Component Analysis (PCA): Involved in statistics, an approach that transforms highly correlated features into a set of uncorrelated principal components while retaining the information variance of the dataset.
- Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA): By supervised learning classes, maximizes the separability of classes during the process of dimensionality reduction.

- Autoencoders: These are very specialized neural networks that encode their data into lower dimensions nonlinearly in a useful way for dependence among inputs.

Dimensionality reduction keeps data simple while it retains salient features so that the calculations can easily be done and the overall generalization of the model will improve. It is noted for its importance to high dimensional data processing in genomics, text analysis, and accident prediction modeling, among other fields.

2.3.2 Machine Learning Algorithms

Machine learning algorithms are the powerhouses of predictive modeling and data analysis. They are designed to accommodate specific kinds of problems: classification, regression, clustering, and deep learning. Each has its possible applicability based on the nature of the dataset, the problem area, and the intended result.

2.3.2.1 Classification

Classification algorithms are used for discrete or categorical outcomes and determine whether an entity falls into one category rather than the other. The widely found applications of classification algorithms are fraud detection, medical diagnosis, and accident likelihood prediction.

- Logistic regression is a statistical model that applies itself to problems of binary classification such as, whether or not there will be an accident (maybe yes, maybe no). It applies a sigmoid function whereby outcome probabilities are modeled.

- Decision Trees follow a tree-like structure. They use filtering by the feature threshold and make decisions. Decision Trees are easily understood can be interpreted, and have applicability for the categorical and continuous variable types.
- Random Forest and Gradient Boosting are advanced ensemble techniques putting together many decision trees so that their predictions are improved, and overfitting can be reduced. They are generally applied in accident risk assessment and safety analyses.

2.3.2.2 Regression

Regression algorithms create a mold to predict continuous outcomes, being measured typically in injury severity, economic losses, or hazard probabilities, between variables or amongst variables.

- Linear Regression: A classical model that creates a linear correlation between dependent and independent variables. For example, it generates estimates for the accident cost based on key factors like incident type and severity.
- Support Vector Regression: An extension of Support Vector Machines (SVMs) for continuous output-fitted hyperplanes within predefined margins. Such cases arise, for example, in datasets that may reflect nonlinear relationships.
- Polynomial Regression: This makes more flexible relationships of the type of phenomena. It can fit any polynomial equation to the data. It is quite relevant when two or more risk factors interact in a complex way.

2.3.2.3 Clustering

Clustering algorithms are algorithms that organize similar data points according to their similarities and facilitate the revelation of patterns, anomalies, or natural groupings in terms of data. This is one of the most effective unsupervised learning algorithms:

- K-Means Clustering: One very popular algorithm where you can partition data into a specified number of clusters by minimizing the distance between that point and its cluster centroid. For example, it can incorporate the categorization of incidents in the workplace to help understand if similar incidents recur.

- DBSCAN: This is the acronym of the Density-Based Clustering of Applications with Noise. It can form non-convex clusters and works well with outliers because it mainly core on outlier detection. It is certainly useful for rare risk phenomena but severe ones.

2.3.2.4 Deep Learning

Deep learning algorithms, part of machine learning, work on large and complex datasets. They are capable of extracting hierarchical features which are essential for tasks that need high-level abstractions.

- Neural Networks (NNs): The interconnected layers of neurons form an NN. This versatile model covers various problems, from accident prediction to risk analysis.

- Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs): CNNs are mainly for imaging and spatial data, concerning visual hazard recognition and monitoring in an industrial context.

- Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs): For analyzing time-series data, such as trends of safety incidents over time, RNNs have been designed.

2.4 Accident Prediction

Accident prediction models are critical for using machine learning techniques in the development of preventive measures for safety and health management. The models collect various databases to analyze those risk factors for patterns and suggest preventive measures. This section presents the important data required for very strong accident prediction systems.

2.4.1 Points to Looks

The success of accident predictions relies on determining the most critical aspects that need to be added and on achieving synergy among them. Broad models will include historical, environmental, operational, and mechanical data for a fuller predictive capability and reliability.

2.4.1.1 Incident History

Incident records are a great source for accident prediction. They include:

- Previous accidents: A complete account of incidents from their causes down to their consequences, making it easier to gauge trends and root causes.

- Near miss: Events have been avoided but could have ended up being an accident. They often reveal existing system weaknesses.

- Lessons learned: The steps taken after incidents to rectify them, which provide a case study of avoiding similar occurrences.

2.4.1.2 Environmental Data

There is a significant influence of environmental factors on accident likelihood, especially within certain industries such as construction, oil and gas, and manufacturing. Important inputs include:

- Weather: Influence of temperature, humidity, precipitation, and wind speed in safety at the site since wet surfaces increase the possibility of slips and falls.

- Site conditions: Ground stability, levels of illumination, and levels of noise influence the alertness of workers and the performance of equipment.

- External hazards: Things such as earthquakes, floods, and extreme heat events act by worsening risks.

2.4.1.3 Process Parameters

External elements outside the factory-provided process parameters will become the most important predictors of an accident - especially in industries which maintain the operational safety of their physical and chemical processes by controlling their operations.

- Temperatures and Pressure Deviations: unsafe operating ranges in any one area or another can lead to dangerous conditions - an explosion at the least or maybe leakage Dangerous

- Flow Rates: Abnormal flow rates in pipes and/or other systems may disclose blocked parts in the line or equipment malfunctioning.

- Chemical Composition: Monitoring of the process materials must keep their composition under strict limits to ensure no hazardous reactions take place at all times.

2.4.1.4 Equipment Failure Rates

Reliability of equipment is the foundation of safe operation. Often, high rates of failure are linked to an increase in the likelihood of accidents. Relevant information includes:

- Failure Frequency: Historical records of breakdowns per equipment type and severity.
- Maintenance History: Regularity and comprehensiveness of all preventive and corrective maintenance processes.

- Sensor Data: performance data in real-time, such as vibrations, temperature fluctuations, and wear indicators of the equipment.

2.4.2 Prediction Insights

Accident prediction models are much more than identifying a few incidents, creating actionable intelligent insights as well as concern-specific safety installation and decision-making actions. The insights provide a route for organizations to understand root causes, and emerging trends, detect anomalies, and measure risk levels.

2.4.2.1 Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis helps to investigate the underlying causes of accidents rather than looking into their symptoms. Accident prediction models deal with historical data and machine learning models combining them to automate and enhance RCA.

- Systematic Investigating: In direct pattern recognition with the accident data, machine learning models help identify repetition factors, such as process deviations, equipment failure, and human errors.
- Causal Relationships: An example formula for describing the causal relationship between a contributing factor and an outcome is Bayesian networks or decision trees.
- Data-Driven Mitigation: RCA Insights uses Animal Interventions such as Modification in Safety Protocols, Changes in Training Programmes, and Equipment Redesign.

2.4.2.2 Trend Detection

Comparative historical and real-time data analysis is done to detect possible signs or signals that are indicative of emerging safety hazards. It will allow organizations to prevent occurrences of such events.

- Emerging Risks: Accident prediction models monitor changes in workplace conditions, such as increasing near-miss rates and deteriorating performance of equipment, to indicate potential safety problems.

- Long-Term Patterns: Time series analysis and clustering algorithms have their applications in detecting seasonal and recurring accident patterns. Higher incident rates occur during certain operations or specific weather conditions.

- Workforce Behavior Trends: The understanding of behavioral trends, including fatigue and deviations from safety measures, provide an understanding required for custom interventions.

2.4.2.3 Anomaly Detection

Anomaly detection includes identifying divergences from more typical operational behavior to advertise misinterpretations that early warning cues usher potential hazards or failures. Machine learning models- the most important being unsupervised learning-methods-as an important aspect of this.

- Operational Deviations: These techniques include One-Class SVMs, Isolation Forest, and autoencoders to flag abnormality in process data, for example, abnormal temperature, pressure spikes, or irregular equipment vibrations.

- Real-Time Monitoring: These models make continuous monitoring of workplace conditions possible thanks to the incorporation of IoT sensors, and raise alarms when anomalies are detected.

- Rare Event Detection: Accident prediction models are designed to predict the low-frequency and high-magnitude events that would typically be ignored during traditional analysis.

2.4.2.4 Failure Probability

Estimation of failure probability relates to measuring the probability of accidents or equipment failures so that safety measures are prioritized and resources properly allocated by organizations.

- Risk Quantification: Probability models, such as Monte Carlo simulations and reliability analysis, predict the probability of a particular event happening based on historical and operational data.
- Safety Investment Prioritization: Failure probability items provide organizations with direction on where to resource allocation including installing/upgrading high risk items or improved training in hazardous areas.
- Cost benefit analysis: Organizations can thus put together how dangerous safety measures might be by quantifying risk and getting how much this has cost as opposed to benefits they would expect to get in return due to lower likelihood of incidents.

Accident prediction insight, including root cause analysis (RCA), trend detection, anomaly detection, and failure probability- it's forecasting, has enabled organizations to move from reactive safety to predictive safety management interventions, that is, mitigation- rather than post-incident treatment of risks. This has upped the operational resilience of organizations where systems and processes are designed to withstand and continuously adapt to unexpected disruptive events or hazards. There is a reduction in the frequency of incidents as threats to safety are identified and dealt with before they turn out into accidents that affect both workers and company assets.

In addition, prediction, in terms of risk or resource allocation, allows for better effects in considering the optimal allocation of safety resources, as it directs expenditure intended for further development of higher priority zones, such as boosting or replacing critical equipment, installing made monitoring systems, or specific safety training for higher-risk tasks. Overall, the safety of a process can improve from these kinds of decisions while at the same time increasing efficiency through cost savings from reducing unnecessary money spent on low-risk areas.

Prediction has been shown to become a catalyst for changing culture-altering messages around safety and sustainability, leading safety to become embedded within the operational value system of an organization so that it may yield long-term improvements in safety performance and compliance as well as contribute to further sustainability goals, such as reducing environmental and operational risks posed by incidents in the workplace. Integrating modernized predictive capabilities into their safety frameworks has enabled organizations to be accountable, resilient, and ultimately proactive in managing risks.