

Thou Shalt Not Depend on Me: Analysing the Use of Outdated JavaScript Libraries on the Web

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Abstract—Web developers routinely rely on third-party JavaScript libraries such as jQuery to enhance the functionality of their sites. However, if not properly maintained, such dependencies can create attack vectors allowing a site to be compromised.

In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive study of client-side JavaScript library usage and the resulting security implications across the Web. Using data from over 133 k websites, we show that 37 % of them include at least one library with a known vulnerability; the time lag behind the newest release of a library is measured in the order of years. In order to better understand why websites use so many vulnerable or outdated libraries, we track causal inclusion relationships and quantify different scenarios. We observe sites including libraries in ad hoc and often transitive ways, which can lead to different versions of the same library being loaded into the same document at the same time. Furthermore, we find that libraries included transitively, or via ad and tracking code, are more likely to be vulnerable. This demonstrates that not only website administrators, but also the dynamic architecture and developers of third-party services are to blame for the Web’s poor state of library management.

The results of our work underline the need for more thorough approaches to dependency management, code maintenance and third-party code inclusion on the Web.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Web is arguably the most popular contemporary programming platform. Although websites are relatively easy to create, they are often composed of heterogeneous components such as database backends, content generation engines, multiple scripting languages and client-side code, and they need to deal with unsanitised inputs encoded in several different formats. Hence, it is no surprise that it is challenging to secure websites because of the large attack surface they expose.

One specific, significant attack surface are vulnerabilities related to client-side JavaScript, such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and advanced phishing. Crucially, modern websites often include popular third-party JavaScript libraries, and thus are at risk of inheriting vulnerabilities contained in these libraries. For example, a 2013 XSS vulnerability in the jQuery [13] library before version 1.6.3 allowed remote attackers to inject arbitrary

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scripts or HTML into vulnerable websites via a crafted tag. As a result, it is of the utmost importance for websites to manage library dependencies and, in particular, to update vulnerable libraries in a timely fashion.

To date, security research has addressed a wide range of client-side security issues in websites, including validation [30] and XSS ([17], [36]), cross-site request forgery [4], and session fixation [34]. However, the use of vulnerable JavaScript libraries by websites has not received nearly as much attention. In 2014, a series of blog posts presented cursory measurements highlighting that major websites included known vulnerable libraries ([25], [26], [24]). These findings echo warnings from other software ecosystems like Android [3], Java [32] and Windows [21], which show that vulnerable libraries continue to exist in the wild even when they are widely known to contain severe vulnerabilities. Given that JavaScript dependency management is relatively primitive and corresponding tools are not as well-established as in more mature ecosystems, these findings suggest that security issues caused by outdated JavaScript libraries on the Web may be widespread.

In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive study on the security implications of JavaScript library usage in websites. We seek to answer the following questions:

- Where do websites load JavaScript libraries from (i.e., first or third-party domains), and how frequently are these domains used?
- How current are the libraries that websites are using, and do they contain known vulnerabilities?
- Are web developers intentionally including JavaScript libraries, or are these dependencies caused by advertising and tracking code?
- Are existing remediation strategies effective or widely used?
- Are there additional technical, methodological, or organisational changes that can improve the security of websites with respect to JavaScript library usage?

Note that the focus of this paper is *not* measuring the security state of specific JavaScript libraries. Rather, our goal (and primary contribution) is to empirically examine whether website operators keep their libraries current and react to publicly disclosed vulnerabilities.

Answering these questions necessitated solving three fundamental methodological challenges. *First*, there is no centralised repository of metadata pertaining to JavaScript libraries and their versions, release dates, and known vulnerabilities. To address this, we manually constructed a catalogue containing

all “release” versions of 72 of the most popular open-source libraries, including detailed vulnerability information on a subset of 11 libraries. *Second*, web developers often modify JavaScript libraries by reformatting, restructuring or appending code, which makes it difficult to detect library usage in the wild. We solve this problem through a combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques. *Third*, to understand why specific libraries are loaded by a given site, we need to track all of the causal relationships between page elements (e.g., script s_1 in frame f_1 injects script s_2 into frame f_2). To solve this, we developed a customised version of Chromium that records detailed *causality trees* of page element creation relationships.

Using these tools, we crawled the Alexa Top 75 k websites and a random sample of 75 k websites drawn from a snapshot of the .com zone in May 2016. These two crawls allow us to compare and contrast JavaScript library usage between popular and unpopular websites. In total, we observed 11,141,726 inline scripts and script file inclusions; 86.6 % of Alexa sites and 65.4 % of .com sites used at least one well-known JavaScript library, with jQuery being the most popular by a large majority.

Analysis of our dataset reveals many concerning facts about JavaScript library management on today’s Web. More than a third of the websites in our Alexa crawl include at least one vulnerable library version, and nearly 10 % include two or more different vulnerable versions. From a per-library perspective, at least 36.7 % of jQuery, 40.1 % of Angular, 86.6 % of Handlebars, and 87.3 % of YUI inclusions use a vulnerable version. Alarmingly, many sites continue to rely on libraries like YUI and SWFObject that are no longer maintained. In fact, the median website in our dataset is using a library version 1,177 days older than the newest release, which explains why so many vulnerable libraries tend to linger on the Web. Advertising, tracking and social widget code can cause *transitive* library inclusions with a higher rate of vulnerability, suggesting that these problems extend beyond individual website administrators to providers of Web infrastructure and services.

We also observe many websites exhibiting surprising behaviours with respect to JavaScript library inclusion. For example, 4.2 % of websites using jQuery in the Alexa crawl include the same library version multiple times in the same document, and 10.9 % include multiple *different versions* of jQuery into the *same document*. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to make these observations, since existing tools ([27], [20]) are unable to detect these anomalies. These strange behaviours may have a negative impact on security as asynchronous loading leads to nondeterministic behaviour, and it remains unclear which version will ultimately be used.

Perhaps our most sobering finding is practical evidence that the JavaScript library ecosystem is complex, unorganised, and quite “ad hoc” with respect to security. As of this writing, there are no reliable vulnerability databases, no security mailing lists for the most popular libraries, few or no details on security issues in release notes, and often, it is difficult to identify which versions of a library are affected by a reported vulnerability.

Overall, our study makes the following contributions:

- We conduct the first comprehensive study showing that a significant number of websites include vulnerable or outdated JavaScript libraries.

- We present results on the origins of vulnerable JavaScript library inclusions, which allows us to contrast the security posture of website developers with third-party modules such as WordPress, advertising or tracking networks, and social media widgets.
- We show that a large number of websites include JavaScript libraries in unexpected ways, such as multiple inclusions of different library versions into the same document, which may impact their attack surface.
- We find existing remediation strategies to be ineffective at mitigating the threats posed by vulnerable JavaScript libraries. For example, less than 3 % of websites could fix all their vulnerable libraries by applying only patch-level updates. Similarly, only 2 % of websites use the version-aliasing services offered by JavaScript CDNs.

II. BACKGROUND

JavaScript has allowed web developers to build highly interactive websites with sophisticated functionality. For example, communication and production-related online services such as Gmail and Office 365 make heavy use of JavaScript to create web-based applications comparable to their more traditional desktop counterparts. In this paper, we focus exclusively on aspects of client-side JavaScript executed in a browser, not the recent trend of using JavaScript for server-side programming.

A. JavaScript Libraries

In many cases, to make their lives easier, web developers rely on functionality that is bundled in libraries. For example, jQuery [13] is a popular JavaScript library that makes HTML document traversal and manipulation, event handling, animation, and AJAX much simpler and compatible across browsers.

In the simplest case, a JavaScript library is a plain-text script containing code with reasonably well-defined functionality. The script has full access to the DOM that includes it; the concept of namespaces does not exist in JavaScript, and everything that is created is by default *global*. More elaborate libraries use hacks and conventions to protect the code against naming conflicts, and expose interfaces for retrieving meta-data such as the name and version of the library. Over the course of this study, we found that JavaScript libraries overwhelmingly use the Semantic Versioning [28] convention of `major.minor.patch`, such as `1.0.1`, where the major version component is increased for breaking changes, the minor component for new functionality, and the patch component for backwards-compatible bug fixes.

To include a library into their website, developers typically use the `<script src="url"></script>` HTML tag and point to an externally-hosted version of the library or a copy on their own server. Library vendors often provide a *minified* version that has comments and whitespace removed and local variables shortened to reduce the size of the file. Developers can also concatenate multiple libraries into a single file, create custom builds of libraries, or use advanced minification features such as dead code removal. While custom minification builds are relatively common, more aggressive minification settings are rare in client-side JavaScript because they can break code [9].

CDNs. Many libraries are available on Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) for use by other websites. Google, Microsoft

and Yandex host libraries on their CDNs, some popular libraries (e.g., Bootstrap and jQuery) offer their own CDNs, and some community-based CDNs accept to host arbitrary open-source libraries. JavaScript CDNs enable caching of libraries across websites to increase performance. Another useful feature offered by some CDNs is *version aliasing*. That is, when including a library, the developer may specify a version prefix instead of the full version string, in which case the CDN returns the newest available version with that prefix. When implemented correctly, the patched version of a library will automatically be used on the website when it becomes available on the CDN. However, this works only for security issues fixed in a backwards-compatible manner, and it conflicts with client-side security mechanisms such as subresource integrity [37]. In addition, version aliasing makes client-side caching of resources less efficient because it must be configured for shorter time spans, that is, hours instead of years. As a result, version aliasing is often discouraged [11].

Third Parties. Third-party modules such as advertising, trackers, social media or other widgets that are often embedded in webpages typically implemented in JavaScript. Furthermore, these scripts can also load libraries, possibly without the knowledge of the site maintainer. If not isolated in a frame, these libraries gain full privileges in the including site's context. Thus, even if a web developer keeps own library dependencies updated, outdated versions may still be included by badly maintained third-party content. Also, some JavaScript libraries and many web frameworks contain their own copies of libraries they depend on. Hence, web developers may unknowingly rely on software maintainers to update JavaScript libraries.

B. Vulnerabilities in JavaScript Libraries

While JavaScript is the de-facto standard for developing client-side code on the Web, at the same time it is notorious for security vulnerabilities. A common, lingering problem is Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [17], which allows an attacker to inject malicious code (or HTML) into a website. In particular, if a JavaScript library accepts input from the user and does not validate it, an XSS vulnerability might creep in, and all websites using this library could become vulnerable.

As an example, consider the popular jQuery library and its `$()` function, which is overloaded and has different behaviour depending on which type of argument is passed [15]: If a string containing a CSS selector is passed, the function searches the DOM tree for corresponding elements and returns references to them; if the input string contains HTML, the function creates the corresponding elements and returns the references. As a consequence, developers who pass improperly sanitised input to this function may inadvertently allow attackers to inject code even though the developers' original intent was only to select an existing element. While this API design places convenience over security considerations and the implications could be better highlighted in the documentation, it does not automatically constitute a vulnerability in the library.

In older versions of jQuery, however, the `$()` function's leniency in parsing string parameters could lead to complications by misleading developers to believe, for instance, that any string beginning with `#` would be interpreted as a selector and could be safe to pass to the function, as `#test` selects the element with identifier `test`. Yet, jQuery considered parameters containing a

TABLE I. THE 30 MOST FREQUENT LIBRARIES IN OUR ALEXA CRAWL (OUT OF 72 SUPPORTED LIBRARIES). VERSIONS: (S) TOTAL IN REFERENCE CATALOGUE FOR STATIC DETECTION; (D) DYNAMIC DETECTIONS OBSERVED IN CRAWLS (SOME LIBRARIES/VERSIONS NOT SUPPORTED DYNAMICALLY).

Library	Versions (S)	Versions (D)	Bower Rank	Wapp %	Use on ALEXA	Crawled Sites COM
jQuery	66	64	1	42 %	83.9 %	61.1 %
jQuery-UI	46	46	13	7 %	23.5 %	8.0 %
Modemizr	24	28	18	10 %	21.4 %	8.6 %
Bootstrap	32	10	3		12.5 %	4.5 %
jQuery-Migrate	7	0			11.3 %	10.7 %
Underscore	61	34	12	3 %	5.8 %	2.4 %
SWFObject	2	1			3.7 %	2.4 %
Moment	54	33	6		3.5 %	1.4 %
RequireJS	62	40			3.4 %	2.3 %
jQuery-Form	14	0			2.7 %	3.4 %
Backbone	29	19		2 %	2.7 %	1.6 %
Angular	110	78	2		2.4 %	1.6 %
LoDash	77	57	26		2.4 %	2.5 %
jQuery-Tools	8	20			2.3 %	0.9 %
jQuery-Fancybox	10	0			2.3 %	1.4 %
GreenSock GSAP	45	45			2.2 %	2.8 %
Handlebars	25	15			2.0 %	0.4 %
Prototype	5	14			1.8 %	1.1 %
MooTools	27	24		3 %	1.5 %	1.4 %
WebFont Loader	100	0			1.5 %	0.9 %
jQuery-Cookie	8	0	21		1.4 %	0.2 %
Hammer.js	26	14			1.2 %	0.4 %
jQuery-Validation	13	0			1.1 %	0.6 %
Mustache	29	21			1.1 %	0.9 %
YUI 3	37	26			1.0 %	1.4 %
Velocity	55	15			0.9 %	0.2 %
Script.aculo.us	5	12			0.8 %	0.4 %
Knockout	21	9			0.8 %	0.1 %
Flexslider	11	0			0.6 %	0.4 %
React	41	23	28		0.5 %	1.6 %

HTML `<tag>` anywhere in the string as HTML [14], so that a parameter such as `#` would lead to code execution rather than a selection. This behaviour was considered a vulnerability and fixed.

Other vulnerabilities in JavaScript libraries include cases where libraries do not sanitise inputs that are expected to be pure text, but are passed to `eval()` or `document.write()` internally, which could cause them to be executed as script or rendered as markup, respectively. Attackers can use these capabilities to steal data from a user's browsing session, initiate transactions on the user's behalf, or place fake content on a website. Therefore, JavaScript libraries must not introduce any attack vectors into the websites where they are used.

III. METHODOLOGY

Identifying client-side JavaScript libraries, finding out how they are loaded by a website, and determining whether they are outdated or vulnerable requires a combination of techniques and data sources. Challenges arise due to the lax JavaScript language, the fragmented library ecosystem, and the complex nature of modern websites. *First*, we need to collect metadata about popular JavaScript libraries, including a list of available versions, the corresponding release dates, code samples, and known vulnerabilities. *Second*, we must be able to determine if JavaScript code found in the wild is a known library. *Third*, we need to crawl websites while keeping track of causal resource inclusion relationships and match them with detected libraries.

A. Cataloguing JavaScript Libraries

In contrast to Maven's Central Repository in the Java world, JavaScript does not have a similarly popular repository of library

versioning and project dependency metadata. We must therefore collect and correlate this data from various separate sources.

1) Selecting Libraries: The initial construction of our metadata archive involves a certain amount of manual verification work. Since there are thousands of JavaScript libraries (e.g., the community-based cdnjs.com hosts 2,379 projects as of August 2016), we focus our study on the most widely used libraries because they are the most consequential.

To select libraries, we leverage library popularity statistics provided by the JavaScript package manager Bower [6] and the web technology survey Wappalyzer [38]. We extend this list of popular libraries with all projects hosted on the public CDNs operated by Google, Microsoft and Yandex. As we will show in Section IV-C, many websites rely on these commercial CDNs to host JavaScript libraries. We collected the data from Bower, Wappalyzer, and the three CDNs in January 2016.

Due to various data availability requirements explained in detail in Section III-A5, we need to exclude certain libraries from our study. Overall, we support 72 libraries—18 out of the Top 20 installed with Bower, 7 out of the Top 10 frameworks identified on websites by Wappalyzer, 13 of the 14 libraries hosted by Google, 12 of the 18 libraries hosted by Microsoft, and all 11 libraries hosted by Yandex. Table I shows a subset of 30 libraries in our catalogue as well as their rank on Bower and their market share according to Wappalyzer. Although our catalogue appears to cover a sparse set of the libraries on Bower, many of the missing ranks belong to submodules of popular libraries (e.g., rank 5 is *Angular Mocks*). According to Wappalyzer, we cover 73 % of the most popular libraries.

2) Extracting Versioning Information: Our next step is compiling a complete list of library versions along with their release dates. After unsuccessful experiments with file timestamps and available-since dates on the libraries’ official websites and CDNs, we determined that GitHub was the most reliable source for this kind of information. Nearly all of the open source libraries in our seed lists are hosted on GitHub and tag the source code of their releases, allowing us to extract timestamps and version identifiers from the tags. In naming their releases, they typically follow a `major.minor.patch` version numbering scheme, which makes it straightforward to identify tags pertaining to releases and ignore all other tags, including “alpha,” “beta” and “release candidate” versions that are not meant to be used in production. As shown in Table I, popular libraries like Angular and jQuery have up to 110 and 66 distinct versions in our catalogue, respectively. However, half of the libraries have fewer than 26 versions.

3) Obtaining Reference Files: Some methods of library detection require us to have access to code samples for each version of a library. We gather library code from two sources: the official website of each library, and from CDNs. For the official websites, we manually download all available library versions. However, some official websites do not provide copies of old library versions, or they only provide copies of a subset of versions. In contrast, CDNs typically do host comprehensive collections of old library versions in order to not break websites that depend on older versions. We utilise the API of one such CDN, jsDelivr, to automatically discover all available versions of libraries on five supported CDNs. For the remaining CDNs, we construct download link templates manually, such as <https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/{version}/jquery.min.js>.




Fig. 1. Fraction of library versions with i distinct known vulnerabilities each (represented by colours), out of the total library versions in parentheses. Angular 1.2.0 has 5 known vulnerabilities and there are 110 versions overall.

ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/{version}/jquery.min.js. In doing so, we make sure that we download all available variants of a library file, including the full development variant and the minified production variant without whitespace or comments.

When comparing files downloaded from official websites and different CDNs, we noticed that even the same version and variant (e.g., minified) of a library may sometimes differ between sources. We observed additional whitespace, removal of comments, or the likely use of a different minifier or minifier setting, especially when the library’s developers do not provide a minified version. This observation highlights the importance of collecting ground-truth JavaScript library samples from as many official and semi-official sources as possible. Therefore, we use official websites as well as dedicated CDNs (Bootstrap CDN and jQuery CDN), commercial CDNs (Google, Microsoft, and Yandex), and open source CDNs (jsDelivr, cdnjs and OssCDN).

In total, we collect 81,027 JavaScript files. We analyse the sizes of the “main” files of each library in our dataset (that is, we exclude files such as plug-ins that cannot be used stand-alone), and find that Script.aculo.us 1.9.0 is the smallest at 996 bytes (minified). After accounting for duplicates and discarding files smaller than 996 bytes (to reduce the likelihood of false positives due to shared ancillary resources such as configuration files, localisations and plug-ins), our final catalogue includes 19,099 distinct files.

4) Identifying Vulnerabilities: The last step towards building our catalogue is aggregating vulnerability information for our 72 JavaScript libraries. Unfortunately, there is no centralised database of vulnerabilities in JavaScript libraries; instead, we manually compile vulnerability information from the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), public bug trackers, GitHub comments, blog posts, and the vulnerabilities detected by Retire.js [27].

Overall, we are able to obtain systematically documented details of vulnerabilities for 11 of the JavaScript libraries in our catalogue. In some cases, the documentation for a given flaw specifies an affected range of versions, in which case we consider all library versions within the range to be vulnerable. In other cases, when a flaw is identified in a specific version v of a library, we consider all versions $\leq v$ to be vulnerable.

Figure 1 shows details of the 11 libraries with vulnerability information. For each library, we show the total number of versions in our catalogue as well as the fraction of versions with i distinct known vulnerabilities. The worst offender is Angular 1.2.0, which contains 5 vulnerabilities. Overall, we see that 28.3%, 6.7%, and 6.1% of these library versions contain one, two, or three known vulnerabilities, respectively.

5) Limitations: Although we have expended a great deal of effort constructing our catalogue of JavaScript libraries, it is impacted by several limitations. *First*, by choosing GitHub for versioning and release date information, we need to exclude a small number of libraries that have few or no releases tagged on GitHub or do so in an apparently inconsistent way (e.g., multiple successive releases tagged on the same day). Furthermore, we cannot include closed-source libraries such as Google Maps, advertising and tracking libraries like Google Analytics, and social widgets since they typically do not publish version information. Fortunately, the vast majority of such libraries are hosted by their creators at a single, non-versioned URL (e.g., <https://www.google-analytics.com/analytics.js>), meaning that all clients automatically include the latest version of the library.

Second, our catalogue may miss some revisions of libraries if the author chose to patch the code and not increment the version number. Similarly, we may miss revisions if they are denoted using non-standard notation, such as special suffixes, four-part version numbers, etc., and we may not possess any code samples for a version of a library if it cannot be downloaded from the developer website or a supported CDN.

Third, our library vulnerability assessments are based solely on publicly available documentation. We make no attempts to discover new vulnerabilities, or to quantify the exploitability of libraries as used on websites, for both practical and ethical reasons. Thus, although a website may include a vulnerable library, this does not necessarily imply that the website is exploitable. Furthermore, libraries differ in their release cycles, attack surfaces, functionality, and public scrutiny with respect to vulnerabilities. Thus, we do not claim to provide comparable coverage of vulnerabilities for each library in our catalogue.

B. Library Identification

Identifying an unknown file as a specific version of a JavaScript library is challenging because these libraries are text, which gives web developers, development tools and network software the ability to modify them, e.g., by adding or removing features, concatenating multiple libraries into a single file, or tampering with comments. To reliably detect as many libraries as possible, we use two complementary techniques. These techniques are conceptually similar to those used by the *Library Detector* Chrome extension [20] and Retire.js.

Static Detection: We compute the file hashes of all observed JavaScript code and compare them to the 19,099 reference hashes in our catalogue. File hashing enables us to identify all cases where libraries are used “as-is.”

Dynamic Detection: During the crawl, we detect the presence of libraries in the browser by fingerprinting the JavaScript runtime environment and by relying on libraries to identify themselves. Specifically, modern libraries typically make themselves available to the environment by means of a

global variable that can be detected at runtime. Furthermore, most libraries in our catalogue contain a variable or method that returns the version of the library. As an illustration, the following snippet of JavaScript code detects jQuery:

```

1 var jq = window.jQuery || window.$ || window.$jq ||
2   window.$j;
3 if (jq && jq.fn) {
4   return jq.fn.jquery || null; //version (if known)
5 } else {
6   return false; //jQuery not found
7 }
```

Line 1 extracts jQuery’s global variable, and line 3 returns the version number if it exists in its `fn.jquery` attribute. Note that in order to prevent false positives, we check for the global variable *and* that the `fn` attribute exists. Later on, we discard all detections with missing or syntactically invalid version strings.

While this dynamic methodology detects libraries even if the source code has been (lightly) modified, it relies on the version attribute to be present. Hence, we can dynamically detect only 39 out of the 72 libraries, and for some, we do not detect (typically older) versions lacking the version string. Table I compares the versions detected dynamically in our crawls \mathcal{D} to our static reference catalogue \mathcal{S} . Version coverage is often similar; dynamic outperforms static when CDNs are incomplete.

Limitations: Our two detection techniques represent a best-effort approach to identifying JavaScript libraries in the wild. However, there are cases where both techniques can fail. For example, heavily modified libraries will not match our file hashes nor will they match the dynamic signatures. Furthermore, we rely on the correctness of our information sources, i.e., that CDNs contain the version of a library that they claim, and that libraries export the correct version string and do not attempt to conceal their presence. Effectively, these limitations mean that our measurement results should be viewed as lower bounds.

C. Data Collection

A central contribution of our work is to analyse not only whether outdated libraries are being used, but *why* this may be the case. This implies that detecting whether a library exists in a window or frame is not enough; we must also detect if it was loaded by another script. To model causal inclusion relationships of resources in websites, we introduce the theoretical concept of *causality trees* and implement it in a modern browser. We integrate our two library detection methods into this modified browser environment and use it to collect data about the usage of JavaScript libraries on the Web.

Causality Trees: The goal of a causality tree is to represent the causal element creation relationships that occur during the loading and execution of a dynamic website in a modern browser. A causality tree contains a directed edge $A \rightarrow B$ if and only if element A causes element B to load. More specifically, the elements we model include scripts, images and other media content, stylesheets, and embedded HTML documents. A relationship exists whenever an element creates another element (e.g., a script creates an iframe) or changes an existing element’s URL (e.g., a script changes the URL of an iframe or redirects the main document), which is equivalent to creating a new element with a different URL.

While the nodes in a causality tree correspond to nodes in the website’s DOM, their structure is entirely unrelated to




Fig. 2. Example causality tree.

the hierarchical DOM tree. Rather, nodes in the causality tree are snapshots of elements in the DOM tree *at specific points in time*, and may appear multiple times if the DOM elements are repeatedly modified. For instance, if a script creates an iframe with URL U_1 and later changes the URL to U_2 , the corresponding script node in the causality tree will have two document nodes as its children, corresponding to URLs U_1 and U_2 , but referring to the same HTML `<iframe>` element. Similarly, the predecessor of a node in the causality tree is not necessarily a predecessor of the corresponding HTML element in the DOM tree; they may even be located in two different HTML documents, such as when a script appends an element to a document in a different frame.

Figure 2 shows a synthetic example of a causality tree. The large black circle is the document root (main document), filled circles are scripts, squares are HTML documents (e.g., embedded in frames or corresponding to a new main document if there is a top-level redirect), and empty circles are other resources (e.g., images). Edges denote “created by” relationships; for example, in Figure 2 the main document included the grey script, which in turn included the blue script. Dashed lines around nodes denote inline scripts, while solid lines denote scripts included from an URL. Thick outlines denote that a resource was included from a known ad network, tracker, or social widget (see below for more details).

The colour of nodes in Figure 2 denotes which document they are *attached to* in the DOM: grey corresponds to resources attached to the main document, while we assign one of four colours to each further document in frames. Document squares contain the colour of their parent location in the DOM, and their own assigned colour. Resources created by a script in one frame can be attached to a document in another frame, as shown by the grey script which has a blue child in Figure 2, i.e., the blue script is a child of the blue document in the DOM.

Figure 12 shows the causality tree of mercantil.com, with images and other irrelevant node types omitted for clarity. It includes three clearly visible social media widgets: Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn. Note that the web developer embedded code provided by the social networks into the main document, which in turn initialises each widget and creates one or more frames for their contents. We also see that the causality tree includes multiple copies of jQuery in the main document, which we will discuss in detail in Section IV-G.

Implementation of Causality Trees: Our definition of causality trees is related to the concepts previously used to analyse malicious JavaScript inclusions [1] and cookie matching between online ad exchanges [5], but it differs in the details. Our implementation is independent from the aforementioned works and uses a different technological approach by building on the

Chrome Debugging Protocol [8] to minimise the necessity for brittle browser source code modifications.

The Chrome Debugging Protocol provides programmatic access to the browser and allows clients to attach to open windows, inspect network traffic, and interact with the JavaScript environment and the DOM tree loaded in the window. Two prominent uses of this API are the Chrome Developer Tools (an HTML and JavaScript front-end to the protocol) and Selenium’s WebDriver interface to remotely control Chrome.

At a high level, we generate causality trees by observing resource requests through the network view of the debugging protocol. Note that this view includes resources not actually loaded over the network, e.g., inline URL schemas such as `data:` or `javascript:`. We disable all forms of caching to observe even duplicate resource inclusions within the same frame, which are otherwise handled through an in-memory cache. For each loaded resource, the protocol allows us to identify the frame in which the resource is located as well as the initiating script, where applicable. Similarly, we utilise protocol methods to be notified of script generation events and store the source code of both inline and URL-based JavaScript. (This includes source code from attribute-based event handlers and string evaluation, which we both model as inline script nodes.) We store a log of all relevant events during the crawl and assemble the causality trees in a post-processing step.

Integration of Library Detection: Hash-based detection of libraries is relatively straight-forward to integrate with our crawler; we simply compute the source code hashes of all script nodes in the causality trees and look them up in our reference catalogue during post-processing.

Integrating dynamic library detection is more challenging—out of the box, existing detection methods can only detect whether a JavaScript context (window or frame) contains a library or not, but in general this information is not sufficient to properly label the correct script node in the causality tree. The Chrome Debugging Protocol allows us to link a method executed in a JavaScript context to the script that contains its implementation; thus, once we hold a reference to a JavaScript library object (such as `jq` in the example from Section III-B), we dynamically enumerate its instance methods and use an arbitrary one of them to identify the implementing script.

Another challenge in dynamically detecting libraries during the crawl is that we need to inject the detection code into each frame of a website, since each frame has its own JavaScript scope and may contain independent library instances. This is further complicated by the fact that modern websites are quite dynamic and an ad frame, for instance, may quickly navigate to a different URL, which causes any library previously loaded in the frame to be unloaded or replaced. Lastly, we observe that many websites include multiple copies of the same library, including different versions of the same library (refer to our analysis in Section IV-G for details). Typically, only one library instance can exist in each context because the more recently loaded instance replaces the previous global reference.

In order to be able to study these phenomena in detail and also address the other aforementioned detection challenges, we inject the detection code into each frame and execute it every 4 seconds. Note that it would not be feasible from a performance point of view to execute the detection code after each script

creation event since websites routinely contain thousands of script nodes (see Section IV-B).

To detect cases of inclusions that we may miss due to the four-second detection interval, we additionally execute the dynamic detection code *post hoc* on all scripts found during the crawl. This execution is done in an individual Node.js environment with a fake DOM tree. This offline detection step cannot fully replace in-browser detections, however, since some libraries such as jQuery UI have code or environment prerequisites that cause the offline detection to fail.

Annotation of Ads, Trackers and Widgets: To further clarify the provenance of scripts we observe in our crawl, we aim to determine whether they are related to known advertising, tracking, or social widget code. We achieve this by injecting a customised version of the AdBlock browser extension into each frame. Our version of AdBlock flags content but permits it to load, and we verified that our customised version remains undetected by common ad-block detection scripts. We use EasyList and EasyPrivacy to identify advertising and tracking content, and Fanboy’s Social Blocking List to detect social network widgets. For our analysis, we label an element in the causality tree as ad/tracker/widget-related whenever the corresponding element or any parent in the DOM tree is labeled by AdBlock. Additionally, we propagate these labels downwards to all children of the labelled node in the causality tree.

Crawl Parameters: To gain a representative view of JavaScript library usage on the Web, we collected two different datasets. *First*, we crawled the Alexa Top 75 k domains, which represent websites popular with users. *Second*, we crawled 75 k domains randomly sampled from a snapshot of the .com zone, that is, a random sample of all websites with a .com address, which we expect to be dominated by less popular websites. We conducted the two crawls in May 2016 from IP addresses in a /24 range in the US. We observe $\sim 5\%$ and $\sim 17.2\%$ failure rates in ALEXA and COM, leaving us with data from 71,217 and 62,086 unique domains, respectively. Failures were due to timeouts and unresolvable domains, which is expected especially for COM since the zone file contains domains that may not have an active website.

To preserve the fidelity of our data collection, our crawler is based on Chromium and includes support for Flash. We disable various security mechanisms such as malware and phishing filters. We only crawl the homepage of each visited site due to the presence of many sites that thwart deeper traversal by requiring log-ins. While visiting a page, the crawler scrolls downwards to trigger loading of any dynamic content. As we found page-loaded events to be unreliable, our crawler remains on each page for a fixed delay of 60 seconds before clearing its entire state, restarting, and then proceeding to the next site.

D. Validation

As the final step in our methodology, we validate that our static and dynamic detection methods work in practice.

Dynamic Detection: To investigate the efficacy of our dynamic detection code, we conduct a controlled experiment: we load each of the reference libraries in our catalogue into Node.js, one at a time, and attempt to detect each file with the dynamic detection method. Intuitively, we know the exact

version of each loaded library, which enables us to assess the accuracy of the dynamic detection.

Overall, we observe that the dynamic detection code is able to identify the exact name and version of 79.2 % of the libraries, as well as the name (but not the version) of 18.6 % of the libraries. Only 2 % of libraries fail to be identified (i.e., were false negatives). We manually examine the libraries that are only detected by name, and find that the vast majority are older versions that do not include a variable or method that returns the library version. Of course, 100 % of these libraries can be detected based on their file hashes, which reinforces the importance of using multiple techniques to identify libraries.

Static Detection: To investigate the efficacy of library detection using file hashes, we conduct a second controlled experiment: we randomly select from our crawled data 415 unique scripts that the dynamic detection code classifies as being jQuery, and attempt to detect them based on their file hashes. In this case, we are treating the output of the dynamic detection method as ground truth.

Overall, we observe that only 15.4 % of the libraries can be identified as jQuery based on their file hash. Although this is a low detection rate, the result also matches our expectation that developers often deploy customised versions of libraries. For example, 90 % of the jQuery libraries that we fail to detect via file hashing contain fewer than 150 line break characters, whereas non-minified copies of jQuery from our catalogue contain more than 1900. This strongly suggests that the unique scripts are custom-minified versions of jQuery.

Hypothetical “Name-in-URL” Detection: For the last validation step, we consider a simple library detection heuristic. The heuristic flags a script file as jQuery, for instance, whenever the string “jquery” appears in the URL of the script. To evaluate the accuracy of this heuristic, we extract from our ALEXA crawl the set of script URLs that contain “jquery,” and the URLs of scripts detected as jQuery by our dynamic and static methods. Out of these URLs, 22.3 % contain “jquery” and are also detected as the library; 69 % are flagged only by the heuristic, and 8.8 % are detected only by our dynamic and static methods. The heuristic appears to cause a large number of false positives due to scripts named “jquery” without containing the library, and it also seems to suffer from false negatives due to scripts that contain jQuery but have an unrelated name.

We validate this finding by manually examining 50 scripts from each of the two set differences. The scripts in the detection-only sample appear to contain additional code such as application code or other libraries. Only one of these scripts does not contain jQuery but Zepto.js, an alternative to jQuery that is partially compatible and also defines the characteristic `$.fn` variable. On the other hand, none of the scripts in the heuristic-only sample can be confirmed as the library; nearly all of them contain *plug-ins* for jQuery but not the library itself.

The results for the Modernizr library, which does not have an equivalent to jQuery’s extensive plug-in ecosystem, confirm this trend. The overlap between heuristic and detection is 55.3 % of URLs, heuristic-only 0.8 %, and detection-only 44 %—the simple heuristic misses many Modernizr files renamed by developers. These results underline the need for more robust detection techniques such as our dynamic and static methods; we do not use the heuristic in our analysis.




Fig. 3. Distribution of JavaScript inclusion type frequency per site in ALEXA.




Fig. 4. Distribution of library inclusion type frequency per site in ALEXA.




Fig. 5. Distribution of vulnerable library count versus overall library count per site in ALEXA.




Fig. 6. Distribution of JavaScript inclusion type frequency per site in COM.




Fig. 7. Distribution of library inclusion type frequency per site in COM.




Fig. 8. Distribution of vulnerable library count versus overall library count per site in COM.

IV. ANALYSIS

In this section, we analyse the data from our web crawls. First, we present a general overview of the dataset by drilling down into the causality trees, overall JavaScript inclusion statistics, and vulnerable JavaScript library inclusions. Next, we examine risk factors for sites that include vulnerable libraries, and the age of vulnerable libraries (i.e., relative to the latest release of each library). Finally, we examine unexpected, duplicate library inclusions in websites, and investigate whether common remediations practices are useful and used in practice.

A. Causality Trees

We begin our analysis by measuring the complexity of the websites in our crawls. The median causality tree in ALEXA contains 133 nodes (p95: 425, max: 19,508) whereas it is 38 nodes (p95: 298, max: 25,485) in COM, indicating that ALEXA contains a larger share of more complex websites. Similarly, ALEXA and COM contain a median of 52 and 14 image nodes, 44 and 16 script nodes, and 4 and 2 document nodes per causality tree, respectively. 95 % of frames in both crawls show only one or two documents during the 60 s of our crawl, whereas a few cycle through larger numbers of documents (max: 12 for ALEXA and 32 for COM).

The median depth of the causality trees (defined as the length of the longest path from the root to a leaf) is 4 inclusions (p95: 9, max: 438) in ALEXA and 3 (p95: 8, max: 62) in COM.

Since paths correspond to causal relationships, intuitively this means that the inclusion of a node could have been influenced by up to 438 predecessors. In both crawls, images tend to appear further up in the causality trees at a median depth of 1, that is, at least half of them are directly included in the main document, whereas documents tend to appear further down at a median depth of 2, which indicates that they are more frequently dynamically generated.

B. General JavaScript Statistics

Scripts are the most common node type in our causality trees; 97 % of ALEXA sites and 83.6 % of COM sites contain JavaScript. The most common script type are *inline* scripts, which includes script code embedded as text in a `<script>` tag, any code in attribute-based event handlers (such as the `onclick` attribute), and any code evaluated from strings using methods such as `eval()`. The causality trees from the ALEXA and COM crawls contain a median of 24 and 9 inline scripts, respectively, with 13.6 % and 6.7 % of the sites having hundreds of inline scripts—the maximum observed was 19 K and 25 K.

When looking at URL-based script inclusions, we distinguish between *internal* scripts, that is, code hosted on the same domain as the website (or a subdomain of the website), and all other scripts that we call *external*. Figures 3 and 6 depict the distribution of script inclusion types for ALEXA and COM, respectively. About 91.7 % of all ALEXA sites include

TABLE II. EXTERNAL JAVASCRIPT: TOP 10 MARKET SHARE.
SORTED BY ALEXA; DATA OMITTED FOR HOSTS NOT PART OF THE TOP 10.

Hostname	ALEXA	COM
www.google.com	11.5 %	
www.google-analytics.com	9.5 %	9.4 %
ak2.imgur.com		5.6 %
ajax.googleapis.com	3.1 %	3.9 %
pagead2.googlesyndication.com	2.9 %	1.5 %
connect.facebook.net	2.8 %	1.5 %
www.googletagmanager.com	2.4 %	
www.googletagservices.com	2.1 %	
partner.googleadservices.com	2.0 %	
www.googleadservices.com	2.0 %	
platform.twitter.com	1.8 %	1.2 %
apis.google.com	1.5 %	1.3 %
maps.googleapis.com		1.3 %
s.ytimg.com		1.2 %

TABLE III. DETECTED JS LIBRARIES: TOP 10 MARKET SHARE.
SORTED BY ALEXA; DATA OMITTED FOR HOSTS NOT PART OF THE TOP 10.

Hostname	ALEXA	COM
ak2.imgur.com	18.3 %	
ajax.googleapis.com	17.6 %	12.7 %
code.jquery.com	3.5 %	3.1 %
static.hugedomains.com		2.8 %
static.parastorage.com		2.3 %
img.sedoparking.com		1.6 %
img4.wsimg.com		1.5 %
cdnjs.cloudflare.com	2.1 %	1.4 %
static.squarespace.com		1.3 %
s0.2mdn.net	1.4 %	
ivid-cdn.adhigh.net	1.2 %	
maxcdn.bootstrapcdncdn.com	0.9 %	
s0.wp.com		0.9 %
cdn10.trafficjunk.net	0.4 %	
netdna.bootstrapcdncdn.com	0.4 %	
ajax.aspnetcdn.com	0.3 %	
dsms0mj1bbhn4.cloudfront.net	0.3 %	

at least one external script, which is consistent with the 88.5 % Nikiforakis et al. found for the Alexa Top 10 k [22]. The median number of internal scripts is 4 per site in ALEXA (0 in COM) and the maximum is 224 (134). Externally-hosted script appears more prevalent with a median of 9 in ALEXA (max: 202) and 2 in COM (max: 172); 6.3 % of sites in ALEXA, and 4.8 % in COM, include 30 or more external scripts. However, we note that we likely underestimate the fraction of internal scripts because our domain name-based heuristic cannot infer that two domains may be under the same administrative control when one is not a subdomain of the other. In both crawls, the median inclusion depth of an internal script node is 1, i.e., directly included by the main document, whereas the median depth of an external script node is 2, suggesting indirect inclusions.

Each site includes scripts from a median of 5 external hosts in ALEXA (2 in COM) with a maximum of 50 (45). Table II lists the hostnames most frequently included by `<script>` tags (counting each hostname at most once per site to reduce bias through multiple inclusions). At least 5 of the Top 10 in ALEXA are related to advertising, especially Google’s ad platforms. This agrees with prior work that has found Google’s Web advertising presence to be nearly ubiquitous ([10], [7]).

C. General Library Statistics

Next, we narrow our analysis to focus just on JavaScript libraries from our catalogue. We use the union of detections

TABLE IV. INCLUSION TYPES OF DETECTED LIBRARIES: LOADED FROM INTERNAL/INTERNAL/EXTERNAL SCRIPT & INCLUSIONS (OF ANY TYPE) DUE TO AD/TRACKER/WIDGET CODE. GREYED OUT IF <100 INCLUSIONS;
OMITTED IF <10. LIBRARIES COUNTED AT MOST ONCE PER SITE.

Library	ALEXA				COM			
	Incl.	Int.	From Ext.	Ad/Tr./Widget	Incl.	Int.	From Ext.	Ad/Tr./Widget
jQuery	2.7	58.8	38.6	3.4	2.9	29.5	67.6	25.6
Modernizr	3.0	65.4	31.6	12.2	1.4	38.2	60.4	3.5
Bootstrap	1.7	69.9	28.4	0.3	0.5	49.2	50.3	3.5
SWFObject	4.4	34.2	61.4	42.4	0.8	13.7	85.5	4.5
RequireJS	2.6	46.6	50.8	8.4		3.9	95.7	6.4
Angular	2.2	56.8	41.0	3.8		5.7	94.2	5.3
LoDash	0.7	48.3	51.0	10.6		7.2	92.7	6.7
GreenSock	13.6	46.0	40.4	30.5	20.3	22.1	57.6	3.7

made by all our techniques, but exclude detections where the version of the library is unknown. Overall, we detect at least one of our 72 target libraries on 86.6 % of all ALEXA sites and 65.4 % of all sites in COM. Table I lists the 30 libraries that appear on most sites in ALEXA. We also list the percentage of sites in COM that include the same libraries; however, for clarity we omit two libraries (both below 0.5 %) that are part of the Top 30 in COM but not in ALEXA. jQuery is by far the most popular library, which we find on 83.9 % of the ALEXA sites and 61.1 % of the COM sites. SWFObject, a library used to include Adobe Flash content, is ranked seventh (3.7 %) and tenth (2.4 %) despite being discontinued [33] since 2013. On the other hand, several relatively well-known libraries such as D3, Dojo and Leaflet appear below the Top 30 in both crawls. We also observe that the market share for these libraries is generally consistent with the data reported by Wappalyzer.

Figures 4 and 7 show the distribution of detected libraries with respect to their inclusion type (i.e., inline, internal, and external) in the two crawls. We detect libraries in inline script on 4.1 % of all ALEXA sites (and 2.8 % of COM sites), which occurs when library code is copy-pasted into a `<script>` tag directly embedded in HTML, or when a script is generated by evaluating a string. For instance, we observe that a version of Dojo loads additional components by making an asynchronous request and passing the response to `eval()`. We detect internal and external inclusions in 62.0 % and 41.1 % of all sites with an overall median of two different libraries per site in ALEXA (COM: internal libraries on 21.4 % of sites, external on 48.7 %, with a median of one library per site).

Table III contains the most frequent hosts serving detected JavaScript libraries. Unsurprisingly, JavaScript CDNs are well represented (six in the Top 10 of ALEXA and three in the Top 10 of COM); they were all used to build our catalogue of library reference files. Between 13 % and 18 % of all non-inline JavaScript library inclusions are loaded from Google’s CDN. Perhaps illustrating the “long tail” nature of the COM crawl, we observe that several web hosting and domain parking companies are represented in the Top 10 library sources of COM (note that we did not group subdomains; e.g., there are multiple other subdomains of `wsimg.com` below the Top 10).

Table IV lists the percentage of inline, internal, and external inclusions for a selection of detected libraries. While the majority of inclusions in ALEXA come from internally-hosted sources (i.e., the website’s own domain), most inclusions are external in COM. About 7.3 % of all sites in ALEXA




Fig. 9. Fraction of websites with detected vulnerable inclusions in the ALEXA Top x , and fraction of websites with at least one detected library for comparison. Vulnerable libraries can be found on 26 % of Top 500 websites.

(16.0 % in COM) contain at least one library inclusion that is causally related to *ad*, *tracker* or *widget* code; SWFObject and GreenSock are relatively often included by such code.

D. Vulnerable Libraries

We now move on to answering our research questions, starting with how many websites become potentially vulnerable due to including a library version with known vulnerabilities.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of total and vulnerable libraries per ALEXA website. Overall, we find that 37.8 % of sites use at least one library version that we know to be vulnerable, and 9.7 % use two or more different vulnerable library versions (COM in Figure 8: 37.4 % and 4.1 %).

To better understand how website popularity is correlated with vulnerable libraries, we plot in Figure 9 the percentage of vulnerable ALEXA websites according to their Alexa ranks. Highly-ranked websites tend to be less likely to include vulnerable libraries, but they are also less likely to include any detected library at all. Towards the lower ranks, both curves increase at a similar pace until they stabilise. While only 21 % of the Top 100 websites use a known vulnerable library, this percentage increases to 32.2 % in the Top 1 k before it stabilises in the Top 5 k and remains around the overall average of 37.8 % for all 75 k websites. This indicates that even relatively large websites (albeit not the largest ones) have a vulnerability rate comparable to the average of the COM dataset, which is dominated by smaller sites.

When grouping ALEXA according to the McAfee Smart-Filter web categorisation [19], we find that financial and governmental websites rank *last* with 52 % and 50 % vulnerable sites, respectively. Malicious websites (e.g., spam) have the same proportion as the full dataset, while parked and adult sites are the least vulnerable with 24 % and 19 %, respectively.

Table V shows the percentage of vulnerable copies for 5 out of the 11 JavaScript libraries in our catalogue with vulnerability data. In ALEXA, 36.7 % of jQuery inclusions are known vulnerable, when at most one inclusion of a specific library version is counted per site. Angular has 40.1 % vulnerable inclusions, Handlebars has 86.6 %, and YUI 3 has 87.3 % (it




Fig. 10. Box plot of each website’s maximum lag behind the newest release of each detected library, broken down into site categories and a random sample of 10,000 websites (ALEXA). Governmental sites are longest behind.

is not maintained any more). These numbers illustrate that inclusions of known vulnerable versions can make up even a majority of all inclusions of a library. However, we caution that these numbers are not suitable for comparing the relative vulnerabilities of different libraries (see Section III-A5).

E. Risk Factors for Vulnerability

So far, we have examined whether sites are potentially vulnerable, that is, whether they include one or more known vulnerable libraries. In the following, we turn to *how* libraries are included by sites and whether we can identify any factors indicating a higher fraction of vulnerable inclusions.

When we look at how the library is being hosted, inline inclusions of jQuery have a clearly higher fraction of vulnerable versions than internally or externally hosted copies. The situation is similar when focusing on the parent node of a library, that is, the document or script that caused the library to be included. For most libraries, direct inclusions by the main document are less likely to be vulnerable than indirect inclusions such as through an intermediate script or in a frame.

As an example for web applications, we briefly survey library use related to WordPress. We consider a library to be used by WordPress if the URL of either the library or its next parent in the causality tree contains `/wp-content/`; an inclusion is unrelated if neither condition holds. For all libraries, WordPress-related inclusions appear to be slightly more up-to-date than unrelated inclusions.

On the other hand, library inclusions by ad, widget or tracker code appear to be more vulnerable than unrelated inclusions. While the difference is relatively small for jQuery in ALEXA, the vulnerability rate of jQuery associated with ad, widget or tracker code in COM—89 %—is almost double the rate of unrelated inclusions. We speculate that this may be due to the use of less reputable ad networks or widgets on the smaller sites in COM as opposed to the larger sites in ALEXA.

We note that the factors above are relatively coarse and the effects are sometimes opposite for different libraries. We suggest further investigation into the underlying causes.

TABLE V. VULNERABLE FRACTION OF INCLUSIONS PER LIBRARY, COUNTING AT MOST ONE LIBRARY-VERSION PAIR PER SITE. CONFIGURATIONS WITH LESS THAN 100 VULNERABLE INCLUSIONS GRAYED OUT; OMITTED IF LESS THAN 10 TOTAL INCLUSIONS AFTER FILTER.

(a) ALEXA						(b) COM					
Inclusion Filter	jQuery	jQ-UI	Angular	Handlebars	YUI 3	Inclusion Filter	jQuery	jQ-UI	Angular	Handlebars	YUI 3
All Inclusions	36.7 %	33.7 %	40.1 %	86.6 %	87.3 %	All Inclusions	55.4 %	37.3 %	38.7 %	87.5 %	13.7 %
Internal	38.1 %	33.0 %	37.1 %	84.6 %	92.8 %	Internal	41.6 %	28.1 %	45.8 %	100.0 %	68.8 %
External	34.8 %	35.5 %	48.2 %	88.6 %	83.8 %	External	62.7 %	42.7 %	38.4 %	85.4 %	12.6 %
Inline	54.8 %	30.7 %	20.0 %	100.0 %	-	Inline	89.9 %	25.6 %	-	-	-
Internal Parent	37.1 %	33.7 %	40.6 %	85.3 %	91.3 %	Internal Parent	59.7 %	37.0 %	78.2 %	94.2 %	47.9 %
External Parent	32.6 %	33.8 %	41.8 %	96.4 %	92.2 %	External Parent	45.9 %	38.0 %	20.7 %	84.1 %	68.9 %
Inline Parent	47.6 %	35.2 %	25.6 %	83.7 %	79.6 %	Inline Parent	79.8 %	48.9 %	-	-	1.0 %
Direct Incl. in Root	36.4 %	33.5 %	40.1 %	85.2 %	90.4 %	Direct Incl. in Root	42.6 %	36.2 %	41.3 %	88.7 %	50.4 %
Indirect Inclusion	41.0 %	35.6 %	43.2 %	92.3 %	87.1 %	Indirect Inclusion	77.5 %	44.5 %	30.8 %	86.4 %	7.5 %
WordPress	29.2 %	14.4 %	23.5 %	77.3 %	-	WordPress	41.6 %	20.4 %	25.0 %	70.3 %	-
Non-WordPress	36.8 %	34.2 %	40.7 %	86.8 %	87.3 %	Non-WordPress	55.6 %	38.6 %	38.9 %	90.7 %	13.7 %
Ad/Widget/Tracker	38.1 %	39.8 %	23.5 %	96.9 %	98.2 %	Ad/Widget/Tracker	89.0 %	31.6 %	19.2 %	-	55.0 %
No Ad/Widget/Tracker	36.7 %	33.6 %	40.8 %	86.5 %	84.1 %	No Ad/Widget/Tracker	45.5 %	37.3 %	39.6 %	87.3 %	12.7 %

TABLE VI. DAYS BETWEEN RELEASE OF USED VERSION AND NEWEST AVAILABLE LIBRARY VERSION (MEDIAN OVER INCLUSIONS). SHOWN SEPARATELY FOR VULNERABLE AND NON-VULNERABLE INCLUSIONS WHERE AVAILABLE, OR (CENTRED) FOR ALL INCLUSIONS OTHERWISE. GREYED OUT WHEN LESS THAN 100 INCLUSIONS OBSERVED.

Library	ALEXA		COM	
	Vuln.	Non-V.	Vuln.	Non-V.
jQuery	1476	705	2243	705
jQuery-Migrate	1105	1024	1105	1024
jQuery-Mobile	49		122	
Bootstrap	304		389	
Angular	657	234	489	287
Handlebars	687	0	687	57
Prototype	1772		1772	
MooTools	1417		1417	
YUI 3	393	140	393	140
Raphael	1491		1491	
D3	491		139	

F. Relative Age of Libraries

When websites include outdated libraries, an interesting question is how far they are behind more current versions of the libraries. We begin by looking at how far sites are behind the most recent *patch*-level releases of libraries. Patch-level releases are usually (though not always) backwards-compatible. In ALEXA, we observe that non-vulnerable inclusions of Angular lag behind by a median of five versions, whereas the median is seven versions for vulnerable inclusions.

When looking at the number of days between the release date of the included version and the release date of the newest available library version overall, the lag for Angular is 398 days for all inclusions, 657 days for vulnerable inclusions, and 234 days for non-vulnerable inclusions. While this may suggest that there is a relationship between higher lag and vulnerability of a site, we note that the lag is also tied to the availability of newer versions—if no update is available, the lag is zero yet the used version could be vulnerable. For instance, 6.7% of all (16.6% of vulnerable) Angular inclusions in ALEXA use the latest available release in their respective *patch* branch, but remain vulnerable as the branch contains no fixed version.

With this caveat in mind, Table VI shows the median lag (in days) behind the most recently released version of each library. We observe significant variations. For instance, the median D3

inclusion in ALEXA uses a version 491 days older than the newest D3 release. For Mootools, the lag is 1,417 days.

To characterise lag from a per-site point of view, we calculate the maximum lag of all inclusions on each site and find that 61.4 % of ALEXA sites are at least one *patch* version behind on one of their included libraries (COM: 46.2 %). Similarly, the median ALEXA site uses a version released 1,177 days (COM: 1,476 days) before the newest available release of the library.

Finally, we plot this lag according to the category of ALEXA sites in Figure 10. Each candlestick shows the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles, respectively. We observe that both governmental and financial websites are the longest behind current releases with a median lag of 1,293 and 1,239 days, respectively. Similar to per-category vulnerability rates, parked and adult websites exhibit values better than the average.

In summary, these results demonstrate that the majority of web developers are working with library versions released a long time ago. We observe median lags measured in years, suggesting that web developers rarely update their library dependencies once they have deployed a site.

G. Duplicate Inclusions

While analysing the use of JavaScript libraries on websites, we noticed that libraries are often used in unexpected ways. We discuss some examples using jQuery as a case study. About 20.7 % of the websites including jQuery in ALEXA (17.2 % in COM) do so two or more times. While it may be necessary to include a library multiple times within different documents from different origins, 4.2 % of websites using jQuery in ALEXA include the same version of the library two or more times *into the same document* (5.1 % in COM), and 10.9 % (5.7 %) include two or more *different* versions of jQuery into the same document. Since jQuery registers itself as a window-global variable, unless special steps are taken only the last loaded and executed instance can be used by client code. For asynchronously included instances, it may even be difficult to predict which version will prevail in the end.

Figure 11 shows the causality tree of ms.gov, the site with the highest number of identical jQuery inclusions in a single document. Only one instance (version 2.2.2) is included




Fig. 11. Causality tree for `ms.gov`, showing multiple jQuery inclusions in a single document. One instance is referenced in the main HTML page; all others are included transitively by other scripts.

directly in the source code of the main HTML page; all twelve other jQuery inclusions (of version 2.2.0) are injected by various self-hosted scripts in quick succession.

In contrast, the inclusions of four *different* jQuery versions on `mercantil.com` (Figure 12) are all referenced directly in the main page’s source code, some of them directly adjacent to each other. While we can only speculate why these cases occur, at least some of them may be related to server-side templating, or the combination of independently developed components into a single document. Indeed, we have observed cases where a web application (e.g., a WordPress plug-in) that bundled its own version of a library was integrated into a page that already contained a separate copy of the same library. Since duplicate inclusions of a library do not necessarily break any functionality, we suspect that many web developers may not be aware that they include a library multiple times, and even less that the duplicate inclusion may be potentially vulnerable.

H. Remediations

From a remediation perspective, the picture painted by our data is bleak. We observe that only very small fraction of potentially vulnerable sites (2.8 % in ALEXA, 1.6 % in COM) could become free of vulnerabilities by applying *patch-level* updates, i.e., an update of the least significant version component, such as from 1.2.3 to 1.2.4, which would generally be expected to be backwards compatible. The vast majority of sites would need to install at least one library




Fig. 12. Causality tree for `mercantil.com` with multiple jQuery inclusions, two libraries concatenated into one file (Modernizr and Yepnope), and complex element relationships in social media widgets (Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn).

with a more recent major or minor version, which might necessitate additional code changes due to incompatibilities.

Version Aliasing. Some JavaScript CDNs support *version aliasing*, where the developer may specify only a prefix of the requested library version and the CDN will automatically return the latest available version with that prefix. In theory, version aliasing appears to be a robust strategy for developers to easily keep their library dependencies up-to-date. We scan our crawl for library inclusions with URLs of a CDN, and detect version aliasing whenever (1) the version given in the URL has only one or two components, such as 1.2, and (2) the library version detected by the static or dynamic method is greater than the prefix extended with zeros, such as 1.2.3 instead of 1.2.0. In ALEXA (and COM), we detect 1,489 (914) confirmed instances of version aliasing, counting at most one per library on each site. Overall, however, the frequency of version aliasing is very small—only around 1.2 % of all sites that include jQuery use version aliasing.

Except for one, all instances of aliasing refer to Google’s CDN, with jQuery being the most frequent library. One one hand, 47.2 % (37.9 %) of jQuery inclusions with aliasing are avoiding a vulnerability, i.e., the inclusions point to a branch that has a known vulnerability, but the issue is addressed by the latest version. On the other hand, while version aliasing may seem like a good way to automatically avoid vulnerabilities, Google recently discontinued this service, citing caching issues and “lack of compatibility between even minor versions” [11].

V. DISCUSSION

Our research has shown that even though patches may be available, vulnerable JavaScript libraries are in widespread use on the Web. In the following, we discuss approaches that we believe could improve the situation.

Dependency Management: Before website developers can update potentially vulnerable libraries that they are using, they must be aware of which libraries they are using. Instead of manually copying library files or CDN links into their codebase, developers should consider more systematic approaches to dependency management. Bower [6] and the more server-oriented Node Package Manager [23] allow developers to declare external dependencies in a configuration file and can automatically download and include the code into the project. Tools such as Auditjs [2] (for Node projects) scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities and can be integrated into automated build processes; such solutions, however, work only if the developer has an understanding of the risks associated with using vulnerable libraries, and is aware of the audit tool itself. Therefore, this functionality would ideally be integrated into the dependency management system of the programming platform so that a warning can be shown each time a developer includes a known vulnerable component from the central repository.

Code Maintenance: Effective strategies to have web developers update vulnerable libraries work only when vulnerability information is properly tracked and disseminated. Unfortunately, security does not appear to be a priority in the JavaScript library ecosystem. Popular vulnerability databases contain nearly no entries regarding JavaScript libraries. None of the 12 most popular libraries from Table I had a dedicated mailing list for security announcements. Furthermore, only a few JavaScript library developers provide a dedicated email address where users can submit vulnerability reports. When the release notes of libraries mention at all that a vulnerability has been fixed, they often do not provide any details about the affected code, or which prior versions are vulnerable. This is problematic because web developers using that library do not know whether the vulnerable code is a function that they depend on, and whether an update is required. Libraries can even silently reintroduce vulnerabilities in order to remain backwards-compatible [12]. Although jQuery is an immensely popular library, the fact that searching for “security” or “vulnerability” in the official learning centre returns “*Apologies, but nothing matched your search criteria*” is an excellent summary of the state of JavaScript library security on the Internet, circa August 2016.¹ A similar lack of adequate information about security issues has also been reported for the Android library ecosystem [3].

An additional complication is that patches are often supplied only for the most recent versions of a library. Yet, these versions are not necessarily backwards-compatible with the versions still in use by many web developers. In fact, the short lifecycles common in web development can become a burden for developers who need to keep up with frequent breaking API changes to maintain their websites free of vulnerable libraries.

Third-Party Components: We observed that libraries included by third-party components such as advertising, tracking

or social media widget code have a higher rate of vulnerability than other inclusions. Such components are often hosted on third-party servers and loaded dynamically through client-side JavaScript. Additional libraries loaded at runtime by these components do not appear in the website’s codebase, and web developers may be unaware that they are indirectly including vulnerable code into their website. Similarly, dynamic inclusions of libraries by third-party components may explain some of the same-document duplicate inclusions that we noticed. In addition to keeping their library dependencies up to date, developers of web services meant to be included into other websites could avoid replacing an existing library instance by using a methodology similar to ours to test whether the library has already been loaded into the page before adding their own copy. On the other hand, web developers who intend to use third-party components such as advertising code for their website can attempt to limit potential damage by isolating these components in separate frames whenever this is feasible.

VI. RELATED WORK

Our work is related to prior studies on JavaScript security, measurements of vulnerability patching and dependency management, a series of blog posts about inclusions of vulnerable libraries that inspired our more in-depth analysis, and existing tools that implement a subset of our detection methodology.

JavaScript Security: In [22], Nikiforakis et al. identify the network sources of JavaScript inclusions in the Alexa Top 10k websites, without special consideration for libraries or corresponding versioning semantics, and develop host-based metrics for maintenance quality to assess whether remote code providers could be compromised by attackers and subsequently serve malicious JavaScript. Whereas Nikiforakis et al. study where included code is hosted, we focus on the narrower but semantically richer setting of libraries to investigate whether included code is outdated or known to be vulnerable, and we leverage our deep browser instrumentation to determine the initiators and causes of such inclusions.

A separate class of related work examines specific attack vectors in client-side JavaScript and conducts crawls to estimate how many websites are subject to the attack: Lekies and Johns [16] survey insecure usage of JavaScript’s `localStorage()` function for code caching purposes, Son and Shmatikov [31] examine vulnerabilities arising from unsafe uses of the `postMessage()` function, Lekies et al. [17] detect and validate DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities, and Richards et al. [29] analyse websites’ usage patterns of the problematic `eval()` API. Yue and Wang [39] study several insecure practices related to JavaScript, namely cross-domain inclusion of scripts as well as the execution and rendering of dynamically generated JavaScript and HTML through `eval()` and `document.write()`, respectively. Li et al. [18] detect malicious redirection code hidden in JavaScript files on compromised hosts by deriving signatures from the differences between infected library files and the original, benign copies. In contrast to the above work, we do not focus on specific vulnerabilities, the use of security-critical functions, or malicious files. Instead, we provide empirical results at a more abstract level to highlight and explain the prevalence of benign-but-vulnerable JavaScript libraries in the wild.

¹Ember, the 50th most popular library in ALEXA (rank 52 in COM), is a notable exception with long-term support versions, a security mailing list, CVEs for vulnerabilities, and affected versions listed in security notices.

Vulnerability and Dependency Management: Four studies have examined vulnerability patching and dependency management in large software ecosystems, although not with respect to JavaScript or the Web. Sonatype Inc., the company behind Maven, released a report [32] examining security maintenance practices observed from the vantage point of the largest repository of Java components. According to the report, the mean time-to-repair of a security vulnerability in component dependencies is 390 days, 51,000 of the components in the repository have known security concerns, and 6.2 % of downloaded components include known vulnerabilities. A key observation in the report is that fixing serious flaws in open source code does not stop vulnerable versions from being used. Our work in this paper shows that there are similar trends with respect to JavaScript library usage on the Web.

Nappa et al. analyse the patch deployment process for 1,593 vulnerabilities in 10 applications installed on 8.4 million Windows hosts worldwide [21]. The authors show that the time until a patch is released for different applications affected by the same vulnerability in a shared library can differ by up to 118 days, with a median of 11 days. Furthermore, patching rates vary among applications and depend, among other factors, on the update mechanism. At most 14 % of vulnerable hosts are patched before an exploit is released.

Thomas et al. propose an exponential decay model to estimate patching delays of Android devices [35]. According to the model, when a new version of the operating system is released, it takes 3.4 years to reach 95 % of the devices.

Backes et al. build LIBSCOUT [3], a system to detect third-party library code in Android applications using a static approach based on abstracted package trees and method signatures. They find that 70.4 % of library inclusions in their dataset include an outdated version, and it takes developers an average of almost one year to migrate their applications to a newer library version after the library has been updated. In a case study of two vulnerabilities, the authors show that the average update delay is 59 and 188 days after the library patch is first made available, while some applications remain without any update. Furthermore, 10 out of 39 advertising libraries contain one or more versions that improperly use cryptographic APIs. In contrast to LIBSCOUT, our detection approach requires that the library API methods used in our signatures not be renamed or removed. While a theoretical possibility, we believe that such eager minification settings are exceedingly rare on the Web since they would necessitate processing all code potentially referencing the library, including in HTML attributes and inline script. To the best of our knowledge, the default settings of minifiers typically do not rename methods or remove dead code in client-side JavaScript (see, for instance, the Closure Compiler [9]). This assumption allows us to detect the version of a JavaScript library more reliably since most libraries self-identify via their `version` attribute or method.

Blog Posts: In 2014, a series of blog posts by Oftedal ([24], [25], [26]) raised awareness about the use of outdated JavaScript libraries on the Web, and the fact that many large companies (including banks) use versions that are known to be vulnerable. We complement this first exploration of the issue with a more comprehensive detection methodology and a more detailed analysis. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report on the modality and causes of JavaScript library inclusions in

websites, uncovering issues such as duplicate library inclusions as well as transitive (and on average more vulnerable) inclusions of libraries by third-party modules such as advertising, tracking, and social media widget code.

Tools: From the point of view of our library detection methodology, we are aware of two open source tools with a similar approach: Retire.js and the Library Detector extension.

Library Detector Chrome Extension. This browser extension [20] aims to detect the JavaScript libraries running on a website. It injects a script into the website’s main document to test for the presence of known libraries and extracts their version, using dynamic detection code similar to the approach presented in Section III-B. The extension does not warn against known vulnerabilities, does not reveal how or why a library was included, cannot reliably detect duplicate inclusions, and does not analyse libraries loaded in frames.

Retire.js. Along with his blog posts, Oftedal released a tool [27] to help web developers detect JavaScript libraries with known vulnerabilities. In a nutshell, Retire.js is a browser extension that intercepts network requests for JavaScript files while a website is loading and detects libraries based on known file hashes, regular expressions over the file contents, and API method signatures dynamically evaluated in an empty sandbox environment. While we also use dynamic detection and hash detection approaches in our methodology, Retire.js makes several simplifications that limit the tool’s utility for our analysis. First, detecting a script as a library in an empty sandbox fails when the library has unmet dependencies. jQuery-UI, for instance, requires jQuery and hence cannot be detected dynamically if jQuery is not present in the environment. Second, intercepting requests only at the network level may miss inline scripts, dynamically evaluated scripts, and duplicate inclusions of cached scripts. Most importantly, Retire.js does not reveal why a library was included, that is, whether the inclusion was caused by advertising code, for instance. We support all of these scenarios and found interesting results as a consequence, such as the vulnerability rates per inclusion type in Table V, and the duplicate inclusions observed in Section IV-G.

VII. CONCLUSION

Third-party JavaScript libraries such as Angular, Bootstrap and jQuery are frequently used on websites today. While such libraries allow web developers to create highly interactive, visually appealing websites, vulnerabilities in these libraries might increase the attack surface of the websites that depend on them. Hence, it is very important to ensure that only recent, patched versions of these libraries are being utilised.

In this paper, we presented the first comprehensive study on the security implications surrounding JavaScript library usage on real-world websites. We found that:

- 86.6 % of ALEXA Top 75 k websites and 65.4 % of COM websites use at least one of the 72 JavaScript libraries in our catalogue (Section IV-C);
- more than 37 % of websites use at least one library version with a known vulnerability, and vulnerable inclusions can account for a significant portion of all observed inclusions of a library (Section IV-D);

- the median lag between the oldest library version used on each website and the newest available version of that library is 1,177 days in ALEXA and 1,476 days in COM (Section IV-F), and development of some libraries still in active use ceased years ago;
- surprisingly often, libraries are not referenced directly in a page, but also inlined, or included transitively by other content such as advertising, tracking or social media widget code (Table IV), and those inclusions have a higher rate of vulnerability than other, direct inclusions (Table V, Section IV-E);
- composition of content modules or third-party content in the same document can lead to duplicate inclusions of a library and potentially nondeterministic behaviour with respect to vulnerability (Section IV-G);
- remediation efforts are hindered by a lack of backwards-compatible patches (Section IV-H) and, more generally, scant availability of information (Section V).

The results of this work highlight the need for more thorough and systematic approaches to JavaScript library inclusion and dependency management on the Web.

The causality trees shown in this work can be viewed online: <https://seclab.ccs.neu.edu/static/projects/javascript-libraries/>

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