# Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar



CS432: Databases

Semester II, AY 2023-24

# **ASSIGNMENT 4**

**GROUP - DataWeavers** 

**TOPIC:** oCEO Activities Portal Management

## **Group Members**


Aditya Gupte	21110012
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Darshi Doshi	21110050
Shah Faisal Khan	21110156
Pranjal	21110160
Rohit Raj	21110179
Tanish Phopalkar	21110221
Animesh Tumne	21110227

Under the guidance of

Prof. Mayank Singh


# Tasks of G1:

- Two feedbacks were taken from Mr. Sabarish Iyer from IMS services at IIT Gandhinagar.
  Relevant changes were made in the database and the webapp code to incorporate the same.
  Below shown are images of the webapp before and after both the feedbacks, which reflects the made changes.
  - I. Before first feedback:
    - a. The oCEO coordinator is not able to login through their faculty email id:







b. SA JS can't see pending payments:




## II. After first feedback:

a.  $\,$  oCEO coordinator able to login:






b. SA JS able to see pending payments:



## III. After second feedback:

a. oCEO coordinator able to see pending timecards to approve:



2. Views and different privileges for different users:
In the backend of our webapp, we are rendering different views with appropriate privileges for the different class of users (e.g. student, professor, oCEO coordinator, admin, dean and SA JS (Junior superintendent at Student Affairs department).

#### User Class:

#### 1. Student

Student have following privileges:

- Change personal information
- Change his/her password
- See Available Jobs
- See applied Jobs and the application status
- Apply for a job and also delete applications.
- View Time Details
- Submit New Time Card
- If employed in 'PAL' job , then the assigned mentees can also be seen

#### 2. Faculty

- Add a job
- Delete a job
- Approve/reject applications
- approve/reject timecards
- Change personal details
- See employed students under them
- Stop applications from accepting responses

#### 3. Others

In general,

- See applications for review, and approve them.
- See approved applications
- a. oCEO coordinator:
  - Timecards for approval
  - Approved timecards
- b. SA JS
  - Timecards for payment approval
  - Approved timecard payments

# Tasks of G2

#### 1. Concurrent Multi-user Access

Concurrent access to multiple users has been implemented accordingly so that when one user makes an update to a given table, another user won't be simultaneously able to make an update; however, he/ she can view the database accordingly.

```
cursor = db.connection.cursor()
cursor.execute("LOCK TABLES application_status WRITE")
# cursor.execute(f"SELECT application_id FROM application_status WHERE job_id = {job_id};")
cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET {perm} = 1 WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
if perm == 'dean_approved':
    cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET approval = 'approved' WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
db.connection.commit()
cursor.execute("UNLOCK TABLES")
cursor.close()
```

The above code changes have been made using LOCK / UNLOCK methods in SQL. When the user is accessing the database for an update, the tables are locked so that another user who is simultaneously trying to make an update in the table will have to wait once the update has been completed. Once the required update query has been executed, the other user will be able to make further updates in the table i.e., when it is unlocked.

This has been implemented for every update made by the Dean, Oceo Coordinator, SA\_JS, and Oceo Admin since they will share a common table.

Further functions with locking implementation have been attached below.

```
return redirect(url_for('review_application',type=type))

elif request.form['submit_button'] == 'Reject':
    application_id = request.form['application_id']
    cursor = db.connection.cursor()
    cursor.execute("LOCK TABLES application_status WRITE")
    # cursor.execute(f"SELECT application_id FROM application_status WHERE job_id = {job_id};")
    cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET {perm}= 0 WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
    cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET approval = 'rejected' WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
    db.connection.commit()
    cursor.execute("UNLOCK TABLES")
    cursor.close()
    return redirect(url_for('review_application',type=type))
```

```
@app.route('/<type>/pending_payments', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def pending payments(type):
   if "email" in session:
       if request.method == 'POST':
           if request.form['submit_button'] == 'payment_done':
               job_id = request.form['job_id']
               roll_number = request.form['roll_number']
               month = request.form['month']
              cursor = db.connection.cursor()
               cursor.execute("LOCK TABLES time card WRITE")
               cursor.execute(f"UPDATE time_card SET payment_status ='done' WHERE job_id = {job_id} AND roll_number = {roll_number} AND
               db.connection.commit()
               cursor.execute('UN
                                      TABLES')
               cursor.close()
            return redirect(url_for('pending_payments',type=type))
```

```
@app.route('/<type>/review_application', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def review_application(type):
   if "email" in session:
      if type =='admin':
           perm = 'faculty_approved'
       elif type =='dean':
          perm = 'dean_approved'
       elif type =='sa_js':
          perm = 'SA_approved'
       elif type =='oceo_coordinator':
          perm = 'oceo_coordinator_approved'
       if request.method == 'POST':
           if request.form['submit_button'] == 'Approve':
               application_id = request.form['application_id']
               cursor = db.connection.cursor()
               cursor.execute("LOCK TABLES application_status WRITE")
               cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET {perm} = 1 WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
               if perm == 'dean_approved':
                   cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET approval = 'approved' WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
               db.connection.commit()
                                      TABLES")
               cursor.execute("UN
               cursor.close()
```

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    # cursor.execute(f"SELECT application_id FROM application_status WHERE job_id = {job_id};")
    cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET {perm} = 0 WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
    cursor.execute(f"UPDATE application_status SET approval = 'rejected' WHERE application_id = {application_id};")
    db.connection.commit()
    cursor.execute("UNLOCK TABLES")
    cursor.close()
    return redirect(url_for('review_application',type=type))
```

## 2. Changes made based on received feedback:

- Based on first feedback, we made the following changes to improve our webapp:
  - Added faculty email id in the others table for oceo coordinator, since no separate email id is there in the name of oceo coordinator. Now, the oceo coordinator can login from the usual "Others" section in the webapp homepage, but now with their faculty email id (e.g. joycee@iitgn.ac.in). It is the role of admin to update the current oceo coordinator's email id.
  - The payment and bank details corresponding to a time card now shown to the SA JS as well, with the authority to complete the payment. For this,

suitable changes done in the backend, so that when SA JS approves a payment, the payment status is reflected as "done" in the time card details.

- Based on the second feedback, we made the following changes to improve our webapp:
  - Added authority of oceo coordinator to approve time cards, so that after being approved by the faculty and before being seen by SA JS, the time card should be approved by the oceo coordinator.

## 3. Adding Google Authentication:

- We added Google Authentication in order to allow only the users from IIT Gandhinagar to access our webapp (register/login).
- For this, we first created a project in Google Cloud Console, added relevant information like authorised URL and User Type as "Internal", after which we obtained the CLIENT ID and CLIENT SECRET.
- Please find the credentials (please use with care):

```
CLIENT ID =
"483725292816-706i235adoidqqhfv1hi0738paa4cfvr.apps.googleusercontent.com"

CLIENT SECRET = "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"
```

• Code added in the backend for Google Auth:

- Relevant changes were made in the frontend files, in such a way that any button in our webapp homepage will only give the desired page when you are authenticated with Google.
- When authorising with Google, the users will be required to log in through their IITGN email id, otherwise, the webapp blocks them to access any further pages (not authorised).

# Tasks of G1 and G2 Combined

#### 1. Performed Attacks and Defenses against them:

#### I. SQL INJECTION:

## A. Example 1

In the below shown images, we see the job details page of a particular job (identified by job id) floated by a professor. Here, the URL is generated based on the entered job id written in the last. This job id value runs the required SQL query, which then renders the shown job page. Here, at the place of job id in URL, we can give 105 or 1=1, which then causes to render all the employed students in all jobs.




Fig: The desired page showing job details.




Fig: URL modified for SQL injection




Fig: SQL injection caused to fetch details of all the employes students.

<u>Defense for this attack:</u> In the query which uses the job\_id entered in URL, enclose {job\_id} of the f-string under single quotes.

## B. Example 2:

Here, we try to change the bank details of another student, from our update profile section.

For this, a student first goes to their bank details under personal information, then goes to edit bank details:



Fig: Current bank details of the student with option to edit.



Fig: The student enters query to be injected in the Account number field.

#### Given input:

145556677849, IFSC\_code = SBIN9876543 WHERE roll\_number = 21110160; UPDATE bank\_details SET bank\_name = 'SBI', account\_number = 1234567891011, IFSC\_code = SBIN1234567 WHERE roll\_number = 21110040;

In the bank\_details table, account number is Primary key. In the injected query, we wish to change the account number of another student into our account number. For this, we first update our own account number into a random one. Then, the second query (written after;) updates the bank details of another student.

This input is handled by the backend as:

```
query = f"UPDATE bank_details SET bank_name = '{bank_name}',
account_number = {account_number}, IFSC_code = '{ifsc_code}' WHERE
roll_number = {roll_number};"
cursor.execute(update_query)
```

But SQL injection of this kind (multiple queries at once) doesn't apply and throws an error. This is because the cursor.execute() method here can process single SQL queries only, and hence acting as a defense for such SQL injections (source:


https://stackoverflow.com/questions/20518677/mysqldb-cursor-execute-cant-run-multiple-queries/20539187#20539187).

#### II. XSS Attack

In this type of attack, we try to inject malicious script into the code which runs when a user interacts with it. In our webapp, the data written in the input fields are stored in the database, and when required to render in the webpage (e.g. in a table), the data is fetched from the database, which only returns strings. Thus, when tried to inject script through such input blocks, the script does not run when encountered later while rendering a page. Instead, it renders as a string. In this way, malicious scripts can't be used in our webapp by storing them through input fields.

#### Example:

Entered alert script in the first name input when creating a new user.




This student then applies to a job. When the professor open the current applications under that job, the first name field should cause the alert to appear. But, the script is instead rendered as a string.



The above was an example of rendering values in a table. We tried another case, where the fetched data from the database is not explicitly being rendered as a string, but even in that case the script is printed instead of running.

Here, the script is sent into student\_name below:


The output seen is:




## III. Attack from URL

Whenever a professor goes to see their floated job details (based on a particular job\_id), then the job\_id goes to the URL which then renders the jop details page accordingly.


Example: The professor choose to see the job page of job\_id = 129:



The job\_id = 129 is entered last in the URL, for which the professor gets the page as:



However, the URL can be manually changed to enter another job\_id, say 105. Then, the page renders the details of job\_id = 105.



## Defense for this attack:

Before running the query, we check if that job\_id is floated by that faculty by running another query involving natural join of faculty and job, where we filter using the faculty\_id.

## IV. URL Interpretation Attack

Similar to above attack, any faculty can edit any other job details by manipulating job\_id in the URL bar.


Defense for this attack:

Before running the query, we check if that job\_id is floated by that faculty by running another query involving natural join of faculty and job, where we filter using the faculty\_id.


## 2. Relations and their constraints, finalized after the second feedback:

#### Final tables:


#### adh:




#### application\_status:




## applied\_student:




applied\_student\_phone:




#### bank\_details:




#### employed\_students:




#### faculty:




job:




#### mentees:



#### mentor\_mentee:




#### other:




others:




## sem\_other\_jobs:




#### subjects\_under\_pal:



### time\_card:



transaction\_status:



# **Contributions:**

## Aditya Gupte:

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## Balgopal Moharana:

- Enhanced backend with concurrency control and locking.
- Optimized table operations for seamless multi-user edits, benefiting Dean SA, SA JS, and OCEO Coordinator.
- Report writing for G2 concurrency question

#### Darshi Doshi:

- Took feedback from the stakeholder
- Tried doing google authentication

#### Shah Faisal Khan:

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#### Pranjal:

- Modified the web application based on the feedback of stakeholders. (Added backend for time card oCEO coordinator approval.)
- Added Google Authentication to the web application.
- Contributed in finding possibilities for the SQL injection and XSS injection and their defenses.
- Provided feedback on the front-end design and suggested some improvements for better UI.

## Rohit Raj:

- Taking 2nd feedback with Animesh.
- Involved in making changes in the webapp and database per the feedback.
- Helped add Google Authentication with Pranjal.
- Found possible attacks through the webapp along with the defenses involved.
- Report writing: G2 (Q2, Q3); G1 and G2 (Q1)
- Added backend code for oceo coordinator time card approval.

#### Tanish Phopalkar:

- Worked on Concurrency of other users
- Enhanced tables operations for concurrency control

## Animesh Tumne:

- Worked on revamping the whole WebApp FrontEnd
- Designed the whole frontend from scratch including tasks like deciding the theme and implementing javascript and css.
- Reworked each link to make sure it is working properly
- Worked on attacks, and how to defend against them

## **Group Distribution:**

G1: Animesh, Darshi

G2: Pranjal, Rohit, Balgopal, Tanish