

Write-up Myster Mask (Side-Channel Analysis)

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Contents

| | | |
|----------|--|----------|
| 1 | Myster Mask - Side-channel analysis challenge | 2 |
| 1.1 | Official description | 2 |
| 1.2 | Exploration | 3 |
| 1.3 | Proposed solution | 4 |



1 Myster Mask - Side-channel analysis challenge

474 points were awarded for the resolution of this challenge, only 11 people managed to solve it during the competition.

1.1 Official description

Myster Mask a conçu une implémentation qui craint un max !

Vous allez devoir analyser les traces de consommation d'un début d'implémentation de l'AES faite par Myster Mask. Saurez-vous exploiter ces traces pour faire la *différence* ?

La partie à cibler correspond à l'étape d'**inversion** présente dans le calcul de la boîte S dans le premier tour de l'AES. **Seule cette étape est implémentée**, il n'est pas nécessaire de connaître l'AES puisque ce challenge est spécifiquement centré sur l'étape d'inversion.

Les traces de consommation fournies dans le fichier `traces.npz` à charger avec `numpy` correspondent à la ligne suivante dans le code `myster_mask.py` :

```
masked_inversion(L)
```

Attention, en tant que bon détective, Myster Mask a protégé cette inversion en faisant honneur à son nom. À vous de jouer !

`SHA256(traces.npz) = d4e16ded8c53f6e295672567cd8bdd3453ebd1318bf353b...`

`SHA256(inputs.npz) = 283b4245a36d7d238ba941a247eaaa38cc90d8db2f3c4e7...`

We get 4 files: `traces.npz`, `inputs.npz`, `myster_mask.py` and `output.txt`.



Figure 1: Myster Mask speaking

1.2 Exploration

`output.txt` contains an initial vector `iv` and a ciphertext `c`.

`myster_mask.py` shows how the masked algorithm works. We take a look at `mask` and `unmask` functions. After a bit of paper reading, we learn that this is a multiplicative 5 shares masking in Galois field 256 GF_{256} .



Figure 2: Structure of the algorithm

The challenge description indicates that side-channel traces correspond to the execution of this function:

```
def masked_inversion(S):  
    output = S  
    for i in range(5):  
        for j in range(16):  
            output[j][i] = GF256(S[j][i]) ** 254  
    return output
```




Figure 3: Average of traces.npy

We recognize in the averaging of all side-channel traces the 16 iterations of `j` in 5 iterations of `i`.

During the challenge I tried multiplying every 5 spikes corresponding to each masking share, then correlating each {key hypothesis XOR input} on them. I was unable to recover the key using this method.

1.3 Proposed solution

Multiplicative Masking and Power Analysis of AES, by Golić, J.D., Tymen, C. (2003) is a nice ressource to understand and solve this challenge. They introduce GF256 multiplicative masking then in section 2 explains how to setup a differential power analysis of AES.

As `GF256(0)` is 0, calling `mask(0)` will always put a 0 in the first share. This implies that if `key[i]` and `input[i]` are equals, then the XOR will be 0 and the masked first share will be 0.

Let's attack each i -th key byte separately. For each K key byte hypothesis, let's filter M traces in which `key[i]` and `input[i]` are equals. Then we compare the average of M to the average trace. If the difference is the most important, then it means that the hypothesis may be the right key.

```
import numpy as np
from Crypto.Cipher import AES

inputs = np.load("inputs.npz")["inputs"]
traces = np.load("traces.npz")["traces"]

C = np.average(traces, axis=0)

key = [0] * 16
for i in range(16):
    max_diff = []
    for K in range(256):
        M = [trace for inp, trace in zip(inputs, traces) if inp[i]^
            K == 0]
        C_K = np.average(M, axis=0)
        max_diff.append(max(np.abs(C_K - C)))

    print(max(max_diff), np.argmax(max_diff))
    key[i] = int(np.argmax(max_diff))

# iv and c from output.txt
iv = bytes.fromhex("ec35aba34b09ddaf40133465cf99e0e4")
c = bytes.fromhex("592eefe2c8c2aa5cc4088909e80ed4342198<snip>")
d = AES.new(bytes(key), AES.MODE_CBC, iv=iv).decrypt(c)
print(d)
```

After some seconds, we get the flag:

```
0.03693260569852941 224
[...]
0.035091276041666675 63
b'FCSC{8e29ba7aa273cc1b3ea74defe5972fd7ff4a0180acf790bddb25980289c8
1d60}\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t'
```