

Applied Microeconometrics - Assignment 4

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Table 1 contains the results of a multinomial logit model of school choice on gender and test scores. The estimates are the Odds-Ratios.

Table 1

choice	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf. interval]	
High_school_1	(base alternative)					
Outside_Utrecht						
gender	-.4690375	.4415235	-1.06	0.288	-1.334408	.3963327
testscore	-.0506644	.0545106	-0.93	0.353	-.1575032	.0561744
_cons	29.04348	29.6866	0.98	0.328	-29.1412	87.22815
Gymnasium_1						
gender	-.419388	.4363943	-0.96	0.337	-1.274705	.435929
testscore	.1200623	.0566682	2.12	0.034	.0089948	.2311299
_cons	-63.95478	30.89643	-2.07	0.038	-124.5107	-3.398893
High_school_2						
gender	-.2547803	1.468061	-0.17	0.862	-3.132128	2.622567
testscore	.2180528	.2512237	0.87	0.385	-.2743366	.7104423
_cons	-121.5995	137.5185	-0.88	0.377	-391.1309	147.9319
High_school_3						
gender	-.2168744	.4658658	-0.47	0.642	-1.129955	.6962058
testscore	-.0206016	.0578131	-0.36	0.722	-.1339133	.0927101
_cons	12.13533	31.48937	0.39	0.700	-49.5827	73.85335
High_school_4						
gender	-.0134729	.5383483	-0.03	0.980	-1.068616	1.04167
testscore	-.0068987	.0669302	-0.10	0.918	-.1380795	.1242822
_cons	3.837665	36.45847	0.11	0.916	-67.61962	75.29495
High_school_5						
gender	-.1953817	1.468223	-0.13	0.894	-3.073045	2.682282
testscore	-.0006672	.1717818	-0.47	0.639	-.4173533	.256019
_cons	41.40126	93.35539	0.44	0.657	-141.5719	224.3745
High_school_6						
gender	-.2324838	.4710565	-0.49	0.622	-1.155738	.6907699
testscore	.0354673	.0596902	0.59	0.552	-.0815233	.1524579
_cons	-18.48359	32.52928	-0.57	0.570	-82.23981	45.27262
High_school_7						
gender	.4913499	.6720051	0.73	0.465	-.8257559	1.808456
testscore	-.0639538	.0781985	-0.82	0.413	-.21722	.0893124
_cons	33.92765	42.54658	0.80	0.425	-49.46212	117.3174
Gymnasium_2						
gender	-.3593733	.5188671	-0.69	0.489	-1.376334	.6575876
testscore	.0798507	.0679752	1.17	0.240	-.0533782	.2130796
_cons	-43.14291	37.07115	-1.16	0.245	-115.801	29.51521

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Table 2 contains the results of a multinomial logit model of school choice on the distance to a given school and whether the deciding student has a sibling at this school. The results suggest that if your sibling is at the school your probability of choosing it increases (positive and significant coefficient). The negative significant coefficient for the distance suggests that the greater the distance to the school, the lower the probability of choosing that school.

Table 2

choice	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf. interval]	
school						
sibling	1.689151	.1895964	8.91	0.000	1.317549	2.060753
distance	-.245953	.0298558	-8.24	0.000	-.3044694	-.1874367
High_school_1	(base alternative)					
Outside_Utrecht _cons	1.42745	.2385271	5.98	0.000	.9599457	1.894955
Gymnasium_1 _cons	1.236214	.2324322	5.32	0.000	.7806554	1.691773
High_school_2 _cons	-2.142987	.743227	-2.88	0.004	-3.599686	-.6862892
High_school_3 _cons	.9008862	.2558284	3.52	0.000	.3994717	1.402301
High_school_4 _cons	-.152363	.2778213	-0.55	0.583	-.6968827	.3921566
High_school_5 _cons	-2.614989	.7388643	-3.54	0.000	-4.063136	-1.166841
High_school_6 _cons	.8443403	.2568296	3.29	0.001	.3409635	1.347717
High_school_7 _cons	-.590173	.3341246	-1.77	0.077	-1.245045	.0646992
Gymnasium_2 _cons	.2806044	.2787649	1.01	0.314	-.2657647	.8269735

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Table 3 combines the regressions of table 1 and table 2. This results in a rank-ordered logit model. The siblings' school and the distance to a given school remain similarly important in determining future students' preferences.

Table 3

choice	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf. interval]	
school						
sibling	1.674634	.1934232	8.66	0.000	1.295531	2.053737
distance	-.2605671	.0306829	-8.49	0.000	-.3207045	-.2004297
High_school_1	(base alternative)					
Outside_Utrecht						
gender	-.6169134	.4638332	-1.33	0.184	-1.52601	.292183
testscore	-.0255972	.0567346	-0.45	0.652	-.136795	.0856006
_cons	15.67982	30.88092	0.51	0.612	-44.84567	76.20531
Gymnasium_1						
gender	-.5939652	.4680242	-1.27	0.204	-1.511276	.3233455
testscore	.1496682	.0600876	2.49	0.013	.0318987	.2674378
_cons	-80.1084	32.74004	-2.45	0.014	-144.2777	-15.93909
High_school_2						
gender	-.4408758	1.487665	-0.30	0.767	-3.356645	2.474894
testscore	.2503491	.2510607	1.00	0.319	-.2417208	.742419
_cons	-130.6169	137.4542	-1.01	0.313	-408.0222	130.7884
High_school_3						
gender	-.6193152	.5079289	-1.22	0.223	-1.614837	.3762071
testscore	.0266032	.0628187	0.42	0.672	-.0965193	.1497257
_cons	-13.27733	34.20047	-0.39	0.698	-80.30901	53.75436
High_school_4						
gender	-.0016342	.5597209	-0.00	0.998	-1.098667	1.095399
testscore	.0127403	.0700957	0.18	0.856	-.1246446	.1501253
_cons	-7.089617	38.17082	-0.19	0.853	-81.90304	67.72381
High_school_5						
gender	-.3748867	1.480941	-0.25	0.800	-3.277477	2.527704
testscore	-.0264712	.1755886	-0.15	0.880	-.3706186	.3176761
_cons	11.94192	95.41748	0.13	0.900	-175.0729	198.9567
High_school_6						
gender	-.4506662	.5073866	-0.89	0.374	-1.445126	.5437932
testscore	.0923924	.0641304	1.44	0.150	-.0333009	.2180857
_cons	-49.27242	34.93046	-1.41	0.158	-117.7349	19.19003
High_school_7						
gender	.4013687	.691612	0.58	0.562	-.9541659	1.756903
testscore	-.031933	.0797927	-0.40	0.689	-.1803230	.1244570
_cons	16.53	43.40518	0.38	0.703	-68.5426	101.6026
Gymnasium_2						
gender	-.6693524	.5540754	-1.21	0.227	-1.75532	.4166153
testscore	.1390897	.0726138	1.92	0.055	-.0032307	.2814101
_cons	-75.21529	39.58453	-1.90	0.057	-152.7995	2.368956

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The theory of independence of irrelevant alternatives means that the coefficients and effects that we have predicted would remain the same if we remove one of the options. This is likely to be the case when all options are substitutes. Schools in our case are all substitutes for education. They may differ, but primarily on observables (type of school, rating, distance from decision maker). However, the regression we have run has not included all those observed. In the analysis we have run not all are very good alternatives so not all other options are irrelevant. For example, gymnasiums are more similar to another gymnasium and no-gymnasium school. In this situation removing one gymnasium school could shift demand not by the factors that we suggested, but primarily on whether replacement schools

Code - Stata

```
use "/Users/julian/Documents/Current/Applied Microeconometrics/GitHub/Assignment  
4/HighSchoolData.dta"  
#Table 1  
asclogit choice, case(id) alternatives(school) casevars(gender testscore)  
#Table 2  
asclogit choice sibling distance, case(id) alternatives(school)  
#Table 3  
asclogit choice sibling distance, case(id) alternatives(school) casevars(gender  
testscore)
```