

## Global Research Highlights

## The consumer vs. interest rates

## Investment Strategy

## Is the consumer too hot?

Our Economics team recently likened July data, including better-than-expected retail sales, to a “scorcher”. In addition to retail sales, Housing sector data also once again underscored consumer spending strength. Ahead of the data last week, Savita Subramanian double-upgraded the Consumer Discretionary sector citing ten pro-cyclical drivers. However, continuing consumer strength which is a key part of the new soft-landing consensus has revived concerns that interest rates could remain higher for longer and challenge market optimism. Indeed, Paul Ciana cautioned that US 10y and 30y yields are rising and are about to retest their 4Q22 intraday high, while Stephen Suttmeier believes that the S&P 500 may struggle over the next few months, especially if the tactical resistances remain intact.

## The Great Bank Debate

A soft landing for the economy could be just the catalyst that Bank stocks are looking for given their low valuations according to Ebrahim Poonawala. He believes that moderation in deposit costs reflected in cooling flows into money market funds are potentially tempering negative net interest income (NII) revisions. Furthermore, Bank stocks are only trading at a ~9.8x 2024e P/E vs. their 14.6x pre-pandemic 5yr median and 1.4x YE24e P/TBV vs. a 2024e ROTCE forecast of 14%. Still, Poonawala sees breakout potential in both directions: the next leg in bank stocks could also be lower if focus returns to interest rates being higher for longer.

## Why Adobe could work

Brad Sills believes that Adobe is one of few software firms with tangible Artificial Intelligence (AI) offerings likely to drive incremental growth in the near-term. In Sills’ view, Adobe is ahead of the curve with offerings such as its generative AI-powered content creation tool, Firefly, which is likely to begin driving meaningful revenue/FCF upside as soon as FY24. In a conservative base case, Sills arrives at AI revenue of \$300 million in FY24, growing to \$960 million by FY26. In a blue-sky scenario, he believes AI revenue could be \$1 billion in FY24, growing to \$2.9 billion by FY26.

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Global

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# US Economic Weekly

## It's a scorcher

### Key takeaways

- This week's data flow was red hot, with July retail sales and IP coming in well above expectations.
- The July FOMC minutes were balanced but a little stale. They suggest that QT might not end when the Fed starts cutting rates.
- Powell should sound less balanced at Jackson Hole, since the latest data raise the risk of a fresh increase in inflation.

**US Economic Weekly will be going on a short break and will return Sep 7<sup>th</sup>.**

### Remarkable retail sales...

This week's highlight was the surge in July retail sales, which beat our above-consensus forecast (see [in a word, remarkable](#)). The four largest categories of retail sales ex-autos registered outsized gains. Moreover, the data are even stronger when viewed in the context of roughly zero inflation in the July CPI report in the categories corresponding to retail sales (goods and food services).

### ...were backed up by strength in IP and housing

Industrial production (IP) also came in well above expectations (see [July Industrial Production: A hot summer](#)). Motor vehicle production rebounded, with assemblies coming in well above the 2019 average. Utilities production also spiked. Meanwhile, housing starts and permits continue to suggest that the sector is close to finding a bottom, particularly in terms of single-family housing, which tends to be a bigger driver of GDP (see [US housing starts and permits increase in July](#)). In totality, this week's data raised our 3Q GDP tracker from our official forecast of 2.0% q/q saar to 2.7%.

### July FOMC minutes: balanced...

We read the July FOMC minutes, released this week, as balanced. With the Fed getting closer to the end of the hiking cycle, several participants thought that risks "had become more two sided". Two participants even leaned towards a hold in July. There were concerns about credit tightening and financial conditions more generally. The minutes also mention risks to banks and insurers from weakness in commercial real estate. Even so, "most participants" saw "significant upside risks to inflation" that could necessitate additional hikes. The staff upgraded its economic forecast, no longer projecting a recession by year-end. And "some participants" argued that the pickup in home prices could mean that the impact of Fed tightening on the housing sector has peaked.

### ... with a nod to extended QT

The minutes offered scant forward guidance on policy rates, but they did offer some clues on QT (quantitative tightening). "A number of participants" (which means more than three but less than the majority) noted that QT need not end when the Fed starts to cut rates.

**18 August 2023**

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Click [US Economic Weekly](#) for full report including important disclosures.

## Global Economic Weekly

## The decoupling continues, but can it last?

**Global Letter: The decoupling continues, but can it last?**

Global data is gradually confirming our view that the main economic blocks are likely in the process of decoupling. The US remains strong, while China continues disappointing at the margin and global investors are becoming concerned. Going forward, it is likely this decoupling continues or the negative impact of a China slowdown impacts the US outlook.

**United States: It's a scorcher**

This week's data flow was red hot, with July retail sales and IP coming in well above expectations. The July FOMC minutes were balanced but a little stale. They suggest that QT might not end when the Fed starts cutting rates. Powell should sound less balanced at Jackson Hole in our view, since the latest data raise the risk of a fresh increase in inflation.

**Asia: India – How relevant is El Nino?**

Rising probability of El Nino in 2023 has started to weigh on India. We conclude that El Nino may not always result in deficient monsoon rainfall. Deficient rainfall impacts agriculture output but the impact on CPI inflation is non-linear.

**Emerging EMEA: CEE – BoP to stay supportive**

Czechia, followed by Poland, records more solid CA dynamics than peers, with more scope for improvement in energy balance. General backdrop for CEE manufacturing/exports is not as bad as the recent Euro area PMIs would suggest.

**Latin America: Argentina – Milei shakes the landscape**

Anti-establishment candidate Milei ended first in Argentina's presidential primaries, much stronger than anticipated. The government devalued the currency. We expect further devaluation following a likely December runoff election.

**Global Economic Weekly will be going on a short break and will return Sep 8<sup>th</sup>**

Click [Global Economic Weekly](#) for full report including important disclosures.

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# Rates Technical Advantage

## The formidable retest

### Key takeaways

- US 10y and 30y yields are rising and about to retest their 4Q22 intraday yield highs (4.34% and 4.42%, respectively).
- Weekly chart trend following methods show wave 5 up to new yield highs is underway, such as 4.50-4.60% and 4.70-4.80%.
- Risk: Brief new yield highs and then a sharp reversal lower can signal the YTD "range" remains and maybe a cycle "double top"

### View: The formidable retest of 4Q22 yield highs

Our base case year ahead view looked for 10Y yield to retest the 2022 highs in 1H23 with some potential for a modest new high to satisfy divergences and a wave 5. Then in 2H23 to look for signs of a top and the start of a drop. A long-awaited retest is finally here. This week the US 10-year yield traded near the 4.25-4.34% peaks from 4Q22 by reaching 4.27%. The 30-year near its 4.33-4.42% 4Q22 peaks by reaching 4.37%. July and August show ongoing yield uptrends with wave 5 up underway and seeking new yield highs (Chart 2, Chart 13). Given this is viewed as wave 5 up, yield uptrends likely reach new highs and then the trend since March 2020 finds an end point. In this report we recap yield trends/targets and answer questions regarding double top patterns.

### 10Y and 30Y Yields: Wave 5 up says new highs coming

The weekly charts of US 10Y and 30Y yield completed a wave 4 consolidation pattern with the July breakouts (Oct 22-July 23) and are in wave 5 up. Modest upside targets are 4.5-4.6% (Chart 2) and 4.75% (Chart 13). While this trend following method carries a short UST bias (sell rallies), wave 5 should be the last leg of the yield uptrend since March 2020. The daily chart of 10y yield is still in a rising channel (Chart 1). The monthly chart of 10y yield remains less modest with risk of 5% in this cycle or the next. (Chart 3).

### FAQ: Is 10Y yield going to double top?

The term "double top" gets thrown around a lot just because price (or yield) tests the prior high and starts to turn down. A double top is definite when the trough between the two peaks is broken. The 10Y yield is far from this point right now. We review 10y yield charts since 1962 and show eight medium term double top patterns. One thing that is clear is yield tends to retest the prior high or makes a modest new high. Then a violent, sharp reversal lower occurs. If we see a sharp reversal week in H2 in the 4.3-4.5% area along with other systematic buy signals, oscillator and volume divergences and/or weaker than expected economic data (U-rate > 3.7%?) then that could be the bullish UST turn to favor lower yields. Next we'd see the 10Y and 30Y yields fall below their rising weekly trend lines now at 3.88% and 3.95% (See Chart 2 and Chart 13). For what it's worth, calling it a double top today (we're not as of now) technically implies the 10Y and 30Y yield can decline to +/- 2.50% in 2024.

Click [Rates Technical Advantage](#) for full report including important disclosures.

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For more on technical strategies such as Elliott wave, please see [Technicals Explained: In 2023 --> Get to know technical strategy 23 January 2023](#)

[2023 FICC Technical Advantage: Animal spirits biting on the leash 05 December 2022](#)

# Market Analysis Comment

## Tracking the ebbs and flows

### Market Analysis

### SPX bounces from first support (4450)

After testing the target for the summer rally at 4580 (see report [SPX hits targets for summer rally](#)), the SPX dipped to 4444 on Friday (8/11) to test the first support at 4450 with the rising 50-day MA near 4443 prior to a rebound. If this tactical bounce continues, prior support at 4527 (7/20 low) and the 8/2 daily downside price gap from 4550 to 4568 provide resistance ahead of the 7/27 peak at 4607.

### Still a corrective phase if SPX resistances hold

August-October is the weakest 3-month period of the year for the SPX going back to 1928. In Presidential Cycle Year 3, the SPX has lackluster returns from August-November prior to a bullish December (see report [Tactical correction underway](#)). This suggests that the SPX may struggle over the next few months, especially if the tactical resistances highlighted above remain intact, with supports near 4325 and 4200.

### SPX: Bullish daily 9 suggests tactical bounce, but a...

A bullish daily Demark 9 for the SPX on Monday (8/14) suggests tactical downside exhaustion and favors a rally from support at 4450. In addition to the chart resistances highlighted above, Demark indicators show resistance from 4562-4576 to 4602. The NASDAQ 100 and NASDAQ Comp also recorded bullish daily Demark 9s on 8/14.

### Recent bearish weekly 9 means risk of seasonal overhang

A mid July bearish weekly 9 and early August weekly bearish engulfing pattern increase the risk that tactical rallies on the SPX fade given more challenging seasonality from August-October and a less robust Presidential Cycle Year 3 pattern until December. Weekly Demark does not yet show downside exhaustion, which is a risk factor for SPX.

### Bullish: high yield leads investment grade once again

The iBoxx High Yield (HY) relative to the iBoxx Investment Grade (IG) ratio looked like it had topped out with a risk-off signal from an October 2022 peak. But weakness for HY vs IG proved to be short-lived with HY bottoming out and rising sharply from a late March low vs IG. This risk-on move has the potential to continue beyond last October's high, which would extend the current up cycle for HY vs IG from the early 2020 low.

### Risk of bearish divergence on % of stocks > 200-day MAs

The percentage of stocks above 200-day MAs generated a bullish signal from a 2022 double bottom. Higher highs for this indicator confirmed the rally for the SPX in early February but have not confirmed the higher highs on the index since the June breakout above the 4200 area. While below the February high of 78.64%, this breadth indicator is a risk for a bearish divergence. The NASDAQ Comp and NYSE have a similar bearish divergence. This divergence occurs heading into weaker August-October seasonality and a less robust part of the Presidential Cycle.

Click [Market Analysis Comment](#) for full report including important disclosures.

14 August 2023

Market Analysis  
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### Technical Strategy notes

[Market Analysis Comment: Tactical correction underway 08 August 2023](#)

[Market Analysis Comment: Summer seasonality less robust in August 01 August 2023](#)

[Chart Blast: SPX hits targets for summer rally 28 July 2023](#)

### Acronyms in this note

A-D = Advance-decline

MA = moving average

SPX = S&P 500

OAS: Option adjusted spread

HY = High yield

IG = Investment grade

CPI: Consumer price index

MACD: Moving average convergence divergence

ICI: investment Company Institute

GICS: Global Industry Classification Standard

MLP: Master limited partnership

P&C: Property and Casualty



## Sector Focus Point

## Let's get cyclical: 10 reasons to double upgrade Consumer Discretionary...

## ...and downgrade Consumer Staples

We raise Consumer Discretionary (CD) to O/W from U/W & lower Staples (CS) to U/W from M/W. Our BofA Consumer analysts provide fundamental support (see inside). From a macro view...

**1) BofA economists: "No recession, better consumption."**

BofA economists now expect a soft land landing/no recession and raise US consumption growth by 100bp in 2024. Inflation has cooled and Fed hikes may be closer to behind us.

**2) Active managers at max underweights in Discretionary**

... by long only (LO) and hedge funds (HF) after six quarters of bracing for a recession.

**3) Cycle shifting: Downturn to Recovery, hikes nearly done**

Cycles have been far from clearcut post-COVID, but our US Regime Indicator has been a good tool for style rotation and flipped from "Downturn" to "Early Cycle" - see [Profiles](#) - where CD has led vs CS. And the end of hiking cycles usually marks the bottom in CD.

**4) Earnings: CD catching up to CS, highest % of beats**

Estimates are now catching up to CS; CD leads in sales & EPS beats (see [EPS Tracker](#)).

**5) 85% of US mortgages are fixed.**

This is far better than any other major region (see [Global Econ Viewpoint](#)).

**6 – 7) Homebuilders as a canary; real wages back in black**

CD tends to lag homebuilders which troughed late last year. CD is one of the biggest beneficiaries of real wage growth which turned positive after two years (Exhibit 8).

**8. S&P 500: 85% goods 15% services, mid income > high**

Slowing services spend hits SMID more; the "rich-cession" matters more for Europe.

**9) Quant model ranks Discretionary #3, Staples last**

US Momentum & Value is based on value, revisions and momentum (see [Cheat Sheet](#)).

**10) Reports of US consumers' death greatly exaggerated**

Recent headlines (depleted excess savings, student loan headwinds) may overstate risks. Pandemic-era stimulus was gravy, we're now back to run-rate savings. Resumption of loan payments is likely a modest and gradual return to a formerly manageable headwind.

**Risk to outlook: jobs, plus AMZN & TSLA**

Discretionary trades expensive – but without AMZN/TSLA (half of the sector by market cap) trades in-line with its average PE – as a stand-alone, and relative to Staples. AMZN also has crowding risks. But the lynchpin of consumer confidence is employment, where layoffs so far have been ring-fenced to pockets (Silicon Valley, Wall Street etc).

**Investment decisions should not be made prior to reading the research report, which includes important information and disclosures.**

Click [Sector Focus Point](#) for full report including important disclosures.

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**Definitions:**

O/W = overweight  
M/W = marketweight  
U/W = underweight

## US Banks

## Earnings &amp; beyond: Uneasy calm

## Industry Overview

**Breakout potential in both directions**

Bulls argue soft-landing, limited likelihood of industry-wide capital event, manageable liquidity pressures and still discounted valuations (especially relative to the S&P). Bears point to risk from a reacceleration in inflation, persistent risk from higher for longer interest rates (margin squeeze, credit deterioration, stalling growth). We are still in search of the “clearing event” with persistent cooling in inflation that allows for Fed rate cuts without crushing the economy/job market as the blue-sky scenario. *See Exhibits 1-101 for a rundown on key operating trends.*

**Links to 2Q23 review notes:** Large-caps: [BK](#), [C](#), [CFG](#), [FITB](#), [GS](#), [HBAN](#), [JPM](#), [KEY](#), [MS](#), [MTB](#), [PNC](#), [RF](#), [STT](#), [TFC](#), [USB](#), [WFC](#). Mid-caps: [ALLY](#), [ASB](#), [BOH](#), [TCB](#), [CFR](#), [CMA](#), [EWBC](#), [FBP & FHB](#), [FHN](#), [NYCB](#), [PB](#), [SNV](#), [WAL](#), [ZION](#).

**No recession narrative could support valuations**

Earlier this month, BofA Economics team removed its recession call, forecasting US GDP growth of +2.1%/+1.1% for 2023/24. While we see EPS risks skewed to the downside, portfolio managers could be forced to revisit their positioning in bank stocks if “soft landing” narrative picks-up steam, need to add exposure to cyclicals. Bank stocks trading at 9.8x 2024e P/E vs 14.6x pre-pandemic 5yr median and 1.4x YE24e P/TBV vs 2024e ROTCE forecast of 14%.

**Deposit costs or credit to deliver alpha from here?**

Messaging from management teams observing a moderation in deposit pricing reflected in cooling inflows into money market funds. If worst of deposit re-pricing priced-in, then negative net interest income (NII) revisions may be tempered from here vs. 1H23. However, unclear if credit ready to take over the baton for alpha creation as systemic issues yet to emerge. FY24 NII revisions -9%/-13% YTD for BofA Large-cap/Mid-cap banks. Non-performing loans as % of loans: Large-caps; -1bp QoQ; Mid-caps; +7bp.

**Basel capital reforms, long slog ahead**

Fed’s capital proposal seen as worst-case scenario, but potential for changes significant. We believe it is extremely challenging (if not impossible) to anchor investment thesis on this issue, although certain investors may choose to stay on the sidelines until additional clarity emerges. Most banks remain in capital optimization/conservation mode given the macro and anticipated regulatory changes. Expect more banks to announce loan sales, business exits as they look to shore-up capital/liquidity. Relevant research: [Basel Capital NPR: As advertised](#), [Expert call takeaways: de-coding Fed’s proposal on capital changes](#)

**Positioning for bear market rallies**

Potential for a positive macro outcome combined with discounted valuations warrants that investors maintain some exposure to the group. The group has witnessed six bear market rallies since March 2022 (Exhibit 12). We see the following stocks as offering a particularly attractive risk/reward: Wells Fargo (WFC), Goldman Sachs (GS), BNY Mellon (BK), US Bancorp (USB), New York Community (NYCB), East West (EWBC), First Horizon (FHN), Western Alliance (WAL).

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Click [US Banks](#) for full report including important disclosures.

13 August 2023

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## Automotive Industry

## Weekly automotive pit stop

## Industry Overview

## Recent US industry reports and data points – Pages 2-8

- [Potential UAW strike = ~2% risk to GDP as the clock counts down to 9/14](#)
- [Total recall 2Q:23 – Big beats met with skepticism on potential 2H risks](#)
- [Timing is everything...upgrading Auto Suppliers](#)
- [Year Ahead 2023: Five Auto themes & top stock picks in difficult macro](#)
- Sales: [July fireworks not as spectacular as expected – US SAAR of 15.7mm](#)

Core Autos primers (see links):

- [Car Wars 2024-2027: Rise of powertrain conundrum & return of market share shifts](#)
- [Who Makes the Car of the Future – 2023](#)
- [The Auto Dealer Dilemma – will the good times keep rolling?](#)

## Valuation update – Pages 9-13

We believe that the accompanying valuation framework is one of the most important fundamental factors that should be considered when making investment decisions on the stocks in our coverage universe. However, given the extreme volatility in certain links of the automotive value chain, investors should be cognizant that the stocks are sensitive to headlines and swings in expectations, especially in the short term.


**Buy:** ABG, ADNT, AN, APTV, BWA, F, GM, GPI, LAD, LEA, MGA, PAG, RACE, RIVN

**Neutral:** AXL, GNTX, LCID, MBL, Y

**Underperform:** CRMT, KAR, KMX, SAH

## Exhibit 1: 2023 YTD stock performance

YTD stock performance of automotive coverage vs. supplier, dealer & OEM averages as well as S&P Index



Source: Bloomberg as of 8/17/23

BofA GLOBAL RESEARCH

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AXL	American Axle
CRMT	America's Car-Mart
APTV	Aptiv PLC
ABG	Asbury Auto
AN	AutoNation, Inc.
BWA	BorgWarner
KMX	CarMax
RACE	Ferrari
F	Ford Motor
GM	General Motors
GNTX	Gentex
GPI	Group 1 Auto
KAR	KAR Auction Svcs
LCID	Lucid Group
LEA	Lear Corp.
LAD	Lithia Motors A
MBLY	Mobileye
MGA	Magna Intl
PAG	Penske Auto Group
RIVN	Rivian Automotive
SAH	Sonic Automotive
TSLA	Tesla

Investment decisions should not be made prior to reading the research report, which includes important information and disclosures.

Click [Automotive Industry](#) for full report including important disclosures.



## Homebuilders

## Housing starts rise in July despite lower builder confidence

Industry Overview

## July housing starts up 6% YoY and 4% MoM

July 2023 housing starts pace (seasonally adjusted annualized rate) increased to 1.45MM, compared to downwardly revised June starts of 1.40MM (+3.9% MoM) and 1.37MM in July 2022 (+5.9% YoY). Single family starts increased on a MoM and YoY basis (+6.7% MoM, +9.5% YoY), while multifamily (MF) starts fell on a MoM and YoY basis (-1.7% MoM, -0.8% YoY). By region: Midwest (+9.9% MoM, +10.6% YoY), South (-1.3% MoM, +11.9% YoY) and West (+14.0% MoM, +13.3% YoY), Northeast (+1.0% MoM, -38.9% YoY). **Supply outlook:** We expect public homebuilders to increase the pace of housing starts in 2H23 relative 1H23 given the improved selling pace over the last six months. We forecast single-family housing starts to decline (7%) YoY in 2023 to 933k (revised higher from 922k), which implies 11% YoY growth in 2H23. See our report: [Housing start acceleration to drive more upside for BLD and OC](#).

## Housing permits decline (13.0%) YoY, but rose 0.1% MoM

July 2023 housing permits (SAAR) increased slightly to 1.442MM compared to 1.441MM in June 2023 (+0.1% m/m and -13.0% y/y). Single-family permits rose +0.6% MoM and +1.3% YoY, while Multifamily permits fell -1.0% MoM and -30.8% YoY.

## MBA purchase index fell 2.7% WoW


Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) purchase applications index (seasonally adjusted) continued to decline YoY (-27.0% YoY) and fell -2.7% WoW in the week ended August 4<sup>th</sup>.

## NAHB confidence declines sharply MoM

Homebuilder confidence, as measured by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) Index, fell 6 points to 50 in August, indicating that a neutral view of the current market. Year-to-date, builder's outlook for the market has improved with better traffic/sales, low levels of existing home inventory and supply chains improvements, however, over the last month, mortgage rates and inputs costs have moved higher.

## Exhibit 2: NAHB Homebuilder sentiment index

Homebuilder sentiment fell to 50 in Aug, indicating a neutral view of the current market



Source: National Association of Home Builders

BofA GLOBAL RESEARCH

16 August 2023

Equity  
United States  
Homebuilders

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## Wells Fargo &amp; Company

## CFO meeting takeaways: Best of both worlds

Reiterate Rating: BUY | PO: 50.00 USD | Price: 42.22 USD

## Self-help, growth, Basel reforms in focus

Our investor meeting with CFO Michael Santomassimo highlighted the significant opportunities ahead to drive growth, boost franchise efficiency, and return capital as WFC continues to make progress towards achieving management's 15% ROTCE target. Our discussion focused on the potential impact of the Fed's capital proposal, expense management, credit quality (specifically CRE), and lending/fee revenue opportunities. See page 5 for takeaways from our meeting.

## Best-positioned GSIB to navigate Basel capital changes

We consider WFC among the best-positioned GSIBs to adapt to Basel reforms. Excess capital (to absorb the impact from higher operational risk), combined with a less complex capital markets business, should lead to below-average RWA inflation. WFC is operating with 200bp of excess capital (15% of market capitalization), providing significant capital flexibility. We roughly estimate a RWA increase of ~20% based on the Fed's proposal. Our forecast assumes share buybacks of \$15.0bn/\$11.9bn for FY23/24.

## Efficiency boost should remain a significant EPS lever

Management sees significant cost-save opportunities across the franchise, which should keep a lid on expense growth and drive an improving efficiency ratio (WFC lags peers in three of the four operating segments) over the coming years. Our forecast assumes that core annual expenses remain in the \$51bn range through FY25 or flat vs. FY23 guide. As a result, we revise up our 2025 EPS estimate by 4% to \$5.62.

## Market share gains expected, wealth, investment banking

In addition to gaining lending market share (aided by capital flexibility), management laser focused on boosting credit card offerings (5% of loans vs. 15% GSIB peer median), turning around the wealth management business (under new leadership since 2020) and growing investment banking revenues. Trading revenues have grown noticeably recently, with potential for additional runway if/when the Fed-mandated asset cap is lifted.

## Best risk/reward in the group, in our view

At 1.1x our year-end 2023e TBV/share and 9.3x our 2024e EPS, WFC stock offers among the most compelling risk/reward in the group. Investors can gain exposure to the best of both worlds – GSIB-like EPS defensibility and regional bank-like gearing to the US economy. The valuation discount vs. higher-quality peers (JPMorgan-JPM, PNC Financial-PNC) should narrow on the improving ROTCE outlook and fading regulatory drag. We reiterate our Buy rating.

Estimates (Dec) (US\$)	2021A	2022A	2023E	2024E	2025E
EPS	4.77	4.50	4.60	4.60	5.62
GAAP EPS	4.96	3.29	4.60	4.60	5.62
EPS Change (YoY)	NM	-5.6%	2.3%	-0.1%	22.3%
Consensus EPS (Bloomberg)			4.87	4.84	5.42
DPS	0.60	1.10	1.30	1.47	1.62
<b>Valuation (Dec)</b>					
P/E	9.0x	9.5x	9.3x	9.3x	7.6x
GAAP P/E	8.6x	13.0x	9.3x	9.3x	7.6x
Dividend Yield	1.4%	2.6%	3.0%	3.4%	3.8%

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17 August 2023

Equity

## Key Changes

(US\$)	Previous	Current
2023E Rev (m)	80,806.0	80,669.6
2024E Rev (m)	79,025.3	78,762.9
2025E Rev (m)	79,588.5	79,748.0
2025E EPS	5.40	5.62

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## Stock Data

Price	42.22 USD
Price Objective	50.00 USD
Date Established	11-Jul-2023
Investment Opinion	B-1-7
52-Week Range	35.25 USD -48.84 USD
Mrkt Val / Shares Out (mn)	217,585 USD / 5,092.1
Average Daily Value	658.58 USD
BofA Ticker / Exchange	WFC / NYS
Bloomberg / Reuters	WFC US / WFC.N
ROE (2023E)	10.5%
ESGMeter™	High

ESGMeter is not indicative of a company's future stock price performance and is not an investment recommendation or rating. ESGMeter is independent of BofA Global Research's equity investment rating, volatility risk rating, income rating, and price objective for that company. For full details, refer to "[BofA ESGMeter Methodology](#)".

CRE: commercial real estate

GSIBs: globally systemically important bank

ROTCE: return on tangible common equity

RWAs: risk-weighted assets

TBV: tangible book value

vs.: versus

Adobe

## Ahead of the curve with AI; upgrade to Buy

Rating Change: BUY | PO: 630.00 USD | Price: 514.49 USD

## AI to drive meaningful incremental revenue in FY24

We upgrade Adobe shares to Buy from Neutral, given our view that the company is emerging as an AI leader. As we outlined in our report, [Navigating the Next Frontier of Enterprise Software](#) published in May, many software firms are likely to benefit from AI as new offerings are launched in the coming years. However, Adobe is ahead of the curve, and we believe that AI offerings (such as generative AI-powered content creation tool Firefly) are likely to begin driving meaningful revenue/FCF upside as soon as FY24.

## See multiple AI monetization opportunities

We see three potential AI monetization opportunities: 1) a paid Firefly subscription, 2) credit packs for Firefly consumption, and 3) custom agreements with global brands to blend data/LLMs with Adobe's. In a conservative base case, we arrive at AI revenue of \$300 million in FY24, growing to \$960 million by FY26 (which assumes Firefly penetration of 18% to the Creative Cloud/Express installed base). In a blue-sky scenario, we arrive at AI revenue of \$1 billion in FY24, growing to \$2.9 billion by FY26 (which assumes 33% Firefly penetration to Creative Cloud/Express users).

## With or without Figma, Adobe to succeed in collaboration

Uncertainty remains regarding the timing and likelihood of the proposed Figma acquisition closing. However, Adobe remains confident that the US, European Commission, and UK regulators will approve the deal on the merits of the joint benefits to creative professionals (we agree). It is clear that Adobe is already developing collaborative capabilities organically and embedding these into key offerings (e.g., multi-player capabilities in Adobe Express). If the Figma deal were terminated, Adobe would continue developing features organically to better address critical collaborative features.

## Upgrade to Buy and raise PO to \$630 from \$575 ...

... given incremental growth likely to come from AI in FY24. Our revised \$630 PO is 27x our C25E FCF (1.9x adjusted for a +14% 3-year FCF CAGR). The new 27x C25E FCF multiple represents a premium to the GARP software group (trading at 1.3x 17% FCF growth) to reflect potential acceleration from AI. If we include incremental FCF from AI (in our mid-case estimate), our PO would represent 25x estimated C26E FCF.

Estimates (Nov) (US\$)	2021A	2022A	2023E	2024E	2025E
EPS	12.47	13.72	15.70	17.74	20.20
GAAP EPS	12.47	13.72	15.70	17.74	20.20
EPS Change (YoY)	23.5%	10.0%	14.4%	13.0%	13.9%
Consensus EPS (Bloomberg)			15.74	17.76	20.21
DPS	0	0	0	0	0
Valuation (Nov)					
P/E	41.6x	37.8x	33.0x	29.2x	25.7x
GAAP P/E	41.6x	37.8x	33.0x	29.2x	25.7x
Dividend Yield	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
EV / EBITDA*	28.9x	26.4x	24.4x	21.9x	19.6x
Free Cash Flow Yield*	2.9%	3.1%	3.2%	3.8%	4.4%

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17 August 2023

Equity

## Key Changes

(US\$)	Previous	Current
Inv. Opinion	B-2-9	B-1-9
Inv. Rating	NEUTRAL	BUY
Price Obj.	575.00	630.00

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## Stock Data

Price	514.49 USD
Price Objective	630.00 USD
Date Established	17-Aug-2023
Investment Opinion	B-1-9
52-Week Range	274.73 USD - 552.94 USD
Mkt Val (mn) / Shares Out (mn)	236,423 USD / 455.8
Average Daily Value (mn)	1444.48 USD
BofA Ticker / Exchange	ADBE / NAS
Bloomberg / Reuters	ADBE US / ADBE.OQ
ROE (2023E)	46.5%
Net Dbt to Eqty (Nov-2022A)	-30.1%

ESGMeter™

High

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AI = artificial intelligence

GARP = growth at reasonable price

LLM = large language model

PO = price objective



## Price objective basis & risk

### Adient Plc (ADNT)

Our price objective of \$52 for ADNT is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 6.0x on our FY2024 estimates, slightly above the historical average of roughly 5.5x as the company successfully completed debt refinancing and secured its capital structure, and continues to improve in performance with its turnaround efforts.

Downside risks: 1) inability to win sufficient and profitable new business, expand the backlog, and reaccelerate top line growth, 2) inability to complete restructuring programs or cost rationalization initiatives, 3) decline in new vehicle production, 4) inability to consistently execute financially, 5) raw material cost inflation, 6) inability to handle OEM price downs, 7) failure to maintain a lean cost structure, 8) new program/platform launch risk.

Upside risks: 1) ADNT successfully wins back business, expands its backlog and reaccelerates its top line growth, 2) better than expected operating leverage from continued growth in global auto production, 3) significant progress made on restructuring programs and cost rationalization actions, 4) material market share gains in China market, 5) wind-down of non-recurring items boosts ongoing cash flow power.

### Adobe (ADBE)

Our PO of \$630 is based on an EV/FCF multiple of 27x our C25E free cash flow estimate. This represents 1.9x our 3-year FCF CAGR of 14%, a premium to the large-cap GARP (growth at reasonable price) software group average of 1.3x. We view the premium as justified given Adobe's AI leadership position and durability of both top- and bottom-line growth.

Risks to our PO are 1) competition from point solutions and platform vendors, 2) application spending cyclicity, and 3) future acquisitions, which could weigh on margin expansion.

### American Axle (AXL)

Our price objective of \$10 is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 4x on our 2024 estimates, which is somewhat lower than the historical average of roughly 4.5x, but in range of recent trading ranges and reflective of the forthcoming US/NA and Global production volume recovery.

Downside risks: 1) a slowdown in large truck volume growth, particularly at key customers, 2) failure to diversify its customer base, geographic, and product exposure, 3) expansion into new segments could significantly reduce operating margins, 4) continued sharp rise in raw material costs, 5) loss of business at key customers, and 6) disruption at AXL's suppliers.

Upside risks: 1) US/NA cycle holds in and production volumes continue to increase, 2) continued strength in large truck volume growth, 3) further diversification of customer base and geographic footprint, 4) transformative M&A materially changes positioning.

### America's Car-Mart, Inc. (CRMT)

Our price objective of \$60 is based on a P/E multiple of approximately 15x on our FY2024 (CY2023) EPS estimates, which is about in line with an average through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate given emerging macroeconomic headwinds to CRMT's business including tight inventory in the used vehicle market and weakening of lower-income consumers.

Upside risks: 1) economic conditions improve and income disparity narrows, providing an outsized benefit to CRMT's lower-income bracket consumers, 2) interest rates remain high, used vehicle prices decline and CRMT resumes its role as a lender of last resort as

competitive pressures abate, 3) used vehicle supply improves, 4) greater cost containment and operating leverage than forecast, 5) credit metrics improve (collections, defaults, loss rate, etc.)

Downside risks: 1) stalled economic improvement, particularly in rural markets where CRMT is overexposed, 2) interest rates decline quickly and used vehicle values rise, keeping competitive pressure from dealers and lenders high, 3) Inflation remains elevated, 4) used vehicle supply remains restricted, 5) inability to cover fixed costs and achieve operating leverage, 6) deterioration of credit metrics (collections, defaults, loss rate, etc.) and 7) increasing scrutiny by state legislators and/or the CFPB.

#### **Aptiv PLC (APTV)**

Our PO of \$140 for APTV is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 13x on our 2024 estimates. Our assumed valuation metrics are in line with the average historical trading multiple, but well above the traditional automotive suppliers, which trade in ranges of 3x to 6x. We believe a valuation premium to the group is warranted, as APTV is more of a pure-play electrification / autonomy / connectivity / mobility-centric company, unencumbered by factor risks from other non-future tech businesses/products. However, we see the stock trading in line with its historical average given the hurdles on the semiconductor supply front, which are not completely resolved yet.

Downside risks: 1) sustained volatility in international markets, 2) a longer than expected decline or flatline in US/global automotive volumes, 3) a continued rise in raw material costs and semiconductors disruptions, 4) loss of key customers or suppliers, 5) inability to win new business, 6) competitive pricing pressure.

Upside risks: 1) strength in global auto production volumes, particularly in North America, 2) increased business wins as a result of Safe, Green, Connected portfolio that continue to support growth above market, 3) shareholder-friendly actions, including accretive M&A and share repurchases, support earnings and the stock.

#### **Asbury Auto (ABG)**

Our price objective of \$340 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 11x on our 2024 estimates, which is about in line with an average dealer through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate in light of the ongoing recovery in the US/NA automotive cycle following the COVID-induced trough in 2020, which should translate into revenue and earnings growth across the dealer vertical over our forecast period.

Downside risks: 1) a swift and/or material downturn in US sales, 2) market share losses by the brands to which ABG is overexposed, 3) higher interest rate environment causes material demand deterioration and/or repossessions, 4) consumer dissatisfaction with auto retailing, and 5) the potential for franchise law and/or consumer finance law changes.

Upside risks: 1) US/North America cycle recovers and plateaus at a high level of sales, continues growing, or even declines less than expected, 2) ABG is able to gain back and/or maintain some gross profit per unit in its new and used vehicles businesses, 3) used vehicle focus drives demand, top line and earnings growth beyond the peak in new vehicle sales, and 4) interest rates decline quicker than expected, stimulating demand in 2H23.

#### **AutoNation, Inc. (AN)**

Our price objective of \$245 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 11x on our 2024 estimates, which is about in-line with an average dealer through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate in light of the ongoing recovery in the US/NA automotive cycle following the COVID-induced trough in 2020, which should translate into revenue and earnings growth across the dealer vertical over our forecast period.



Downside risks: 1) a swift and/or material downturn in US sales, 2) poorer-than-expected cost performance and margin compression, 3) a stoppage in share repurchase activity or material sell-off by key shareholders, 4) higher interest rate environment causes material demand deterioration and/or repossessions 5) consumer dissatisfaction with auto retailing, and 6) the potential for franchise law and/or consumer finance law changes.

Upside risks: 1) US/NA cycle recovers and plateaus at a high level of sales, continues growing, or even declines less than expected, 2) AN is able to gain or even just maintain gross profit per unit in its new and used vehicles businesses, 3) standalone used vehicle stores capture some demand and drives top line and earnings growth beyond the peak in new vehicle sales, and 4) interest rates decline quicker than expected, stimulating demand in 2H23.

### **BorgWarner (BWA)**

Our price objective of \$67 is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 8.0x on our 2024 estimates, above the historical average of roughly 7.0x, which we believe reflects the higher growth trajectory on which the company positioned itself after the spin-off of the Fuel Systems and Aftermarket segments in July 2023.

Downside risks: 1) relaxed fuel-efficiency regulations, 2) increased competition in the turbocharger industry, 3) a longer than expected decline or flatline in US/global automotive volumes, 4) a continued rise in raw material costs, 5) slower electric vehicle adoption.

Upside risks: 1) strength in global auto production volumes, particularly in North America, 2) faster adoption of electric and hybrid vehicles, 3) BWA regains lost investor confidence through continued execution and performance.

### **CarMax, Inc. (KMX)**

Our price objective of \$44 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 12x on our FY2025 (CY2024) estimates, which is the lower end of the average P/E multiple historical range, which we view as appropriate as it reflects challenges presented by the short supply of used vehicles.

Upside risks: 1) used vehicle pricing remains range bound as supply increases and KMX effectively manages its inventory to drive total profits, 2) reversal in the trend of consumers opting for new vehicles rather than late-model used, 3) greater than anticipated store growth, 4) increase in customer interaction/footprint through online presence.

Downside risks: 1) extreme fluctuations in used vehicle pricing, which would have a big impact on sentiment towards the stock, 2) an extensive trend of customers opting for new vehicles rather than late-model used, 3) deterioration in credit availability and decline in the ABS market, 4) disruption from newer tech-oriented entrants, 5) potential demand destruction stemming from macro pressures.

### **East West Bancorp, Incorporated (EWBC)**

Our \$75 PO incorporates recession risk (via applying a trough P/TBV multiple). We apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E multiple, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV multiples. We assign 9.0x/8.0x/1.8x multiples respectively, versus peer multiples (9.5x/9.3x/1.2x) due to risk of outsized EPS pressure in the current rate environment.

Upside risks to our PO are a faster-than-expected economic rebound, higher interest rates. Downside risks to our PO are a worsening in the macro-economic outlook, decline in interest rates.

**Ferrari (RACE / XJHKF)**

Our \$380 PO for RACE US (EUR347 for RACE IM) is based on an adj. EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 26x on our 2024 estimates, which is a slight premium to RACE's current trading level due to ongoing volume, sales, and earnings growth. This valuation is also supported by a DCF analysis. The multiples used for our valuation framework are a premium to the current trading range of a number of luxury companies we classify as RACE's peer group, but warranted, in our view, given RACE's outsized growth opportunity and stability.

Downside risks: 1) devaluation of the brand due to overproduction or licensing expansion, 2) a decline in the wealth/size of the HNWI community, 3) degradation in perceived vehicle quality or performance, 4) impairment of its Formula 1 reputation or perceived racing pedigree, 5) F-1 losses persist or accelerate, 6) deterioration in adjacent businesses, 7) intensifying competition in the luxury vehicle market, 8) dependence on certain large volume suppliers, 9) significant rise in raw material costs, 10) significant voting power and control attributable to Piero Ferrari & Exor S.p.A.

Upside risks: 1) modest volume expansion, 2) an upward bias on pricing, 3) growth in adjacent businesses, 4) gradual brand and licensing extension, 5) moderation or rationalization of F-1 losses, 6) execution & cost efficiency realization, and 7) management commitment to preserving the exclusive luxury culture.

**First Horizon Corporation (FHN)**

Our \$14 PO is based on apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV. We assign 9.5x/9.5x/1.2x multiples based on historical valuation for bank stocks, FHN and our expectations for a US economic recession over the next 6-12 months (we apply a trough P/TBV multiple). The assigned multiples are in-line with peer multiples (9.5x/9.0x/1.2x) given the persistent overhang on EPS outlook tied to deposit growth trends which offsets the superior growth potential and significant capital optionality.

Risks to the upside are stronger-than-expected loan/deposit growth and better-than-expected mgmt. execution post-TD acquisition termination. Risks to the downside are lack of clarity from mgmt. on strategic and operating outlooks, deposit outflows, regulatory overhang, slower revenue growth trends, and a worsening US economic outlook.

**Ford Motor (F)**

Our price objective of \$23 is based on an EV/EBITDAP multiple (EV/EBITDA adjusted for pension) of roughly 4x on our 2024 estimates. This valuation methodology reflects a multiple within Ford's historical range (3-6x). We believe a multiple at this level is warranted considering the timing of the cycle and as the company is on the verge of executing something analogous to our Core to Future transition framework, by which it will strengthen its core business pillars to fund its future business.

Downside risks: 1) a more swift and/or material downturn in US auto sales, 2) a sharp and sustained rise in input costs, 3) disruption in the supply base, 4) significant increase in gas prices, 5) new vehicle pricing deteriorates, 6) market share losses pressure results, 7) unwillingness of dealers to shoulder inventory risk, 8) suppliers gain significant pricing power, 9) stress in capital markets makes borrowing more expensive, 10) Incremental execution risk as management ramps up.

Upside risks: 1) continued strength in US auto cycle, 2) growth in China remains robust, which Ford is able to leverage with product launches, 3) mix and pricing remain favorable, 4) capital allocation is directed towards shareholder returns (special dividend, etc.).





**General Motors Company (GM)**

Our price objective of \$75 is based on an EV/EBITDAP multiple (EV/EBITDA adjusted for pension) of roughly 4x on our 2024 estimates. This valuation methodology reflects a multiple within GM's historical range (3-6x). We believe a multiple at this level is warranted considering the timing of the cycle and as GM's Core business is being well managed even amidst a choppy macro, while the accelerating focus on Future-proofing the business with the development of the necessary components of the future of mobility services, including an autonomous electric vehicle fleet (Cruise Anywhere) and connectivity (OnStar), may provide upside.

Downside risks: 1) a more swift and/or material downturn in US auto sales, 2) a sharp and sustained rise in input costs, 3) disruption in the supply base, 4) significant increase in gas prices, 5) new vehicle pricing deteriorates, 6) market share losses pressure results, 7) unwillingness of dealers to shoulder inventory risk, 8) suppliers gain significant pricing power, 9) stress in capital markets makes borrowing more expensive, 10) key members of management leave.

Upside risks: 1) continued strength in US auto cycle, 2) growth in China remains robust, which benefits GM through its established market position, 3) mix and pricing remain favorable, 4) capital allocation is directed towards shareholder returns (share repurchases, etc.).

**Gentex (GNTX)**

Our \$35 price objective on GNTX shares is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 10x on our 2024 estimates, which reflects a well above average supplier multiple, and in line with the company's historical trading range. However, we believe a lower multiple could be applied given longer-term structural headwinds for its core products unless new product lines are added to the portfolio.

Upside risks: 1) new program wins that drive higher-than-expected shipment growth, 2) a successful launch of new technology that allows the company to avoid losing market share and re-accelerate growth, 3) stronger-than-expected positive operating leverage, and 4) any regaining of pricing power with the automakers.

Downside risks: 1) a further slowdown in global auto shipments, 2) softer-than-expected operating leverage, 3) a continued rise in raw materials costs, and 4) increased competition from other suppliers 5) risk of management pursuing large and potentially dilutive M&A.

**Goldman Sachs (GS)**

Our \$388 PO incorporates recession risk (via applying a trough multiple). We apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E multiple, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV multiples. We assign 12.6x/12.0x/1.5x multiples, respectively, above peers (9.3x/8.5x/1.5x) due to lower credit risk relative to peers into a potential recession.

Risks to the upside is stronger capital markets activity.

Risks to the downside are a weaker economy/capital markets, macro or geo-political issues, competition, structural pressures, tougher global regulation, and litigation.

**Group 1 Auto (GPI)**

Our price objective of \$450 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 11x on our 2024 estimates, which is about in-line with an average dealer through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate in light of the ongoing recovery in the US/NA automotive cycle following the COVID-induced trough in 2020, which should translate into revenue and earnings growth across the dealer vertical over our forecast period.

Downside risks: 1) weaker demand than expected in the US, and/or UK, 2) the loss of key management, 3) the possibility that GPI is unable to achieve the operating leverage we forecast, 4) higher interest rate environment causes material demand deterioration and/or repossessions, 5) consumer dissatisfaction with auto retailing, and 6) the potential for franchise law and/or consumer finance law changes.

Upside risks: 1) US/NA cycle recovers and plateaus at a high level of sales, continues growing, or even declines less than expected, 2) GPI is able to gain back some gross profit per unit in its new and used vehicles businesses, 3) growth in international markets helps to offset weakness in the US market, and 4) interest rates decline quicker than expected, stimulating demand in 2H23.

### **Harley-Davidson (HOG)**

Our \$50 PO is based on 9-10x our F24 adj. EPS of \$5.10 (incl. Livewire) as we believe HOG should trade more in line with its historical multiple of 10-15x given: (1) potential EPS upside on new model launches, (2) accelerating brand momentum, supported by a reset to a "Pull" market strategy (under new CEO Jochen Zeitz), (3) newly established leadership in Electric motorcycles and the creation of a dedicated EV division, and (4) the long-term opportunities for motorcycle division EBIT margin recovery to peak 15%+ and stronger International growth (incl. China).

Risks to the downside are (1) Aggregate on-highway new motorcycle units have been challenged historically, (2) The timing of a launch of a premium low displacement motorcycle for China remains uncertain, (3) Rider safety remains a top concern for new joiners, and (4) HOG global dealerships are declining.

### **KAR Auction Services (KAR)**

Our price objective of \$16 is based on an adjusted EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 8x on our 2024 estimates. Although KAR's longer-term historical average EV/EBITDA multiple range is somewhat illustrative, it is not directly applicable because of significant changes in the company since it was last public. We believe recent management changeover will catalyze a broader turnaround effort and result in more sustainable improved operating performance. However, the lack of wholesale vehicle supply in the short term may usurp management's best efforts.

Upside risks: 1) supply of wholesale vehicles bounces back faster than currently expected, 2) execution of a large, transformational acquisition, 3) development of relationships with new suppliers and customers.

Downside risks: 1) supply of new vehicles does not recover or further declines 2) failure to maintain relationships with key customers, 3) failure to maintain key managers.

### **Lear Corp. (LEA)**

Our \$230 price objective on LEA shares is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 7.0x on our 2024 estimates. This multiple is a slight premium to the company's historical average since we believe adjustment to a lower volume environment and the company's vertical integration will bolster already strong cash flow that is being returned to shareholders through dividends and growing share buybacks.

Downside risks: 1) a slower or further decline in US/global automotive volume growth, 2) disruption from the re-emergence in the Seating market of LEA's largest competitor (ADNT), 3) increased pricing pressure from OEM customers, 4) loss of business at key customers, 5) fierce competition in the automotive supply base, 6) a new rise in raw material costs, 7) execution risk of restructuring, operations, and acquisitions.

Upside risks: 1) faster recovery than expected in global auto production volumes, 2) continued execution and progress on margin expansion, 3) shareholder-friendly actions including accretive M&A and share repurchases support earnings and the stock.



**Life Time (LTH)**

Our \$24 PO is based on an enterprise value of 11X our F24 adj. EBITDA estimate of \$564.0mn, a valuation more in line with other Best-in-Class Experience Membership Models.

Risks to the downside are: 1) Life Time operates in a highly competitive U.S. market with other luxury fitness providers including Equinox, high-end boutique fitness studios including F45 & Xponential Fitness, and other fitness/experience based membership models incl. country clubs, (2) rise in COVID-19 case counts could pressure Life Time recovery trends especially if case counts continue to pressure consumer sentiment, (3) strong momentum during the peak new member sign up period of mid-December/January is important for Centers to achieve strong results for the full new year, (4) Continued rise of at home fitness, including Peloton, could pressure demand for in-center fitness models, (5) Life Time has significant leverage with a forecasted Net Debt / Adj. EBITDA ratio of 23.8X for YE 2021, & (6) New Center construction/opening delays could push off timing of contribution from new Centers vs. current model expectations.

**Lithia Motors A (LAD)**

Our price objective of \$455 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 11x on our 2024 estimates, which is a slight premium to an average dealer through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate in light of the company's track record of strong earnings and recent strong execution of M&A growth actions.

Downside risks: 1) a swift and/or material downturn in US sales, 2) slower improvement in operating leverage than forecast, 3) substantial market share loss by domestic brands, to which LAD is exposed, 4) higher interest rate environment causes material demand deterioration and/or repossessions, 5) consumer dissatisfaction with auto retailing, and 6) the potential for franchise law and/or consumer finance law changes.

Upside risks: 1) acquisition activity above current forecasts, 2) continued recovery in US auto sales beyond current estimates, 2) LAD is able to gain back/maintain some gross profit per unit in its new and used vehicles businesses, and 3) interest rates decline quicker than expected, stimulating demand in 2H23.

**Lucid Group (LCID)**

Our price objective of \$8 is based on 6x EV/Sales on our 2025 estimates, which implies roughly 0.5x EV/Sales and 3x EV/EBITDA on pro-forma capital-induced 2030 estimates. Our valuation framework for LCID is relatively consistent with TSLA and includes the following steps: 1) What the current stock price affords to LCID in incremental plants/units. 2) What the incremental units translates into in incremental revenue/profits. 3) What the incremental revenue/profits translates into in terms of multiples on theoretical pro-forma 2030 metrics.

Downside risks: 1) inability to continue to raise low cost capital to fund business ventures, 2) inability to convert refundable reservations into contracted orders, unit sales, and revenue, 3) greenfield/clean-sheet approach to EV manufacturing introduces risk of successful execution, 4) direct-to-consumer sales and service model may create challenges for business to scale, 5) inability to reach sustainable positive EBITDA/FCF.

Upside risks: 1) significant and better than expected customer traction for introduced/unveiled products, 2) successful execution of go-to-market strategy via direct-to-consumer sales and service model, 3) better than expected progress on start and ramp of production with clean-sheet manufacturing approach, 4) breakthrough in advanced battery technology to drive ICE/EV parity, 5) incremental government/regulatory support/stimulus for EV market.

**Magna Intl (MGA / YMG)**

Our \$80 price objective on MGA US (CAD107 for MG CN) is based on an EV/EBITDA multiple of roughly 6x on our 2024 estimates, above the historical average of roughly 5.0x, which we believe reflects MGA's superior long-term positioning, and expertise of the complete vehicle/components that provides the company with a competitive advantage amid the ongoing industry evolution and technological advancement (Big Bang).

Downside risks: 1) a flatline or decline in the US SAAR and NA production volumes for longer than expected, 2) inability to deliver on projected growth targets in emerging markets, 3) stress at key customers, most notably the Detroit Three.

Upside risks: 1) strength in global auto production volumes, particularly in North America, 2) expansion into China market, 3) continued execution and progress on restructuring programs and margin expansion, 4) shareholder-friendly actions including accretive M&A and share repurchases support earnings and the stock.

**Mobileye (MBLY)**

Our PO of \$44 is based on 9x EV/Sales on 2025E, which is above the average of four closest peers (NVDA, QCOM, LAZR, AMBA) and higher than the range of the two Tier 2+ ADAS/AV hardware companies in the comp set. Ultimately, our 2025 estimate primarily reflects growth we expect from ADAS offerings and the higher multiple provides upside optionality for MBLY's Level 4+ Consumer AV and Robotaxi applications. We believe there is also potential for MBLY to unlock additional value from adjusting its strategy.

Downside risks: 1) Market penetration of Level 2+ ADAS may take longer than expected and pathway/timing of Level 4+ autonomous vehicle (AV) capabilities is unclear, 2) inability to maintain technological leadership over competition, 3) standardization of ADAS/AV technology could make it challenging to maintain gross and operating margins, 4) macro/market volatility could impact demand and product launches, 5) export control limitations of key semiconductor technology and restriction of US citizens/greencard holders from working in certain Chinese entities, 6) lack of liquidity in the stock and/or future stock sales.

Upside risks: 1) Mega-trend towards ADAS & autonomy, 2) timing and go-to-market strategy of MBLY's Level 4+ offerings could exceed expectations, 3) MBLY may be more successful in winning new customers/contracts, 4) barriers to entry could prove more formidable, 5) industry consolidation in ADAS/AV, 6) better operating performance and/or changes to strategy.

**New York Community Bancorp (NYCB)**

Our \$15 PO is based on apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV. We assign 10.0x/9.5x/1.4x multiples based on historical valuation for bank stocks, NYCB and our expectations for a US economic recession over the next 6-12 months. The assigned multiples are broadly above peer multiples (9.5x/9.0x/1.2x).

Upside risks to our price objective are: better than expected growth 2) steepening in the yield curve and 3) better than expected deal synergies. Downside risks to our price objective are: worse than expected growth, significantly higher than (market) expected Fed Funds rate, severe downturn in the NYC economy and the NYC commercial real estate market.

**Owens Corning (OC)**

Our PO for OC is \$165. Our PO is based on 7.5x 2024E EV/EBITDA, in line with Owens Corning's historical average and roughly in line with OC's historical discount to the group to the current peer group average. We believe that a multiple in the middle of OC's historical range is appropriate given positive demand and pricing trends but some input cost pressure and capacity constraints.

Downside risks: 1) further input cost pressure, 2) softer-than-expected new construction and repair and remodel trends in the US, 3) slower-than-expected GDP growth in key regions, 4) deceleration in industrial production, 5) further competitor capacity additions in the insulation industry, 6) inability to successfully integrate acquisitions, 7) slowing global growth.

Upside risks: 1) stronger than-expected new construction and repair and remodel trends in the US, 2) upside to GDP growth in key regions and global industrial production, 3) better-than-forecast capacity utilization, particularly in Insulation, 4) stronger-than-expected pricing power.

**Penske Auto Group (PAG)**

Our price objective of \$205 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 12x on our 2024 estimates, which is about in-line with an average dealer through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate in light of the ongoing recovery in the US/NA automotive cycle following the COVID-induced trough in 2020, which should translate into revenue and earnings growth across the dealer vertical over our forecast period.

Downside risks: 1) the loss of Roger Penske's leadership, 2) a swift and/or material downturn in US sales, 3) slower recovery in Europe sales, 4) higher interest rate environment causes material demand deterioration and/or repossessions 5) unfavorable foreign exchange rates, 6) consumer dissatisfaction with auto retailing, and 7) the potential for franchise law and/or consumer finance law changes.

Upside risks: 1) acquisition activity above current forecasts, 2) continued recovery in US auto sales beyond current estimates, 3) significant improvement in cost leverage beyond our estimates. 4) interest rates decline quicker than expected, stimulating demand in 2H23.

**Rivian Automotive (RIVN)**

Our price objective of \$40, based on 3x EV/Sales on our 2025 estimates, implying 0.5x EV/Sales and 3x EV/EBITDA on pro-forma capital-induced 2030 estimates. Our valuation framework for RIVN is relatively consistent with TSLA and includes the following steps: 1) What the current stock price affords to RIVN in incremental plants/units. 2) What the incremental units translates into in incremental revenue/profits. 3) What the incremental revenue/profits translates into in terms of multiples on theoretical pro-forma 2030 metrics.

Downside risks: 1) inability to continue to raise low cost capital to fund business ventures, 2) inability to convert pre-orders and orders into unit sales, revenue, and eventually earnings, 3) termination of or amendment to sales and service agreement with anchor customer, 4) direct-to-consumer sales and service model may create challenges for business to scale, 5) inability to reach sustainable positive EBITDA/FCF with investment across numerous business areas.

Upside risks: 1) significant and better than expected customer traction for introduced/unveiled products, 2) successful execution of go-to-market strategy via direct-to-consumer sales and service model, 3) better than expected progress ramp of production and successful build-out of incremental capacity, 4) breakthrough in advanced battery technology to drive ICE/EV parity, 5) incremental government/regulatory support/stimulus for EV market.

**Sonic Automotive (SAH)**

Our price objective of \$57 is based on a P/E multiple of roughly 9x on our 2024 estimates, which is just below an average dealer through-cycle multiple. We believe this is appropriate in light of the somewhat stalled recovery in the US/NA automotive cycle following the COVID-induced trough in 2020, as well as SAH's over exposure to the Used market via its standalone EchoPark stores.

Upside risks are 1) prolonged upside in the US cycle beyond our forecasts, 2) material accretive M&A activity, 3) market share gains as a result of successful initiatives. 4) interest rates decline quicker than expected, stimulating demand in 2H23.

Downside risks are 1) a swift and/or material downturn in US sales, 2) higher interest rate environment causes material demand deterioration and/or repossessions, 3) consumer dissatisfaction with auto retailing, and 4) the potential for franchise law and/or consumer finance law changes.

**Tesla Motors (TSLA)**

Our price objective of \$300 is based on 8.5x EV/Sales and 46x EV/EBITDA on our 2024 estimates, which implies roughly 3x EV/Sales and 25x EV/EBITDA on pro-forma capital-induced 2025 estimates. Our valuation framework for TSLA includes the following steps: 1) What the current stock price affords to TSLA in incremental plants/units. 2) What the incremental units translates into in incremental revenue/profits. 3) What the incremental revenue/profits translates into in terms of multiples on theoretical pro-forma 2025 metrics.

Downside risks: 1) inability to continue raising low-cost capital to fund business ventures, 2) inability to generate positive earnings/FCF, 3) slower ramp in electric vehicle demand, 4) setbacks or lack of advancements in battery technology, 5) fierce competition from incumbent OEMs, 6) inability to execute efficiently with higher volume, 7) low gasoline prices, and 8) loss of management.

Upside risks: 1) better execution and cost containment, 2) a sharp/sustained rise in gasoline prices, 3) a breakthrough in advanced battery technology, 4) increase in federal or state incentives, 5) short covering.

**The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (BK)**

Our \$55 PO incorporates recession risk. We apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E multiple, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV multiples. We assign 11.5x/10.5x/2.1x multiples respectively, above trust bank peers (11.0x/9.8x/2.1x) reflecting cyclical and self-help factors that should drive EPS defensibility.

Risk to the upside is stronger equity/bond markets.

Risks to the downside are a severe selloff in equity/bond markets that that could put downward pressure on fee growth and M&A that could temper capital return.

**TopBuild Corp (BLD)**

Our \$340 PO is based on a 10.5x EV/2024E EBITDA multiple, in line with its average from 2017-2023. We think BLD's valuation will trade more in-line with its historical valuation as housing starts recover.

Upside risks to our PO: 1) faster than expected recovery in new home starts, 2) further residential market share gains through organic growth and M&A, 3) continued strength in the commercial/industrial market, 4) continued price increases on insulation products.

Downside risks: 1) a downturn in the housing market leading to less starts, 2) deflation in insulation products leading to weaker revenue growth and margin pressure, 3) a broad pullback in commercial/industrial activity.



**Topgolf Callaway Brands Corp (MODG)**

Our \$26 price objective is based on an enterprise value of 9-10x our C2024 adj. EBITDA estimate of \$743MM, a premium to other Leisure Brands & Experience models (trading at 7x) reflecting stickiness in new customer acquisition and pricing opportunity across both golf equipment and Topgolf.

Risks to the downside are: 1) tough comparisons as MODG laps surge in demand for golf equipment, (2) slowdown in golf participation as consumers return to other forms of entertainment in a post-COVID environment, (3) resurgence in COVID-19 cases could pressure recovery trends for Topgolf, and (4) risk from increasing supply chain headwinds including from Vietnam Factory shutdowns, elevated freight costs, & rising raw material input costs.

**U.S. Bancorp (USB)**

Our \$45 PO incorporates recession risk (via utilization of historical trough P/TBV multiple). We apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E multiple, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV multiples. We assign 9.5x/8.5x/2.0x multiples respectively, in-line to above peer multiples (9.3x/8.5x/1.5x) given the bank's credit history and execution.

Downside risks are increased credit deterioration and higher expense growth. Upside risks are better than expected positive operating leverage, specifically on revenue, lower realized credit losses (vs. peers), and stronger economic growth.

**Wells Fargo & Company (WFC)**

Our \$50 PO incorporates recession risk. We apply a 50% weighting to our 2023 P/E multiple, with the remaining 50% evenly split between 2024 P/E and 2023 P/TBV multiples. We assign 11.5x/11.2x/1.2x multiples respectively, compared with large-cap peers (9.3x/8.5x/1.5x).

Downside risks to our price objective are a worse-than-expected economic downturn that lead to significantly higher-than-expected credit losses, elevated expense trajectory, slower-than-expected resolution of its consent orders. Upside risks are better-than-expected credit quality (i.e., lower loan losses) and material expense management that improve visibility on future earnings.

**Western Alliance Bancorp (WAL)**

Our \$60 PO is driven by assigning a 1.3x YE23 TBV vs. our return on tangible common equity forecast of around 16% for FY24. We believe the perceived risk to EPS/ROTCE from rising funding costs and/or credit risk if the economy hits a hard landing is likely to cause investors to assign a higher cost of equity. Given the uncertain EPS outlook, we believe the stock is more likely to trade on P/TBV relative to ROTCE expectations vs. on EPS outlook.

Risks to the upside are stronger-than-expected loan/deposit growth. Risks to the downside are deposit outflows, regulatory overhang, slower revenue growth trends, and a worsening US economic outlook.

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We, Alexander Perry, Brad Sills, Ebrahim H. Poonawala, John Murphy, CFA, Paul Ciana, CMT, Rafe Jadrosich, Robert F. Ohmes, CFA and Savita Subramanian, hereby certify that the views each of us has expressed in this research report accurately reflect each of our respective personal views about the subject securities and issuers. We also certify that no part of our respective compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or view expressed in this research report.



## **IQmethod<sup>SM</sup> Measures Definitions**

### **Business Performance**

Return On Capital Employed

Return On Equity  
Operating Margin  
Earnings Growth  
Free Cash Flow

### **Quality of Earnings**

Cash Realization Ratio  
Asset Replacement Ratio  
Tax Rate  
Net Debt-To-Equity Ratio  
Interest Cover

### **Valuation Toolkit**

Price / Earnings Ratio  
Price / Book Value  
Dividend Yield  
Free Cash Flow Yield  
Enterprise Value / Sales

EV / EBITDA

### **Numerator**

NOPAT = (EBIT + Interest Income) × (1 – Tax Rate) + Goodwill Amortization

Net Income  
Operating Profit  
Expected 5 Year CAGR From Latest Actual  
Cash Flow From Operations – Total Capex

### **Numerator**

Cash Flow From Operations  
Capex  
Tax Charge  
Net Debt = Total Debt – Cash & Equivalents  
EBIT

### **Numerator**

Current Share Price  
Current Share Price  
Annualised Declared Cash Dividend  
Cash Flow From Operations – Total Capex  
EV = Current Share Price × Current Shares + Minority Equity + Net Debt + Other LT Liabilities  
Enterprise Value

### **Denominator**

Total Assets – Current Liabilities + ST Debt + Accumulated Goodwill Amortization  
Shareholders' Equity  
Sales  
N/A  
N/A

### **Denominator**

Net Income  
Depreciation  
Pre-Tax Income  
Total Equity  
Interest Expense

### **Denominator**

Diluted Earnings Per Share (Basis As Specified)  
Shareholders' Equity / Current Basic Shares  
Current Share Price  
Market Cap = Current Share Price × Current Basic Shares  
Sales  
Basic EBIT + Depreciation + Amortization

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<b>Investment rating</b>	<b>Total return expectation (within 12-month period of date of initial rating)</b>	<b>Ratings dispersion guidelines for coverage cluster<sup>R1</sup></b>
Buy	≥ 10%	≤ 70%
Neutral	≥ 0%	≤ 30%
Underperform	N/A	≥ 20%

<sup>R1</sup> Ratings dispersions may vary from time to time where BofA Global Research believes it better reflects the investment prospects of stocks in a Coverage Cluster.

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