

Business Email Compromise

Or, why “you” may not be “you”

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Think about this scenario

- Your company A/P clerk receives an email from a vendor (ACME INC.), requesting a change to banking details for future payments
- The email appears to come from a name and domain that makes sense –
`frank.smith@acmeinc.info`
- A/P clerk updates vendor records, cuts check for \$566k next day
- Two days later, vendor contacts you when payment not received

Or, how about this scenario...

- Your company A/P clerk receives an email from the company CFO authorizing payment for the attached invoice
- A/P clerk processes payment and releases
- Days later, CFO asks why this payment was sent out

But, this never happens?!?

- Sedgwick County, Kansas - October 2016
- Attack carried out by a Brookhaven resident
- Attacker bought domain name and set up email server
- Approximate time to stage – 2 hours
- Approximate cost to attacker - \$100
- BTW, dude was totally busted by the FBI...

Seriously, this happens...

- Ubiquiti Networks (2015) - \$46.7M
- Ameriforge Group (2014) - \$480K
- Socular (2015) - \$17.2M

What are we talking about?

- Business email compromise, or BEC
- Organization, and specific employees, are carefully selected targets
- This is not a simple “phishing” attack
- Attackers study their targets, learn their operating methods
- Use OSINT to time attacks

How big is this problem?

- May 4, 2017 - FBI released a PSA regarding BEC
- October 2013-December 2016
 - Global
 - 40,203 incidents, \$5.3B loss
 - U.S. only
 - 22,292 victims, \$1.5B loss



<https://imgflip.com/memegenerator/53373986/Macaulay-Culkin>



Your adversaries are:

- Smart
- Organized
- Patient
- Intelligent
- Based in multiple countries



So, what can you do?

- Operational controls
 - Out-of-band verification
 - Two-person authorization
 - Organizational policy
 - Operations and social media
 - Security Education and Awareness Training (SETA)

But wait, you can do more...

- IT controls
 - Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
 - Domain Message Authentication Reporting & Conformance (DMARC)
 - Buy “adjacent” domains
 - acme.info; acme.us; acme.org
 - Buy “fat fingered” domains

And still, there is more...

- Examine your organizational culture
 - Do you “shame” when mistakes are made
 - Do you encourage admission of mistakes
 - Encourage “healthy skepticism”

And with that...



Thank you for having me speak!

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