

# Regime Changes and Economic Preferences

Empirical Research Task

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Data Setting Econometric mode

#### Research question:

Is there a causal link between experiencing regime changes and economic preferences?



V-Dem	General Preference Survey
Panel from 1789-now	Cross-section collected in 2012
Liberal Democracy Index (0 - 1)	6 economic preferences, country, age, math skills,
	gender

• Combination of both: approx **75.000 individuals** from **1910-2012** from **76 countries** 



## Structure of aggregation: Liberal Democracy Index

#### Various indicators:

eral democracy index			v2x_libdem	
Electoral democracy index		v2x_polyarchy		
Liberal component index			v2x_liberal	
	Equality before the law and individual liberty index		v2xcl_rol	
		Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm	0.254
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	0.254
		Freedom of foreign movement	v2clfmove	0.444
		Freedom from political killings	v2clkill	0.458
		Property rights for men	v2clprptym	0.459
		Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	0.459
		Freedom of religion	v2clrelig	0.591
		Freedom from forced labor for men	v2clslavem	0.512
		Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef	0.512
		Freedom of domestic movement for men	v2cldmovem	0.423
		Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew	0.423
		Rigorous and impartial public admin- istration	v2clrspct	0.505
		Freedom from torture	v2cltort	0.391
		Transparent laws with predictable en- forcement	v2cltrnslw	0.396
Judicial constraints on the executive index		v2x_jucon		
		Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.547
		Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.336
		Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.341
		High court independence	v2juhcind	0.416
		Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.411
	Legislative constraints on the executive index		v2xlg_legcon	
		Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	0.284
		Legislature opposition parties	v2lgoppart	0.434
		Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	0.373
		Legislature questions officials in prac- tice	v2lgqstexp	0.526



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#### **Economic preferences**

From General Preference Survey (2012)

Values for each preference derived from combination of responses to different survey measures



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Patience	Risk Taking	Positive Reciprocity
hypothetical binary	Choices between	Imagine you got lost in an unfamiliar area -
choice: immediate	fixed lottery payouts	stranger offers to take them into their
or delayed financial	x or 0, or varying sure	destination. How much eur to give stranger
reward	payments y	as a "thank you"
		self assesment: how willing are you to return
		a favor?



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<b>Negative Reciprocity</b>	Altruism	Trust
self assesment:	how willing would you be to give	Do you assume people have
willingness to punish	to good causes without expecting	only the best intentions?
someone for unfair	anything in return?	(Likert scale 0-10)
behavior	unexpectedly receiving 1000	
prosocial punishment	euros: how much to donate?	
(similar concept to		
norm enforcement)		



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#### Treatment group

• **Goal**: identify whether an individual experienced a regime change during formative years (3-18)

Methodology from Lührmann et al. (2020), we start on country level

1. 
$$\Delta \text{ LDI} = \text{LDI}_t - \text{LDI}_{t-10}$$

Setting

- 2.  $|\Delta \text{ LDI}| > 0.2$
- 3. Test for significant change:


$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{CI}_t &= [\mathbf{LDI}_t - \mathbf{ME}_t, \mathbf{LDI}_t + \mathbf{ME}_t] \\ \mathbf{CI}_{t-10} &= [\mathbf{LDI}_{t-10} - \mathbf{ME}_{t-10}, \mathbf{LDI}_{t-10} + \mathbf{ME}_{t-10}] \end{aligned}$$


Significant if:  $CI_t \cap CI_{t-10} = \emptyset$ 



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- next step: connect with individual level data (GPS survey)
  - 1. Evaluate age of each individual at regime change periods
  - 2. If between "formative age" (3-18 years): treated

Economic preferences are formed during childhood + adolescence (Detlefsen et al., 2024)

**Assumption**: the individual was also born in the same country

Group	Number of observations
Treated: <b>Autocratization</b>	4 949
Treated: <b>Democratization</b>	17 344
No regime change during formative years	53 175



## Control group

- True controls: Individuals from countries that never experienced any regime changes
- Contaminated controls: Individuals from countries that experienced a regime change, but these happen to be outside of their formative years period (3-18 years), Removed from analysis

Group	N
Treated: Autocratization	4 949
Treated: Democratization	17 344
No regime change	<u>26876</u>



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Why removing so many observations?

Individuals might have indirect exposure effects to the regime changes, which could compromise the integrity of our study.



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### **Baseline specification: TWFE**

Errors clustered at country level

$$Y_{irt} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Autocratization}_{ir} + \gamma_r + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{irt}$$

$$Y_{irt} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Democratization}_{ir} + \gamma_r + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{irt}$$

 $Y_{ict}$ : Preference outcome for individual ( i ), region ( r ), birth cohort ( t )

 $\operatorname{Autocratization}_{ir}$  or  $\operatorname{Democratization}_{ir}:\operatorname{Binary}$  treatment indicator

 $\gamma_r$ : Region fixed effects

 $\delta_t$ : Birth cohort fixed effects



#### Specification with controls

Goal: Exploit cross-sectional variation between individuals who experienced regime changes and those who didn't, within the same region and birth cohort, while controlling for observed characteristics

$$Y_{irt} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Democratization}_{ir} + \gamma_r + \delta_t + X_{irt} \cdot (\text{Controls}) + \varepsilon_{irt}$$

$$Y_{irt} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Autocratization}_{ir} + \gamma_r + \delta_t + X_{irt} \cdot (\text{Controls}) + \varepsilon_{irt}$$

 $\beta$ : Causal effect of interest

 $X_{ict}$ : Controls including: Average V-Dem LDI during formative years (ages 3-18)

Log of average GDP per capita in formative years (ages 3-18)



#### Recession in formative years (ages 3-18)

- 1. Country specific recession threshold = Mean growth (1,5 x standard deviation)
- 2. Recession: GDP growth $_{c,t} < \left(\mu_{\text{growth}_c} 1.5 \times \sigma_{\text{growth}_c}\right)$
- 3. 1 if recession occured in formative years, 0 otherwise
- = 47% of individuals experienced a recession during their formative years



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Thank you for your attention, now let's move to Results + Robustness checks (Elvin)



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