Appendix

Table 1: Summary of events by activists' stated goals This table provides the summary of activists' campaigns categorized by activists' stated objectives. The sample consists of 362 activist campaigns over 2000-2015. The demands were manually classified into the same categories as in Brav et al. (2008). The first column corresponds to a broad demand category. The second column narrows the activists' objective down to a more narrow category. The third column counts a number of occurences of earch objective, the fourth column corresponds to share of such occurences and the fifth column to the percent of successful successful realizations of such objectives. Number of occurences and % of Successes do not sum to 362 and 100% correspondigly because each campaign can have multiple objectives.

| Category | Activist Objective | Num. events | % Sample | % Success |
|-------------------|--|-------------|----------|-----------|
| Capital structure | Excess cash, under-leverage, dividends/repurchases | 66 | 18.2% | 68.2% |
| | Equity issuance, restructure debt, recapitalization | 23 | 6.4% | 73.9% |
| Business strategy | Operational efficiency | 36 | 9.9% | 52.8% |
| | Lack of focus, business restructuring and spinning off | 53 | 14.6% | 66% |
| | M&A: as target (against the deal/for better terms) | 34 | 9.4% | 32.4% |
| | M&A: as acquirer (against the deal/for better terms) | 13 | 3.6% | 76.9% |
| | Pursue growth strategies | 5 | 1.4% | 40% |
| Sell company | Sell company or main assets to a third party | 87 | 24.0% | 50.6% |
| | Take control/buyout company and/or take it private | 11 | 3.0% | 36.4% |
| Governance | Rescind takeover defenses | 23 | 6.4% | 47.8% |
| | Oust CEO, chairman | 35 | 9.7% | 62.9% |
| | Board independence and fair representation | 99 | 27.3% | 73.7% |
| | More information disclosure/potential fraud | 23 | 6.4% | 34.8% |
| | Excess executive compensation/pay for performance | 37 | 10.2% | 51.4% |
| Other | Institute environmental protection policy | 3 | 0.8% | 0% |
| | Public Short Position/Bear Raid | 2 | 0.4% | NA |
| | Total number | 362 | 100% | 66.9% |

Table 2: Sussess rate by stage This table provides the breakdown of stages at which the campaign is terminated.

| Exit after | Num.campaigns | % Sample | Num. Successes | % Successes |
|----------------------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------------|
| Demand negotiations | 163 | 45% | 108 | 66.3% |
| Board representation | 38 | 10.5% | 14 | 36.8% |
| Proxy fight | 161 | 44.5% | 120 | 74.5% |

Table 3: Descriptive statistics. This table provides summary statistics on the variables used in preliminary analysis. The variables are grouped by type. success of stated obj is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Num. large investors is the number of investors that fall into top 5% holding percentile and have shares in the target. Num. activist connections is total number of connections that activist has with large investors in the target. Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as $\frac{Share-min\{Share\}}{\max\{Share\}-\min\{Share\}}$ Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as $\frac{Share-min\{Share\}}{\max\{Share\}-\min\{Share\}}$. Perc. large ownership is aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. Leverage is the long-term leverage of the target firm. MTB is market-to-book value of the target firm at the start of the campaign. ROA is return-on-assets of the target at the start of the campaign. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company.

| Variable type | Variable | mean | sd | min | p25 | median | p75 | max |
|------------------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| | | | | | | | | |
| Campaign outcome | Success of stated goals | 0.49 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| | Won board seat(s) | 0.72 | 0.45 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Activist power | Perc. active ownership | 9.41 | 3.11 | 3.23 | 7.16 | 8.71 | 11.49 | 17.54 |
| | Import. activist ownership | 0.54 | 0.22 | 0 | 0.43 | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.69 |
| Network | Num. large investors | 2.45 | 0.4 | 0 | 2.3 | 2.56 | 2.64 | 2.89 |
| | log(Num. activist connections) | 9.36 | 2.42 | 0 | 8.29 | 9.86 | 10.78 | 15.44 |
| | Perc. large ownership | 11.17 | 2.07 | 0 | 10.65 | 11.26 | 11.76 | 18.45 |
| | Simple con. weighted by perc. | 21.62 | 2.83 | 0 | 20.36 | 21.35 | 23.15 | 28.31 |
| | Spring con. weighted by perc. | 5.99 | 3 | 0 | 4.03 | 5.92 | 7.44 | 16.92 |
| | Simple con. weighted by import. | 5.54 | 2.85 | 0 | 4.57 | 6.31 | 7.23 | 12.41 |
| | Simple con. weighted by import. | 0.42 | 0.7 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.14 | 0.54 | 4.38 |
| | Simple closeness centrality | 6.12 | 2.23 | 0 | 6.22 | 7.1 | 7.52 | 9.75 |
| | Spring closeness centrality | 6.35 | 2.26 | 0 | 6.38 | 7.37 | 7.78 | 9.97 |
| | Simple betweenness centrality | 13.91 | 2.73 | 0 | 14.1 | 15.11 | 15.56 | 17.67 |
| | Spring betweenness centrality | 12.03 | 2.76 | 0 | 11.96 | 13.13 | 13.74 | 15.75 |
| | Spring strength | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.02 | 1 |
| | Simple strength | 120.26 | 294.77 | 1 | 7 | 21 | 66 | 4239 |
| Controls | log(Market capitalization) | 7.2 | 1.95 | 3.03 | 5.75 | 7 | 8.33 | 13.03 |
| | Poison pill | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| | Firm age | 22.33 | 14.03 | 1 | 11 | 19 | 30 | 53 |
| | Leverage | 1.25 | 6.96 | -30.1 | 0.09 | 0.43 | 1.2 | 112.41 |
| | MTB | 3.26 | 19.05 | -113.94 | 1.15 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 316.84 |
| | ROA | 53.08 | 393.1 | -1938.71 | -38.48 | 40.07 | 111.66 | 4325.62 |
| | Short term objective | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Campaign cost | Exit after board demands | 0.1 | 0.31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | Exit after proxy fight | 0.44 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as max[Share] = Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import, corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as max{Share}—min{Share}. Perc. large ownership is Table 4: Correlation table. success_of_stated_obj is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Num. large investors is the number of investors that fall into top 5% holding corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. Leverage is the long-term leverage of the target firm. MTB is market-to-book value of the target firm at the start of the campaign. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share percentile and have shares in the target. Num. activist connections is total number of connections that activist has with large investors in the target. Simple con. weighted by perc. the spring strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the simple which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. repurchase programs or sale of the company.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 10 1 | 1 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|--------|----------|--------|----------|---------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|----|
| 1 Success of stated goals | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 Won board seat(s) | 0.26 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 Perc. active ownership | -0.17 | 0.05 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 Import. activist ownership | 0.34 | 0.14 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 Num. large investors | 0.37 | 0.21 | -0.02 | 0.36 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 log(Num. activist connections) | 0 | -0.15 | -0.04 | 0.05 | 0.2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 Perc. large ownership | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.04 | -0.05 | 90.0 | 0.03 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 Simple con. weight by perc. | -0.17 | -0.07 | 0.12 | -0.23 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 90.0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 Spring con. weight by perc. | -0.12 | 0.14 | 0.31 | -0.07 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.17 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 Simple con. weight by import. | 0.43 | 0.18 | -0.16 | 0.41 | 0.63 | 0.44 | -0.06 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11 Simple con. weight by import. | 90.0 | 0 | -0.06 | 0.2 | 0.36 | 0.78 | -0.03 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 Simple closeness centrality | 0.55 | 0.18 | -0.25 | 0.59 | 0.62 | 0.16 | -0.03 | -0.23 | 0 80.0- | 0.84 0 | 0.3 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 Spring closeness centrality | 0.55 | 0.18 | -0.23 | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.16 | -0.03 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14 Simple betweenness centrality | 0.53 | 0.18 | -0.23 | 0.58 | 0.65 | 0.15 | -0.03 | | | | .29 0.97 | 7 0.97 | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 Spring betweenness centrality | 0.55 | 0.19 | -0.24 | 0.58 | 0.67 | 0.15 | -0.03 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16 log(Market capitalization) | -0.06 | 0.1 | 0.25 | 0.01 | 0.26 | -0.06 | -0.12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 Poison pill | 0.09 | 0.11 | -0.05 | 0.26 | 90.0 | 0 | -0.05 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| 18 Firm age | -0.1 | -0.01 | 0.12 | 0 | 0.13 | -0.03 | -0.1 | | | | | | 90.0- 90 | 3 -0.05 | 0.46 | -0.01 | 1 | | | | |
| 19 Leverage | -0.05 | 0.13 | 0 | 0.02 | 0 | 0.09 | 0.04 | | | | | | | | | -0.04 | 0.05 | 1 | | | |
| 20 MTB | -0.04 | 0.16 | 0.05 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.09 | 0.03 | | | | | | | | | -0.06 | 0.04 | 96.0 | 1 | | |
| 21 ROA | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.07 | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0 | | | | | | | | | -0.05 | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0 | 1 | |
| 22 Short term objective | 0.11 | 80.0 | -0.04 | 0.2 | 0 | -0.01 | -0.03 | | | | | | | | | 0.18 | -0.12 | -0.06 | -0.04 | 0.11 | 1 |

Table 5: Number of large investors and activist's success

| | | | $Dependent\ variable:$ | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | - | | Success of stated goal | S | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Num.large investors | t = 0.4422 $t = 6.0873***$ | | 0.2658 t = $2.2835**$ | | |
| log(Num. activist connections) | | t = 4.8219*** | 0.0565 $t = 2.2186**$ | | t = 4.0828*** |
| Perc. large ownership | | | | 0.0179 $t = 1.7174*$ | -0.0071 t = -0.3406 |
| Exit after board demands | t = -3.0083*** | t = -0.0341 t = -3.9548*** | t = -0.0281 t = -3.1952*** | t = -0.0476 t = -3.7937*** | t = -3.5630** |
| Exit after proxy fight | t = -0.3345 t = -3.3789*** | t = -0.4450 t = -5.1510*** | $t = -0.4059 \\ t = -3.8700****$ | t = -0.3869 t = -2.2972** | t = -0.4443 t = -5.3092*** |
| Perc. activist ownership | t = 0.8092 | 0.0572 $t = 1.4711$ | 0.0605 $t = 1.4301$ | t = 2.0889** | 0.0547 $t = 1.4799$ |
| Poison pill | 0.0279 t = 1.5475 | 0.0106 $t = 0.4879$ | 0.0088 $t = 0.5452$ | $t = 3.1312^{***}$ | 0.0102 $t = 0.4263$ |
| Firm age | t = -0.0014 t = -0.6588 | -0.0009 t = -0.3839 | t = -0.0013 t = -0.5514 | t = -0.0015 t = -0.5786 | -0.0008 t = -0.3784 |
| $\log({ m Market\ capitalization})$ | -0.0027 t = -0.1450 | 0.0113 $t = 1.2252$ | t = -0.0016 t = -0.1000 | $t = 4.5722^{***}$ | 0.0075 $t = 2.2927**$ |
| Leverage | t = -0.0148 t = -0.6973 | t = -0.0194 t = -0.9344 | t = -0.0185 t = -0.8912 | t = -0.0158 t = -0.7307 | t = -0.0198 t = -0.9676 |
| МТВ | 0.0053 $t = 0.7154$ | 0.0065 $t = 0.8943$ | 0.0063 $t = 0.8665$ | t = 0.8016 | 0.0065 $t = 0.9137$ |
| ROA | t = 0.8050 | 0.00005 $t = 0.7387$ | t = 0.8683 | t = 0.8074 | 0.00005 $t = 0.7469$ |
| Short term objective | 0.0569 $t = 0.5134$ | 0.0380 $t = 0.3849$ | t = 0.3912 | t = 0.0632 t = 0.5390 | 0.0381 $t = 0.3892$ |
| Constant | 39.9436 $t = 1.8394*$ | -8.0481 t = -0.2546 | 5.9414 $t = 0.1812$ | $t = 0.4727 \\ t = 4.4880****$ | -7.7441 t = -0.2508 |
| Activist type FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes V |
| Year FE Observations | Yes 298 | Yes 298 | Yes 298 | Yes 298 | Yes 298 |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.2759 | 0.2842 | 0.3055 | 0.1820 | 0.2846 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.2454 | 0.2540 | 0.2737 | 0.1446 | 0.2519 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaign_outcome = Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. success_of_stated_goals is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Num. large investors is the number of investors that fall into top 5% holding percentile and have shares in the target. Num. activist connections is total number of connections that activist has with large investors in the target. Perc. large ounership is aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. ROA is return-on-assets of the target at the start of the campaign. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company. Each regression contains year fixed effects and an activist's type (e.g. hedge fund, pension fund, etc.) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by the campaign category (capital structure, business strategy, sell company, governance or other). Table contains standard significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.05, ***p<0.01$

Table 6: Network support and activist's success

| | | Dependent v | variable: | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------|
| | | Success of sta | ated goals | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Simple con. weighted by perc. | t = 2.3987** | | | |
| Spring con. weighted by perc. | | $t = 6.5881^{***}$ | | |
| Simple con. weighted by import. | | | $t = 13.7909^{***}$ | |
| pring con. weighted by import. | | | | 0.0498 |
| Exit after board demands | t = -0.4733 t = -4.9838*** | t = -0.4852 $t = -5.1234****$ | t = -0.2570 $t = -4.0046***$ | -0.2325 |
| Exit after proxy fight | t = 0.4022 | t = 0.0216 t = 0.5338 | t = 1.8740* | -0.0149 |
| Perc. activist ownership | t = -0.0607 t = -5.2991*** | t = -0.0669 t = -6.0906*** | | |
| mport. activist ownership | | | $t = 2.7363^{***}$ | 0.6080 |
| Poison pill | 0.0476 t = 1.7503* | 0.0442 $t = 1.4952$ | -0.0656 t = $-2.8337****$ | -0.0151 |
| irm age | t = -0.0004 t = -0.1630 | t = -0.0002 t = -0.0760 | t = -0.0007 t = -0.2915 | -0.0002 |
| pg(Market capitalization) | 0.0215 $t = 1.9153*$ | 0.0126 $t = 1.0394$ | t = -0.0329 t = -4.2009**** | -0.0060 |
| everage | t = -0.0151 t = -0.6766 | t = -0.0172 t = -0.7317 | t = -0.0156 t = -0.7382 | -0.0122 |
| ИТВ | 0.0052 $t = 0.6854$ | t = 0.7432 | 0.0054 $t = 0.7439$ | 0.0038 |
| ROA | 0.00003 $t = 0.4551$ | t = 0.3857 | 0.00004 $t = 0.4535$ | 0.00001 |
| thort term objective | 0.0621 $t = 0.5875$ | t = 0.0614 t = 0.5581 | 0.0038 $t = 0.0400$ | 0.0069 |
| Perc. large ownership | t = -0.0128 t = -0.7079 | t = -1.1787 | t = -0.0333 t = -5.0925*** | -0.0052 |
| Constant | 36.9617 $t = 1.1384$ | 37.8916 $t = 1.1684$ | 0.2623 $t = 1.6495*$ | 53.4233 |
| ctivist type FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| ear FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 298 | 298 | 298 | 298 |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.2158 | 0.2185 | 0.3522 | 0.2177 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.1561 | 0.1590 | 0.3055 | 0.1582 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaignoutcome = Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. success_of_stated_goals is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by import. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as <math display="block">\frac{Share - min{Share}}{max{Share}} - Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of the campaign. RoA is return-on-assets of the target firm. MTB is market-to-book value of the target firm at the start of the campaign. RoA is return-on-assets of the target at the start of the campaign. Perc. large ownership is aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Short tern objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands inclu$

Table 7: Large investors' centrality and activist's success

| | | Dependent | t variable: | |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Success of s | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Simple closeness centrality | t = 0.1429 $t = 9.4729***$ | | | |
| Spring closeness centrality | | t = 0.1411 $0.7562***$ | | |
| Simple betweenness centrality | | | t = 8.7633*** | |
| Spring betweenness centrality | | | | $t = 11.1252^{***}$ |
| Spring con. weighted by perc. | $t = 6.3521^{***}$ | t = 4.7206*** | t = 6.6575*** | t = 7.3696*** |
| Import. activist ownership | t = 0.0728 t = 0.7911 | t = 0.8635 | 0.1065 $t = 1.2221$ | 0.0763 $t = 0.9109$ |
| Exit after board demands | t = -0.0365 t = -2.3261** | t = -0.0387 t = -2.4435** | t = -0.0371 $t = -2.4370**$ | t = -0.0373 t = -2.2309** |
| Exit after proxy fight | t = -0.0021 t = -1.1291 | t = -1.0691 | t = -0.0019 t = -1.0139 | t = -1.0601 |
| Poison pill | t = -0.4668 | t = -0.0055 t = -0.9582 | t = -0.0025 t = -0.4578 | t = -0.3325 |
| Firm age | t = -0.0140 t = -0.6383 | t = -0.0133 t = -0.6267 | t = -0.0124 t = -0.5673 | t = -0.0128 t = -0.5768 |
| $\log({ m Market\ capitalization})$ | 0.0047 $t = 0.6350$ | t = 0.0045 t = 0.6190 | 0.0041 $t = 0.5554$ | 0.0043 $t = 0.5669$ |
| Leverage | 0.0138 $t = 0.1546$ | t = 0.0121 t = 0.1379 | 0.0239 t = 0.2745 | 0.0277 t = 0.3132 |
| МТВ | t = -0.1667 $t = -2.7564***$ | t = -0.1670 $t = -2.8386***$ | t = -0.1847 $t = -2.3258**$ | t = -0.1766 t = -2.5125** |
| ROA | 0.0646 $t = 1.8190*$ | 0.0689 $t = 1.9195*$ | 0.0531 t = 1.0544 | 0.0592 t = 1.3241 |
| Short term objective | -42.8908 t = $-1.7012*$ | -42.9710 t = $-1.7137*$ | -25.2579 t = -1.2429 | -15.1037 t = -0.7385 |
| Activist type FE Year FE Observations B ² | Yes Yes 298 0.3510 | Yes Yes 298 0.3520 | Yes Yes 298 0.3394 | Yes Yes 298 0.3518 |
| n Adjusted R ² | 0.3237 | 0.3247 | 0.3394 | 0.3245 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation Campaignoutcome = Investor_importance + Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. success_of_stated_goals is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Simple closeness centrality is an aggregate closeness centrality computed with simple network. Spring closeness centrality computed with spring network. Simple betweennes centrality is an aggregate betweennes centrality computed with simple network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweennes centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweennes centrality is an aggregate betweennes centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweennes centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweennes centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweennes centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweenness centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweenness centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweenness centrality computed with spring network. Spring betweenness centrality is an aggregate betweenness centrality is an aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ned demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign. Perm age is the age of the target and poison pill prior to the campaign of the target at the start of the campaign. Perm age is the age of the target owned by large investors. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company. Each regression contains year fixed effects and an activist's type (e.g. hedge fund, pension fund, etc.) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by the campaign category (capital structure, business strat

Table 8: Activist's success and connection strength

| | Dependen | t variable: |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| | $\Delta(Simple)$ | $\Delta(Spring)$ |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Connected to active activist | -69.5342 | -0.0327 |
| | t = -3.3304*** | t = -2.0470** |
| Activist wins | 0.5400 | 0.0072 |
| | t = 0.1285 | t = 1.6374 |
| Target shareholder | -29.6642 | -0.0153 |
| | t = -4.2657*** | t = -2.8762*** |
| Connected to active activist x Target shareholder | -25.4380 | -0.0319 |
| | $t = -2.7262^{***}$ | $t = -3.5082^{***}$ |
| Connected to active activist x Activist wins | 20.5412 | 0.0032 |
| | $t = 1.8187^*$ | t = 0.3247 |
| Connected to active activist x Target shareholder | -2.3695 | -0.0036 |
| | t = -1.5060 | t = -2.1938** |
| Connected to active activist x Target shareholder x Activist wins | 24.6975 | 0.0238 |
| | t = 3.1145**** | t = 3.2918*** |
| Activist FE | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,975,068 | 1,975,068 |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.0977 | 0.3189 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.0976 | 0.3188 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $\Delta(Connectionstrength) = \alpha + Connected_to_active_activist + Activist_wins + Target_shareholder + \sum First_differences + Connected_to_active_activist * Target_shareholder * Connected_to_active_activist * Activist_wins + Controls + \epsilon$. In the first column, $\Delta(Simple)$ corresponds to the change in the simple strength (number of connections). in the second column, $\Delta(Spring)$ corresponds to the change in the spring strength. Each regression contains year fixed effects and an activist's type (e.g. hedge fund, pension fund, etc.) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by the campaign category (capital structure, business strategy, sell company, governance or other). Table contains standard significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Robustness

Table 9: Robustness: network support and activist's success. Large investor is an investor that belongs to top 10 percent

| | | Depender | nt variable: | |
|---------------------------------|---|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | | stated goals | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Simple con. weighted by perc. | $t = 3.3387^{***}$ | | | |
| Spring con. weighted by perc. | | t = 4.5198*** | | |
| Simple con. weighted by import. | | | $t = 12.6061^{***}$ | |
| Spring con. weighted by import. | | | | t = 3.4605*** |
| Exit after board demands | t = -0.4864 $t = -5.1504***$ | t = -0.4834 $t = -5.0432***$ | t = -0.2515 t = -3.8453*** | t = -0.2283 t = -1.9107* |
| Exit after proxy fight | 0.0153 $t = 0.3673$ | 0.0199 $t = 0.4749$ | 0.0530 $t = 1.8781*$ | t = -0.0162 t = -0.5075 |
| Perc. activist ownership | $t = -5.2839^{***}$ | t = -6.6195*** | | |
| Import. activist ownership | | | 0.2794 $t = 2.6898***$ | t = 5.4409*** |
| Poison pill | t = 1.6822* | t = 1.4919 | t = -0.0639 t = -2.7904*** | -0.0208 t = -1.2269 |
| Firm age | $\begin{array}{c} -0.0002 \\ t = -0.1051 \end{array}$ | t = -0.0002 t = -0.0704 | -0.0006 t = -0.2580 | t = -0.0001 t = -0.0528 |
| $log(Market\ capitalization)$ | 0.0065 $t = 0.5754$ | t = 0.1837 | t = -0.0379 t = -4.6176*** | t = -0.0144 t = -1.5557 |
| Leverage | t = -0.0160 t = -0.7167 | t = -0.0178 t = -0.7597 | t = -0.0158 t = -0.7572 | t = -0.0139 t = -0.5449 |
| МТВ | 0.0055 $t = 0.7258$ | t = 0.7705 | 0.0055 $t = 0.7598$ | 0.0044 $t = 0.4902$ |
| ROA | 0.00004 $t = 0.4762$ | 0.00003 $t = 0.3738$ | 0.00003 $t = 0.4111$ | 0.000001 $t = 0.0169$ |
| Short term objective | 0.0622 t = 0.5989 | 0.0586 $t = 0.5382$ | 0.0025 $t = 0.0266$ | 0.0016 $t = 0.0160$ |
| Perc. large ownership | -0.0313 t = -1.5823 | -0.0258 t = -1.6373 | t = -0.0381 t = -5.6236*** | -0.0110 t = -1.1355 |
| Constant | 38.0564 $t = 1.1762$ | 39.0593 $t = 1.2117$ | t = 1.9887** | 51.9008 t = 1.8432* |
| Activist type FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 298 | 298 | 298 | 298 |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.2181 | 0.2199 | 0.3488 | 0.2251 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.1586 | 0.1605 | 0.3017 | 0.1661 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaign_0$ utcome = $Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. success_of_stated_goals is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investors simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as <math display="block">\frac{Share-min\{Share\}}{max\{Share\}-min\{Share\}}$ Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Everage is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. Leverage is the long-term leverage of the target at the start of the campaign. Proceedings and the start of the campaign and weight one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company. Each regression contains year fixed effects and an activist's type (e.g. hedge fund, pension fund, etc.) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by the campaign category (capita

Table 10: Robustness: network support and activist's success. Large investor is an investor that belongs to top 20 percent

| | | Depender | nt variable: | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Success of | stated goals | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Simple con. weighted by perc. | t = 3.2665*** | | | |
| Spring con. weighted by perc. | | t = 4.8129**** | | |
| Simple con. weighted by import. | | | t = 14.0334*** | |
| Spring con. weighted by import. | | | | t = 4.1895*** |
| Exit after board demands | t = -0.4848 $t = -4.9535***$ | t = -0.4963 t = -4.8960*** | t = -0.2495 t = -3.4861*** | t = -0.2289 t = -2.0350** |
| Exit after proxy fight | t = 0.3477 | t = 0.5029 | t = 1.9635** | t = -0.0128 t = -0.4167 |
| Perc. activist ownership | t = -0.0602 $t = -5.1892***$ | $t = -0.0746 \\ t = -7.6130****$ | | |
| Import. activist ownership | | | t = 0.2862 $t = 2.7440****$ | t = 4.8904*** |
| Poison pill | 0.0437 $t = 1.7543*$ | t = 1.5705 | t = -0.0617 t = -2.5043** | t = -0.0376 t = -2.1717** |
| Firm age | $\begin{array}{c} -0.0002 \\ t = -0.1058 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} -0.000000 \\ t = -0.00001 \end{array}$ | t = -0.2772 | t = -0.0001 t = -0.0351 |
| $\log({\rm Market\ capitalization})$ | t = 0.2004 | t = -0.0244 t = -1.3652 | t = -0.0399 $t = -5.1217***$ | t = -0.0206 t = -2.4963** |
| Leverage | t = -0.0160 t = -0.7162 | t = -0.0185 t = -0.7884 | t = -0.0151 t = -0.7408 | t = -0.0131 t = -0.5376 |
| MTB | t = 0.7222 | t = 0.8010 | t = 0.7367 | t = 0.4833 |
| ROA | 0.00004 $t = 0.4860$ | t = 0.4382 | 0.00003 $t = 0.4281$ | 0.000001 $t = 0.0099$ |
| Short term objective | 0.0623 $t = 0.6048$ | 0.0624 $t = 0.5866$ | 0.0056 $t = 0.0601$ | t = 0.0041 $t = 0.0424$ |
| Perc. large ownership | $t = -1.8385^*$ | t = -0.0521 t = -2.5603** | t = -0.0404 t = -5.9094*** | -0.0167 t = -1.6358 |
| Constant | 38.0733 $t = 1.1771$ | 44.7800 t = 1.4048 | t = 2.0510** | 56.3669 t = $2.1503**$ |
| Activist type FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations R ² | 298 0.2184 | 298 0.2325 | 298 0.3467 | 298 0.2482 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.2184 | 0.2325 | 0.3467 | 0.2482 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaign_outcome = Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. success_of_stated_goals is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by large investors. Simple con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as <math display="block">\frac{Share-min\{Share\}}{max\{Share\}-min\{Share\}}$ Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. Leverage is the long-term leverage of the target at the start of the campaign. Proceedings and the start of the campaign. Proceedings and the start of the campaign. Proceedings of the target of the target at the start of the campaign. Proceedings of the target of the target at the start of the campaign. Proceedings of the target at the start of the campaign. Proceedings

Table 11: Robustness check of table 6, with differently measured imporance

| | Dependent variable: |
|------------------------------|--|
| | Success of stated goals |
| (1) | (2) |
| t = 2.2860** | |
| | 0.0676 $t = 2.0281**$ |
| t = -0.3378 t = -2.2660** | t = -0.2702 $t = -2.3404**$ |
| 0.1676 $t = 0.7626$ | t = -0.749 t = -0.7363 |
| 0.0689 $t = 0.7898$ | 0.1392 $t = 2.2198**$ |
| -0.0268 t = -0.3964 | 0.0344 $t = 0.5211$ |
| t = -0.0013 t = -0.5305 | t = -0.0006 t = -0.2500 |
| t = -1.0776 | t = -0.0149 t = -0.7694 |
| -0.0132 t = -0.5859 | -0.0153 t = -0.7696 |
| 0.0046 $t = 0.6057$ | 0.0049 $t = 0.7163$ |
| 0.3091 $t = 1.3792$ | $t = 2.8084^{***}$ |
| $245 \\ 0.1462$ | 295 0.1608 0.1282 |
| | $\begin{array}{c} 0.0456 \\ t = 2.2860^{**} \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.3378 \\ t = -2.2660^{**} \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.1676 \\ t = 0.7626 \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.0689 \\ t = 0.7898 \\ -0.0268 \\ t = -0.3964 \\ -0.0013 \\ t = -0.5305 \\ -0.0204 \\ t = -1.0776 \\ -0.0132 \\ t = -0.5859 \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.0046 \\ t = 0.6057 \\ 0.3091 \\ t = 1.3792 \\ \end{array}$ |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaign_outcome = Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. success_of_stated_goals$ is an indicator of fulfillment of activists' demands. $Simple\ con.\ weighted\ by\ perc.\ corresponds\ to\ the simple\ strength\ of\ connection\ weighted\ by\ large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. <math>Spring\ con.\ weighted\ by\ perc.\ corresponds\ to\ the\ spring\ strength\ of\ connection\ weighted\ by\ import.\ corresponds\ to\ the\ simple\ strength\ of\ connection\ weighted\ bi\ importance\ of\ target\ to\ large\ investors\ and\ aggregated\ across\ large\ investors. <math>Spring\ con.\ weighted\ by\ import.\ corresponds\ to\ the\ spring\ strength\ of\ connection\ weighted\ the\ importance\ of\ target\ to\ large\ investors\ and\ Spring\ con.$

large investors of swinership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as $\frac{Share-min\{Share\}}{max\{Share\}-min\{Share\}}, Perc.$ activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target Mrket capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. Leverage is the long-term leverage of the target firm. MTB is market-to-book value of the target firm at the start of the campaign. ROA is return-on-assets of the target at the start of the campaign. Perc. large ownership is aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company. Each regression contains year fixed effects and an activist's type (e.g. hedge fund, pension fund, etc.) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by the campaign category (capital structure, business strategy, sell company, governance or other). Table contains standard significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 12: Robustness: number of large investors and activist's success

| | | | Dependent variable: | | |
|---|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | | Won board seat | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Num.large investors | t = 2.2737** | | t = 4.0358*** | | |
| log(Num. activist connections) | | 0.0279 t = 1.0768 | 0.0045 $t = 0.2085$ | | 0.0251 $t = 1.1001$ |
| Perc. large ownership | | | | 0.0181 $t = 0.6907$ | 0.0125 t = 0.5086 |
| Exit after board demands | 0.0067 $t = 0.7278$ | t = -0.0011 t = -0.1179 | 0.0069 $t = 0.6992$ | t = -0.0120 t = -0.4523 | t = -0.0032 t = -0.3486 |
| Exit after proxy fight | -0.3057 t = -1.3879 | t = -0.3298 t = -1.3336 | t = -0.3098 t = -1.3129 | $t = -1.8777^*$ | -0.3204 t = -1.3693 |
| Perc. activist ownership | t = -0.1750 t = -1.8674* | t = -0.1774 t = -1.7736* | t = -0.1730 t = -1.9503* | -0.2650 t = -1.3743 | t = -0.1754 t = -1.8019* |
| Poison pill | t = 2.6623*** | t = 2.2910** | $t = 2.6253^{***}$ | t = 2.6248*** | t = 2.2770** |
| Firm age | $\begin{array}{c} 0.00005 \\ t = 0.0251 \end{array}$ | 0.0008 $t = 0.3878$ | 0.0001 $t = 0.0436$ | 0.0008 $t = 0.3729$ | 0.0007 t = 0.3732 |
| $log(Market \ capitalization)$ | 0.0098 $t = 0.4356$ | 0.0239 $t = 0.9662$ | 0.0097 $t = 0.4301$ | 0.0360 $t = 1.0057$ | 0.0305 t = 0.8842 |
| Leverage | t = -0.0124 t = -0.4097 | t = -0.0218 t = -0.6600 | t = -0.0124 t = -0.4074 | t = -0.0253 t = -0.7026 | t = -0.0221 t = -0.6566 |
| МТВ | t = 1.3239 | t = 1.4055 | t = 1.2755 | t = 1.4677 | 0.0140 $t = 1.4345$ |
| ROA | 0.00002 $t = 0.6431$ | 0.00001 $t = 0.3587$ | t = 0.6637 | t = -0.2466 | 0.00001 t = 0.3474 |
| Short term objective | t = -1.7654* | t = -0.0390 t = -1.7565* | t = -0.0427 t = -1.8496* | t = -0.0245 t = -1.1003 | t = -0.0394 t = -1.8131* |
| Constant | -13.5988 t = -1.4133 | -27.0715 t = -1.0678 | t = -16.3434 t = -0.7556 | 0.5552 t = 1.4128 | -28.0624 t = -1.0831 |
| Activist type FE Year FE Observations R ² | Yes Yes 162 0.1320 | Yes Yes 162 0.1102 | Yes Yes 162 0.1322 | Yes Yes 162 0.1040 | Yes Yes 162 0.1119 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.0621 | 0.0386 | 0.0560 | 0.0253 | 0.0339 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaign_outcome = Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. Won_board_seat$ is an indicator that the activist won at least one board seat. Num. large investors is the number of investors that fall into top 5% holding percentile and have shares in the target. Num. activist connections is total number of connections that activist has with large investors in the target. Perc. large ownership is aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight ample appeared over the campaign. Foison pill is an indicator that firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of campaign. Leverage is the long-term leverage of the target firm. MTB is market-to-book value of the target firm at the start of the campaign. ROA is return-on-assets of the target at the start of the campaign. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company. Each regression contains year fixed effects and an activist's type (e.g. hedge fund, pension fund, etc.) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by the campaign category (capital structure, business strategy, sell company, governance or other). Table contains standard significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 13: Robustness: network support and activist's success

| | Dependent variable: Won board seat | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Simple con. weighted by perc. | t = -0.7098 t = -0.7336 | | | |
| Spring con. weighted by perc. | | t = 4.5855*** | | |
| Simple con. weighted by import. | | | t = 1.3866 | |
| Spring con. weighted by import. | | | | t = 0.0588 t = 0.5029 |
| Exit after board demands | t = -0.3390 t = -1.3405 | t = -0.4353 t = -1.9275* | t = -0.3341 t = -1.3086 | t = -0.3468 t = -1.3258 |
| Exit after proxy fight | t = -0.2060 t = -2.3005** | t = -0.1984 $t = -2.0414**$ | t = -0.1834 $t = -2.2136**$ | t = -0.1988 $t = -2.2447**$ |
| Perc. activist ownership | 0.0082 $t = 0.4168$ | t = -0.0155 t = -0.6193 | | |
| Import. activist ownership | | | t = -0.0842 t = -0.3334 | 0.1001 $t = 0.5849$ |
| Poison pill | t = 1.9605** | 0.0887 $t = 1.4538$ | 0.0731 $t = 1.0496$ | t = 1.6501* |
| Firm age | 0.0012 $t = 0.4745$ | 0.0020 $t = 0.8964$ | 0.0012 $t = 0.4658$ | 0.0011 $t = 0.4443$ |
| $\log({ m Market\ capitalization})$ | 0.0247 t = 0.4195 | t = -1.2398 | 0.0154 $t = 0.5079$ | 0.0103 $t = 0.2869$ |
| Leverage | t = -0.0375 t = -0.9710 | t = -0.0517 t = -1.2522 | t = -0.0307 = -0.7530 | t = -0.0334 = -0.8455 |
| МТВ | 0.0174 $t = 1.6792*$ | 0.0219 t = 1.9865** | 0.0163 $t = 1.3466$ | 0.0166 t = 1.4389 |
| ROA | t = -0.00002 t = -0.5949 | t = -0.00003 t = -0.8642 | t = -0.00002 t = -0.4731 | t = -0.00002 t = -0.8833 |
| Short term objective | t = -0.0076 t = -0.1772 | t = -0.0308 t = -0.8519 | t = -0.0150 = -0.2998 | t = -0.0195 t = -0.5036 |
| Perc. large ownership | 0.0349 $t = 1.0250$ | t = -0.0325 t = -1.3148 | t = 0.6539 | 0.0260 $t = 0.8297$ |
| Constant | -9.4839 t = -0.4584 | -0.6948 t = -0.0344 | 0.5685 $t = 1.8314*$ | -18.7546 t = -0.7825 |
| Activist type FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations \mathbb{R}^2 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| R ² Adjusted R ² | 0.1779 0.0613 | 0.2150 0.1037 | 0.1818 0.0723 | 0.1788 0.0623 |

Notes: OLS regression of the equation $Campaign_outcome = Network_support + Activist_power + Activist_cost + Controls + e. Won_board_seat$ is an indicator that the activist won at least one board seat. Simple con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted by large investor's ownership in the target and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by perc. corresponds to the simple strength of connection weighted corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Spring con. weighted by import. corresponds to the spring strength of connection weighted the importance of target to large investors and aggregated across large investors. Importance is defined as $\frac{Share - min\{Share\}}{\max\{Share\} - \min\{Share\}}$. Perc. activist ownership corresponds to the aggregate percentage owned by activists. Exit after board demands is a dummy which is equal to one if the campaign ends with activist's demands and does not go to proxy fight. Exit after proxy fight is an indicator that proxy fight happened over the campaign. Poison pill is an indicator that the firm had poison pill prior to the campaign or adopted it in response to the campaign. Firm age is the age of the target. Market capitalization is market capitalization of the target at the start of the campaign. RoA is return-on-assets of the target at the start of the campaign. Perc. large ownership is aggregate percentage of the target owned by large investors. Short term objective is a dummy equal to one if activist's demands include payout of divideds, share repurchase programs or sale of the company. Each r