



HELP Model United Nations Conference 2021
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)



Chair Introductions

Head Chair: Kim Osman

Sup. I'm Kim, and I'll be your chair for these next few days, or weeks, I guess-- depending on when you're reading this. For reference: I'm a Ukrainian residing in Malaysia, so this topic in itself means a whole lot to me. As such, I hope you're all able to solve the harshening situation in the Ukrainian Donbass and Crimea to the best of your ability, as no more innocent lives can be lost. Should there be any slip-ups on my part (which may not be so tubular), then I wish to apologise beforehand. Now there are two things I wish to expound upon:

- i. Primo, the notion that MUNs are the playing-pens of the more experienced, and that beginners are simply subsided. To tell you the truth, 'MUN Experience' is just a number. Even I've seen the most, /experienced/ of delegates falter to beginners willing to grasp the opportunity MUN provides in voicing out their opinions freely. Even if you're shy, then put yourself out there, and surely you'll push through. To the experienced delegates: Don't get comfortable. If I hear anything resembling "Oh this is my [x] ever MUN conference," then I'll chair's discretion you to the firing wall.
- ii. This Research Report (hereinafter now referred to as 'RR'). While made possible by both Dee and I, do note that this RR merely serves as a stepping-stone for your research, as it is expected that you read up on other sources prior to council, and as assistance for your Position Paper.

Was that scary? I hope I found the balance between snarky and intimidating. More about myself (if that isn't narcissistic enough). I listen to music, if that says anything-- but exclusively punk rock and metal, and writing my own works of literature. On top of that, I enjoy discussing public transport and soap-making, so if you'd like to talk to me about QOTSA, intercity hyperlinks, or fragrance oils, then do reach out to me via Instagram @kimosmn or email at mxskly@gmail.com.

Co-Chair: Dee Emeralda Prihadi

Dee has been in the Malaysian MUN scene since 2018. Ever since then, they had been focusing on honing and perfecting their skills in order to appropriately coach their former highschool MUN club to this day. While Dee can often be spotted chairing in many places, they have also hosted three MUN conferences as a Secretary-General in 2021 alone, including HELPMUNC 2021.

In any case, Dee also enjoys droning hours into the Sims 4 alongside finishing their statistics coursework so as to not fail, yet another, math related subject.

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Committee Introduction

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was declared post-World War II under the United States' President Harry S. Truman's decree at Washington D.C. in 1949, originally serving as an intergovernmental military alliance intended to prevent the spreading of Communism and deter a possible invasion into Western Europe following the occupation of the Soviet Satellite States and the Iron Curtain. The 12 founding Member States of NATO; *Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States* saw themselves in the midst of economic crisis, with the after-effects of the war playing an immense strain-- as more European nations turned to Communism under the subjugation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) through an alliance of similar vein-- the Warsaw Pact.

Seeking to maintain the security and peace of Western Europe from the growing power of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the establishment of Article V in the NATO treaty series states that 'An attack on one member, is an attack on all members'. Though, with the looming threat of nuclear immolation between the two military alliances; *NATO* and *the Warsaw Pact*, the larger ground force possessed by the USSR in comparison to NATO warranted the constant threat of nuclear war to deter the likelihood of an invasion, dubbed as the flexible response strategy, whereby numerous warheads and missiles were deployed across Western European command centres. The country in possession of such fire-power and the United States had the authority to veto the use of it in the scenario where an invasion began-- also known as the dual-key system so as to prevent an all-out nuclear exchange in the event of mutually-assured destruction (MAD). With the turn of the 1990s however, the plethora of factors and events leading up to the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact would eventually draw the Cold War to a close.

The subsequent years following the dissolution of the USSR resulted in an influx of former-Warsaw Pact nations ascending to membership status within the Alliance through the Membership Action Plan, which seeks to provide practical advice and targeted assistance to aspiring Member States to meet key membership requirements. Article X of the NATO treaty series stimulates an 'open door policy' as NATO membership is open to '*any European state in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area*'. To join the Alliance, nations are expected to respect the values of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as to meet certain political, economic, and military criteria, which include:

- i. Constituting a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy.
- ii. Showcasing a fair treatment of minority populations.
- iii. Showing a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully.
- iv. Displaying an ability and willingness to make military contributions to NATO operations.
- v. Exhibiting a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.



Consequently, any decision made within NATO, including that of admission must be made ‘by unanimous agreement’, with multilateral consensus by every Member State. While NATO resolutions, also known as communiques, are legally-binding to each Member State, the sovereignty of each nation and that of free choice is respected through NATO’s fundamental principles enshrined within its international agreements, including that of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Thus, NATO’s membership and decisions are not imposed upon countries outside the Alliance.

As of 2021, NATO’s membership count has increased from the original 12 countries to 30 countries, recognising 3 aspiring members that have participated in the Membership Action Plan, 20 other countries in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, and 15 other countries involved in institutionalised dialogue programmes. Thus, NATO’s primary functions can be split into two categories;

- i. Political: NATO seeks to promote democratic values in the consultation and cooperation of Member States on defense and security-related issues.
- ii. Military: NATO is committed to resolving disputes through peaceful and diplomatic means. Should diplomatic efforts fail, NATO has the military capability to undertake crisis-management operations as stated under Article V of the NATO treaty series or under the United Nations mandate.

Establishing the Issue

“The desolate clouds looming over the Ukrainian Donbass congest with plumes of artillery smoke emerging overhead. As Crimea rumbles with the whirrs of caterpillar tracks from Russian BTGs, fifth Russian Premier Vladimir Putin readies for his speech; declaring the eternality of the events of February 2014-- all of which is being monitored closely by the United States and NATO.”

It is November 2021; tensions continue to rise in both the Ukrainian Donbass region and Russian-annexed Crimea-- integral regions to the near decade-long Russo-Ukrainian War. As satellite imagery shows amassing Russian support equipment near the Ukrainian border and some-90,000 troops mobilised in Crimea (CNN; 2021), Ukraine makes international headlines once again for the sheer disparity of the situation. While the Ukrainian defense ministry remains relatively unphased by the situation (Reuters; 2021), such ‘unusual’ activity on behalf of the Russian Federation continues to turn the heads over at Washington-- as the Biden Administration proclaims a US-Ukraine strategic partnership in projecting its influence over the region.

With the war fluttering on to the East in the Donbass region, conflict between Russian-backed separatists, the Donetsk's People's Republic (DNR), and Luhansk's People's Republic (LNR), against the Ukrainian Armed Forces rapidly claims the lives of both soldiers and civilians-- with some-14,000 Ukrainian lives lost throughout the duration of the war (OHCHR; 2019). While general disarray runs rampant throughout the Donbass, the Russian Federation continues to cement its hold on Crimea through brutal crackdowns and forced citizenship



stemming from a so-called ‘referendum’ (Human Rights House; n.d.); seemingly collecting human rights violations like stamps to a stamp book.

Tasked with maintaining regional peace and security in the Trans-Atlantic region, Ukraine is placed at the heart of the conflict between two global superpowers, the *United States of America* and the *Russian Federation*; whose actions ironically parallel that of a similarly drawn-out proxy war from decades prior between both parties-- the Cold War. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation spearheads the defense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity at the behest of the United States, Russia refuses to forgo its alarming stance in vying for control over the region. With rising tensions, it is evident that both sides are sitting on a powder keg ready to explode-- so clearly, diplomacy is the best possible trajectory.

History of the Issue

Part 1: Pre-Modern Period

Gifted with fertile lands and vast shorelines providing direct access to the Black Sea, the Eastern-European region of what is presently known as Ukraine acts as a crossroads between two major continents-- Asia and Europe (Masters; 2020). With such strategic positioning, Ukraine has always been at the crux of conflict-- being passed one from oppressive monarchs, to stalinistic tyrants, and to ruthless oligarchs like a ping-pong ball being shot back and forth.

Seemingly intertwined in a state of discord, one can only understand the situation in present-day Ukraine by venturing to its roots-- dating all the way back to the Middle Ages of the 12th century within the Kievan Rus. Acting as a sort of barrier to protect the European continent from incoming Mongol hordes, a domino effect from local prospectors and foreign artistes would garner notoriety for the dubbed name of ‘Ukraine’-- which from a literal translation, meant either ‘border-lands’ or ‘in-lands’ (Tolochko; 1997).

Setting name etymologies aside, such empires would come and go (as that part of historical Ukraine is of pure irrelevance here). With continued subjugations from the fall of the Rus to the Mongols, and then to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and to the freedom-loving cossacks of the 1600s, Ukraine, stretching out all the way from the Dnipro River to the Black Sea and Crimea, would eventually find itself being placed under the ‘protection’ of the Russian Tsar; directly under the subjugation of the Russian Empire.

Having been tossed around for far enough, this continued existence under imperial governments inspired a sense of nationalism in both Ukrainian writers and intellectuals-- sparking a determination to not only revive the nationalistic and linguistic traditions of Ukraine, but to subsequently establish a Ukrainian nation-state under the movement of known as Ukrainophilism (Martynenko; 2015). Russia, fearing separatism, thus imposed strict limitations on the Ukrainian language-- even going as far to ban its use and study, with further impositions being made to translate all Ukrainian works into Russian. With such harsh measures, the state of Ukrainian culture was heavily affected and diminished-- leading to the executions of prominent Ukrainian novelists such as Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Mohylnytskyi (Hrushevsky; 1918).



The continued imposition of ‘Russophile’ policies seeking to ‘Russify’ Ukrainians would eventually lead to an immense exodus of Ukrainian intellectuals into Western Ukraine-- attempting to escape the repressive grasp of the Tsarist regime. However, not all Ukrainians would be able to afford such a luxury, as certain individuals merely accepted their fate into the Russian Empire as assimilation soon occurred under the guise of Russophilia, with some Ukrainians even achieving great fortunes there (Hrushevsky; 1918). Due to grave strongholds of systemic anti-Ukrainian oppression, the short-lived revival of Ukrainian culture soon diminished, as recognition and use of both the Ukrainian language and identity were indistinguishable and thus rather silenced under the rule of the Russian Empire in favour of having Ukrainians identify as Russian (Martynenko; 2015). Lighting the fire to the powder keg, the now-established linguistic divide carving up Western and Eastern Ukraine could only hint at the conflicts to come.

Part 2: The Soviet Union

With the turn of the 20th century, continued cultural oppression towards minority ethnic groups under the Russian Empire as well as the events of World War I eventually culminated in splintering independence movements throughout Ukraine. In conjunction with the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution which brought a halt to Russia’s participation in the war, Ukraine would find itself accommodating a variety of factions, including that of Nestor Makhno’s Black Army, the Tsarist White Army, and the Bolshevik Red Army making strides in vying for control over Ukraine (Kubicek; 2008).

Ultimately, Ukrainian independence was unfortunately short-lived, as most Ukrainian lands were incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic (Ukrainian SSR) as of 1919 (Kubicek; 2008). Contrary to popular belief however, initial Soviet rule would actually prove to benefit Ukrainians-- as first Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin had undertaken the implementation of a policy simply known as ‘Korenizatsiya’, which served to improve minority representation in administrative and local governments, therefore enabling for a rise in nationalism among ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians (Liber; 1991). Allowing for a certain degree of de-Russification, the next few years saw a rise in Ukrainian nationalism, and should the policy be allowed to continue, then a genuine multilateral standard of representation among minorities had the potential to mend the linguistic and ethnic divide established decades prior.


Though, all good things must come to an end. With the rise of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s rule by the year 1929, the previously-established ‘Korenizatsiya’ policy was brought to an end in favour of general Russification (Tuminez; 2003), thus reopening the wounds of linguistic division sown into Ukraine during the ages of Tsarist Russia. Deadset on greatly reducing the number of officially recognised nationalities under the Soviet Union, the usage of Ukrainian was greatly limited once more through the construction of so-called ‘national schools’, which mandated the learning of Russian. Paired with the mass, man-made starvations of Holodomor from 1932 to 1933, millions of Ukrainians were genocided as the Ukrainian identity soon whittled out into dust once again (Applebaum; 2018).



With the death of Stalin by 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR issued a decree on the transfer of the Crimean peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, as it had originally been under the legislation of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (Lewycka; 2014). Under the motivation that “the commonality of the economy, proximity, and close cultural relations between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR” (Munich; 2005), a vote was held between councilates deciding the transfer despite the lack of quorum-- as the Crimean population residing within Crimea were seemingly transferred overnight, with little to no say or vote in the matter. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union consequent to the Cold War, Ukraine, alongside Crimea, would gain independence in 1991 under the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, who would not only attempt to mend the still-prevalent linguistic divide between a nationalistic West and Russophile East (CSMonitor; 2014), but additionally appease Crimean residents through a veneer of autonomy, so long as they affirmed their ‘sovereignty’ as part of Ukraine (Dunlop; 1995).

Part 3: Ukrainian Independence

Dwindling the Ukrainian economy from financial incompetence (BBC; 2019), inflation rose as the trend of money-hungry politicians running for power made its mark during this point of time. In 1994, the election of the second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma was surrounded by numerous corruption scandals as well as the limitation of media freedoms which belittled his public opinion (Karatnycky; 2015). Deciding not to run for re-election, the third Ukrainian presidential election in 2004 saw two prominent nominees come to power-- Euro-centric politician Viktor Yuschenko and Russophile politician Viktor Yanukovych. Winning by a narrow margin, Yanukovych’s election results coincided with the linguistic divide between a nationalist West and a Russian-speaking East.




(Hooper; 2014)

However, the election was vetoed by the Ukrainian Supreme Court-- the *Verkhovna Rada*-- following a political crisis as opposition leaders began rallying peaceful protests on the



streets of Ukraine, dubbed the ‘Orange Revolution’. Yanukovych resigned, though remained in Ukraine-- signing off from charges of Russian government meddling, as well as corruption and bribery (Karatnycky; 2015). Following a runoff election, Yuschenko would be proclaimed as the fourth President of Ukraine, as relations between Russia and Ukraine strained in favour of relations with the European Union (EU) (BBC; 2010).

During the 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections, a third-way race had been enacted consequent to Yuschenko’s decision to run for re-election against his former ally during the Orange Revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko, as well as former president Viktor Yanukovych. Dividing pro-Orange voters between both Yuschenko and Tymoshenko, the fifth presidential election was claimed at the hands of former president Viktor Yanukovych, once again inciting tensions throughout the country. Winning off of a slim margin striking parallels off of the previous presidential election, a similar linguistic divide would prevail in proving the split between Ukraine’s Euro-centric West and a Russian-speaking East, as shown below:



(Kireev; n.d.)

With accusations of attempting to silence Ukraine’s opposition bloc, a series of criminal cases were opened against the opposition leader and former presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko (Telegraph; 2010). Although such trials, while enabling a filibuster in opposition policies, were ultimately fruitless and had only yielded condemnation from Western governments due to the alleged politically-influenced nature of such trials.

In November 2013, the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement was finally tabled so as to allow Ukraine to finally fulfil its motives in systematically participating, with closer and more established ties to the EU. Though, this agreement was ultimately rejected-- as Yanukovych, fueled by pro-Russian sentiment, sought to pursue closer ties with the Kremlin (BBC; 2016). Formulating adverse reactions, this move by Yanukovych would bring unprecedented effects serving to carve deeper wounds into Ukraine-- not only from the perspective of external stakeholders, but additionally an internal strife within the heart of the nation and its populace.



Timeline of Key Events

*Note that this section only highlights key events relevant to the committee, and delegates are encouraged to read up on other parts of Ukraine's background leading up to the situation today

The Euromaidan (November 2013 - February 2014)

The event known as the 'Euromaidan' consisted of a wave of pro-European demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine's Independence Square in Kiev-- also known as the *Maidan Nezalezhnosti*. Acting in retaliation to former President Yanukovych's refusal to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, any previous attempts for political association and free trade agreements with the European Union (EU) would turn to moot, instead seeking to pursue closer ties with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.



(Luhn; 2014)

Striking parallels once more to the linguistic divide of both the 2004 and 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections, pro-European citizens all over Western Ukraine and parts of Eastern Ukraine rallied at the Maidan in protest of the decision. While initially non-violent, Yanukovych's decision to employ riot police (known as the Berkut) would eventually result in a series of clashes, causing numerous deaths from both civilians and police (CNN; 2014). With eventual escalation into the fully-fledged toppling of buildings and widespread arson, the Verkhovna Rada, spearheaded by President Yanukovych, began passing a cluster of anti-protest laws colloquially dubbed the 'dictatorship laws', which served to limit the freedom of speech and the right to assembly within Ukraine (Washington Post; 2014). Merely adding fuel to the fire, such 'dictatorship laws' led to the occurrence of protestor-on-protestor violence, as pro-Russian anti-Maidan protestors from Eastern Ukraine began making their way to the scene in picking up fights with one another-- as some were even paid to do so by riot police so as to indulge in brutally beating protestors (Nimfuehr; 2017).

As killings continued as a result of police brutality, corruption, and bribery, protestors soon began spreading sentiments calling for the resignation of President Yanukovych (BBC; 2014). Placing immense pressure on Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada would declare



Yanukovych relieved of his duties as president following a unanimous-passed impeachment vote (KyivPost; 2014).

Having fled and received asylum in Russia, the interim government in place of Yanukovych proceeded to sign the aforementioned EU agreement, allowing for closer ties with the EU. Pleading that the parliamentary motion was illegal and coerced, the Russian Federation released a press statement declaring the ‘overthrow’ of Yanukovych as an illegal coup, and did not recognise the legitimacy of the interim government (New York Times; 2014).

Crimean Annexation (February 2014 - Present)

Following the events of the Euromaidan, the Kremlin approved the deployment of Russian troops into the peninsula, as masked green-clad soldiers lacking insignia, colloquially known as the ‘Little Green Men’, would take over the Supreme Court of Crimea. Officially marking the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, strategic sites within the peninsula were seized as Crimea would fall into the hands of the Russian Federation in less than a month (Reuters; 2017).



(DW; 2017)


Under Russian military control, a Crimean status referendum was conducted among Crimean civilians-- as the peninsula was soon ‘voted’ into the Russian Federation. Despite a large sample size in favour of integration, both NATO and the EU express their condemnations of the referendum-- deeming it illegitimate given the circumstance of Russia’s military presence. Considered a violation of international law due to the lack of respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the annexation of Crimea has led to Russia being suspended from international governmental organisations such as the G8 as well as a round of sanctions being imposed against the country. Albeit so, the Russian government opposes the label of ‘annexation’, for it is said that Russia is merely defending the referendum and complying with the principle of self-determination of the Crimean peoples (Reuters; 2014).

The War in Donbass (April 2014 - Present)

Immediately after the Crimean crisis, pro-Russian unrest in East Ukraine sparked the breakaway of two separatist groups in Ukraine’s Donbass basin-- the Donetsk’s People’s Republic (DNR), and Luhansk’s People’s Republic (LNR). Waging war on the Ukrainian



armed forces, both separatist groups seek for closer ties with Russia, or Russian integration as a whole. As pro-Russian extremists flocked from all over Ukraine as well as neighbouring countries to the Donbass, manpower, ammunition, and supplies were of no shortcomings-- as direct Russian funding soon came into major assistance (Reuters; 2016).



Escalating into a proxy war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would utilise a combination of disinformation tactics, irregular fighters, regular Russian troops, military and monetary support to destabilise the Donbass region (Karber; 2015). Following a series of offensives and counter-offensives from the Ukrainian military as well as the internationally-highlighted shooting down of commercial aeroplane Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) by Russian separatists, a ceasefire was established between Ukraine, Russia, the DNR, and the LNR called the ‘Minsk Protocol’ on 5 September 2014. Despite such an agreement, violations of the ceasefire become common as warlords begin taking control of swaths of land on each side-- with ethnonationalist Ukrainian paramilitary groups such as the infamous Azov Battalion assisting the Ukrainian military in fending off separatist forces.

Kerch Strait Incident (November 2018)

Taking place on 25 November 2018, the Kerch Strait Incident involved the unprovoked firing and capture by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard against three Ukrainian Navy vessels after they attempted to transit from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait (Reuters; 2018). Notably, this incident marks the first time that Russian forces had openly engaged Ukrainian forces.



Under the ‘Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait’ (this is the actual god damn name), the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea were bilaterally agreed to be regarded as shared territorial waters by both countries, and freely accessible. Despite such an agreement, Russia insists that while the treaty still remains valid, Ukrainian ships are to ask for permission before entering the strait, as it borders the perimeter of Russian-occupied Crimea with regards to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Though, as the annexation of Crimea by Russia is not recognised by Ukraine, Ukraine holds that the invocation of an international treaty pertaining to Crimean waters is not legitimate.

Thus, tensions culminated in the Russian coast guard pursuing the Navy vessels as they left the strait, and later fired upon the vessels in international waters off the coast of Crimea. With three Ukrainian crew members injured in the clash, all twenty-four sailors present on the ship were detained by Russia (Reuters; 2018). Characterised by a convolution of international and domestic treaties, Russia regards the incident as a deliberate provocation by former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to undermine both the sovereignty of the Russian Federation as well as Crimea.

Ukrainian Constitutional Crisis (October 2020 - Present)

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine ranked 117th out of 180 countries in 2020 (Transparency International; 2020)-- being the second lowest-ranked country in Europe after Russia. With high levels of corruption as roots of money laundering, bribery, and embezzlement sink deep within the history of the nation, the Ukrainian Constitutional Crisis began on 27 October 2020 when the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared much of Ukraine’s 2014 anti-corruption reforms under former President Petro Poroshenko unconstitutional.

Initially passed to abate the rising trend of corruption within Ukraine, such reforms served to increase international collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) through increased foreign aid and monetary loans as well as stricter punishments on a lack of financial information. Meeting fierce resistance from incumbent President Volodymyr Zelensky, he warned that if the Verkhovna Rada did not restore such anti-corruption laws, then such relations with international governmental organisations would be at risk-- as Ukraine would additionally not be able to receive the necessary loans from the IMF due by the same year. Fearing a further strain on Ukraine’s foreign policy, President Zelensky submitted a draft law to the Verkhovna Rada proposing a termination of the Constitutional Court’s entire composition-- albeit the bill was rejected as some lawmakers accused him of a power grab, which caused a swift withdrawal of the bill.

In an effort to end the crisis and maintain public opinion, President Zelensky suspended the Constitutional Court’s chairperson, Oleksandr Typutski for two months-- to which, he then lodged a lawsuit against the Kiev District Administrative Court for not allowing him to work in the Constitutional Court. Albeit so, Typutski had failed to provide sufficient evidence for



the lawsuit, which subsequently failed as Zelensky signed a decree to suspend the chairperson for another month.

With continued declarations of legislative suspensions, the Constitutional Court is now debating the constitutionality of President Zelensky's decrees that suspended the court's own chairperson, Oleksandr Tupytskyi. At the request of 49 Ukrainian MPs, court proceedings were opened due to such a request, with further actions by the Ukrainian President unclear.

Current Situation

Marking the 31st formal meeting of the heads of state of NATO on the 14th of June 2021, NATO leaders reiterated that Ukraine was to become a member of the Alliance, coinciding with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) undertaken by Ukraine ever since 2008, without external interference or the possibility of a veto from Russia (NATO; 2021). Securing Ukraine's right to self-determination and protecting its territorial integrity, another round of NATO invitations were promised to countries such as Ukraine and Georgia-- as the Alliance slowly encroaches upon Russia's doorstep.

Following a large-scale military exercise conducted by NATO in March 2021, simultaneous operations were launched by the Alliance in areas across Central and Eastern Europe. Preparing in the event of an armed confrontation with Russia (UAWire; 2021), the Russian Federation has displayed its dismay with the large-scale military exercise-- perhaps threatened by the show of force from the Alliance and its Member States. Consequently, the following month oversaw a large quantity of arms and equipment being transported from Western and Central Russia into the Crimean peninsula (The Guardian; 2021), as some-85,000 Russian troops were additionally spotted in close proximity of the Russo-Ukrainian border around Rostov and Voronezh oblasts (Khurshudyan et al; 2021).

With tensions rising across Eastern Europe, Russia's increased presence within the region has escalated conflicts in regards to the Donbass War, with deaths increasing twofold-- a majority of which being composed of civilian casualties (BBC; 2021). As Russia continues to provide Russian passports to those living under the DNR and LNR, a sense of impunity prevails around the region with brutalists, war criminals, and terrorists being given asylum under the veneer of 'defending the Russian peoples'. Further refusing to participate in Vienna Document meetings with Ukraine, France, Germany, and the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (Axelrod; 2021), Russia has not only shown its uncompromising nature in conflict resolution, but additionally its stubborn stance in refusing to partake in diplomatic resolves-- only to spark further concern for the Alliance and the European continent as a whole.

With routine Russian military exercises in both Crimea and around Ukraine, incumbent Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has made multiple requests to American President Joe Biden to hasten Ukrainian membership into NATO (Cullison; 2021). Given the potentiality of economic disparity packed with the COVID-19 pandemic, Ukraine's position as the primary geographical pipeline supplying gas from Russia to the European continent is now threatened, as Russia's plans on constructing the new 'Nord Stream 2 Pipeline'



completely bypasses Ukraine as a transit route-- thus limiting the sources of income for the nation (Reuters; 2021).

While chaos surrounds the region around the Donbass, the situation in Crimea has been in relative stagnancy-- with COVID-19 restrictions limiting the amount of police crackdowns within the peninsula; albeit Crimean citizens continue to face restrictions with regards to the freedom of assembly, freedom of press, and freedom of speech. Thus, it is clear that the civilian population of Ukraine continues to suffer-- including those that live under the oppressive regime of the DNR and LNR, as well as within the Crimean peninsula under the Russian Federation. With financial and geopolitical standing threatened, Ukraine is far from recovery-- albeit is making steps to alleviate the situation in extenuating closer ties to both the EU and NATO. By formulating mechanisms to ensure that the innocent lives of Ukraine are maintained, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation additionally takes up the task of maintaining Ukraine's territorial integrity-- for no more lives can be lost; no more civilians can be displaced; and no more incursions can threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine.

Past Actions Taken

Domestic Actions

Language Policy

The Ukraine Language Policy was instilled under article 10 of Ukraine's Constitution. The issue of language came to play around the fall of the Soviet Union. The usage of the Russian language decreased as most moved towards considering Ukrainian (following their independence - prior, the *Ukrainian SSR* had both Russian and Ukrainian as the official languages) as the official national language of Ukraine. However, there was a stark difficulty for many businesses, and associations to adapt to the shift as Russian was still the official language for said industries. Because of that, the bill to establish Russian as an official regional language in Ukraine was drafted by Serhii Vasylovych Kivalov and Vadym Kolesnychenko and eventually proposed by none other than Viktor Yanukovych himself - the fourth president of Ukraine.

The proposed bill was very controversial, leading to tear-gas level protests due to the presumption that it would symbolically boost the status of the Russians and cause its rapid spread.

While it rapidly caused an internal struggle and riot, internationally, it temporarily honoured the diplomatic ties between Russia and Ukraine - with Vladimir Putin himself awarding the drafters of the bill a *Medal of Pushkin* for their efforts of cultural conservation of the Russian language outside of Russian borders.

The specific article states by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1996):

The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.



The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed.

The State promotes the learning of languages of international communication.

The use of languages in Ukraine is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and is determined by law.

Кримська Платформа (The Crimea Platform)

The Crimea Platform is an initiative to restore Russian-Ukraine relations in 2021. The goal of the platform itself is to reverse and mend the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014.

Proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emine Dzhaparova, the Crimean Platform aims to address the consequences of Russian occupation on Crimea - with the efforts to expose the many occurrences of human rights violations of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, heavy militarisation, and environmental degradation that deeply affects the trade routes of the Black Sea and Azov Sea Region. This was also a proposed long term plan with the aim of eventually de-occupying Crimea.

The main basis of dialogues have been identified as freedom of navigation, *effective* sanctions against Russia, humanitarian law, educational, cultural and religious rights, and the negative impacts upon the environment and economy. There will also be a highlight upon the political prisoners of Crimea.

International Actions

Action	Detail
<u>UNGA Resolution 68/262</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• UN response to the Crimean Annexation• Supported by 100 member states• Affirms Ukraine's sovereignty• Unsuccessful implementation due to Russia veto in the Security Council
<u>UNGA Resolution 71/205</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Condemns Russian abuse of Crimean residents• Urges Russia to bring immediate end to all abuses• Urges Russia to release all Ukrainian citizens whom were wrongfully detained• Seeks joint effort with OHCHR
<u>US-Ukraine Joint Statement</u>	USA makes statement and press release with actions to aid Ukraine:



	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Granting security and defence● Advancing human rights against Russian abuse● Sustainable energy aid● Implementing key practices and reformation for economic recovery● Humanitarian + Pandemic Aid
<u>EU-Ukraine Association Agreement</u>	<p>This agreement details the conditions for the framework of the cooperation between the EU with a non-EU member.</p> <p>In essence, this will lead to Ukraine following EU member nations conditions in order for the EU to appropriately assist them - especially in terms of economic recovery</p>

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1. How can NATO alleviate the situation in Ukraine without imposing on its sovereignty, seeing that Ukraine is not officially a Member State within the Alliance?
2. What measures should be taken by NATO to protect Ukraine's territorial integrity, and avoid any future incursions by Russia?
3. How should underlying issues in Ukraine, but not limited to the Russo-Ukrainian linguistic divide, corruption, impunity, and racial extremism be resolved?
4. Should Ukraine follow the conditions set by Russia? If otherwise, explain why.
5. As Ukraine is undertaking NATO's Membership Action Plan with intentions to attain membership within the Alliance, what further steps should be made to ease such a decision?
6. Seeing as neither Russia nor Ukraine is in NATO, to whom should the solutions proposed lean in favour to?
7. Given that certain European countries in both the EU and NATO heavily rely upon Russia for supplies such as oil and gas, how should the situation in Ukraine be addressed without souring foreign relations?



Position Paper Guidelines

The submission of **Position Papers** will be **MANDATORY**. Examples of position papers may be found [here](#).

Format

When writing a position paper, delegates are advised to adhere to the following format:

- Position Papers and Emails should be titled:
HELMUNC2021_PP_NATO_[Country]_[Full Name of Delegate]
E.g. HELMUNC2021_PP_NATO_Turkey_AhmadZulkifli
- Position papers are to be written in **English**. Sections written in any language other than English will not be taken into account.
- Position Papers are to be written in **Times New Roman**, font size **12**, **1.5 line spacing** in **justified** format, with **one [1] inch margins and zero [0] kerning value**.
- The usage of **bold**, **underline**, and **italics** is **permitted**.
- Any referenced sources should be added into a bibliography at the end of the position paper, following the **7th Edition APA Style** in-text citations and bibliography.
- The Position Paper should not exceed **two [2] pages** excluding the bibliography.

Once completed, delegates are required to **email** their position papers in **PDF Form** to both chairs no later than **2359 hours on 25 November 2021 (GMT +8)**. Requests for extensions are valid under the discretion of the chairs. Any other queries can be made via email or Direct Messages (DMs).

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