Axelrod1980_solution

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1 Solution of Axelrod 1980

In [13]:
```
import numpy as np
```

1.1 Implement the five strategies

In [2]:
```
# We are going to implement five strategies.
# Each strategy takes as input the history of the turns played so far
# and returns 1 for cooperation and 0 for defection.

# 1) Always defect
def always_defect(previous_steps):
    return 0

# 2) Always cooperate
def always_cooperate(previous_steps):
    return 1

# 3) Purely random, with probability of defecting 0.5
def random(previous_steps):
    if np.random.random(1) > 0.5:
        return 1
    return 0

# 4) Tit for tat
def tit_for_tat(previous_steps):
    if len(previous_steps) == 0:
        return 1
    return previous_steps[-1]

# 5) Tit for two tat
def tit_for_two_tat(previous_steps):
    if len(previous_steps) < 2:
        return 1
    # if the other player defected twice
    if sum(previous_steps[-2:]) == 0:
        # retaliate
```

```
        return 0
    return 1
```

1.2 Write a function that accepts the name of two strategies and competes them in a game of iterated prisoner's dilemma for a given number of turns.

You could implement a series of `if elif` that plays each strategy against the other. Here, we present a more advanced approach that matches a string such as "strategy_1" with a name of a corresponding function. The call `globals()[strategy_1]` does just that. Now `pl1` is an "alias" that calls the function that corresponds to the chosen strategy.

```
In [3]: def play_strategies(strategy_1, strategy_2, nsteps = 200):
            pl1 = globals()[strategy_1]
            pl2 = globals()[strategy_2]
            # We create two vectors to store the moves of the players
            steps_pl1 = []
            steps_pl2 = []
            # and two variables for keeping the scores.
            # (because we said these are numbers of years in prison, we
            # use negative payoffs, with less negative being better)
            points_pl1 = 0
            points_pl2 = 0
            # Iterate over the number of steps
            for i in range(nsteps):
                # decide strategy:
                # player 1 chooses using the history of the moves by player 2
                last_pl1 = pl1(steps_pl2)
                # and vice versa
                last_pl2 = pl2(steps_pl1)
                # calculate payoff
                if last_pl1 == 1 and last_pl2 == 1:
                    # both cooperate -> -1 point each
                    points_pl1 = points_pl1 - 1
                    points_pl2 = points_pl2 - 1
                elif last_pl1 == 0 and last_pl2 == 1:
                    # pl2 lose
                    points_pl1 = points_pl1 - 0
                    points_pl2 = points_pl2 - 3
                elif last_pl1 == 1 and last_pl2 == 0:
                    # pl1 lose
                    points_pl1 = points_pl1 - 3
                    points_pl2 = points_pl2 - 0
                else:
                    # both defect
                    points_pl1 = points_pl1 - 2
                    points_pl2 = points_pl2 - 2
                # add the moves to the history
                steps_pl1.append(last_pl1)
```

```
            steps_pl2.append(last_pl2)
        # return the final scores
        return((points_pl1, points_pl2))
```

```
In [6]: # Your numbers will differ given the involved randomness
        play_strategies("random", "always_defect")
```

```
Out[6]: (-506, -188)
```

1.3 Implement a round-robin tournament, in which each strategy is played against every other (including against itself) for 10 rounds of 1000 turns each.

```
In [7]: def round_robin(strategies, nround, nstep):
            nstrategies = len(strategies)
            # initialize list for results
            strategies_points = [0] * nstrategies
            # for each pair
            for i in range(nstrategies):
                for j in range(i, nstrategies):
                    print("Playing", strategies[i], "vs.", strategies[j])
                    for k in range(nround):
                        res = play_strategies(strategies[i],
                                              strategies[j],
                                              nstep)
                        # print(res)
                        strategies_points[i] = strategies_points[i] + res[0]
                        strategies_points[j] = strategies_points[j] + res[1]
            print("\nThe final results are:")
            for i in range(nstrategies):
                print(strategies[i] + ":", strategies_points[i])
            print("\nand the winner is....")
            print(strategies[strategies_points.index(max(strategies_points))])
```

```
In [8]: my_strategies = ["always_defect",
                          "always_cooperate",
                          "random",
                          "tit_for_tat",
                          "tit_for_two_tat"]
```

```
In [12]: # Your numbers will differ slightly given the involved randomness
         round_robin(my_strategies, 10, 1000)
```

```
Playing always_defect vs. always_defect
Playing always_defect vs. always_cooperate
Playing always_defect vs. random
Playing always_defect vs. tit_for_tat
Playing always_defect vs. tit_for_two_tat
Playing always_cooperate vs. always_cooperate
```

```
Playing always_cooperate vs. random
Playing always_cooperate vs. tit_for_tat
Playing always_cooperate vs. tit_for_two_tat
Playing random vs. random
Playing random vs. tit_for_tat
Playing random vs. tit_for_two_tat
Playing tit_for_tat vs. tit_for_tat
Playing tit_for_tat vs. tit_for_two_tat
Playing tit_for_two_tat vs. tit_for_two_tat

The final results are:
always_defect: -89962
always_cooperate: -90046
random: -84828
tit_for_tat: -74929
tit_for_two_tat: -77474

and the winner is...
tit_for_tat
```