Online Supplementary Materials

A Theoretical model

In this section, we provide the more abstract version of the model and explain why we can relax several of the assumptions made as part of its exposition in the main text.

Recall that each voter i gets a payoff of $\theta - c_i$ if the initiative is approved and a payoff of 0 otherwise, where c_i is the cost to voter i of the increased tax burden and θ is the initiative's uncertain effect on a valued outcome. Assume θ is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G, while each voter i's cost c_i is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F, with $G(0) = F(0) = 0$ and G and F each strictly increasing. A voter i supports the initiative if and only if $\mathbf{E}(\theta) \geq c_i$. In the absence of further information about θ, the expected proportion of voters who prefer for the initiative to pass is $F(\mathbf{E}(\theta))$.

Assume the deliberative minipublic is one person drawn from the electorate, and after learning the true value of θ, this person declares support for the initiative if and only $\theta \geq c_M$, where c_M is distributed according to a strictly increasing cumulative distribution function F_M and its value observed only by the member of the minipublic. Let S refer to the event in which the minipublic supports the initiative. Voters learn whether S has occurred. Conditional on learning that S has occurred, a voter i supports the initiative if and only if $\mathbf{E}(\theta|S) \geq c_i$. Thus, the average effect of observing S on the proportion who prefer for it to pass is

$$F(\mathbf{E}(\theta|S)) - F(\mathbf{E}(\theta)) > 0 \tag{1}$$

This average effect must be strictly positive under the assumptions of the theory, because the posterior distribution of θ, conditional on observing S, first-order stochastic dominates the prior distribution. Take any $\hat{\theta}$. Given the behavior ascribed to the minipublic participant, $\mathbf{P}(S|\theta < \hat{\theta}) < \mathbf{P}(S|\theta = \hat{\theta}) < \mathbf{P}(S|\theta \geq \hat{\theta})$. By Bayes' rule, it follows that $\mathbf{P}(\theta < \hat{\theta}|S) < \mathbf{P}(\theta < \hat{\theta})$, establishing

first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, $\mathbf{E}(\theta|S) > \mathbf{E}(\theta)$, and the inequality then follows from the assumption that F is strictly increasing.

Turning now to the case where voters also learn the parties' positions, assume that the Democratic and Republican parties, like the deliberative minipublic, know the true value of θ. Observers know that the Democratic Party announces support for the initiative if and only if $\theta \geq c_D$, while the Republican Party announces support if and only if $\theta \geq c_R$, where $0 \leq c_D < c_R$. Let R refer to the event in which the Democratic Party supports the initiative, while the Republican Party opposes it. The average effect of observing the deliberative minipublic's support, in the presence of learning the parties' conflicting positions, is then

$$F(\mathbf{E}(\theta|S,R)) - F(\mathbf{E}(\theta|R)) > 0 \tag{2}$$

This effect must be strictly positive because the distribution of θ conditional on S and R first-order stochastic dominates the distribution of θ conditional on R alone. Take any $\hat{\theta} \in (c_D, c_R)$. Given the behavior ascribed to the minipublic, $\mathbf{P}(S|\theta < \hat{\theta}, R) < \mathbf{P}(S|\theta = \hat{\theta}, R) < \mathbf{P}(S|\theta \geq \hat{\theta}, R)$. By Bayes' rule, it follows that $\mathbf{P}(\theta < \hat{\theta}|S,R) < \mathbf{P}(\theta < \hat{\theta}|R)$. Thus, $\mathbf{E}(\theta|S,R) > \mathbf{E}(\theta|R)$, and the inequality then follows from the assumption that F is strictly increasing.

Remark 1. The assumption that the deliberative minipublic is (a) one person, who becomes (b) perfectly informed about θ and (c) automatically reveals her sincere preference, is made for simplicity; each part of the assumption can be relaxed without affecting the model's implications. Re: (a). Assume the deliberative minipublic has multiple members, and a majority declare support for the initiative if and only if $\theta \geq c_M$, where c_M now represents the median cost of the initiative among the minipublic's members and F_M is the distribution of the median.

Re: (b). Suppose we interpret θ, not as the effects of the initiative, but as the expected effects conditional on the evidence received by the deliberative minipublic. That is, we suppose that $\theta := \mathbf{E}(X|Y)$, where X is the random variable representing its true effects and Y is the variable

representing the evidence received by the minipublic. Note that θ is a function of Y and is itself a random variable; we now interpret the cdf G as the distribution of this random variable. (The assumption that G is strictly increasing, with $G(0) = 0$, now implies that for any possible $x \in (0, \infty)$, there is evidence y the minipublic could potentially receive such that $\mathbf{E}(X|Y = y) = x$.) We now assume the deliberative minipublic learns the realization of Y and therefore the realization of θ under its new interpretation. In assuming the observer prefers for the initiative to pass if and only if $\mathbf{E}(\theta) \geq c_i$, we are making the same substantive assumption as before, because $\mathbf{E}(\theta) = \mathbf{E}(\mathbf{E}(X|Y)) = \mathbf{E}(X)$ (the first equality by the new definition of θ and the second by the law of total expectation).

Re: (c). Might the minipublic participant have reason to misrepresent her preferences if she cares about whether the initiative passes and voters observe her action? Clearly not, because revealing her genuine support always makes observers more likely to support the initiative.

Remark 2. As discussed in the main text, the theory alone does not tell us whether the effect of the signal from the deliberative minipublic, on its own, should be greater or less than its effect in the presence of the partisan cue. To illustrate, suppose c_M and c_i are uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ for all observers i and $c_D = 0 < c_R$. Assume θ is discrete (the continuous case is analogous) and assume $\Theta := \{x|\mathbf{P}(\theta = x) \neq 0\} \subset [0, 1]$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{P}(S) &= \sum_{x \in \Theta} \mathbf{P}(\theta = x)\mathbf{P}(S|\theta = x) \\ &= \sum_{x \in \Theta} \mathbf{P}(\theta = x)x \\ &= \mathbf{E}(\theta)\end{aligned}$$

Using this fact, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{E}(\theta|S) - \mathbf{E}(\theta) &= \sum_{x\in\Theta} x\mathbf{P}(\theta = x|S) - \mathbf{E}(\theta) \\
&= \sum_{x\in\Theta} x\frac{\mathbf{P}(\theta = x)\mathbf{P}(S|\theta = x)}{\mathbf{E}(\theta)} - \mathbf{E}(\theta) \\
&= \sum_{x\in\Theta} x\frac{\mathbf{P}(\theta = x)x}{\mathbf{E}(\theta)} - \mathbf{E}(\theta) \\
&= \sum_{x\in\Theta} \frac{\mathbf{P}(\theta = x)x^2}{\mathbf{E}(\theta)} - \mathbf{E}(\theta) \\
&= \frac{\mathbf{E}(\theta^2) - \mathbf{E}(\theta)^2}{\mathbf{E}(\theta)} \\
&= \frac{\mathbf{V}(\theta)}{\mathbf{E}(\theta)}
\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{V}$ is the variance operator.

Now assume $Pr(\theta = 0) = Pr(\theta = \delta) = \varepsilon/2$ and $Pr(1) = 1 - \varepsilon$ for $\delta, \varepsilon \in (0, c_R)$. Recall that R is the event $\theta \in [0, c_R]$.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{E}(\theta|S, R) - \mathbf{E}(\theta|R) &= \sum_{x\in\Theta} x\mathbf{P}(\theta = x|S, R) - \mathbf{E}(\theta|R) \\
&= \delta\mathbf{P}(\theta = \delta|S, R) - \mathbf{E}(\theta|R) \\
&= \delta - \mathbf{E}(\theta|R) \\
&= \delta/2
\end{aligned}$$

Fix δ. Since $\lim_{\varepsilon\to 0} \frac{\mathbf{V}(\theta)}{\mathbf{E}(\theta)} = 0$, we have

$$\mathbf{E}(\theta|S) - \mathbf{E}(\theta) < \mathbf{E}(\theta|S, R) - \mathbf{E}(\theta|R)$$

for sufficiently small ε.

$$\mathbf{V}(\theta) = (1-\varepsilon)(1-\mathbf{E}(\theta))^2 + \varepsilon/2(\delta - \mathbf{E}(\theta))^2 + \varepsilon/2\mathbf{E}(\theta)^2$$

Now fix ε. Since $\lim_{\delta \to 0} \mathbf{V}(\theta)/\mathbf{E}(\theta) = \varepsilon$, one can choose δ small enough so that

$$\mathbf{E}(\theta|S) - \mathbf{E}(\theta) > \mathbf{E}(\theta|S,R) - \mathbf{E}(\theta|R)$$

We conclude that the assumptions of the generalized version of the model are compatible with the effect of the deliberative minipublic's signal being, on its own, greater or less than its effect in conjunction with the signal from the parties.

B Sample Composition and Survey Weights

To assess the discrepancy between the composition of our online sample and that of the target population (California adult residents), we compared the distribution of basic socio-demographic variables in our samples vis-à-vis the distribution of similar variables among adult California residents in the July 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS). The first two columns in Table B1 contain the results of this comparison.

These figures indicate that, while our sample is relatively well balanced in terms of gender and age, it considerably over-represents non-Hispanic whites, as well as individuals with high levels of education. To adjust for these differences, we constructed post-stratification weights that account for these discrepancies and largely allow us to recover the distribution of socio-demographic variables in the CA adult population (see third column in B1). To ensure that our estimates of treatment effects apply at the population level, these weights were used throughout the entire analysis reported in the paper.

Table B1: Distribution of Basic Sociodemographic Variables

		CPS (CA, Jul 2014)	Qualtrics (unweighted) (CA, Jul 2014)	Qualtrics (weighted) (CA, Jul 2014)
Age	Less than 32	25.64	23.66	25.17
	32 to 45	24.51	25.71	24.41
	46 to 58	22.89	24.51	23.18
	59 or older	26.96	26.11	27.23
Gender	Male	48.11	47.77	48.03
	Female	51.89	52.23	51.97
Education	High school or less	39.03	19.66	35.98
	Some college	28.77	38.51	30.25
	4-year college degree	21.00	30.34	22.14
	Postgraduate degree	11.19	11.49	11.63
White race	White	54.86	41.94	53.00
	Non-white	45.14	58.06	47.00
Hispanic ethnicity	Hispanic	66.14	81.20	69.23
	Non-Hispanic	33.86	18.80	30.77

C Additional Tables for Main Results

Table C1: Approval of Proposal in Partisan and Non-Partisan Contexts

(unweighted results)

	No partisan cue		Difference (II-I)	
	Condition I	Condition II	mean	s.e.
Approve strongly	6.2	10.7	4.5	1.8
Approve somewhat	13.4	24.7	11.3	2.7
Neither approve nor disapprove	12.7	14.0	1.3	2.3
Disapprove somewhat	24.5	22.6	-1.9	2.8
Disapprove strongly	38.8	25.2	-13.6	3.0
I'm not sure	4.5	2.9	-1.6	1.2
	Partisan cue		Difference (IV-III)	
	Condition III	Condition IV	mean	s.e.
Approve strongly	10.1	12.4	2.4	2.1
Approve somewhat	18.8	24.7	5.8	2.7
Neither approve nor disapprove	13.9	13.6	-0.3	2.2
Disapprove somewhat	20.4	21.9	1.5	2.7
Disapprove strongly	32.3	23.3	-9.0	3.0
I'm not sure	4.5	4.1	-0.3	1.4

Note: The table provides the distribution of approval of the proposed reform among respondents assigned to each treatment condition (first and second columns), as well as differences in levels of approval between respondents who were and were not exposed to the deliberative cue (third column). The fourth column provides bootstrapped standard errors for the differences in levels of approval.

Table C2: Approval of Proposal in Absence/Presence of Partisan Cues

	Condition I (no party cue)	Condition III (party cue)	Difference (III-I) mean	s.e.
Approve strongly	6.2	9.5	3.3	1.9
Approve somewhat	12.3	20.8	8.5	2.5
Neither approve nor disapprove	13.2	15.3	2.1	2.5
Disapprove somewhat	24.8	19.4	-5.4	3.0
Disapprove strongly	38.8	30.4	-8.4	3.3
I'm not sure	4.7	4.6	-0.1	1.4

Note: The table provides the distribution of approval of the proposed reform among respondents assigned to the first and third treatment condition (first and second columns), as well as differences in levels of approval between respondents who were and were not exposed to the partisan cue (third column). The fourth column provides bootstrapped standard errors for the differences in levels of approval.

Table C3: Approval of Proposal in Absence/Presence of Partisan Cues

	Democrats			
	Condition I (no party cue)	Condition III (party cue)	Difference (III-I) mean	s.e.
Approve strongly	10.2	15.3	5.1	3.4
Approve somewhat	18.0	31.0	13.0	4.3
Neither approve nor disapprove	12.8	16.4	3.7	3.5
Disapprove somewhat	28.9	18.9	-9.9	4.3
Disapprove strongly	27.0	12.3	-14.7	4.1
I'm not sure	3.1	6.0	2.8	2.1

	Independents			
	Condition I (no party cue)	Condition III (party cue)	Difference (III-I) mean	s.e.
Approve strongly	3.8	6.1	2.3	2.9
Approve somewhat	7.2	15.5	8.2	4.0
Neither approve nor disapprove	11.2	14.1	2.8	4.2
Disapprove somewhat	21.2	24.5	3.4	5.4
Disapprove strongly	46.3	36.9	-9.4	6.3
I'm not sure	10.2	2.9	-7.3	3.3

	Republicans			
	Condition I (no party cue)	Condition III (party cue)	Difference (III-I) mean	s.e.
Approve strongly	3.3	4.2	0.9	2.9
Approve somewhat	6.5	12.2	5.6	4.6
Neither approve nor disapprove	8.3	6.7	-1.6	4.0
Disapprove somewhat	18.5	13.6	-4.9	5.6
Disapprove strongly	59.6	63.3	3.7	7.6
I'm not sure	3.7	0.0	-3.7	2.0

Note: The table provides the distribution of approval of the proposed reform among respondents assigned to the first and third treatment condition (first and second columns), as well as differences in levels of approval between respondents who were and were not exposed to the partisan cue (third column). The fourth column provides bootstrapped standard errors for the differences in levels of approval.

Table C4: Regression Analysis of Approval of the Proposed Reform

	OLS	Ordered Logit
Deliberative cue	0.52	0.74
	(0.09)	(0.13)
Republican	-0.50	-0.81
	(0.09)	(0.13)
Democrat	0.70	0.95
	(0.08)	(0.11)
Party cue	0.34	0.46
	(0.09)	(0.13)
Party cue * Deliberative cue	-0.22	-0.29
	(0.13)	(0.19)
Female	0.00	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Hispanic	0.09	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.12)
Income	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.04	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.04)
N	1,537	

Note: The table provides point estimates and standard errors (between parentheses) for the coefficients of OLS and ordered logit models of approval of the proposed reform.

D Results on Preference Rankings

The survey contained a question item asking respondents to rank the policy mentioned in the treatment question—lowering the legislative supermajority threshold for increasing taxes—against two alternative reforms aimed at reducing legislative gridlock. The question read:

> *Next we would like you to RANK the three proposals for reducing the frequency of legislative gridlock in California listed below.*
>
> *Please indicate your level of preference by writing numbers 1, 2, or 3 next to each proposal. Assign a 1 to your most-preferred proposal; a 2 to your second most-preferred proposal; and so on. If you are indifferent between two proposals you may assign the same number to them.*
>
> - *SINGLE LEGISLATIVE BODY: Replace the current State Senate and Assembly by a single legislative body of 120 members*
> - *SMALLER MAJORITY REQUIREMENT: Lower the majority requirement for deciding important questions in the California State Legislature*
> - *TWO-YEAR BUDGET CYCLE: Establish a budget that is enacted every two years instead of on an annual basis*

Among respondents assigned to the control condition, the most popular reform was a two-year budget cycle (47.8%), followed by a unicameral legislature (26.0%), and finally a smaller majority requirement (23.0%). Preferences varied considerably as a function of party identification, with Republicans much more likely to favor a two-year budget cycle (64.0%), and much less likely to support a smaller majority requirement (7.9%), than both Democrats and Independents. Table D1 provides further details.

We included this question as an additional measure of respondents' attitudes, because one might reasonably expect the deliberative cue to affect respondents' preferences over the three policies. Learning that a majority of the deliberative minipublic's participants support a policy should, under reasonable background assumptions, increase the proportion of observers who rank the policy above any two alternative policies. Intuitively, it causes those observers whose preferences are

likely similar to the deliberative minipublic participants' to revise upwards their assessment of the expected utility of the policy, so that, all else equal, these observers end up more likely to rank the policy above alternatives. We therefore expected the proposed reform—lowering the legislative supermajority threshold—to be ranked first by a larger proportion of respondents who received the deliberative cue (treatment condition II) than in the control group (condition I).

Table D1: Preferences over Reforms in the Absence of Cues

	2-year Budget	Unicameral Legislature	Lower Majority	Missing
All respondents	47.84	26.02	23.02	3.11
Democrats	44.25	22.57	29.70	3.47
Independents	46.78	28.51	23.15	1.56
Republicans	63.95	27.56	7.92	0.57

Note: The table provides the proportion of respondents assigned to condition I (that is, who were not exposed to either the deliberative or partisan cue) who specified each reform as their top preference.

Table D2: Ranking of "Smaller Majority Requirement"

	Condition I (no video)	Condition II (video)	Difference (II-I) mean	s.e.
Overall Score				
First	23.0	27.6	4.6	3.0
Second	30.9	33.2	2.4	3.3
Third	43.9	37.3	-6.7	3.3
Missing	2.2	2.0	-0.2	0.9
Relative to Unicameral Legislature				
First	31.4	38.2	6.8	3.3
Indifferent	19.7	20.0	0.3	2.7
Second	48.3	41.8	-6.5	3.3
Missing	0.6	0.0	-0.6	0.4
Relative to Two-Year Budget Cycle				
First	27.1	29.6	2.4	2.9
Indifferent	16.9	16.3	-0.6	2.5
Second	55.2	54.1	-1.2	3.3
Missing	0.7	0.1	-0.6	0.4

Note: The table provides the distribution of preferences over policy proposals among respondents assigned to conditions I and II (first and second columns), as well as the differences in the proportions (third column) and corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (fourth column).

Table D3: Ranking of "Smaller Majority Requirement"

(unweighted results)

	Condition I (no video)	Condition II (video)	Difference (II-I) mean	s.e.
Overall Score				
First	20.3	26.8	6.6	2.9
Second	31.8	31.4	-0.5	3.2
Third	45.7	39.9	-5.8	3.4
Missing	2.2	1.9	-0.3	0.9
Relative to Unicameral Legislature				
First	32.1	39.0	6.9	3.2
Indifferent	19.4	17.8	-1.6	2.7
Second	48.1	43.2	-4.9	3.4
Missing	0.4	0.0	-0.4	0.3
Relative to Two-Year Budget Cycle				
First	25.6	28.3	2.7	3.0
Indifferent	16.0	14.5	-1.5	2.6
Second	57.7	57.0	-0.7	3.5
Missing	0.7	0.2	-0.4	0.5

Note: The table provides the distribution of preferences over policy proposals among respondents assigned to conditions I and II (first and second columns), as well as the differences in the proportions (third column) and corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (fourth column).

The top panel of Table D2 contains information about the proportion of respondents, in condition I (first column) and condition II (second column), specifying "smaller majority requirement" as their first-, second-, and last-ranked alternative. The third and fourth columns of Table D2 show treatment effects and associated bootstrapped standard errors, respectively. These results suggest that exposure to the deliberative cues caused a 6.7 percentage point reduction in the proportion of respondents who ranked lowering the majority threshold last and a corresponding increase in the proportion of respondents ranking it first and second, in line with our hypothesis. In Table D3 we present measures of the effect of the deliberative cue on preference rankings calculated without using post-straification weights. Unweighted measures of treatment effects are somewhat different in magnitude but qualitatively similar to those shown in Table D2.

We also asked respondents to rank "smaller majority requirement" vis-à-vis each of the other two alternative reforms (see middle and bottom panels in Table D2). While respondents who were exposed to the deliberative cue showed virtually no change in their preference for lowering the required majority relative to establishing a two-year budget cycle, they did become more likely (by 6.8 percentage points) to prefer the recommended reform to the option of a unicameral legislature.

Consistent with our main results concerning approval of the proposed amendment, the influence of the deliberative cue on overall and pairwise preference rankings diminished when respondents were exposed to both deliberative and partisan cues; see Tables D4 and D5. The results of a regression analysis of the effect of the deliberative cue on the probability of selecting "smaller majority requirement" as the first-ranked alternative suggest that the effect of the deliberative cue was approximately 6 percentage points in a non-partisan context, and fell by about 2 percentage points when the partisan cue was also provided, although the reduction was not statistically significant; see Table D6. These results reinforce our previous conclusion that raising respondents' awareness of the partisan divide on the issue may dampen the effects of the deliberative cue.

Lastly, we again studied whether the influence of the deliberative cue varies as a function of respondents' party identification. We estimated OLS and logit regression models of respondents'

decisions to place "smaller majority requirement" at the top of their ranking, allowing the effects of deliberative and partisan cues to vary as a function of party identification (see Table D7 in the appendix). Regression estimates indicate that the influence of the deliberative cue was positive for respondents of all partisan backgrounds, but effects generally failed to reach our threshold of statistical significance in both non-partisan and partisan contexts. An analysis of the influence of the deliberative cue on the probability of selecting the proposed reform as the top choice, for hypothetical respondents with different party identifications, produced analogous results; see Table D8.

Table D4: Ranking of Proposed Reform, Partisan Context

	Condition III (no video)	Condition IV (video)	Difference (IV-III) mean	s.e.
Overall score				
First	23.0	25.0	2.1	2.9
Second	27.7	32.1	4.4	3.0
Third	47.2	41.9	-5.4	3.4
Missing	2.1	1.0	-1.1	0.9
Relative to unicameral liegislature				
First	35.0	37.0	2.0	3.2
Indifferent	18.4	18.9	0.5	2.6
Second	45.9	43.8	-2.1	3.3
Missing	0.7	0.3	-0.4	0.5
Relative to 2-year budget				
First	28.0	27.8	-0.2	2.9
Indifferent	12.9	16.8	3.9	2.3
Second	58.7	55.1	-3.5	3.3
Missing	0.5	0.3	-0.2	0.4

Note: The table provides the distribution of preferences over policy proposals among respondents assigned to conditions III and IV (first and second columns), as well as the differences in the proportions (third column) and corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (fourth column).

Table D5: Ranking of Proposed Reform, Partisan Context

(unweighted results)

	Condition III (no video)	Condition IV (video)	Difference (IV-III) mean	s.e.
Overall score				
First	22.2	26.5	4.3	3.0
Second	27.1	30.9	3.7	3.0
Third	48.2	41.2	-7.0	3.3
Missing	2.5	1.4	-1.1	0.9
Relative to unicameral liegislature				
First	32.3	37.1	4.8	3.2
Indifferent	19.1	17.7	-1.3	2.6
Second	48.0	44.9	-3.1	3.4
Missing	0.7	0.2	-0.4	0.4
Relative to 2-year budget				
First	27.8	28.6	0.8	2.9
Indifferent	11.9	15.0	3.1	2.2
Second	59.6	56.2	-3.4	3.3
Missing	0.7	0.2	-0.4	0.4

Note: The table provides the distribution of preferences over policy proposals among respondents assigned to conditions III and IV (first and second columns), as well as the differences in the proportions (third column) and corresponding bootstrapped standard errors (fourth column).

Table D6: Regression Analysis of Preferences for the Proposed Reform

	OLS	Logit
Deliberative cue	0.06	0.36
	(0.03)	(0.17)
Republican	-0.08	-0.57
	(0.03)	(0.18)
Democrat	0.07	0.35
	(0.03)	(0.14)
Party cue	0.02	0.12
	(0.03)	(0.17)
Party cue * Deliberative cue	-0.02	-0.11
	(0.04)	(0.24)
Female	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.12)
Age	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Hispanic	0.02	0.10
	(0.03)	(0.16)
Income	0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education	0.01	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.05)
N	1,592	

Note: The table provides point estimates and standard errors (between parentheses) for the coefficients of OLS and logit models of the decision to select the proposed reform as the top choice in the three-way comparison.

Table D7: Regression Analysis of Preferences for the Proposed Reform

	OLS	Ordered Logit
Deliberative cue	0.05	0.31
	(0.06)	(0.34)
Deliberative cue * Republican	0.06	0.65
	(0.08)	(0.55)
Deliberative cue * Democrat	0.00	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.41)
Republican	-0.09	-0.85
	(0.06)	(0.43)
Democrat	0.10	0.55
	(0.05)	(0.30)
Party cue	0.03	0.22
	(0.06)	(0.33)
Party cue * Deliberative cue	0.02	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.45)
Party cue * Republican	0.00	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.58)
Party cue * Democrat	-0.03	-0.20
	(0.07)	(0.40)
Party cue * Deliberative cue * Republican	-0.07	-0.56
	(0.12)	(0.75)
Party cue * Deliberative cue * Democrat	-0.05	-0.20
	(0.10)	(0.55)
Female	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.12)
Age	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Hispanic	0.02	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.16)
Income	0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education	0.01	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.05)
N		1,592

Note: The table provides point estimates and standard errors (between parentheses) for the coefficients of OLS model and logit models of the decision to select the proposed reform as the top choice in the three-way comparison. Both models also included intercepts and the following control variables: gender, age, Hispanic ethnicity, income, and education.

Table D8: Change in Probability of Selecting Proposed Reform as Top Choice by Party Identification

	Non-partisan context		Partisan context	
	mean	s.e.	mean	s.e.
Democrat	4.6	5.1	2.4	4.8
Independent	5.2	5.5	6.9	5.5
Republican	10.8	4.9	6.0	5.3

Note: Note: The table provides point estimates and standard errors for the change in the probability of selecting the proposed reform as the top choice in the three-way comparison, for individuals with different party identifications.