

Liquid Insight

The difficult last inflation mile


Key takeaways

- Will the US economy slow? Will G10 inflation continue to drop in 2024? Baseline yes for both but risks and uncertain timing.
- Reasons economy performed well to fade, but red flags from sticky inflation and all-time low unemployment.
- USD weaker if US slows, inflation drops, Fed cuts; stronger if US resilient, inflation stuck. Elections adds to uncertainty.

By Athanasios Vamvakidis

Exhibit 1: Average inflation rates in G10 economies

Recent data suggests inflation has become stickier in G10 economies



Source: Bloomberg, Haver and BofA Global Research

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Will the US economy slow? Will G10 inflation continue to drop this year? The answers will determine when central banks start to cut rates, how fast and how far. In our view, four reasons explain why the real economy has performed better than expectations, particularly in the US, but they should fade this year: loose fiscal policy, excess savings, longer than usual monetary policy lags, central bank growth credibility. However, we see red flags: recent data suggests inflation is stickier (Exhibit 1) and unemployment remains at all-time lows.

If the US economy slows, inflation drops further and the Fed starts to cut rates, we would expect the USD to weaken this year (baseline). The risk is the economy remains resilient, or inflation gets even stickier, keeping the Fed on hold, in which case the USD will remain strong. The US elections makes the market outlook even more uncertain.

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Two key questions

Two key questions for fixed income markets right now include: 1) will the US economy slow? and 2) will G10 inflation continue to drop this year? The two are related but may not necessarily coincide and may even move in different directions in the short term.

Although the focus of the first question is on the US economy, given its much stronger performance than the rest of G10, it is also relevant for the other economies. The US remains in a non-landing scenario, with growth still surprising to the upside. However, most of the other G10 economies have also done better than what the consensus had expected during this tightening cycle, despite growing slower than the US.

The second question has to do with a scenario of sticky inflation on the way down, with the so-call last mile towards the 2% inflation target proving to be the most difficult. This is relevant for the US given its strong growth performance, but also for most of the rest of G10, as they have also performed better than expectations.

Both questions are very important to determine when central banks will start cutting rates, how fast they will cut and how far they will go. The year started with the market too optimistic on all these three, expecting early and aggressive cuts. Following strong data, particularly in the US, and central bank comments suggesting caution, markets have adjusted. However, markets still expect close to four cuts for both the Fed and the ECB this year, and close to three cuts for the BoE. Our economists remain below market pricing, with three cuts for the Fed and the ECB and two for the BoE.

If the real economy remains strong and/or inflation gets stuck at current levels, central banks may not be able this year to cut anywhere near what markets are still pricing, if at all in some cases. Last month, before the market repricing, we discussed a risk scenario of no rate cuts at all this year (see [Thinking the unthinkable: what if no central bank cuts rates this year? 16 January 2024](#)). Our economists are also concerned about US inflation re-accelerating if demand remains strong (see [The Global Thinker: Let's talk about inflation risks 30 January 2024](#)).


The baseline of landing

We believe there are four main reasons that the real economy has performed better than expectations – still non-landing – particularly in the US, but we also argue that these forces should be fading this year:

- Loose fiscal policy. This is particularly the case in the US, where deficits have reached levels only seen during a crisis before. However, fiscal policies were also loose in most of the rest of G10, as they spent the inflation-driven revenue overperformance instead of allowing automatic stabilizers to operate. In some cases, countries kept energy-related subsidies for too long after energy prices dropped, while these subsidies were often badly targeted to begin with. Looking ahead, we expect lower government deficits in most of the G10 economies this year – even in the US – suggesting a negative fiscal policy impulse (Exhibit 2).
- Excess savings. This was because of the massive fiscal stimulus during the pandemic, once again particularly in the US. Dissaving is lasting longer than the market has been expecting, also because fiscal policy remained loose. Our estimates suggest about 60% of this excess saving has been spent so far (Exhibit 3). Although what remains is still substantial, not all of it may be spent.

Exhibit 2: Structural primary balance/Potential GDP

Fiscal policy to tighten in 2024




Source: IMF, BofA Global Research.

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Exhibit 3: Excess US personal saving rate/disposable income (cumulative vs. 2019 average)

60% of excess US savings accumulated during the pandemic has been spent



Source: Bloomberg, BofA Global Research.

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- Longer than usual monetary policy lags. Empirical evidence suggests monetary policy tightening affects the economy with 12-18 months lag. This time, the lags may be longer for two reasons. 1) The starting point was a very loose monetary policy stance. 2) Monetary policy tightening followed a long period of very low interest rates, suggesting that most companies and households may still be locked in low rates. However, as maturities approach, we would expect the policy tightening that has already taken place to affect the economy more (see report: *Global Credit Strategy Year Ahead: A cut above the rest*, 20 November 2023).
- Central bank growth credibility. Central banks have gained inflation credibility since they adopted inflation targeting in recent decades. However, they have also gained credibility in supporting the economy since the Global Financial Crisis and even more after the pandemic. As a result, the market has been expecting aggressive rate cuts during landing, which in turn may have kept the so-called animal spirits strong. However, central banks have not faced a dilemma of choosing between their inflation and their employment mandates yet. This may change in a landing scenario with sticky inflation, as central banks are likely to stick to their inflation target and allow the economy to weaken.

Red flags

Although inflation dropped fast last year, this was primarily because of one-off supply forces. These forces include the drop in energy prices and the resolution of pandemic-related bottlenecks. These “easy wins” explain the drop of inflation without a landing of the real economy, but they are now behind us. We believe that a further drop of inflation will need weaker demand and a landing of the real economy.


The latest data suggest that inflation is getting stickier. It is still too early to know for sure, but the latest data based on the average headline, core and 3-month average seasonally adjusted annualized core inflation in G10 economies point to risks of inflation getting stuck around 3% (Exhibit 1). With the exception of Switzerland, inflation remains well above the target in the rest of G10 (Exhibit 4).

At the same time, unemployment remains stuck at all-time lows across the board. The unemployment rate has not increased almost at all during this aggressive monetary policy tightening and remains mostly below the natural rate (Exhibit 5). Such low unemployment across the board in G10, regardless of anything else – strong growth in the US and weak growth in the Eurozone and the UK – is a puzzle. Any landing scenario should see at least some increase in unemployment at some point. Before this happens,

the risk is for stickier inflation, or even reacceleration in some cases. Even if inflation somehow continues falling, we expect low unemployment to keep central banks cautious, resulting in a very gradual easing cycle.

Exhibit 4: Latest inflation rate in G10 economies

Inflation still high in most G10 economies




Source: Bloomberg, Haver and BofA Global Research

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Exhibit 5: Unemployment rate – Natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU)

Stretched labor markets in all G10 economies




Source: Bloomberg and BofA Global Research

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Given very low unemployment and inflation still above the target and recent evidence of getting stickier, it is hard to argue that central banks should be easing policies soon. The Bloomberg Taylor rule suggests monetary policies remains loose in all G10 economies (Exhibit 6) – this is the case even for Switzerland, despite inflation being well below 2%, because of very low unemployment. Taking z-scores, to adjust for actual monetary policies in each G10 central bank compared with the Taylor rule as a benchmark historically, monetary policy is tight in the case of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and slightly for the BoC, about right for the Fed, and still loose everywhere else (Exhibit 7). This evidence suggests that we need to see lower inflation and higher unemployment for central banks to start cutting rates; the starting point also suggests a gradual and shallow easing cycle in a soft-landing scenario, in most cases.

Exhibit 6: Taylor rule spread

Spreads from a Taylor rule suggest central banks have not over-tightened




Source: Bloomberg and BofA Global Research

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Exhibit 7: Taylor rule spread z-score

Z-score spreads from a Taylor rule suggest central banks have not over-tightened



Source: Bloomberg and BofA Global Research

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The market response

Even if the US economy slows this year, helping to bring inflation down and allowing the Fed to cut rates, timing is uncertain. A slower economy and falling inflation may not coincide in the short term, leading to central bank policy dilemmas. These dynamics may also differ among different G10 economies.

As long as the US economy slows, US inflation comes down to below 3% and the Fed starts to cut rates, we would expect the USD to weaken this year. Whether EURUSD goes all the way to 1.15 by year-end, which remains our above-consensus end-year forecast, will depend on the details. We expect USD weakness in such a scenario despite other central banks easing policies at the same time, as the Fed cuts matter more in our view and have global implications.

The risk is that the US economy remains resilient for longer or inflation is even stickier than we expect. In such a case, we would expect the USD to remain strong for longer or strengthen even more.

A landing scenario will likely start in services in our view, which remains strong in most cases and amount to more than 2/3rds in advanced economies. Only weaker services will start weakening the stretched labor market, eventually affecting wages and then inflation dynamics, with inflation expectations falling earlier, allowing central banks to start cutting rates. The strong USD should start to weaken in this case. We are not there yet.

The known-unknown of the US elections

The outcome of the US elections in November could change almost everything we have discussed above. The market is also likely to start pricing related risks well before. We have discussed the FX implications from the US elections in detail in [USD Year Ahead: A winding road to depreciation 25 January 2024](#). To summarize our views, tariffs and tax cuts will be inflationary and positive for the USD, but any concerns about a new dovish Fed leadership after Powell's term ends in 2026 will be negative for the USD. At the same time, if the outcome of the US elections forces the Europeans to move closer together and agree on a larger EU budget, this will be positive for the EUR. These considerations suggest uncertain and mixed FX implications from the US elections, at least at this still early stage.

Notable Rates and FX Research

- **Global Macro Year Ahead 2024** - [Hope for the best, prepare for the worst](#), 19 Nov 2023
- **Global Rates Year Ahead 2024** – [Cloudy with a chance of landing](#), 19 Nov 2023
- **G10 FX Year Ahead** - [The year of the landing](#), 20 Nov 2023
- [Dollar dependence](#), **Liquid Cross Border Flows**, 19 Feb 2024

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For a complete list of our open trade recommendations, as well as our trade recommendations closed over the past 12 months, see the reports below:

[Global FX weekly: Silver linings playbook 23 February 2024](#)

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