Regime Changes and Economic Preferences: Global Evidence

Milestone 2: Data

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Sources

In our project, we are making use of 3 datasets:

- Vdem (Coppedge et al. (2025)) dataset comes also as an R package:vdemdata. This dataset contains various democracy indicators for 202 countries starting of year 1789. We will be using the **Liberal democracy index which** combines many of these indicators into a single number for each country/year.
- Global Preference Survey (Falk et al. (2018)) dataset was downloaded as a ZIP file from the following website. This dataset contains information about economic preferences of 80337 individuals from 76 countries. The survey was conducted between 2012 and 2013.
- Data on country's GDP's was downloaded from the Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and Zanden (2025)). This dataset was downloaded on 5th May 2025.

Data

The following table Table 2 shows how were the economic preferences from the GPS survey (Falk et al. (2018)) measured. The table Table 4 shows how the LDI was calculated.

 $\label{eq:table 2} \mbox{Table 2}$ Economic preferences from the Global Preference Survey

Preference	Measurement Approach	Description	Scale (min- max)
Time	Combined	• Quantitative: Five binary choices between	-1.3 -
Prefer-	quantitative and	immediate vs. delayed financial rewards (today	2.8
ence/Patience qualitative		or in 12 months)	
		• Qualitative: Self-assessment on willingness to wait (11-point Likert scale)	
Risk	Combined	• Quantitative: Five binary choices between	-1.9 –
Preference	quantitative and	fixed lottery and varying sure payments	2.5
	qualitative	• Qualitative: Self-assessment (11-point Likert scale)	
Positive	Combined	• Quantitative: Scenario about giving a gift to	-3.8 –
Reciprocity	quantitative and qualitative	a helpful stranger (choice of presents worth 5-30 euros)	1.3
		• Qualitative: Self-assessment on willingness to return favors (11-point Likert scale)	
Negative	Three qualitative	• Willingness to take revenge at personal cost	-1.6 -
Reciprocity	self-assessments	• Willingness to punish unfair behavior toward self	2.3
		• Willingness to punish unfair behavior toward others (prosocial punishment)	
Altruism	Combined	• Quantitative: Hypothetical donation	-2.6 -
	quantitative and	scenario (how much of 1,000 euros would be	1.7
	qualitative	donated)	
	-	• Qualitative: Self-assessment on willingness to	
		give without expecting returns (11-point Likert scale)	
Trust	Single qualitative item	• Self-assessment on whether others have the best intentions (11-point Likert scale)	-2 - 1.7

Table 4

Liberal democracy index information

Value	Measurement approach	Description	Scale (min – max)
Liberal democracy index (v2x_libd	Aggregation of 55 unique indicators using Bayesian enfactor analysis	The indicators come from the Liberal Democracy index and Liberal component index. Here you can find the exact indicators.	0(least liberal democratic) – 1(most liberal democratic)

Sample period

Our sample period is defined by the birth years of the indviduals, which we calculated based on the age information in the GPS dataset. Each study unit (=individual) appears once. We had data for 80337 individuals. After merging and removing NAs it reduced to 75468.

Treatment calculation

Since we have information about the age of each individual during the time of interview in the GPS survey, we were able to calculate their birth years. Then we could determine whether they experienced a regime change during their formative years, which we define following the literature as the period between 3 and 18 years of age. This definition aligns with the National Library of Medicine, which considers childhood as the stage from 3–11 years and adolescence from 12–18 years (Balasundaram and Avulakunta 2025). Research also supports that the formation of economic preferences such as patience and risk-taking during childhood and adolescence has lasting consequences for life outcomes, including educational attainment and financial decision-making (Detlefsen et al. 2024).

To implement this classification, we linked the V-Dem dataset with the GPS survey data. Our objective was to separate individuals into treated and control groups based on the **Liberal Democracy Index (v2x_libdem)** from the V-Dem dataset. The treated group consists of individuals who experienced a regime change during their formative years (ages 3–18), while the control group did not. Also we calculated the amount of years spend after regime changes.

Following the methodology proposed by Lührmann et al. (2020), we define regime change as a substantial and statistically significant change in the Liberal Democracy Index over a 10-year period. Specifically, we compute the difference between the index value at time t and time t-10. A change is considered *substantial* if the absolute value of the change


exceeds **0.05**, and *significant* if the confidence intervals at time **t** and **t-10** do not overlap. This procedure captures both sudden and gradual transformations in regime type. After that, we gain following number of observations in each group, as shows in table Table 5.

Table 5: Number of treatment variables

0 1 53175 22293

Variables

Figure 1: Mean Preference Profiles by Regime Change Exposure



Mean values displayed above/below bars

In the Figure 1 you can see simple mean comparison graph between Treated and Control group for all 6 economic preferences. For completeness, we include **summary statistics** table for all 6 economic preferences in Table 6. Table 7 depicts the summary statistics for our control variables.

Table 6: Economic Preferences Comparison by Group

	Mean (SD)		
	Control Group	Treatment Group	Difference
Trust	0.091 (1.017)	-0.081 (0.977)	-0.172*** (0.009)
Patience	-0.042 (0.987)	-0.005 (0.964)	0.038*** (0.009)
Risk Taking	0.080 (1.023)	0.057 (0.970)	-0.023* (0.009)
Positive	0.088	-0.094	-0.182***
Reciprocity	(1.008)	(1.006)	(0.009)
Negative	-0.011	0.063	0.073***
Reciprocity	(1.016)	(0.987)	(0.009)
Altruism	0.161 (1.003)	-0.069 (0.962)	-0.230*** (0.009)

Note:

Standard deviations in parentheses. Standard errors for differences in parentheses.

Table 7: Control Variables Comparison by Group

	Mean (SD)		
	Control	Treatment	Difference
	Group	Group	
age	37.604	39.391	1.787***
	(15.772)	(17.340)	(0.153)
avg_gdppc_form	mative345	8.670	0.325***
	(1.102)	(0.859)	(0.009)
Subjective	5.222	5.142	-0.080**
Math Skills	(2.880)	(2.748)	(0.026)


Note:

Standard deviations in parentheses. Standard errors for differences in parentheses. **** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1


The Figure 2 and Figure 3 below depict the average values grouped by country in 2012 and

^{****} p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 2: Average Economic Preference Values by Country: Trust, Patience, Altruism Mean Trust values grouped by country



Mean Patience values grouped by country



Mean Altruism values grouped by country





Figure 3: Average Economic Preference Values by Country: Risk, Negative and Positive reciprocity



Descriptive statistics


The following figures present a detailed **visual overview of the descriptive statistics**, including distribution histograms, group-level comparisons, and difference-in-differences style visualizations highlighting trends across cohorts.

By regime change exposure during formative years 0.8 0.5 1.5 0.6 0.4 1.0 density 0.4 density 0.3 density 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 3 2 0 1 0 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 risktaking trust patience

Figure 4: Distribution of Key Economic Preferences


The following figures present additional visualizations of our data. In the following graphs Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10 we are aiming to examine the **parallel trends assumption** between treated and control groups in all 6 economic preferences.

Figure 5: Trust by Age Cohort and Regime Change Experience



Regime Change Experience
No Yes

Figure 6: Patience by Age Cohort and Regime Change Experience



Regime Change Experience - No - Yes

Figure 7: Risk Taking by Age Cohort and Regime Change Experience





Figure 8: Altruism by Age Cohort and Regime Change Experience



Regime Change Experience
No Yes

Figure 9: Negative Reciprocity by Age Cohort and Regime Change Experience





Figure 10: Positive Reciprocity by Age Cohort and Regime Change Experience



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