



RISC-V Shadow Stacks and Landing Pads (Zisslpcfi)

RISC-V Shadow-stack and Landing-pads Task Group

Version 0.1, 03/2023: This document is in development. Assume everything can change. See <http://riscv.org/spec-state> for details.

Table of Contents

Preamble	1
Copyright and license information	2
Contributors	3
1. Introduction	4
2. Shadow Stack and Landing Pad CSRs	8
2.1. Machine environment configuration registers (<code>menvcfg</code> and <code>menvcfgh</code>)	8
2.2. Hypervisor environment configuration registers (<code>henvcfg</code> and <code>henvcfgh</code>)	9
2.3. Machine status registers (<code>mstatus</code>)	9
2.4. Supervisor status registers (<code>sstatus</code>)	10
2.5. Virtual supervisor status registers (<code>vsstatus</code>)	11
2.6. Landing pad label (<code>lp1</code>)	11
2.7. Shadow stack pointer (<code>ssp</code>)	12
2.8. Machine Security Configuration (<code>mseccfg</code>)	12
3. Backward-edge control-flow integrity	14
3.1. Backward-edge CFI instruction encoding	14
3.2. Push to and Pop from the shadow stack	16
3.3. Read <code>ssp</code> into a register	22
3.4. Atomic Swap from a shadow stack location	23
3.5. Shadow Stack Memory Protection	24
3.5.1. Virtual-Memory system extension for Shadow Stack	24
3.5.2. PMP extension for shadow stack	26
4. Forward-edge control-flow integrity	28
4.1. Forward-edge CFI Instruction encoding	29
4.2. Landing pad instruction	30
4.3. Label matching instructions	31
4.4. Setting up landing pad label register	32
4.5. Preserving expected landing pad state on traps	35
Bibliography	36

Preamble



This document is in the [Development state](#)

Assume everything can change. This draft specification will change before being accepted as standard, so implementations made to this draft specification will likely not conform to the future standard.

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Contributors

This RISC-V specification has been contributed to directly or indirectly by (in alphabetical order):

Andrew Waterman, Antoine Linarès, Dean Liberty, Deepak Gupta, George Christou, Greg McGary, Henry Hsieh, Johan Klockars, Kip Walker, Liu Zhiwei, Mark Hill, Nick Kossifidis, Thurston Dang, Tsukasa OI, Vedvyas Shanbhogue

Chapter 1. Introduction

Control-flow Integrity (CFI) provides CPU instruction set architecture (ISA) capabilities to defend against Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Call/Jump-Oriented Programming (COP/JOP) style control-flow subversion attacks. This attack methodology uses code sequences in authorized modules with at least one instruction in the sequence being a control transfer instruction that depends on attacker-controlled data either in the return stack or in a register/memory for the target address. Attackers stitch these sequences together by diverting the control flow instruction (e.g., RET, CALL, JMP) from its original target address to a new target via modification in the data stack or in the register or memory used by these instructions.

This specification describes CFI threat model, security objectives and the architectural design choices to ensure that control-flow subversion attacks are effectively thwarted.

RV32/RV64 provide two types of control transfer instructions - unconditional jumps and conditional branches. Conditional branches encode an offset in the immediate field of the instruction and are thus direct branches that are not susceptible to control-flow subversion.

Unconditional direct jumps using JAL transfer control to a target that is in a +/- 1 MiB range from the current pc. Unconditional indirect jumps using the JALR obtain their branch target by adding the sign extended 12-bit immediate encoded in the instruction to the rs1 register.

The RV32I/RV64I does not have a dedicated instruction for calling a procedure or returning from a procedure. A JAL or JALR may be used to perform either a procedure call or a return from a procedure. The RISC-V ABI however defines the convention that a JAL/JALR where rd (i.e. the link register) is x1 or x5 is a procedure call, and a JAL/JALR where rs1 is the conventional link register (i.e. x1 or x5) is a return from procedure. The architecture allows for using these hints and conventions to support return address prediction. The hints are specified in Table 2.1 of the Unprivileged ISA specifications [1].

The RVC standard extension for compressed instructions provides unconditional jump and conditional branch instructions. The C.J and C.JAL instructions encode an offset in the immediate field of the instruction and thus are not susceptible to control-flow subversion.

The C.JR and C.JALR RVC instruction performs an unconditional control transfer to the address in register rs1. The C.JALR additionally writes the address of the instruction following the jump (pc+2) to the link register x1 and is a procedure call. The C.JR where rs1 is the conventional link register (i.e. x1 or x5) is a return from procedure. A C.JR where rs1 is not the conventional link register is an indirect jump.

The RISC-V control-flow integrity (CFI) extension (Zisslpcfi) builds on these conventions and hints.

The term call is used to refer to a JAL or JALR instruction with a link register as destination i.e., rd != x0. Conventionally the link register is x1 or x5. A call using JAL or C.JAL is termed a direct call. A C.JALR expands to JALR x1, 0(rs1) and is a call. A call using JALR or C.JALR is termed an indirect call.

The term return is used to refer to a JALR instruction with rs1 == x1 or rs1 == x5 and rd == x0. A C.JR instruction expands to JALR x0, 0(rs1) and is a return if rs1 == x1 or rs1 == x5.

The term indirect jump is used to refer to a **JALR** instruction with **rd == x0** and where the **rs1** is not **x1** or **x5** (i.e. not a return). A **C.JR** instruction where **rs1** is not **x1** or **x5** (i.e. not a return) is an indirect jump.

To enforce backward-edge control-flow integrity, the extension introduces a shadow stack. The shadow stack is designed to provide integrity to control transfers performed using return instruction (where the return may be from a procedure invoked using an indirect call or a direct call) and this is referred to as backward-edge protection. A program using backward-edge control-flow integrity has two stacks - a regular stack and a shadow stack. The shadow stack is used exclusively to store shadow copies of return addresses.

The shadow stack is used to spill the link register if required by non-leaf functions. A shadow-stack-pointer (**ssp**) register is introduced in the architecture to hold the address of the top of the current active shadow stack. The shadow stack is architecturally protected from inadvertent corruptions and modifications as detailed later. The extension provides instructions to store and load the link register to the shadow stack. Each function in a program compiled to use shadow stacks stores the link register to the data stack and a shadow copy of the link register to the shadow stack when the function is entered (the prologue). When the function needs to return (the epilogue), the function loads the link register from the data stack and the shadow copy of the link register from the shadow stack. The link register value from the data stack and the shadow link register value from the shadow stack are compared. A mismatch of the two values is indicative of a subversion of the return address control variable and causes an illegal instruction exception.

Operating in shadow stack mode, i.e., where the call stack layout is preserved and the shadow stack is used to store a shadow copy of the link register, preserves the ABI.



A program may alternatively operate in control stack mode where the link register is stored only on the shadow stack. Such programs break the ABI but benefit from avoiding the additional instructions to store and load the link register to the data stack and to compare the two before returning from a function. Control stack mode may also allow the program to have a smaller data stack as the space to save the link register is no longer needed.

To enforce forward edge control-flow integrity, the extension introduces new landing pad instructions (**lpc11**) that enable software to indicate valid targets for indirect calls and jumps in a program. Compiler is expected to emit a **lpc11** as the first instruction of address-taken functions. Compiler is expected to emit a **lpc11** at an indirect jump target.

The landing-pads are designed to provide integrity to control transfers performed using indirect call and indirect jump and this is referred to as forward-edge protection.

When the landing pad feature is active, the hart tracks an expected landing pad (**ELP**) state that is updated with the expected landing pad instruction on indirect calls and jumps. An indirect call or jump updates the **ELP** to require a **lpc11** instruction at the target. If the instruction at the target is not **lpc11** then an illegal instruction exception is raised.

The landing pads may be labeled. With labeling enabled, the number of landing pads that can be reached from an indirect call or indirect jump site can be defined using programming language

based policies. A landing pad label (**lpl**) is set up prior to initiating an indirect call or indirect jump with the expected landing pad label using an instruction to set the **lpl**. If the label of the landing pad does not match that in **lpl** then an illegal instruction exception is raised. This extension supports up to 25-bit width labels

In the simplest form the program may be built with a single label value to implement a coarse grained version of forward-edge CFI. A program would significantly reduce the gadget space by constraining gadgets to be preceded by a landing pad instruction i.e., to the start of indirect callable functions.

A second form of label generation may generate a signature (e.g., a MAC) using the prototype of the functions. Such programs would further constrain the gadgets reachable from a call site to indirect callable functions that have the expected prototype of functions called by that call site.

A third form of label generation may generate labels by analyzing the control-flow-graph (CFG) of the program and lead to even further constraining of reachable gadgets. Such programs may further use the multi-label capability i.e. when a function is called from two or more call sites, the common functions may be labeled as reachable from each of the call sites. For example, consider two call sites A and B. A invokes functions X and Y. B invokes functions Y and Z. With a single label scheme the functions X, Y, and Z would need to be assigned the same label such that both call site A and B can invoke the common function Y. This allows call site A to additionally call function Z and call site B to additionally call function X. However, if function Y was labeled with two labels - one corresponding to call site A and other to call site B then Y can be invoked by both, but the X can only be invoked by call site A and Z only by call site B. To support multiple labels, the compiler may create a call site specific entry-point to such shared functions with each entry-point containing the call site specific landing pad instruction followed by a direct branch to the start of the function.

A portion of the label space may be dedicated to labeled landing pads that are only valid targets of an indirect jump (and not an indirect call).

Forward-edge and backward-edge CFI may be enabled independently for software that execute in U-mode, S-mode, or M-mode. The processor keeps track of the CFI enabled and CFI state for each mode in the **mstatus** CSR. A subset of the fields in the **mstatus** CSR are accessible using the **sstatus** CSR. VS-mode's version of **sstatus** (**vsstatus**) tracks the CFI state for VS-mode and VU-mode.

Tracking CFI state and setting individually for each privilege level enables applications that use CFI to co-exist with applications that do not use CFI; with the operating system context switching the CFI enabling and CFI state of the application. Operating system may enable the use of CFI by U-mode applications with or without CFI being used by the operating system itself. Hypervisors may enable the use of CFI in a virtual machine with or without CFI being used by the hypervisor itself. Virtual machines that use CFI may co-exist with virtual machines that do not use CFI; with the hypervisor context switching the CFI enables and state of the virtual machine. Machine mode firmware may enable the use of CFI

independently of the use of CFI in lower privilege modes.



To use Zisslpcfi, the operating system has to be modified to enable Zisslpcfi capabilities, including the context switching of the CFI extension state. The set of programs installed in such OS may however be a mix where some programs are compiled with Zisslpcfi capabilities and others that are not. Allowing the U-mode CFI to be individually enabled from S-mode, allows an operating system to keep CFI enabled when operating in S-mode and enable or disable it for U-mode depending on the program being executed in U-mode.

To support backward compatibility of the programs built with Zisslpcfi support, the new instructions to operate on the shadow stack, the landing pad instructions, and the instructions to set the `lpl` are encoded using Zimop encodings. When Zisslpcfi is not enabled for a program or the program is executing on a processor that does not support the Zisslpcfi extension, the instructions introduced by the Zisslpcfi extensions execute as defined by Zimop extension.



An OS distribution compiled with Zisslpcfi extension typically also includes the system libraries (e.g., glibc, etc.) that are also compiled with the Zisslpcfi extension. Such system libraries however may need to link dynamically to programs that are not compiled with the Zisslpcfi extension. When such programs are executing, the OS may disable the Zisslpcfi extension in U-mode. When these system libraries are invoked in U-mode by such programs, the Zisslpcfi instructions in the libraries revert to their Zimop defined behavior. Without Zimop encoding, the OS distribution may need to carry two versions of such libraries, one with Zisslpcfi instructions and one without, and thus require significantly larger cost and complexity for supporting the Zisslpcfi extension.

An OS distribution compiled with Zisslpcfi extension may be installed on a machine that does not support Zisslpcfi extensions. On such machines, since Zisslpcfi instructions are encoded as Zimop, they revert to their Zimop defined behavior.

A program compiled with the Zisslpcfi extension may be installed on an OS that is not compiled for the Zisslpcfi extension or on a machine that does not support the Zisslpcfi extension. The Zisslpcfi instructions are encoded as Zimop revert back to their Zimop defined behavior.

The Zisslpcfi extension depends on the Zicsr, A, Zimop, Zcmop, and page-based virtual memory system (Sv39/Sv48/Sv57) extensions.

Chapter 2. Shadow Stack and Landing Pad CSRs

This chapter specifies the CSR state of the Zisslpcfi extension.

2.1. Machine environment configuration registers (menvcfg and menvcfgh)

63	62	61	60	59	58	56
STCE	PBMTE	HADE	CFIE	SFCFIE	WPRI	
55				WPRI		48
47				WPRI		40
39				WPRI		32
31				WPRI		24
23				WPRI		16
15				WPRI		8
7	6	5	4	3	1	0
CBZE	CBCFE	CBIE			WPRI	FIOM

Figure 1. Machine environment configuration register (menvcfg) for MXLEN=64

The **CFIE** (bit 60) field controls if Zisslpcfi extension is available for use in modes less privileged than M. When **CFIE** is 1, the **SFCFIE** (bit 59) field enables forward-edge CFI at S-mode.

When **menvcfg.CFIE** bit is 0, then at privilege modes less privileged than M:

- Attempts to access **ssp** or **lp1** CSR raise an illegal instruction exception.
- Zisslpcfi extension instructions revert to the Zimop defined behavior.
- The **UBCFIE**, **UFCFIE** and **SPELP** fields in **sstatus** are read-only zero.
- The **CFIE** field in **henvcfg** is read-only zero.
- The **pte.xwr=010b** encoding in S-stage page tables is reserved.



When the Zisslpcfi extension is available for use at privilege level less than M, the operating system may use the **UBCFIE** and **UFCFIE** to selectively enable the backward-edge and forward-edge CFI at U mode per application.

When the Zisslpcfi extension is available for use at S-mode, the operating system may use shadow stacks at S-mode. If the operating system uses forward-edge CFI then it may request the SEE to set **SFCFIE** to 1.

With these set of controls the backward-edge and forward-edge CFI may be separately enforced at S-mode and for each application.

2.2. Hypervisor environment configuration registers (**henvcfg** and **henvcfgh**)

63	62	61	60	59	58	56
STCE	PBMTE	HADE	CFIE	SFCFIE		WPRI
55						48
				WPRI		
47						40
				WPRI		
39						32
				WPRI		
31						24
				WPRI		
23						16
				WPRI		
15						8
				WPRI		
7	6	5	4	3	1	0
CBZE	CBCFE		CBIE		WPRI	FIOM

Figure 2. Hypervisor environment configuration register (**henvcfg**) for *MXLEN=64*

The **CFIE** (bit 60) bit controls if Zisslpcfi extension is available for use in VS and VU modes. When **menvcfg.CFIE** is 0, **henvcfg.CFIE** is read-only zero.

When **henvcfg.CFIE** bit is 0, then at privilege modes VS and VU:

- Attempts to access **ssp** or **lp1** CSR raise an illegal instruction exception.
- Zisslpcfi extension instructions revert to the Zimop defined behavior.
- The **UBCFIE**, **UFCFIE** and **SPELP** fields in **sstatus** (really **vsstatus**) are read-only zero.
- The **pte.xwr=010b** encoding in VS-stage page tables remains reserved.

When **henvcfg.CFIE** is 1, the **henvcfg.SFCFIE** (bit 59) field enables forward-edge CFI at VS-mode.

2.3. Machine status registers (**mstatus**)

63	62						56
SD				WPRI			
55							48
				WPRI			
47							40
				WPRI			
39	38	37	36	35	34	33	32
	WPRI	MBE	SBE	SXL[1:0]		UXL[1:0]	
31				27	26	25	24
		WPRI			MPELP	SPELP	UBCFIE
23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16
UFCFIE	TSR	TW	TVM	MXR	SUM	MPRV	XS[1:0]
15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8
XS[1:0]	FS[1:0]		MPP[1:0]		VS[1:0]		SPP
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
MPIE	UBE	SPIE	WPRI	MIE	WPRI	SIE	WPRI

Figure 3. Machine-mode status register (*mstatus*) for RV64

The **UFCFIE** (bit 23) and **UBCFIE** (bit 24) are WARL fields that when set to 1 enable forward-edge and backward-edge CFI respectively at U-mode.

The **SPELP** (bit 25) and **MPELP** (bit 26) WARL fields are updated when a trap is taken into S-mode or M-mode respectively. When a trap is taken into privilege mode *x*, the **xPELP** fields are updated to indicate that a landing pad was expected at the privilege level *xPP* at the time of taking the trap.

The **xPELP** fields are encoded as follows:

- 0 - **NO_LP_EXPECTED** - no landing pad instruction expected
- 1 - **LP_EXPECTED** - landing pad instruction expected

2.4. Supervisor status registers (*sstatus*)

63	62						56
SD				WPRI			
55							48
				WPRI			
47							40
				WPRI			
39					34	33	32
			WPRI			UXL[1:0]	
31					26	25	24
			WPRI			SPELP	UBCFIE
23	22		20	19	18	17	16
UFCFIE		WPRI		MXR	SUM	WPRI	XS[1:0]
15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8
XS[1:0]	FS[1:0]		WPRI		VS[1:0]		SPP
7	6	5	4		2	1	0
WPRI	UBE	SPIE		WPRI		SIE	WPRI

Figure 4. Supervisor-mode status register (*sstatus*) when *SXLEN*=64

When *menvcfg.CFIE* is 1, access to the following fields accesses the homonymous field of *mstatus* register. When *menvcfg.CFIE* is 0, these fields are read-only zero.

- **UFCFIE** (bit 23)
- **UBCFIE** (bit 24)
- **SPELP** (bit 25)

2.5. Virtual supervisor status registers (vsstatus)

63	62						56
SD				WPRI			
55							48
				WPRI			
47							40
				WPRI			
39					34	33	32
			WPRI			UXL[1:0]	
31					26	25	24
			WPRI			SPELP	UBCFIE
23	22		20	19	18	17	16
UFCFIE		WPRI		MXR	SUM	WPRI	XS[1:0]
15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8
XS[1:0]		FS[1:0]		WPRI		VS[1:0]	SPP
7	6	5	4		2	1	0
WPRI	UBE	SPIE		WPRI		SIE	WPRI

Figure 5. Virtual supervisor status register (`vsstatus`) when `VSXLEN=64`

The `vsstatus` register is VS-mode's version of `sstatus` and the Zisslpcfi extension introduces the following fields.

- **UFCFIE** (bit 23)
- **UBCFIE** (bit 24)
- **SPELP** (bit 25)

When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 0, these fields are read-only zero. When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 1 and `henvcfg.CFIE` is 0, these fields are read-only zero in `sstatus` (really `vsstatus`) when `V=1`.



The `vsstatus` and `henvcfg` CSR for a virtual machine may be restored in any order. The state of `henvcfg.CFIE` does not prevent access to the bits introduced in `vsstatus` when the CSR is accessed in HS-mode.

2.6. Landing pad label (lpl)

The **lpl** CSR is a supervisor read-write (SRW) 32-bit register that holds the label expected at the target of an indirect call or an indirect jump. The label is split into a 8-bit upper label (**UL**), 8-bit middle label (**ML**), and a 9-bit lower label (**LL**).

Figure 6. `lpl` for RV32 and RV64

When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 0, an attempt to access `lpl` in a mode other than M-mode raises an illegal instruction exception.



Access to `lpl` at S-mode is not dependent on `sstatus.UBCFIE` or `menvcfg.SFCFIE` to allow an operating system to be able to context switch U-mode `lpl` state even when the operating system itself does not enable the use of forward-edge CFI at S-mode.

When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 1 but `henvcfg.CFIE` is 0, an attempt to access `lpl` when `V=1` raises a virtual instruction exception.

2.7. Shadow stack pointer (`ssp`)

The `ssp` CSR is an unprivileged read-write (URW) CSR that reads and writes `XLEN` low order bits of the shadow stack pointer (`ssp`). There is no high CSR defined as the `ssp` is always as wide as the `XLEN` of the current privilege level.

When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 0, an attempt to access `ssp` in a mode other than M-mode raises an illegal instruction exception. When `sstatus.UBCFIE` is 0, an attempt to access `ssp` in U-mode raises an illegal instruction exception.



Access to `ssp` at S-mode is not dependent on `sstatus.UBCFIE` to allow an operating system to be able to context switch U-mode `ssp` per application.

When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 1 but `henvcfg.CFIE` is 0, an attempt to access `ssp` when `V=1` raises a virtual instruction exception.

When `menvcfg.CFIE` and `henvcfg.CFIE` are both 1 but `vsstatus.UBCFIE` is 0, an attempt to access `ssp` in VU-mode raises an illegal instruction exception.

2.8. Machine Security Configuration (`mseccfg`)

63	WPRI																56
55	WPRI																48
47	WPRI																40
39	WPRI																32
31	WPRI																24
23	WPRI																17
15	WPRI																16
10	SSPMP																8
7	SSPMP																0
3	MFCFIE																2
2	SSEED																1
1	USEED																0
0	WPRI																0
0	RLB																0
0	MMWP																0
0	MML																0

Figure 7. Machine security configuration register (`mseccfg`) when `MXLEN=64`

A new WARL field `sspmp` is defined the `mseccfg` CSR to identify a PMP entry as the shadow stack

memory region for M-mode accesses. The rules enforced by PMP for M-mode shadow stack memory accesses are outlined in [Section 3.5.2](#).

The **MFCFIE** (bit 10) is a WARL field that when set to 1 enables forward-edge CFI at M-mode.

Chapter 3. Backward-edge control-flow integrity

A shadow stack is a second stack used to push the link register if it needs to be spilled to make a new procedure call.


The shadow stack, similar to the regular stack, grows downwards, i.e. from higher addresses to lower addresses. Each entry on the shadow stack is **XLEN** wide and holds the link register value. The **ssp** points to the top of the shadow stack, i.e. address of the last element pushed on the shadow stack.



Compilers when generating code for a CFI enabled program must protect the link register, e.g. **x1** and/or **x5**, from arbitrary modification by not emitting unsafe code sequences.

3.1. Backward-edge CFI instruction encoding


The backward-edge CFI extension introduces the following instructions for shadow stack operations. These instructions are encoded using the SYSTEM major opcode and using the **mop.r** and **mop.rr** encodings defined by the Zimop extension.



Encoding **rd** as **x0** is not supported for **ssamoswap** and **sspr**. Only **x1** and **x5** encodings are supported as **rd** for **sspop**. Only **x1** and **x5** encodings are supported as **rs1** for **sspopchk**. Only **x1** and **x5** encodings are supported as **rs2** for **sspush**.

When a Zimop encoding is not supported by the Zisslpcfi extension then the instruction follows its Zimop defined behavior.

The extension includes 16-bit versions of the **sspush x1** and **sspopchk x5** instructions using the Zcmop encodings. The **c.sspush x1** and the **c.sspopchk x5** instructions are encoded using the **C.LUI** major opcode and using the **c.mop.0** and **c.mop.2** encodings defined by the Zcmop extension. Unlike the Zimop, the Zcmop are defined to not write **rd**.



The `c.sspush x1` expands to `sspush x1` and `c.sspopchk x5` expands to `sspopchk x5`.

While any register may be used as link register, conventionally the `x1` or `x5` register is expected to be as link register. The Zisslpcfi shadow stack instructions are designed to be most efficient for use of the `x1` and `x5` registers as the link register.



Return-address prediction stacks are a common feature of high-performance instruction-fetch units, but require accurate detection of instructions used for procedure calls and returns to be effective. For RISC-V, hints as to the instructions' usage are encoded implicitly via the register numbers used. The return-address stack (RAS) actions to pop and/or push onto the RAS are specified in Table 2.1 of the Privileged specification.

Use of `x1` or `x5` as the link register allows a program to benefit from the return-address prediction stacks and avoid additional register movements to use the shadow stack instructions.

When `menvcfg.CFIE` is 0, then Zisslpcfi is not enabled for privilege modes less than M.

When `V=0` and `menvcfg.CFIE` is 1, then backward-edge CFI is enabled at S-mode. When `V=0` and `menvcfg.CFIE` is 1, then backward-edge CFI is enabled at U-mode if `mstatus.UBCFIE` is 1.

When `henvcfg.CFIE` is 0, then Zisslpcfi is not enabled for use when `V=1`.

When `V=1` and `menvcfg.CFIE` and `henvcfg.CFIE` are both 1, then backward-edge CFI is enabled in VS-mode. When `V=1` and `menvcfg.CFIE` and `henvcfg.CFIE` are both 1, then backward-edge CFI is enabled in VU-mode if `vsstatus.UBCFIE` is 1.

The term `xBCFIE` is used to determine if backward-edge CFI is enabled at a privilege level `x` and is defined as follows:

Listing 1. xBCFIE determination

```

if ( privilege == M-mode )
    xBCFIE = 1
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 0 && privilege == S-mode )
    xBCFIE = 1
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 0 && privilege == U-mode )
    xBCFIE = mstatus.UBCFIE
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && henvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 1 && privilege == S-mode )
    xBCFIE = 1
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && henvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 1 && privilege == U-mode )
    xBCFIE = vsstatus.UBCFIE
else
    xBCFIE = 0

```

When backward-edge CFI is not enabled($\text{xBCFIE} = 0$):

- The 32-bit instructions defined for backward-edge CFI revert to their Zimop defined behavior and write 0 to [rd].
- The 16-bit instructions defined for backward-edge CFI revert to their Zcmop defined behavior of not performing any operation.



The use of shadow stacks at U-mode must be explicitly enabled per application. Explicit enable for user mode applications allows such an application to invoke shared libraries that may have shadow stack instructions even when the application itself has backward-edge CFI not enable. The shadow stack instructions invoked in the context of this application revert to their Zimop defined behavior.

When Zisslpcfi is enabled, the use of backward-edge CFI is always enabled for use at S-mode. However, it is benign to use an operating system that has not been compiled with shadow stack instructions. Such an operating system that does not use backward-edge CFI for S-mode execution may still enable the backward-edge CFI use by U-mode.

When Zisslpcfi is implemented, the use of backward-edge CFI is always enabled at M-mode. However, it is benign to use M-mode firmware that has not been compiled with shadow stack instructions.

When programs using shadow stack instructions are installed on a machine that supports the CFI extensions but the operating system installed does not enable the CFI extensions, the program continues to function due to Zimop defined behavior of writing 0 to [rd] and not causing an illegal-instruction exception.



When programs using shadow stack instructions are installed on a machine that does not support the CFI extensions but support the Zimop extension, the program continues to function due to Zimop defined behavior of writing 0 to [rd] and not causing an illegal-instruction exception.

On machines that do not support Zimop extension, the instructions cause an illegal-instruction exception. Installing programs that use the shadow stack instructions on such machines is not supported.

3.2. Push to and Pop from the shadow stack

A push operation is defined as decrement of the ssp by XLEN followed by a write of the link register at the new top of the shadow stack. A pop operation is defined as a XLEN wide read from the current top of the shadow stack followed by an increment of the ssp by XLEN .

Usually programs with a shadow stack push the return address onto the regular stack as well as the shadow stack in the function prologue. Such programs when returning from the function pop the link register from the data stack and pop a shadow copy of the link register from the shadow stack. The two values are then compared. If the values do not match it is indicative of a corruption of the return address variable and the program causes an illegal instruction exception.

To push a link register on the shadow stack, the CFI extension provides a `ssp` instruction and its compressed form `c.ssp`.

A `sspopchk` instruction and its compressed form `c.sspopchk` is provided to pop the shadow return address value from the shadow stack and check that the value matches the contents of the link register. This instruction is expected to be used by programs operating in shadow stack mode.

The CFI extension additionally provides a `sspop` instruction to pop a return address from the shadow stack into a link register. This instruction is expected to be used by programs operating in control stack mode.

Programs may operate in shadow stack mode or in control stack mode.

When operating in shadow stack mode, the program uses the shadow stack to store a shadow copy of the link register. Such programs push the link register on the regular stack as well as the shadow stack in the prologue of the function. In the epilog, the link register value from the regular stack is compared to the shadow copy on the shadow stack. Programs operating in shadow stack mode are portable to implementations that do not support the Zisslpcfi extension. On implementations where the extension is not supported, the shadow stack instructions revert to their Zimop defined behavior but the program continues to function as the link register is also pushed and popped from the regular stack. Pushing and popping the link register to regular stack allows such programs to comply with the ABI. The prologue and epilog of a function in shadow stack mode is as follows:



```
function_entry:
    addi sp,sp,-8 # push link register x1
    sd x1,(sp)    # on data stack
    #
    # Let the contents of ssp register be 0x0000000121679F8 and
    # XLEN be 64 ssp register holds the address of the top of
    # shadow stack. Let the contents of the link register x1
    # be 0x0000000010252000
    #
    # 0x00000000121679E8:[
    # 0x00000000121679F0:[
    # 0x00000000121679F8:[0xffffffffffffffff] <- ssp
    #
    sspush x1      # push link register x1 on shadow stack
    #
    # sspush store the source register value to address
    # (ssp - XLEN/8) and updates ssp to (ssp - XLEN/8) - does
    # a push. Following completion of # sspush the ssp value is
    # the new top of stack i.e. 0x0000000121679F0 and the value
    # in x1 is stored at this location
    #
    # 0x00000000121679E8:[
    # 0x00000000121679F0:[0x0000000010252000] <- ssp
```

```

# 0x00000000121679F8:[0xffffffff]
#
:
:
ld x1,(sp)    # pop link register x1 from data stack
addi sp,sp,8
sspopchk x1    # compare link register x1 to shadow
                # return address; faults if not same

#
# sspopchk loads the value from location addressed by ssp and
# compares the loaded value to the value held in the register
# source and if the two are identical updates ssp to
# (ssp + XLEN/8) - does a pop and a check. Following
# completion of sspopchk the ssp value is the # new top of
# stack i.e. 0x00000000121679F8
#
# 0x00000000121679E8:[          ]
# 0x00000000121679F0:[0x0000000010252000]
# 0x00000000121679F8:[0xffffffff] <- ssp
#
ret

```

Programs operating in the control stack mode store the return address only on the shadow stack. Such programs are not portable to implementations that do not support the Zisslpcfi extension. As these programs do not push a return address on the regular stack they may not be compliant with the ABI. The prologue and epilog of a function when operating in control stack mode is as follows:

```

function_entry:
#
# Let the contents of ssp register be 0x19740428 and XLEN be 32
# ssp register holds the address of the top of shadow stack
# Let the contents of the link register x1 be 0x19791216
#
# 0x19740418:[          ]
# 0x19740420:[          ]
# 0x19740428:[0xffffffff] <- ssp
#
sspush x1      # push link register x1 on shadow stack
#
# Following sspush the shadow stack and ssp are as follows:
#
# 0x19740418:[          ]
# 0x19740420:[0x19791216] <- ssp
# 0x19740428:[0xffffffff]
#
:
:
sspop x1       # pop return address from shadow stack
#

```

```

# sspop loads the value from location addressed by ssp into
# destination register and updates ssp to (ssp + XLEN/8)
# - does a pop. Following completion of sspop the ssp value
# is the new top of stack i.e. 0x19740428
#
# 0x19740418:[          ]
# 0x19740420:[0x19791216]
# 0x19740428:[0xffffffff] <- ssp
#
ret

```

These examples illustrate the use of **x1** register by the ABI as the link register. Alternatively, the ABI may use **x5** as the link register.

A leaf function i.e. a function that does not itself make function calls does not need to push the link register to the shadow stack or pop it from the shadow stack in either shadow stack mode or in control stack mode. The return value may be held in the link register itself for the duration of the leaf function execution.

The **sspop**, **c.sspopchk**, and **sspopchk** instructions perform a load identically to the existing **LOAD** instruction with the difference that the base is implicitly **ssp**, the width is implicitly **XLEN**.

The **sspush** and **c.sspush** instructions performs a store identically to the existing **STORE** instruction with the difference that the base is implicitly **ssp**, the width is implicitly **XLEN**.

The **sspush**, **c.sspush**, **sspopchk**, **c.sspopchk**, and **sspop** require the virtual address in **ssp** to have a shadow stack attribute (see [Section 3.5](#)).

Correct execution of **sspush**, **c.sspush**, **sspopchk**, **c.sspopchk**, and **sspop** require that **ssp** refers to idempotent memory. If the memory reference by the **ssp** is not idempotent then the **sspush/c.sspush** instructions causes a store/AMO access fault and the **sspop/sspopchk/c.sspopchk** instructions cause a load access fault.

If the virtual address in **ssp** is not **XLEN** aligned then the **sspop/ sspopchk/c.sspopchk** instructions cause a load access fault and the **sspush/ c.sspush** instructions cause a store/AMO access fault.

Misaligned accesses to shadow stack are not required and enforcing alignment is more secure to detect errors in the program. An access-fault exception is raised instead of address-misaligned exception in such cases to indicate fatality and that the instruction must not be emulated by a trap handler.



The **sspopchk** instruction performs a load followed by a check of the loaded data value with the link register source. If the check against the link register faults and the instruction is restarted by the trap handler then the instruction will perform a load again. If the memory from which the load is performed is non-idempotent then the second load may cause unexpected side effects. Shadow stack instructions require the memory referenced by **ssp** to be idempotent to avoid such concerns. Locating shadow stacks in non-idempotent memory (e.g., non-idempotent device memory) is not an expected usage and requiring memory referenced by **ssp** to be

idempotent does not pose a significant restriction.

When backward-edge CFI is enabled (i.e., `xBCFIE = 1`), the `c.sspush x1` instruction behaves identically to the `sspush x1` instruction and the `c.sspopchk x5` instruction behaves identically to the `sspopchk x5` instruction.

The operation of the `sspush` and `c.sspush` instructions is as follows:

Listing 2. `sspush` and `c.sspush` operation

```
If (xBCFIE = 1)
    *[ssp - (XLEN/8)] = [src]    # Store src value to ssp - XLEN/8
    [ssp] = [ssp] - (XLEN/8)    # decrement ssp by XLEN/8
else
    [dst] = 0
endif
```

The operation of the `sspop` instruction is as follows:

Listing 3. `sspop` operation

```
if (xBCFIE = 1)
    dst = *[ssp]                # Load dst from address in ssp
                                # Only x1 and x5 may be used as dst
    [ssp] = [ssp] + (XLEN/8)    # Increment ssp by XLEN/8.
else
    [dst] = 0;
endif
```

The operation of the `sspopchk` and `c.sspopchk` instructions is as follows:

Listing 4. `sspopchk` and `c.sspopchk` operation

```
if (xBCFIE = 1)
    temp = *[ssp]              # Load temp from address in ssp and
    if temp != [src]           # Compare temp to value in src and
                                # cause an illegal-instruction exception
                                # if they are not bitwise equal.
                                # Only x1 and x5 may be used as src
        Raise illegal-instruction exception
    else
        [ssp] = [ssp] + (XLEN/8) # increment ssp by XLEN/8.
    endif
else
    [dst] = 0;
endif
```

The `ssp` is incremented by `sspop`, `sspopchk`, and `c.sspopchk` only if the load from shadow stack completes successfully. The `ssp` is decremented by `sspush` and `c.sspush` only if the store to the

shadow stack completes successfully.

The use of the compressed instruction `c.sspush x1` to push on the shadow stack is most efficient when the ABI uses `x1` as the link register as the link register may then be pushed without needing a register to register move in the function prologue. To use the compressed instruction `c.sspopchk x5` the function should pop the return address from regular stack into the alternate link register `x5` and use the `c.sspopchk x5` to compare the return address to the shadow copy store on the shadow stack. The function then uses `c.jr x5` to jump to the return address.



```
function_entry:
    c.addi sp,sp,-8 # push link register x1
    c.sd x1,(sp)    # on data stack
    c.sspush x1     # push link register x1 on shadow stack
    :
    :
    c.ld x5,(sp)    # pop link register x5 from data stack
    c.addi sp,sp,8
    c.sspopchk x5   # compare link register x5 to shadow
                   # return address; faults if not same
    c.jr x5
```



Store to load forwarding is a common technique employed by high performance processor implementations. CFI implementations may prevent forwarding from a non-shadow-stack store to `sspop/sspopchk/c.sspopchk` instructions. A non-shadow-stack store causes a fault if done to a page mapped as a shadow stack. However such determination may be delayed till the PTE has been examined and thus may be used to transiently forward the data from such stores to a `sspop/sspopchk/c.sspopchk`.



A common operation performed on stacks is to unwind them to support constructs like `setjmp/longjmp`, C++ exception handling, etc. A program that uses shadow stacks must unwind the shadow stack in addition to the stack used to store data. The unwind function must verify that it does not accidentally unwind past the bounds of the shadow stack. Shadow stacks are expected to be bounded on each end using guard pages i.e. pages that do not have a shadow stack attribute. To detect if the unwind occurs past the bounds of the shadow stack the unwind may be done in maximal increments of 4 KiB and testing for the `ssp` to be still pointing to a shadow stack page or has unwound into the guard page. The following examples illustrate the use of backward-edge CFI instructions to unwind a shadow stack. This example assumes that the `setjmp` function itself does not push on to the shadow stack (being a leaf function it is not required to).

```
setjmp() {
    :
    :
```

```

    // read and save the shadow stack pointer to jmp_buf
    asm("sspr %0" : "=r"(cur_esp));
    jmp_buf->sav_esp = cur_esp;
    :
    :
}
longjmp() {
    :
    // Read current shadow stack pointer and
    // compute number of call frames to unwind
    asm("sspr %0" : "=r"(cur_esp));
    // Skip the unwind if backward-edge CFI not enabled
    asm("beqz %0, back_cfi_not_enabled" : "=r"(cur_esp));
    num_unwind = jmp_buf->sav_esp - cur_esp;
    // Unwind the frames in a loop
    while ( num_unwind > 0 ) {
        step = ( num_unwind >= 4096 ) ? 4096 : num_unwind;
        cur_esp += step;
        num_unwind -= step;
        // write the esp register with unwound value
        asm("csrw %0, $esp_csr_num" : "=r"(cur_esp));
        // Test if unwound past the shadow stack bounds
        asm("sspush x5");
        asm("sspop x5");
    }
    back_cfi_not_enabled:
    :
}

```

3.3. Read `ssp` into a register

The `sspr` instruction is provided to move the contents of `ssp` to the destination register.

The operation of the `sspr` instructions is as follows:

Listing 5. `sspr` operation

```

If (xBCFIE = 1)
    [dst] = [ssp]
else
    [dst] = 0;
endif

```



The property of Zimop writing 0 to the rd when the extension using Zimop is not present or not enabled may be used by such functions to skip over unwind actions by dynamically detecting if the backward-edge CFI extension is enabled.

An example sequence such as the following may be used:


```

sspr r t0                # mv ssp to t0
beqz bcfi_not_enabled    # zero is not a valid shadow stack
                        # pointer by convention

# Shadow stacks enabled
:
:
bcfi_not_enabled:

```

3.4. Atomic Swap from a shadow stack location

The CFI extension defines an **ssamoswap** instruction to atomically swap the **XLEN** bits of **src** register with **XLEN** bits on the shadow stack at address in **addr** and store the value from address in **src** into register **dst**.

The **ssamoswap** is always sequentially consistent and cannot be reordered with earlier or later memory operations from the same hart.

The **ssamoswap** requires the virtual address in **addr** to have a shadow stack attribute (see [Section 3.5](#)).

If the virtual address is not **XLEN** aligned then **ssamoswap** causes a store/AMO access-fault exception.

If the memory reference by the **ssp** is not idempotent then **ssamoswap** causes a store/AMO access fault.

The operation of the **ssamoswap** instructions is as follows:

Listing 6. ssamoswap operation

```

If (xBCFIE = 1)
    Perform the following atomically with sequential consistency
        [dst] = *[addr]
        *[addr] = [src]
else
    [dst] = 0;
endif

```

Stack switching is a common operation in user programs as well as supervisor programs. When a stack switch is performed the stack pointer of the currently active stack is saved into a context data structure and the new stack is made active by loading a new stack pointer from a context data structure.



When shadow stacks are enabled for a program, the program needs to additionally switch the shadow stack pointer. The pointer to the top of the deactivated shadow stack if held in a context data structure may be susceptible to memory corruption vulnerabilities. To protect the pointer value the program may then store it at the top of the shadow stack itself and thus create a checkpoint.

An example sequence to store and restore the shadow stack pointer is as follows:

```

# The a0 register holds the pointer to top of new shadow
# to switch to. The current ssp is first pushed on the current
# shadow stack and the ssp is restored from new shadow stack
save_shadow_stack_pointer:
    sspr    x5                                # read ssp and push value onto
    sspush  x5                                # shadow stack. The [ssp] now
    addi    x5, x5, -(XLEN/8)                 # holds ptr+XLEN/8. The [x5] now
                                                # holds ptr. Save away x5
                                                # into a context structure to
                                                # restore later.

restore_shadow_stack_pointer:
    ssamoswap t0, x0, (a0)                   # t0=[a0] and *[a0]=0
                                                # The [a0] should hold ptr'
                                                # The [t0] should hold ptr'+XLEN/8

    addi    a0, a0, (XLEN/8)                 # a0+XLEN/8 must match to t0
    bne     t0, a0, crash                     # if not crash program
    csrwr   ssp, t0                          # setup new ssp

```

Further the program may enforce an invariant that a shadow stack can be active only on one hart by using the `ssamoswap` when performing the restore from the checkpoint such that the checkpointed data is zeroed as part of the restore sequence and multiple hart attempt to restore the checkpointed data only one of them succeeds.

3.5. Shadow Stack Memory Protection

To protect shadow stack memory the memory is associated with a new page type - Shadow Stack (SS) page - in the page tables.

When the `Smeppm` extension is supported the PMP configuration registers are enhanced to support a shadow stack memory region for use by M-mode.

3.5.1. Virtual-Memory system extension for Shadow Stack

The shadow stack memory is protected using page table attributes such that it cannot be stored to by instructions other than `sspush`, `c.sspush`, and `ssamoswap`. The `sspop`, `sspopchk`, and `c.sspopchk` instructions can load only from shadow stack memory.

The shadow stack can be read using all instructions that load from memory.

Attempting to fetch an instruction from a shadow stack page raises a fetch page-fault exception.

The encoding `R=0`, `W=1`, and `X=0`, is defined to mean a shadow stack page. When `menvcfg.CFIE=0`, this encoding continues to be reserved. When `V=1` and `henvcfg.CFIE=0`, this encoding continues to be reserved at `VS` and `VU`.

The following faults may occur:

1. If the accessed page is a shadow stack page

- a. Stores other than `sspsh` and `ssamoswap` cause store/AMO access faults.
 - b. Instructions fetch causes a page fault
2. if the accessed page is not a shadow stack page or if the page is in non-idempotent memory
- a. `ssamoswap`, `c.sspsh`, and `sspsh` cause a store/AMO access fault
 - b. `sspop`, `c.sspchk`, and `sspopchk` causes a load access fault



Stores other than `sspsh`, `c.sspsh`, and `ssamoswap` cause an access fault and not a page fault to indicate fatality. A page fault in such cases would suggest that the operating system should service that fault and correct the condition; which is not possible in this case. If a page fault were caused in this case then to determine this fatal condition the page fault handler would have to resort to decoding the opcode of the instruction that caused the store/AMO page fault to caused by non-shadow-stack-stores to shadow stack pages vs. a page fault caused by an `sspsh`, `c.sspsh`, or `ssamoswap` to a non-resident page (which is a recoverable condition). Usually the operating system page fault handler is performance critical. By causing an access fault instead of a page fault, the operating system can easily distinguish the fatal/non-recoverable condition from the recoverable page fault.

On implementations where address-misaligned exception is prioritized higher than access-fault exception, a trap handler handler that emulates misaligned stores must cause an access-fault exception if the store is not `sspsh`, `c.sspsh`, or, `ssamoswap` and the store is to a shadow stack page.

Shadow stack instructions cause an access fault if the accessed page is not a shadow stack page or if the page is in non-idempotent memory to similarly indicate fatality.

Instruction fetch from a shadow stack page causes a page fault as this condition is clearly distinguished by a unique cause code and is non recoverable.

To support these rules, the virtual address translation process specified in section 4.3.2 of the Privileged Specification [2] is modified as follows:

- 3. If `pte.v = 0` or if any bits of encodings that are reserved for future standard use are set within `pte`, stop and raise a page-fault exception corresponding to the original access type. The encoding `pte.xwr = 010b` is not reserved if `menvcfg.CFIE` is 1 or if `V=1` and `henvcfg.CFIE` is 1.
- 4. Otherwise, the PTE is valid. If `pte.r = 1` or `pte.w = 1` or `pte.x = 1`, go to step 5. Otherwise, this PTE is a pointer to the next level of the page table. Let `i = i - 1`. If `i < 0`, store and raise a page-fault exception corresponding to the original access type. Otherwise, let `a = pte.ppn x PAGE_SIZE` and go to step 2.
- 5. A leaf PTE has been found. If the memory access is by a shadow stack instruction and `pte.xwr != 010b` then cause an access-violation exception corresponding to the access type. If the memory access is a store/AMO and `pte.xwr == 010b` then cause a store/AMO access-violation. If the requested memory access is not allowed by the `pte.r`, `pte.w`, `pte.x`, and `pte.u` bits, given the current privilege mode and the value of the `SUM` and `MXR` fields of the `mstatus` register, stop and raise a page-fault exception corresponding to the original access type.

The PMA checks are extended to require memory referenced by `sspush`, `sspop`, `ssamoswap`, `c.sspush`, `c.sspopchk`, and `sspopchk` to be idempotent.

The **U** and **SUM** bit enforcement is performed normally for shadow stack instruction initiated memory accesses. The state of the **MXR** bit does not affect read access to a shadow stack page as the shadow stack page is always readable by all instructions that load from memory.

Svpbmt extension and Svnapot extensions are supported for shadow stack pages.



Operating systems should protect against writeable non-shadow-stack alias virtual-addresses mappings being created to the shadow stack physical memory.



Shadow stacks are expected to be bounded on each end using guard pages such that there are no two adjacent shadow stacks. Not locating two shadow stacks adjacent to each other guards against accidentally underflowing or overflowing from one shadow stack to another. Traditionally a guard page for a stack is a page that is inaccessible to the process owning the stack. For shadow stacks, the guard page may also be a non-shadow-stack page that is otherwise accessible to the process owning the shadow stack due to the property that shadow stack loads and stores to non-shadow-stack pages lead to an exception.

The G-stage address translation and protections are not affected by the shadow stack extension. When G-stage page tables are active, the `ssamoswap`, `sspop`, `c.sspopchk`, and `sspopchk` instructions require the G-stage page table mapping the accessed memory to have read permission and the `ssamoswap`, `c.sspush`, and `sspush` instructions require write permission. The `xwr == 010b` encoding in the G-stage PTE remains reserved.



A future extension may define shadow stack encoding the G-stage page table to support use cases such as a hypervisor enforcing shadow stack protections for virtual-supervisor.



All instructions that load from memory are allowed to read the shadow stack. The shadow stack only holds a copy of the link register as saved on the regular stack. The ability to read the shadow stack is useful for debug, performance profiling, and other use cases.

3.5.2. PMP extension for shadow stack

When privilege mode is less than M, the PMP region accessed by `sspush`, `c.sspush`, and `ssamoswap` must provide write permission and the PMP region accessed by `sspop`, `c.sspopchk`, and `sspopchk` must provide read permission.

The M-mode memory accesses by `sspush`, `c.sspush` and `ssamoswap` instructions test for write permission in the matching PMP entry when permission checking is required.

The M-mode memory accesses by `sspop`, `c.sspopchk`, and `sspopchk` instructions test for read permission in the matching PMP entry when permission checking is required.

A new WARL field `ssmp` is defined in the `msecfg` CSR to identify a PMP entry as the shadow stack memory region for M-mode accesses.

When `msecfg.MML` is 1, the `ssmp` field is read-only else it may be written.

When `ssmp` field is implemented, the following rules are additionally enforced for M-mode memory accesses:

- `sspush`, `c.sspush`, `sspop`, `sspopchk`, `c.sspopchk`, and `ssamoswap` instructions must match PMP entry `ssmp`.
- Write by instructions other than `sspush`, `c.sspush`, and `ssamoswap` that match PMP entry `ssmp` cause an access violation exception.



The PMP region used for the M-mode shadow stack is expected to be made inaccessible for U-mode and S-mode read and write accesses. Allowing write access violates the integrity of the shadow stack and allowing read access may lead to disclosure of M-mode return addresses.

Chapter 4. Forward-edge control-flow integrity

The forward-edge CFI introduces landing pad instructions that enable software to indicate valid targets for indirect calls and indirect jumps in a program.

A landing pad (**lpc11**) instruction is defined as the instruction that must be placed at the program locations that can be valid targets of indirect jumps or calls.

To enforce that the target of an indirect call or indirect jump must be a valid landing pad instruction, the hart maintains an expected landing pad (**ELP**) state to determine if a landing pad instruction is required at the target of a **JALR** instruction. The **ELP** state can be one of:

- 0 - **NO_LP_EXPECTED**
- 1 - **LP_EXPECTED**

The Zisslpcfi extension determines if an indirect call or an indirect jump must land on landing pad as specified in Listing 7. An indirect call or an indirect jump updates the **ELP** to **LP_EXPECTED** if **is_lp_expected** is 1.

Listing 7. Landing pad expected determination

```
is_indirect_call_jump = ( (JALR || C.JR || C.JALR) &&
                          (rs1 != x1) && (rs1 != x5) ) ? 1 : 0;
is_sw_guarded_jump = ( JALR && rd == x7 && rs1 == x7 ) ? 1 : 0;
is_lp_expected = is_indirect_call_jump & ~is_sw_guarded_jump;
```

When **ELP** is set to **LP_EXPECTED** and the next instruction in the instruction stream is not 4-byte aligned, or is not a **lpc11**, or if the label encoded in the **lpc11** does not match the lower label in **lp1** register then an illegal instruction exception is raised. If the next instruction in the instruction stream is 4-byte aligned and is a **lpc11** with its label matching the lower label in **lp1** register then the **ELP** updates to **NO_LP_EXPECTED**.



Tracking of **ELP** and requiring valid landing pad instructions at the target of indirect call and jump enables a processor implementation to significantly reduce or to prevent speculation to non-landing-pad instructions. Constraining speculation using this technique greatly reduces the gadget space and increases the difficulty of using techniques such as branch-target-injection, also known as Spectre variant 2, that use speculative execution to leak data through side channels.

When the indirect branch using **JALR** encodes both **rd** and **rs1** as **x7**, the branch is termed a software guarded branch. Such branches do not need to land on a landing pad and thus do not update **ELP**. Such branches must be used by a program only when the compiler or the program has emitted code to explicitly verify that the target held in **x7** is a valid target for that branch.



Software guarded branches are expected to be used by compilers for generating

code for constructs like switch-cases. When using the software guarded branches, the compiler is required to ensure it has full control on the possible jump targets (e.g., the targets are obtained from a read-only table in memory and the index into the table is bounds checked, etc.).

While software guarded branches may be secured using such compiler generated checks, in some cases they may be susceptible. For example, where software can be interrupted, the `x7` register may be spilled to mutable memory by the interrupt or signal handler. The memory location where the register is spilled may be susceptible to modifications. Software should opt to use the software guarded branches only where such threats are not applicable or are mitigated.

The forward-edge CFI also supports labeling of landing pads. By itself a landing pad allows, for example, an indirect call to land on any `lpc1l` in the program. This significantly reduces the number of valid targets for an indirect call. Labeling of the landing pads enables software to achieve greater precision in pairing up indirect call sites or indirect jump sites with valid targets. To support labeled landing pads, the indirect call/jump sites establish an expected landing pad label in the landing pad label (`lp1`). If the target of the indirect call/jump is a valid landing pad instruction, the expected label established in the `lp1` is matched with the target's label. If a mismatch is detected then the label check instruction causes an illegal instruction exception.

Each landing pad may be labeled with a label that may be up to 25-bits wide. The `lp1` has three subfields - a 9-bit lower label (`LL`), a 8-bit middle label (`ML`), and an 8-bit upper label (`UL`).

The forward-edge CFI provides a `lps1l` instruction to establish the expected `LL` in the `lp1`, a `lpsml` instruction to establish the `ML`, and a `lpsul` instruction to establish the `UL` in the `lp1`.


The `lpc1l` instructions embed a 9-bit immediate field. The instruction compares this value to the `LL` and on a mismatch causes an illegal-instruction exception.


For label widths up to 17-bit a companion instruction `lpcm1` is provided. The `lpcm1` embeds a 8-bit immediate value that is compared to the `ML` and on a mismatch causes an illegal-instruction exception.

For label widths greater than 17-bit a second companion instruction `lpcul` is provided. The `lpcul` embeds a 8-bit immediate value that is compared to the `UL` and on a mismatch causes an illegal-instruction exception.

4.1. Forward-edge CFI Instruction encoding

The forward-edge CFI introduces the following instructions for landing pad operations. All instructions are encoded using the `SYSTEM` major opcode and using the `mop.rr` instructions defined by the Zimop extension.





When privilege level is M, the forward-edge CFI is active when **MFCFIE** is 1 in **mseccfg** register.

When **menvcfg.CFIE** is 0, then **Zisslpcfi** is not enabled for privilege modes less than M and forward-edge CFI is not active at privilege levels less than M.

When **V=0** and **menvcfg.CFIE** is 1, then forward-edge CFI is active at S-mode if **menvcfg.SFCFIE** is 1 and is active at U-mode if **mstatus.UFCFIE** is 1.

When **henvcfg.CFIE** is 0, then **Zisslpcfi** is not enabled for use when **V=1**.

When **V=1** and **menvcfg.CFIE** and **henvcfg.CFIE** are both 1, then forward-edge CFI is active at S-mode if **henvcfg.SFCFIE** is 1 and is active at U-mode if **vsstatus.UFCFIE** is 1.

The term **xFCFIE** is used to determine if forward-edge CFI is active at privilege level **x** and is defined as follows:

Listing 8. xFCFIE determination

```

if ( privilege == M-mode )
    xFCFIE = mseccfg.MFCFIE
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 0 && privilege == S-mode )
    xFCFIE = menvcfg.SFCFIE
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 0 && privilege == U-mode )
    xFCFIE = mstatus.UFCFIE
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && henvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 1 && privilege == S-mode )
    xFCFIE = henvcfg.SFCFIE
else if ( menvcfg.CFIE == 1 && henvcfg.CFIE == 1 && V == 1 && privilege == U-mode )
    xFCFIE = vsstatus.UFCFIE
else
    xFCFIE = 0

```

When forward-edge CFI is not active(**xFCFIE = 0**):

- The implementation does not update expected landing pad (**ELP**) state on indirect call or jump and does not require the instruction at the target of a indirect call or jump to be a landing pad instruction.
- The implementation does not update expected landing pad (**ELP**) when **lpc11** is executed.
- The instructions defined for forward-edge CFI revert to their Zimop defined behavior and write 0 to [rd].

4.2. Landing pad instruction

lpc11 is the valid landing pad instructions at target of indirect jumps and indirect calls. When a forward-edge CFI is active, the instructions cause an illegal instruction exception if they are not

placed at a 4-byte aligned `pc`. The `lpc1l` has the lower landing pad label embedded in the `LLPL` field. `lpc1l` causes an illegal instruction exception if the `LLPL` field in the instruction does not match the `lp1.LL` field.

When the instructions cause an illegal-instruction exception, the `ELP` does not change. The behavior of the trap caused by this illegal-instruction exception is specified in section [Section 4.5](#).

The operation of the `lpc1l` instruction is as follows:

Listing 9. `lpc1l` operation

```
If xFCFIE != 0
    // If PC not 4-byte aligned then illegal-instruction
    if pc[1:0] != 0
        Cause illegal-instruction exception
    // If lower landing pad label not matched -> illegal-instruction
    else if (inst.LLPL != lp1.LL)
        Cause illegal-instruction exception
    else
        ELP = NO_LP_EXPECTED
else
    [rd] = 0;
endif
```



Contenation of two instructions `A` and `B` may be consumed as a valid landing pad in the program. For example, consider a 32-bit instruction where the bytes 3 and 2 have a pattern of `4073h` or `c073h` (for example, the immediate fields of a `lui`, `auipc`, or a `jal` instruction), followed by a 16-bit or a 32-bit instruction with a second byte with pattern of `83` (for example, an `addi x6, x0, 1`).

The `lpc1l` requires a 4-byte alignment such that when such patterns are detected the assembler/linker the instruction `A` may be forced to be aligned to a 4-byte boundary to cause the unintended `lpc1l` pattern to become misaligned and cause an illegal instruction exception.

4.3. Label matching instructions

The `lpcm1` instruction matches the 8-bit wide middle label in its `MLPL` field with the `lp1.ML` field and causes an illegal instruction exception on a mismatch. The `lpcm1` is not a valid target for an indirect call or jump.

The `lpcu1` instruction matches the 8-bit wide upper label in its `ULPL` field with the `lp1.UL` field and causes an illegal instruction exception on a mismatch. The `lpcu1` is not a valid target for an indirect call or jump.

The operation of the `lpcm1` instruction is as follows:

Listing 10. `lpcml` operation

```
If xFCFIE != 0
    if (lpl.ML != inst.MLPL)
        cause illegal-instruction exception
    else
        [dst] = 0;
    endif
```

The operation of the `lpcul` instruction is as follows:

Listing 11. `lpcul` operation

```
If xFCFIE != 0
    if (lpl.UL != inst.ULPL)
        cause illegal-instruction exception
    else
        [dst] = 0;
    endif
```

4.4. Setting up landing pad label register

Before performing an indirect call or indirect jump to a labeled landing pad, the `lpl` is loaded with the expected landing pad label - a constant determined at compilation time.

A `lpsll` instruction is provided to set the value of the lower label (`LL`) field of the `lpl`.

The operation of this instruction is as follows:

Listing 12. `lpsll` operation

```
If xFCFIE == 1
    lpl.LL = inst.LLPL
    lpl.ML = lpl.UL = 0
else
    [rd] = 0;
endif
```



The following instruction sequence may be emitted at indirect call sites by the compiler to set up the landing pad label register when labels that are up to 9-bit wide are used:

```
foo:
:
# x10 is expected to have address of function bar()
lpsll $0x1de    # setup lpl.LL with value 0x1de
jalr %ra, %x10
```

:

The following instruction sequence may be emitted at indirect call sites by the compiler to set up the landing pads at entrypoint of function bar():

```
bar:
    lpc1l $0x1de    # Verifies that lpl.LL matches 0x1de
    :              # continue if landing pad checks succeed
```

A `lpsml` instruction is provided to set the value of the middle label (ML) field of the `lpl`. This instruction is used when labels wider than 9-bit are used.

The operation of this instruction is as follows:

Listing 13. lpsml operation

```
If xFCFIE == 1
    lpl.ML = inst.MLPL
else
    [rd] = 0;
endif
```

The following instruction sequence may be emitted at indirect call sites by the compiler to set up the landing pad label register when labels that are up to 17-bit wide are used:

```
foo:
    :
    # x10 is expected to have address of function bar()
    lps1l $0x1de    # setup lpl.LL with value 0x1de
    lpsml $0x17     # setup lpl.ML with value 0x17
    jalr %ra, %x10
    :
```



The following instruction sequence may be emitted at indirect call sites by the compiler to set up the landing pads at entrypoint of function bar():

```
bar:
    lpc1l $0x1de    # Verifies that lpl.LL matches 0x1de
    lpcm1 $0x17     # Verifies that lpl.ML matches 0x17
    :              # continue if landing pad checks succeed
```


A `lpsul` instruction is provided to set the value of upper label (UL) field `lpl`. This instruction is used when labels wider than 17-bit are used.

The operation of this instruction is as follows:

Listing 14. `lpsul` operation

```
If xFCFIE == 1
    lpl.UL = inst.ULPL
else
    [rd] = 0;
endif
```

The following instruction sequence may be emitted at indirect call sites by the compiler to set up the landing pad label register when labels that are up to 25-bit wide are used:




```
foo:
:
# x10 is expected to have address of function bar()
lpsll $0x1de    # setup lpl.LL with value 0x1de
lpsml $0x17     # setup lpl.ML with value 0x17
lpsul $0x13     # setup lpl.UL with value 0x13
jalr %ra, %x10
:
```

The following instruction sequence may be emitted at indirect call sites by the compiler to set up the landing pads at entrypoint of function bar():

```
bar:
lpcll $0x1de    # Verifies that lpl.LL matches 0x1de
lpcml $0x17     # Verifies that lpl.ML matches 0x17
lpcul $0x13     # Verifies that lpl.ML matches 0x13
:              # continue if landing pad checks succeed
```

The `lpcml` and `lpcul` need not occur together or in that order. Use of a `lpcul` does not require a preceeding or a following `lpcml`. The following sequences are also a valid label check sequence:



```
bar:
lpcll $lwr_label
lpcul $upr_label
:
```

```
bar:
lpcll $lwr_label
lpcul $upr_label
lpcml $mdl_label
```

:

A `lpsll` sets the `LL` as specified in the instruction and also initializes the `ML` and `UL` to zero. If the label to be assigned has a value of 0 for these fields then explicitly setting them to zero using a `lpsml` and/or `lpsul` is not required. The `lpsml` and `lpsul` need not occur together or in that order. Use of a `lpsul` does not require a preceeding or following `lpsml`.

4.5. Preserving expected landing pad state on traps

A trap may need to be delivered to the same or higher privilege level on completion of JALR but before the instruction at the target of JALR was decoded due to asynchronous interrupts.

A trap may be caused by synchronous exceptions with priority lower than that of an illegal-instruction exception (See Table 3.7 of Privileged Specification [2]).

A trap may be caused by the illegal-instruction exception due to the instruction at the target of a JALR not being a `lpcll` instruction, or the `lpcll` instruction not being 4-byte aligned, or due to the `LLPL` encoded in the `lpcll` not matching the `LL` field of `lp1`.

To avoid losing previous `ELP` state, `MPELP` and `SPELP` bit is provided in the `mstatus` CSR for M-mode and HS/S-mode respectively. The `SPELP` bit can be accessed through the `sstatus` CSR. To avoid losing `ELP` state on traps to VS-mode, `SPELP` bit is provided in `vsstatus` (VS-modes version of `sstatus`) to hold the `ELP`. When a trap is taken into VS-mode, the `SPELP` bit of `vsstatus` CSR is updated with `ELP`. When `V=1`, `sstatus` aliases to `vsstatus` CSR. The `xPELP` fields in `mstatus` and `vsstatus` are WARL fields. The trap handler should preserve the `lp1` CSR.

When a trap is taken into privilege mode `x`, the `xPELP` bit is updated with current `ELP` and `ELP` is set to `NO_LP_EXPECTED`.

`MRET` or `SRET` instruction is used to return from a trap in M-mode or S-mode respectively. When executing an `xRET` instruction, the `ELP` is set to `xPELP` if `xFCFIE` is 1 at the targeted privilege level. The `xPELP` is set to `NO_LP_EXPECTED`. Trap handlers should restore the preserved `lp1` value before executing the `SRET` or `MRET`.

Bibliography

[1] “RISC-V Instruction Set Manual, Volume I: Unprivileged ISA .” [Online]. Available: github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual.

[2] “RISC-V Instruction Set Manual, Volume II: Privileged Architecture .” [Online]. Available: github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual.