


# ECONOMICS OF PATENT




# INTRODUCTION

- Patent is an exclusive right approved to a discoverer/inventor to have power over the use of an invention for a specific period.
- Such rights authorizes a temporary monopoly to the inventor which is one of the way of rewarding inventive activity.
- Monopoly is a market structure in which a product is supplied by a single firm.

# ECONOMICS OF PATENTS

- ❑ Patent is a source of monopoly
- ❑ Patent grants the owner monopoly power to set the price above the cost of production
- ❑ The more the difference between the cost of production and price, the more monopoly profit incurs
- ❑ Under monopoly, the price and quantity of innovation is determined as shown in figure 1

Figure 1: Determination of price & quantity



# INVENTIONS & NATURAL MONOPOLY

- Some inventions create natural monopoly (fall in average costs with increase in scale of production) as shown in fig. 2
- Microsoft Corporation is the best example of natural monopoly enjoying huge monopoly profits.





Figure 2: Monopoly profit


# BREADTH OF PATENT

- ❑ Patent Breadth refers to a condition in which an awarded patent covers the field to which it pertains.



- Broad Patent: Provides widest scope of protection but also present biggest target for validity challenges.
- Narrow patent: It usually refers to precisely one exceptional invention
- ❑ Broad patent facilitates original research and narrow patent encourages development.

# Process of Product Development



# BREADTH OF PATENT....

## *Broader Patent*

- If social value of investment on research > the social value of investment on developing applications, patent should be *broadened*.
- Patent protection should be *broader* for original inventions having little stand alone value.

## *Narrow Patent*

- If social value of investment on research < the social value of investment on developing applications, patent should be *narrowed*.
- Patent protection should be *narrower* for original inventions having large stand alone value.

## DURATION OF PATENT

- ❑ It refers to numbers of years the patent has been granted to the owner.
- ❑ Ideally there would be different patent duration for each invention.
- ❑ It is obvious that with increase in duration, the inventor enjoys benefit of more innovation



# DURATION OF PATENT

- Duration of patent protection should be determined where marginal social benefits=marginal social costs (Nordhaus, 1969) as shown in fig. 3




Figure 3: Optimum Patent Life

## ECONOMICS OF PATENT....

- Patent rights deal with information related to inventions, innovations and technological improvement.
- Public goods characteristics of information like non excludability and non rivalry leads to under supply of inventions or less than optimum level of invention which refers to market failure.



# **ECONOMICS OF PATENT....**

## **➤ Economics of innovation:**

- Patent protects and stimulates innovations and inventions.
  - A. by giving return on the innovator's investment,
  - B. by disclosing knowledge and information.

It can be shown with the help of fig. 4.1

## **➤ Patent impedes innovation :**


- A. by restricting use of knowledge,
- B. by generating monopoly power,
- C. by imposing short run costs,
- D. by creating difficulties in the determination of boundaries

Thus patent may possibly discourage innovations and therefore reducing knowledge spillovers as shown in fig. 4.2




# RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IPR AND INNOVATION

## POSITIVE RELATION



Strength of patent protection  
**Fig. 4.1**

## CONCAVE RELATION



Strength of patent protection  
**Fig. 4.2**

**Figure : Relation between IPR and innovation**

# PATENT AND ECONOMICS OF WELFARE

- Whether stronger patent protection increases economic welfare or not?
- Major aim of providing patent is to maximize welfare and to minimize losses.
- The welfare effect of patent protection can be explained through a partial equilibrium as shown in the figure 5.




Figure 5: Effect of patent protection on welfare

Source: Mukherjee (2015)

# PATENT PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

- In an open economy, the determination of efficient patent protection is not simple because one country's policy affects others (cross border externalities).
- Grossman & Lai (2002) studied efficient patent protection in non-cooperative regime through model of Nash equilibrium as explained in the figure 6.




Figure 6 : Non co-operative and efficient patent protection

## EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

- Example of east Asian countries like, Japan, South Korea & Hong Kong shows the positive effect of softer patent regime on welfare.
  
- While, the experience of countries like, India, Brazil & South Africa shows the negative impact of TRIPS (greater protection) on economic well being.



## ECONOMICS OF PATENT....

- The trade off between the social benefits of improved innovation and the social costs of restricted uses of innovation determines the optimum level of patent protection.
- Economic justification for patent protection:
  - ❖ Prevents free riding
  - ❖ It creates incentives for private entrepreneurs
  - ❖ Optimum allocation of resources
  - ❖ Optimum production of inventions
  - ❖ Prevents society to pay additional opportunity cost on the way of production
  - ❖ Checks market failure through externalities.

# CONCLUSION

- ❑ After explaining patent protection from economic point of view, we can say that it is an important tool for innovation and information.
- ❑ The economic value of patent protection is to a large extent based on the economics of monopoly, information, innovation, welfare and trade.



# FURTHER READINGS

- Cooter, R. & Ulen, T. (2004). *Laws & Economics*. New Delhi: Pearson Education Pte. Ltd.
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- Nordhaus, W.D. (1969). Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change, Cambridge MA, The M.I.T. Press
- Grossman G.M., & Helpman, E. ( 1991). Quality ladders in the theory of growth, *Review of Economic Studies*, 58, 43-61
- Mukherjee D. (2015). TRIPS and the balance between private rights and public well being: The case of the pharmaceutical sector. *Foreign trade review*, 50(4), 284-297.

**THANK YOU**

